Jesse,
The definition I use (which is one that fits the tradition) is chalk full of assumptions and therefore meanings. I could provide papers that articulate it in further detail. But this is what I say when I simplify all the assumptions:
intellectual apprehension of reality
It is praxeological in nature, and Aristotle and Aquinas had knowledgeable possession of act.
edit: really didn't want this to all be italized
where does that leave -whatever it is you really have to say- about ethics/morality/law in epistemic relation to what we're saying?
That ethics is only possible if you make ethical assumptions.
I Samuel 8
I rest my case.
Edit: wait, does this 'reality' include "should" statements?
where does that leave -whatever it is you really have to say- about ethics/morality/law in epistemic relation to what we're saying? That ethics is only possible if you make ethical assumptions.
So you shouldn't be commenting?
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
?
Hoppe:From “Four Critical Replies,” Appendix to The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (Kluwer, 1993) Osterfeld's fourth objection to my article states that my argument is an instance of ethical naturalism, but that I then seem to fall afoul of the naturalistic fallacy of deriving an "ought" from an "is." I am willing to accept the first part of this proposition but not the second. What I offer is an entirely value-free system of ethics. I remain exclusively in the realm of is-statements and nowhere try to drive an "ought" from an "is." The structure of my argument is this: (a) justification is propositional or argumentative (a priori true is-statement);
Osterfeld's fourth objection to my article states that my argument is an instance of ethical naturalism, but that I then seem to fall afoul of the naturalistic fallacy of deriving an "ought" from an "is." I am willing to accept the first part of this proposition but not the second. What I offer is an entirely value-free system of ethics. I remain exclusively in the realm of is-statements and nowhere try to drive an "ought" from an "is." The structure of my argument is this: (a) justification is propositional or argumentative (a priori true is-statement);
Whether something is justified is a judgment of value. Judgments of value are not existential propositions, and therefore they can neither be validated nor invalidated.
Hoppe: (b) argumentation presupposes the recognition of the private property ethic (a priori true is-statement)
(b) argumentation presupposes the recognition of the private property ethic (a priori true is-statement)
Argumentation implies that, at the moment of utterance, the speaker values present argumentation over present violence. It implies nothing about the speaker's present valuations regarding future states of affairs.
Hoppe: (c) no deviation from a private property ethic can be justified argumentatively (a priori true is statement)
(c) no deviation from a private property ethic can be justified argumentatively (a priori true is statement)
A pro-aggression justification is just as much a matter of value-judgment as a libertarian justification is. Therefore, such justifications also can neither be validated nor invalidated.
Hoppe is trying to refute justifications. You cannot refute something that can be neither true nor false in the first place.
"PROPOSITIONS asserting existence (affirmative existential propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential propositions) are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe or of parts of the universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. They must not be confounded with judgments of value. Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth and falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence. Judgments of value are mental acts of the individual concerned. As such they must be sharply distinguished from the sentences by means of which an individual tries to inform other people about the content of his judgments of value. A man may have some reason to lie about his valuations. We may describe this state of affairs in the following way: Every judgment of value is in itself also a fact of the actual state of the universe and as such may be the topic of existential propositions. The sentence --I prefer Beethoven to Lehar-- refers to a judgment of value. If looked upon as an existential proposition, it is true if I really prefer Beethoven and act accordingly and false if I in fact prefer Lehar and for some reasons lie about my real feelings, taste, or preferences. In an analogous way the existential proposition "Paul prefers Beethoven to Lehar" may be true or false. In declaring that with regard to a judgment of value there cannot be any question of truth or falsity, we refer to the judgment as such and not to the sentences communicating the content of such a judgment of value to other people." Mises, Theory and History
"PROPOSITIONS asserting existence (affirmative existential propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential propositions) are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe or of parts of the universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. They must not be confounded with judgments of value.
Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth and falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence.
Judgments of value are mental acts of the individual concerned. As such they must be sharply distinguished from the sentences by means of which an individual tries to inform other people about the content of his judgments of value. A man may have some reason to lie about his valuations. We may describe this state of affairs in the following way: Every judgment of value is in itself also a fact of the actual state of the universe and as such may be the topic of existential propositions. The sentence --I prefer Beethoven to Lehar-- refers to a judgment of value. If looked upon as an existential proposition, it is true if I really prefer Beethoven and act accordingly and false if I in fact prefer Lehar and for some reasons lie about my real feelings, taste, or preferences. In an analogous way the existential proposition "Paul prefers Beethoven to Lehar" may be true or false. In declaring that with regard to a judgment of value there cannot be any question of truth or falsity, we refer to the judgment as such and not to the sentences communicating the content of such a judgment of value to other people."
Mises, Theory and History
Lol, poor Jesse.
“Socialism is a fraud, a comedy, a phantom, a blackmail.” - Benito Mussolini"Toute nation a le gouvernemente qu'il mérite." - Joseph de Maistre
Lilburne:Natural rights doctrine says something right? And it doesn't just assert it, but it at least tries to derive its conclusions as implications of premises right? So then it attempts some kind of inference. I'm asking, if the inferences do not fit the is/ought deductive formula, then what formula do they fit?
Understand that natural law is simply a statement of what is. Different theories on what is exist in the world. Some theories are even grounded in the same axioms and at times, include the same deductions. The theories can be very similar at times. So I would say Aristotle's natural deduction. Axioms, ie. self-evident. Premise-conclusions, ie. logical deductions. Ontological realism
wilderness:In essence, Rothbard is using the term "should" different than you are interpreting it. He is referring to it in a praxeologic way.
Lilburne:What, pray tell, is a praxeologic "should" as distinct from what I'm referring to?
When a person wants to get an apple then they should act certain means to get that apple. If they don't, yet their goal is the apple, then their means are false. They are not doing what they should do to get the apple. Uncontroversial.
Lilburne:btw, Rothbard makes it very clear in The Ethics of Liberty that natural law doctrine, as he conceives it, is distinct from praxeology.
That's impossible if we are both referring to the axiom human action. It's an axiom. So it depends on what you mean by praxeology. Where not talking catallitics are we? We are talking about human action I'd assumed. People do act politics, ethics, etc....
"Ethics, or more specifically political philosophy, is the second pillar of the Rothbardian system, strictly separated from economics, but equally grounded in the acting nature of man and complementing it to form a unified sys tern of rationalist social philosophy." - Hoppe's Intro. of Rothbard's "Ethics of Liberty"
"Mises:
'...contend that a social order in which nobody enjoys privileges at the expense of his fellow-citizens could exist without any compulsion and coercion for the prevention of action detrimental to society.'
Indeed, Rothbard wholeheartedly agreed with Mises that without resort to compulsion..." - Hoppe Intro. to Rothbard's "Ethics of Liberty".
Rothbard:Furthermore, Rothbard explicitly tried to defend the practice of deriving "ought" from "is" here.
1 - I wonder what Rothbard meant here. I haven't read enough on this as there are articles that say an ought can be derived from an is. Here's one. Putnam said everything is an ought. Everything that a person does, including practice natural sciences, involves value based action. The scientist does something because they ought to as it has so far proved fruitful. So the scientist continues to do what he or she ought to do based on hypothesis that are not even proved to show that they are (is) referring to something that exists. It's what the discovery of science is all about. I'd have to know what Rothbard meant further on this point. If this could or couldn't actually be done, then I would like to know. That small footnote doesn't help explain what he might have meant. It takes more research to fully explain something. One footnote doesn't possibly discuss the details. But it is a very interesting point. I'll grant you that. But Rothbard does use the axiom of human action in ethics. It's an axiom. It's impossible to be excluded.
2 - Hoppe has shown that the is/ought gap doesn't even need to be bridged. Hoppe has shown through argumentation ethics that ethics are presupposed in "is-ness". The is/ought gap isn't a question with Hoppe.
3 - These are different theories, and since I don't know what Rothbard meant I can't readily comment. But Hoppe didn't find the question to be valid in the first place when it comes to what Hoppe can demonstrate. Thus is the nature of science. Different theories. I personally choose the best and most intellectually sound theory. I don't know if I would reject Rothbard's take on this on this point because I don't know what he meant. But I linked an article that Rothbard had footnoted on how an ought is derived from an is. I haven't read it. I suggest you read it before making a decision. It would only be good science to know what any one person actually means instead of making the usual ad hoc assumptions you have made throughout this current discussion.
wilderness:]intellectual apprehension of reality
Jesse:I rest my case. Edit: wait, does this 'reality' include "should" statements?
Why did you say you rest your case?
If somebody says, "I should do this.", then yes. There's the statement. I wrote it.
I mean what are you really asking? Were you really just asking me to type out a should statement to show you that one exists? Couldn't you have just done that yourself?
(Note: I added more to my previous post.)
Lilburne:Whether something is justified is a judgment of value. Judgments of value are not existential propositions, and therefore they can neither be validated nor invalidated.
This is where different paradigms come to different conclusions.
What I read when I see "judgments of value" and you saying they are "not existential propositions" in realist terms is not true. If judgments of value do not exist, then why are you talking about them? And my feelings are definitely real.
wilderness:What I read when I see "judgments of value" and you saying they are "not existential propositions" in realist terms is not true. If judgments of value do not exist, then why are you talking about them?
I said judgments of value cannot be true nor false. I did not say they do not exist.
My judgment that the music of Bach is beautiful can neither be true nor false. Yet the judgment exists.
Lilburne:I said judgments of value cannot be true nor false. I did not say they do not exist. My judgment that the music of Bach is beautiful can neither be true nor false. Yet the judgment exists.
Ok. That's how I would say it. So what does this have to do with the current discussion?
Let me clarify: Propositions in realist terms are derived from what is abstract and empirical. The proposition isn't necessarily only abstract nor empirical. It is both in nature. So my feelings as real terms are not names, there's a difference. Philosophically as terms 'my feelings' is both an abstract and empirical category. It was the word "proposition" that had me wondering.
I'm greatly enjoying this discussion and would like to ask a quick question. I'm really interested in educating myself more on the subject of natural law. Do you guys recommend the natural law collection by Liberty Fund? I'm thinking about asking for it for a gift.
http://www.libertyfund.org/naturallaw.asp
http://www.libertyfundcatalog.com/lg_display.cfm/page/44/catalog/Spring_Summer_2010
I'm not sure. I went to the first link. It depends on what you are interested in. If you go to my profile page I have listed some books.
One book that I would highly recommend is Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's "On Human Nature". It's one of the best books I have ever read.
I would say they are true (or false) with regard to the subject to whom they pertain, i.e. it is true (or false) that bacon is good (or, more specifically, provides a relative degree of satisfaction) with regard to the perspective of a given individual. What is neither true, nor false, is the conception that 'bacon is good' cosmologically speaking, or that bacon is necessarily good with regard to all subjects, or that bacon is automatically the 'highest good' (summum bonnum) to some set of subjects. The latter three are false because they are nonsensical, value only exists with relation to an actual valuer and along his actual scale of values (that is to say, relative to other values).
Liberte,
Exactly. A very good point, which leads right into how I define natural rights. Or better yet, the act of ethics.
This discussion hasn't even come close to defining ethics in terms of natural law. It is a long way off, possibly. Yet what you say here did help quicken it that way. I know you don't like natural law, but I'm referring to my 'valuing'. That in and of itself is really an explicit sentiment to how I interpret a natural right theory.
why is everything in italics now?
Whether something is justified is a judgment of value. Judgments of value are not existential propositions, and therefore they can neither be validated nor invalidated.'
hurt--piece
Ok. Nevermind. I re-rest my case. If Grayson can't convince you, there's no way that I can.
Never try to convince people of moral, religious or political propostions (as though there were a difference), especially on the internet. These things are intimately bound up with socio-biological factors like heirarchical assertion, atavism and signaling: people are hard wired to resist change. They are more likely to change their opinions if everyone stops talking to them than if people actually debate them; because if people stop paying attention to them they cease to be effective signaling means.
wilderness:Putnam said everything is an ought. Everything that a person does, including practice natural sciences, involves value based action. The scientist does something because they ought to as it has so far proved fruitful. So the scientist continues to do what he or she ought to do based on hypothesis that are not even proved to show that they are (is) referring to something that exists. It's what the discovery of science is all about.
Of course personal value judgments are implicit in all actions. The existence of value judgments can be verified/falsified. It does not follow from that that the CONTENT of value judgments can be verified or falsified.
Again, as Mises wrote in the quote I posted above, attempts to express value judgments must not be confused with the value judgments themselves. So someone's proposition, "striking your face is now and will be in the future better than shaking your hand", as an alleged expression of value judgments, can be falsified if the speaker shakes the addressee's hand when he could have struck him instead. But then it is not a value judgment being falsified. It is the speaker's statement regarding his value judgments that is falsified. If the speaker not only said the "striking your face is better..." statement but also acted accordingly, striking the other person's face, and therefore actually held the judgment of value he expressed in words, that judgment of value can neither be true nor false.
Ok. But that says nothing about some people holding different values of judgment. Person-A values X. Person-B values Y. So what? They value different things. Now person-A values striking person-B in the face. Person-B values that such a thing not happen. Again so what? But what that is in real terms is the very essence of what an ethical situation is.
Jesse:Ok. Nevermind. I re-rest my case. If Grayson can't convince you, there's no way that I can.
Jesse, ask yourself this:
Why are you arguing with me over my values on having private property? Why do you try to philosophically attack my private property?
Why are you, Lilburne, and Liberte philosophically attacking my value judgments? It's very hypocritical. Lilburne gave quotes of Mises, which I have not argued against, and yet, you three are not heeding your own words. Why is that?
ERO: Whether something is justified is a judgment of value. Judgments of value are not existential propositions, and therefore they can neither be validated nor invalidated.' hurt--piece
Are you saying my argument is somehow "drunken" or "ugly"? If so, how so?
ERO,
You repeatedly ask me to respond to Hoppe's ArgEthics. You finally give me something to chew on, so I do so with a fully Misesian analysis of Hoppe's vain attempt to refute a value judgment, and all you have in response is childish teh-internetz-speak? And you have the nerve to say you're embarrassed by me?
Am I the only one who finds this question utterly irrelevant and nonsensical?
Lilburne,
Because, for one, if I go by your logic, then you can't refute Hoppe's value judgment. Yet you tried. But I suppose that's one way of looking at it. Makes me wonder why you quoted Mises and then go on to try to refute judgements of value.
Secondly, this is what is being said: you can't refute what you have to enact in order to refute. It's axiomatic.
wilderness: Jesse:Ok. Nevermind. I re-rest my case. If Grayson can't convince you, there's no way that I can. Jesse, ask yourself this: Why are you arguing with me over my values on having private property? Why do you try to philosophically attack my private property? Why are you, Lilburne, and Liberte philosophically attacking my value judgments? It's very hypocritical. Lilburne gave quotes of Mises, which I have not argued against, and yet, you three are not heeding your own words. Why is that?
We are not arguing with you over your values. There couldn't be anything further from what we are doing, since we are arguing that it makes no sense to argue over ANY values in the first place. You value natural law doctrine. Your valuation can neither be true nor false. But the doctrine itself is false. Pope Urban VIII valued the doctrine of geocentrism. His valuation was neither true nor false, but geocentrism is false.
wilderness:Because, for one, if I go by your logic, then you can't refute Hoppe's value judgment.
Hoppe is not making a value judgment, he's making an existential proposition about a method of discovering the alleged validity/invalidity of value judgments.
wilderness:you can't refute what you have to enact in order to refute.
Only propositions can be refuted. And propositions cannot be enacted. Value judgments can be enacted. But value judgments cannot be refuted (although propositions about the existence of value judgments can be).
Lilburne:We are not arguing with you over your values. There couldn't be anything further from what we are doing, since we are arguing that it makes no sense to argue over ANY values in the first place. You value natural law doctrine. Your valuation can neither be true nor false. But the doctrine itself is false. Pope Urban VIII valued the doctrine of geocentrism. His valuation was neither true nor false, but geocentrism is false.
Yet you haven't demonstrated that you know what natural law is. Rid the Mises quotes on natural law that's a done deal. He doesn't bring it up in accord with the A-T tradition.
And yes. You are arguing over private property. You are arguing that my existence is not true.
Put this way: You are arguing that my life, liberty, and private property are false.
Yes. In fact, you are arguing against not only what I value, but my very life. Why don't you understand that? Natural rights are life, liberty, and private property. My life, liberty, and private property. That's exactly what it means. Yet you argue against my life, liberty, and private property. Why! Why do you abhor my existence? This is the very root of the philosophy of natural law. It doesn't mean what Mises said. Mises was wrong. Natural law is based on every single individuals own life, liberty, and private property. Yet you argue against some people being able to have life, liberty, and private property. The very people that value it. Why? I don't know why you do this. This is the natural law doctrine. It is alive and breaths. It is the very human existence. This is exactly what it means and has always meant. Mises never in any one of those quotes talked about or tried to refute the very real acts of life, liberty, and private property. Mises never did. He never talked about refuting life itself. Or liberty itself. Or private property itself. Yet you go on arguing against human's being able to possess life itself, liberty itself, and private property itself. Why? Even Mises said 'protect life, liberty, health, and private property'. Have you completely given up on the very core value of that some people hold in being able to live?
Understand. This is completely the doctrine of natural law. When you attack philosophically natural law you argue against life itself, liberty itself, and private property itself. Where's the economic action? Why do I need to bring up economic action to you, because I think you only think about economics and don't think about the very valued life, liberty, and private property that people possess. I say that because you argue against it. That's all you've been doing for how many posts now? Arguing against people valuing their own life, liberty, and private property, why?
Lilburne: "Hoppe is not making a value judgment, he's making an existential proposition about a method of discovering the alleged validity/invalidity of value judgments."
No. He discovered that you can't refute life, liberty, and private property because in order to refute it you have to use life, liberty, and private property (property by definition includes in ones person). You can't refute what you have to use while refuting. It's a living act. That's what axioms are. They are negatively demonstrated.
Lilburne: "Only propositions can be refuted. And propositions cannot be enacted. Value judgments can be enacted. But value judgments cannot be refuted (although propositions about the existence of value judgments can be)."
Propositions are acted when you argue. The proposition itself is also an act as it does act in the world, meaning, it is real. Propositions are embedded in the verbal argument and even when a person doesn't argue their very existence, meaning, what they are doing demonstrates an argument/proposition. Those propositions or terms are grounded in very real empirical or abstract events.
Secondly, arguing is an act that uses life, liberty, and private property (property by definition is in ones person). So in order to refute life, liberty, and private property you have to use life, liberty, and private property. You can't refute what you have to use. That's the definition of an axiom. Human action can't be refuted because in order to refute it, then it has to be used. You can't refute what is used while refuting. It's the defintion of an axiom.
Who is the legislator of natural law? Who is the executor? Who is the judge?
bloom,
Every single person is the legislator of natural law, executes it, and judges what it is.
So human action is natural law?
It is a natural law. Because human action is axiomatic. Yes.
bloom: "Who is the legislator of natural law? Who is the executor? Who is the judge?"
I've got to hand it to you bloom. You know how to ask the right questions. Spot on.
You're usually very perceptive. I don't agree with your gov't slant, but especially of recent, I've been finding your posts very perceptive. I've been complimenting you on them and I mean what I say.
wilderness:And yes. You are arguing over private property. You are arguing that my existence is not true. Put this way: You are arguing that my life, liberty, and private property are false. Yes. In fact, you are arguing against not only what I value, but my very life. Why don't you understand that? Natural rights are life, liberty, and private property. My life, liberty, and private property. That's exactly what it means. Yet you argue against my life, liberty, and private property. Why! Why do you abhor my existence?.
Yes. In fact, you are arguing against not only what I value, but my very life. Why don't you understand that? Natural rights are life, liberty, and private property. My life, liberty, and private property. That's exactly what it means. Yet you argue against my life, liberty, and private property. Why! Why do you abhor my existence?.
Natural rights regard life, liberty, and private property. They are not synonymous with those things. You have life, a certain degree of liberty, and certain amount of private property: these are verifiable/falsifiable facts. Natural rights doctrine, despite all you say, asserts that in some universal sense you OUGHT to have these things. Ought statements can only represent a non-verifiable/non-falsifiable judgment of value, therefore the value judgments promoted by the doctrine are neither true nor false, and the doctrine itself is false.
wilderness:Yet you argue against some people being able to have life, liberty, and private property. The very people that value it.
I do no such thing. Say you and I are walking down the street. Someone steals your wallet, and runs off. You and I both run after him; I am actively trying to help you catch him so as to return your wallet back to you. While we're chasing him you shout out to the thief, "We are both humans, and both have human natures, therefore you should return my wallet!" That strikes me as odd, but of course I continue on anyway. I tackle the thief, wrench your wallet away from him, and send him on his way with a kick in the rump. I give you you're wallet and say, "You know, what you said back there doesn't really logically follow." Then, according to your current logic, in spite of everything I did to return your wallet, I would then be exhibiting an abhorrence for your private property.
This is why you are completely misinterpreting natural law and what EO quoted of Hoppe.
No. Natural rights are not "regarding" those things. They are those things. Remember the A-T tradition is a realist tradition. That's why they are axioms. Now to further elucidate on what a "right" is as it is already semantically the possession of ife, liberty, and private property, that further elucidation is a theory. Axioms being the real things are part of theories. So based on the already existent state of affairs that all people already possess life, liberty, and private property (again this as an axiom means in ones person) a theory or theories can be drawn up.
Do you see why you have been strawmanning natural rights yet? Natural law is not just words. It's the very existence, in terms of human nature, of the real, live, breathing person. That's why propositions in all the intro. to logic books I've read state that they are: not only abstract and not only empirical data. Same goes for axioms.
As for your example, the 'wallet' does logically follow from the axiom of property. But it involves further logical steps that include still again 'who was there first', ie principle of orginal appropiation. I'm not going to write out all the theories in this post. That would be books long.
So, after the axioms, the rest is all theory. And there can be as many theories about axioms as there are people in the world in the past, present, and future. It just so happens though that there are logical implications involved in some theories that are true or not. Yet as all theories some parts of any one theory may not be fully developed. Same goes for economics. The socialists at the Fed. are doing economics. Yet Austrain economics is supposed to be economics. So who's right? Same thing goes when it comes to your example. That example is an ethical situation. Now who gets the wallet entails theories by the robber as well as the people trying to get the wallet back. Same thing, who's right? In other words, who has the better theory on who is to have the wallet. Theories are not always put into practice. The Fed. puts theories into practice all the time, but fail. A robber can put something to practice but the example of everybody logically being a robber, fails. Because if everybody is taking everything from everybody then nobody has anything and logically that is impossible in the same way that socialism is impossible.
Grayson,
I applaud your patience. Keep up the good work.
wilderness:Propositions are acted when you argue.
No they are not. Value judgments are enacted when you argue. Propositions are only expressed when you argue.
wilderness:The proposition itself is also an act as it does act in the world, meaning, it is real.
No, the formulation of, reflection upon, or utterance of a proposition is an act. A verifiable/falsifiable proposition itself is not an act. If it was, then there would be such a thing as a refutable action, which is nonsense.
wilderness:even when a person doesn't argue their very existence, meaning, what they are doing demonstrates an argument/proposition.
No. Again, action only demonstrates a value judgment, a preference.
wilderness:Human action can't be refuted because in order to refute it, then it has to be used.
No, human action can't be refuted because it is not a proposition in the first place.