Need a quick and easy answer, maybe an example to proove some friends wrong. They believe that firms would stop investing in R&D if copyrights, patents, industrial design rights and trade secrets, were to be abolished.
So if there are five bakeries in a town, then none of them would try to sell something better than the others?
Just a quick comment. There is surely spillover costs (for the producers) without such state protection, yet, there is also transition times and lags. If one company invests in R & D eventually their increases in productivity will spill over to their competitors, but during the lag they may steal market share.
Read until you have something to write...Write until you have nothing to write...when you have nothing to write, read...read until you have something to write...Jeremiah
Utilitarianism One reason libertarians support IP is that they approach libertarianism as a whole from a utilitarian perspective instead of a principled perspective. They are in favor of laws that increase overall utility, or wealth. And they believe the state's propaganda that state-granted IP rights actually do increase overall wealth. Now, the utilitarian perspective itself is bad enough, because all sorts of terrible policies could be justified this way: why not take half of Bill Gates's fortune and give it to the poor? Wouldn't the sum total of the welfare gains to the thousands of recipients be greater than Gates's reduced utility? After all, he's still a billionaire afterwards. And if a man is extremely desperate for sex, couldn't his gain be greater than the loss suffered by his rape victim, say, if she's a prostitute? But even if we ignore the ethical and other problems with the utilitarian, or wealth-maximization, approach, it is bizarre that utilitarian libertarians are in favor of IP when they have not demonstrated that IP does increase overall wealth. (For further discussion of various problems with utilitarianism, see Against Intellectual Property, pp. 19–23.) They merely assume it does and then base their policy views on this assumption. It is beyond dispute that the IP system imposes significant costs, in money terms alone — not to mention the cost to liberty. However, the argument that the incentive provided by IP law stimulates additional innovation and creativity has not even been proven. It is entirely possible — even likely, in my view — that the IP system, in addition to imposing billions of dollars of cost on society, actually reduces or impedes innovation, adding damage to damage. But even if we assume that the IP system does stimulate some additional, valuable innovation, no one has established yet that the value of the purported gains is greater than the costs of the system. If you ask an advocate of IP how it is that they know there is a net gain, you get silence in response (this is especially true of patent attorneys). They cannot even point to any study to support their utilitarian contention; they usually point to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, as if the back-room dealings of politicians two centuries ago is some sort of evidence. In fact, as far as I've been able to tell, virtually every study that attempts to tally the costs and benefits of copyright or patent law either concludes that these schemes cost more than they are worth, that they actually reduce innovation, or the study is inconclusive. There are no studies showing a net gain. There are only repetitions of state propaganda. Anyone who accepts utilitarianism should, based on the available evidence, be opposed to IP.
One reason libertarians support IP is that they approach libertarianism as a whole from a utilitarian perspective instead of a principled perspective. They are in favor of laws that increase overall utility, or wealth. And they believe the state's propaganda that state-granted IP rights actually do increase overall wealth.
Now, the utilitarian perspective itself is bad enough, because all sorts of terrible policies could be justified this way: why not take half of Bill Gates's fortune and give it to the poor? Wouldn't the sum total of the welfare gains to the thousands of recipients be greater than Gates's reduced utility? After all, he's still a billionaire afterwards. And if a man is extremely desperate for sex, couldn't his gain be greater than the loss suffered by his rape victim, say, if she's a prostitute?
But even if we ignore the ethical and other problems with the utilitarian, or wealth-maximization, approach, it is bizarre that utilitarian libertarians are in favor of IP when they have not demonstrated that IP does increase overall wealth. (For further discussion of various problems with utilitarianism, see Against Intellectual Property, pp. 19–23.) They merely assume it does and then base their policy views on this assumption. It is beyond dispute that the IP system imposes significant costs, in money terms alone — not to mention the cost to liberty.
However, the argument that the incentive provided by IP law stimulates additional innovation and creativity has not even been proven. It is entirely possible — even likely, in my view — that the IP system, in addition to imposing billions of dollars of cost on society, actually reduces or impedes innovation, adding damage to damage.
But even if we assume that the IP system does stimulate some additional, valuable innovation, no one has established yet that the value of the purported gains is greater than the costs of the system. If you ask an advocate of IP how it is that they know there is a net gain, you get silence in response (this is especially true of patent attorneys). They cannot even point to any study to support their utilitarian contention; they usually point to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, as if the back-room dealings of politicians two centuries ago is some sort of evidence.
In fact, as far as I've been able to tell, virtually every study that attempts to tally the costs and benefits of copyright or patent law either concludes that these schemes cost more than they are worth, that they actually reduce innovation, or the study is inconclusive. There are no studies showing a net gain. There are only repetitions of state propaganda.
Anyone who accepts utilitarianism should, based on the available evidence, be opposed to IP.
from here
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
Ash Lawson:Need a quick and easy answer, maybe an example to proove some friends wrong. They believe that firms would stop investing in R&D if copyrights, patents, industrial design rights and trade secrets, were to be abolished.
Do they also believe that firms would stop producing altogether if property rights were to be abolished?
Z.
They believe that the scientist, inventor, etc will have no motivation to develop new technologies without the incentive of profit made possible by said ip laws.
Not that firms would stop manufacture altogether, but simply that no progress in technological advances would be made.
It's a baseless assertion. Point out that there were centuries of technological advances with no IP law.
I was going to go down that route, just take something like the wheel and all the advances made on the wheel, the competitors who manufacture tyres (tires) etc still put money into R&D
Forget IP, inventions and technologies. Would anyone produce anything if property rights were to be abolished -- if no one had the right to own anything, including whatever they produce?
Maybe i should take the open source software example instead !
Forget IP, inventions and technologies. Would anyone produce anything if property rights were to be abolished -- if no one had the right to own anything, including whatever they produce? Z.
I think you need to review this section now.
Libertarian Creationism Another reason many libertarians favor IP is confusion about the origin of property and property rights. They accept the careless observation that you can come to own things in three ways: through homesteading an unowned thing, by contractual exchange, and by creation. The mistake is the notion that creation is an independent source of ownership — independent, that is, from homesteading and contracting. However, it is easy to see that it is not, that "creation" is neither necessary nor sufficient as a source of ownership. If you carve a statue using your own hunk of marble, you own the resulting creation because you already owned the marble. You owned it before, and you own it now. And if you homestead an unowned resource, like a field, by using it and thereby establishing publicly visible borders, you own it because this first use and embordering gives you a better claim than latecomers. So creation is not necessary. And suppose you carve a statue in someone else's marble — either without permission, or with permission, such as when an employee does this with his employer's marble by contract — then you do not own the resulting statue, even though you "created" it. If you are using marble stolen from another, your vandalizing it does not take away the owner's claims to it. And if you are working on your employer's marble, he owns the resulting statue. So creation is not sufficient. (See also Against Intellectual Property, pp. 36–42.) Or, as Sheldon Richman explains,
Another reason many libertarians favor IP is confusion about the origin of property and property rights. They accept the careless observation that you can come to own things in three ways: through homesteading an unowned thing, by contractual exchange, and by creation.
The mistake is the notion that creation is an independent source of ownership — independent, that is, from homesteading and contracting. However, it is easy to see that it is not, that "creation" is neither necessary nor sufficient as a source of ownership.
If you carve a statue using your own hunk of marble, you own the resulting creation because you already owned the marble. You owned it before, and you own it now. And if you homestead an unowned resource, like a field, by using it and thereby establishing publicly visible borders, you own it because this first use and embordering gives you a better claim than latecomers. So creation is not necessary.
And suppose you carve a statue in someone else's marble — either without permission, or with permission, such as when an employee does this with his employer's marble by contract — then you do not own the resulting statue, even though you "created" it. If you are using marble stolen from another, your vandalizing it does not take away the owner's claims to it. And if you are working on your employer's marble, he owns the resulting statue. So creation is not sufficient. (See also Against Intellectual Property, pp. 36–42.)
Or, as Sheldon Richman explains,
A key reason [many libertarians support IP] is the importance attached to the act of creation. If someone writes or composes an original work or invents something new, the argument goes, he or she should own it because it would not have existed without the creator. I submit, however, that as important as creativity is to human flourishing, it is not the source of ownership of produced goods. … So what is the source? Prior ownership of the inputs through purchase, gift, or original appropriation. This is sufficient to establish ownership of the output. Ideas contribute no necessary additional factor. If I build a model airplane out of wood and glue, I own it not because of any idea in my head, but because I owned the wood, the glue, and myself.
Of course, this is not to deny the importance of knowledge, or creation and innovation. All action, including action that employs owned scarce means, involves the use of technical knowledge — knowledge of causal laws, for example. To be sure, creation is an important means of increasing wealth. As Hoppe has observed, One can acquire and increase wealth either through homesteading, production and contractual exchange, or by expropriating and exploiting homesteaders, producers, or contractual exchangers. There are no other ways. But while production or creation is a means of gaining "wealth," it is not an independent source of ownership or rights. Production is not the creation of new matter; it is the transformation of things from one form to another — the transformation of things one necessarily already owns. Using your labor and creativity to transform your property into more valuable finished products gives you greater wealth, but not additional property rights. So the idea that you own anything you create is a confused one that does not justify IP.
Of course, this is not to deny the importance of knowledge, or creation and innovation. All action, including action that employs owned scarce means, involves the use of technical knowledge — knowledge of causal laws, for example. To be sure, creation is an important means of increasing wealth. As Hoppe has observed,
One can acquire and increase wealth either through homesteading, production and contractual exchange, or by expropriating and exploiting homesteaders, producers, or contractual exchangers. There are no other ways.
But while production or creation is a means of gaining "wealth," it is not an independent source of ownership or rights. Production is not the creation of new matter; it is the transformation of things from one form to another — the transformation of things one necessarily already owns. Using your labor and creativity to transform your property into more valuable finished products gives you greater wealth, but not additional property rights.
So the idea that you own anything you create is a confused one that does not justify IP.
E. R. Olovetto:I think you need to review this section now.
Irrelevant to my point. The concept of information property encourages creation and trading of information in the free market in the same way that the concept of tangible property encourages the creation and trading of tangible goods in the free market. The abolishment of the concept of property in either domain would lead to the same market degrading result. I've already argued about this before (with you, as well) and don't feel like doing it all over again in this thread.
The concept of information property encourages creation and trading of information in the free market in the same way that the concept of tangible property encourages the creation and trading of tangible goods in the free market. The abolishment of the concept of property in either domain would lead to the same market degrading result.
If you say so. Don't you see why you need to do better than this?
I've already argued about this before (with you, as well) and don't feel like doing it all over again in this thread.
Then drop out now and save us both the time. You can look through the last IP thread and answer what I clearly listed as important things that IP proponents need to prove. My points were ignored and some moron told me I need to read some irrelevant books.
Kinsella: Now, the utilitarian perspective itself is bad enough, because all sorts of terrible policies could be justified this way: why not take half of Bill Gates's fortune and give it to the poor? Wouldn't the sum total of the welfare gains to the thousands of recipients be greater than Gates's reduced utility? After all, he's still a billionaire afterwards. And if a man is extremely desperate for sex, couldn't his gain be greater than the loss suffered by his rape victim, say, if she's a prostitute?
What an irresponsible characterization of "utilitarianism", from Kinsella.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
Why?
E. R. Ovoletto: Why?
His understanding of "utilitarianism" is that as "high time preference utilitarianism".
what time horizon is 'correct' for performing utilitarian analysis, and how is this known?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
nirgrahamUK: what time horizon is 'correct'
what time horizon is 'correct'
From your perspective, whatever is the means to your ends.
Erm, typically I thought "utilitarianism" involved a faulty reification of society and assignment of ends to it. Sure there is the utility in individual action, but the "problem" here is that R&D, generally for the whole free society, would fall.
i doubt investing would stop but the way dollars were invested may change.
Mises value analysis against central planning is utilitarian because it's goal is everyone is better off.
I agree with I. Ryan. There is nothing bad about such analysis; in fact, it is the cornerstone of economic theory; NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH BENTHAM's "SOCIAL UTILITY FUNCTION", which is as Rothbard has pointed out a socialist idea coming from Betham's idealized prison system scheme.
The articleon utilitarianism posted was a rubbishy review of utlitarian theory, basically equating with Bentham and his nonsense with all means-ends-preference anaysis.
Menger's demonstration of how "morals" are rather spontaneous rules arising from concerns to promote property rights is yet to be disproven (and has been followed up on by Hayek very nicely). Mises and Hayek do not differ on this point. If we start reasoning from moral principles, then we get trash.
Same with literature; if we say "this is wrong; and that's that"; we produce trashy literature. If we show why it is wrong and does not accomplish anythign good, we get powerful drama.
[back on topic]
Once again, thought experiment: IP would arise in a stateless society via PMCs. Try it.
E. R. Olovetto: Erm, typically I thought "utilitarianism" involved a faulty reification of society and assignment of ends to it. Sure there is the utility in individual action, but the "problem" here is that R&D, generally for the whole free society, would fall.
Right now, I am using the word "utilitarianism" like how Mises and Hazlitt used it:
Ludwig von Mises: All nonutilitarian systems of ethics look upon the moral law as something outside the nexus of means and ends. The moral code has no reference to human well-being and happiness, to expediency, and to the mundane striving after ends. It is heteronomous, i.e., enjoined upon man by an agency that does not depend on human ideas and does not bother about human concerns. Some believe that this agency is God, others that it is the wisdom of the forefathers, some that it is a mystical inner voice alive in every decent man’s conscience. He who violates the precepts of this code commits a sin, and his guilt makes him liable to punishment. Punishment does not serve human ends. In punishing offenders, the secular or theocratic authorities acquit themselves of a duty entrusted to them by the moral code and its author. They are bound to punish sin and guilt whatever the consequences of their action may be.
All nonutilitarian systems of ethics look upon the moral law as something outside the nexus of means and ends. The moral code has no reference to human well-being and happiness, to expediency, and to the mundane striving after ends. It is heteronomous, i.e., enjoined upon man by an agency that does not depend on human ideas and does not bother about human concerns. Some believe that this agency is God, others that it is the wisdom of the forefathers, some that it is a mystical inner voice alive in every decent man’s conscience. He who violates the precepts of this code commits a sin, and his guilt makes him liable to punishment. Punishment does not serve human ends. In punishing offenders, the secular or theocratic authorities acquit themselves of a duty entrusted to them by the moral code and its author. They are bound to punish sin and guilt whatever the consequences of their action may be.
Ludwig von Mises: The essential teachings of utilitarian philosophy as applied to the problems of society can be restated as follows: Human effort exerted under the principle of the division of labor in social cooperation achieves, other things remaining equal, a greater output per unit of input than the isolated efforts of solitary individuals. Man1s reason is capable of recognizing this fact and of adapting his conduct accordingly. Thus social cooperation becomes for almost every man the great means for the attainment of all ends. An eminently human common interest, the preservation and intensification of social bonds, is substituted for pitiless biological competition, the significant mark of animal and plant life. Man becomes a social being. He is no longer forced by the inevitable laws of nature to look upon all other specimens of his animal species as deadly foes. Other people become his fellows. For animals the generation of every new member of the species means the appearance of a new rival in the struggle for life. For man, until the optimum size of population is reached, it means rather an improvement than a deterioration in his quest for material well-being. [...] As social cooperation is for acting man a means and not an end, no unanimity with regard to value judgments is required to make it work. It is a fact that almost all men agree in aiming at certain ends, at those pleasures which ivory-tower moralists disdain as base and shabby. But it is no less a fact that even the most sublime ends cannot be sought by people who have not first satisfied the wants of their animal body. The loftiest exploits of philosophy, art, and literature would never have been performed by men living outside of society.
The essential teachings of utilitarian philosophy as applied to the problems of society can be restated as follows: Human effort exerted under the principle of the division of labor in social cooperation achieves, other things remaining equal, a greater output per unit of input than the isolated efforts of solitary individuals. Man1s reason is capable of recognizing this fact and of adapting his conduct accordingly. Thus social cooperation becomes for almost every man the great means for the attainment of all ends. An eminently human common interest, the preservation and intensification of social bonds, is substituted for pitiless biological competition, the significant mark of animal and plant life. Man becomes a social being. He is no longer forced by the inevitable laws of nature to look upon all other specimens of his animal species as deadly foes. Other people become his fellows. For animals the generation of every new member of the species means the appearance of a new rival in the struggle for life. For man, until the optimum size of population is reached, it means rather an improvement than a deterioration in his quest for material well-being. [...] As social cooperation is for acting man a means and not an end, no unanimity with regard to value judgments is required to make it work. It is a fact that almost all men agree in aiming at certain ends, at those pleasures which ivory-tower moralists disdain as base and shabby. But it is no less a fact that even the most sublime ends cannot be sought by people who have not first satisfied the wants of their animal body. The loftiest exploits of philosophy, art, and literature would never have been performed by men living outside of society.
This is an introduction to how Hazlitt saw ethics, which he called "utilitism" or "utilitarianism":
Henry Hazlitt: Now the connection between what is and what ought to be is always a desire of some kind. We recognize this in our daily decisions. When we are trying to decide on a course of action, and are asking advice, we are told, for example: "If you desire to become a doctor, you must go to medical school. If you desire to get ahead, you must be diligent in your business. If you don't want to get fat, you must watch your diet. If you want to avoid lung cancer, you must cut down on cigarettes," etc. The generalized form of such advice may be reduced to this: you desire to attain a certain end, you ought to use a certain means, because this is the means most likely to achieve it. The is is the desire; the ought is the means of gratifying it. So far, so good. But how far does this get us toward a theory of ethics? For if a man does not desire an end, there seems no way of convincing him that he ought to pursue the means to that end. If a man prefers the certainty of getting fat, or the risk of a heart attack, to curbing his appetite or giving up his favorite delicacies; if he prefers the risks of lung cancer to giving up smoking, any ought based on the assumption of a contrary preference loses its force. A story so old that it is told as an old one even by Bentham[2] is that of the oculist and the sot: A countryman who had hurt his eyes by drinking went to a celebrated oculist for advice. He found him at table, with a glass of wine before him. "You must leave off drinking," said the oculist. "How so?" says the countryman. "You don't, and yet methinks your own eyes are none of the best." "That's very true, friend," replied the oculist: "but you are to know, I love my bottle better than my eyes." How, then, do we move from any basis of desire to any theory of ethics? We find the solution when we take a longer and broader view. All our desires may be generalized as desires to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory state. It is true that an individual, under the immediate influence of impulse or passion, of a moment of anger or rage, malice, vindictiveness, or the desire for revenge, or gluttony, or an overwhelming craving for a release of sexual tension, or for a smoke or a drink or a drug, may in the long run only reduce a more satisfactory state to a less satisfactory state, may make himself less happy rather than more happy. But this less satisfactory state was not his real conscious intention even at the moment of acting. He realizes, in retrospect, that his action was folly; he did not improve his condition, but made it worse; he did not act in accordance with his long-run interests, but against them. He is always willing to recognize, in his calmer moments, that he should choose the action that best promotes his own interests and maximizes his own happiness (or minimizes his own unhappiness) in the long run. Wise and disciplined men refuse to indulge in immediate pleasures when the indulgence seems only too likely to lead in the long run to an overbalance of misery or pain. To repeat and to sum up: It is not true that "no amount of is can make an ought." The ought rests, in fact, and must rest, either upon an is or upon a will be. The sequence is simple: Every man, in his cool and rational moments, seeks his own long-run happiness. This is a fact; this is an is. Mankind has found, over the centuries, that certain rules of action best tend to promote the long-run happiness of both the individual and society. These rules of action have come to be called moral rules. Therefore, assuming that one sees one's long-run happiness, these are the rules one ought to follow.
Now the connection between what is and what ought to be is always a desire of some kind. We recognize this in our daily decisions. When we are trying to decide on a course of action, and are asking advice, we are told, for example: "If you desire to become a doctor, you must go to medical school. If you desire to get ahead, you must be diligent in your business. If you don't want to get fat, you must watch your diet. If you want to avoid lung cancer, you must cut down on cigarettes," etc. The generalized form of such advice may be reduced to this: you desire to attain a certain end, you ought to use a certain means, because this is the means most likely to achieve it. The is is the desire; the ought is the means of gratifying it. So far, so good. But how far does this get us toward a theory of ethics? For if a man does not desire an end, there seems no way of convincing him that he ought to pursue the means to that end. If a man prefers the certainty of getting fat, or the risk of a heart attack, to curbing his appetite or giving up his favorite delicacies; if he prefers the risks of lung cancer to giving up smoking, any ought based on the assumption of a contrary preference loses its force. A story so old that it is told as an old one even by Bentham[2] is that of the oculist and the sot: A countryman who had hurt his eyes by drinking went to a celebrated oculist for advice. He found him at table, with a glass of wine before him. "You must leave off drinking," said the oculist. "How so?" says the countryman. "You don't, and yet methinks your own eyes are none of the best." "That's very true, friend," replied the oculist: "but you are to know, I love my bottle better than my eyes." How, then, do we move from any basis of desire to any theory of ethics? We find the solution when we take a longer and broader view. All our desires may be generalized as desires to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory state. It is true that an individual, under the immediate influence of impulse or passion, of a moment of anger or rage, malice, vindictiveness, or the desire for revenge, or gluttony, or an overwhelming craving for a release of sexual tension, or for a smoke or a drink or a drug, may in the long run only reduce a more satisfactory state to a less satisfactory state, may make himself less happy rather than more happy. But this less satisfactory state was not his real conscious intention even at the moment of acting. He realizes, in retrospect, that his action was folly; he did not improve his condition, but made it worse; he did not act in accordance with his long-run interests, but against them. He is always willing to recognize, in his calmer moments, that he should choose the action that best promotes his own interests and maximizes his own happiness (or minimizes his own unhappiness) in the long run. Wise and disciplined men refuse to indulge in immediate pleasures when the indulgence seems only too likely to lead in the long run to an overbalance of misery or pain. To repeat and to sum up: It is not true that "no amount of is can make an ought." The ought rests, in fact, and must rest, either upon an is or upon a will be. The sequence is simple: Every man, in his cool and rational moments, seeks his own long-run happiness. This is a fact; this is an is. Mankind has found, over the centuries, that certain rules of action best tend to promote the long-run happiness of both the individual and society. These rules of action have come to be called moral rules. Therefore, assuming that one sees one's long-run happiness, these are the rules one ought to follow.
This might be relevant:
Henry Hazlitt: There is no irreconcilable conflict between the interests of the individual and those of society. If there were, society could not exist. Society is the great means through which individuals pursue and fulfill their ends. For society is but another name for the combination of individuals for cooperation. It is the means through which each of us furthers the purposes of others as an indirect means of furthering his own. And this cooperation is in the overwhelming main voluntary. It is only collectivists who assume that the interests of the individual and of society (or the State) are fundamentally opposed, and that the individual can only be led to cooperate in society by Draconian compulsions. The real distinction we need to make for ethical clarity is not that between the individual and society, or even between "egoism" and "altruism," but between interests in the short run and those in the long run. [...] The distinction between the consideration of short-run and long-run consequences is so basic, and applies so widely, that one might be excused for trying to make it, by itself, the whole foundation for a system of ethics, and to say, quite simply, that morality is essentially, not the subordination of the "individual" to "society" but the subordination of immediate objectives to long-term ones. Certainly the Long-Run Principle is a necessary if not a sufficient foundation for morality. [...] To sum up: The distinction between the short-run and the long-run effects of conduct is more valid than the traditional contrasts between the interests of the individual and the interests of society. When the individual acts in his own long-run interests he tends to act also in the long-run interest of the whole society. The longer the run we consider, the more likely are the interests of the individual and of society to become identical. Moral conduct is in the long-run interest of the individual. [...] It is only from a short-sighted view that the interests of the individual appear to be in conflict with those of "society," and vice versa. Actions or rules of action are not "right" or "wrong" in the sense in which a proposition in physics or mathematics is right or wrong, but expedient or inexpedient, advisable or inadvisable, helpful or harmful.
There is no irreconcilable conflict between the interests of the individual and those of society. If there were, society could not exist. Society is the great means through which individuals pursue and fulfill their ends. For society is but another name for the combination of individuals for cooperation. It is the means through which each of us furthers the purposes of others as an indirect means of furthering his own. And this cooperation is in the overwhelming main voluntary. It is only collectivists who assume that the interests of the individual and of society (or the State) are fundamentally opposed, and that the individual can only be led to cooperate in society by Draconian compulsions. The real distinction we need to make for ethical clarity is not that between the individual and society, or even between "egoism" and "altruism," but between interests in the short run and those in the long run. [...] The distinction between the consideration of short-run and long-run consequences is so basic, and applies so widely, that one might be excused for trying to make it, by itself, the whole foundation for a system of ethics, and to say, quite simply, that morality is essentially, not the subordination of the "individual" to "society" but the subordination of immediate objectives to long-term ones. Certainly the Long-Run Principle is a necessary if not a sufficient foundation for morality. [...] To sum up: The distinction between the short-run and the long-run effects of conduct is more valid than the traditional contrasts between the interests of the individual and the interests of society. When the individual acts in his own long-run interests he tends to act also in the long-run interest of the whole society. The longer the run we consider, the more likely are the interests of the individual and of society to become identical. Moral conduct is in the long-run interest of the individual. [...] It is only from a short-sighted view that the interests of the individual appear to be in conflict with those of "society," and vice versa. Actions or rules of action are not "right" or "wrong" in the sense in which a proposition in physics or mathematics is right or wrong, but expedient or inexpedient, advisable or inadvisable, helpful or harmful.
What Kinsella was employing was what Hazlitt called "ad hoc utilitism":
Henry Hazlitt: The principle of acting in accordance with general rules has had a most curious history in ethics. It is implicit in religious ethics (the Ten Commandments); it is implicit in "intuitive" ethics and in "common-sense" ethics--in the concept of the "man of principle" and the "man of honor"; it is explicitly stated by the first utilitist, Hume; then it is almost completely overlooked by the classical Utilitarian, Bentham, and only fitfully glimpsed by Mill; and now, practically within the last decade, it has been rediscovered by a group of writers.[18] They have given it the name rule-utilitarianism as contrasted with the older act-utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. The former designation is excellent (though I would prefer rule-utilitism as a little less cumbersome), but the aptness of the latter is more questionable. In both cases it is the probable consequences of an act that are being judged, but in the first it is the probable consequences of the act as an instance of following a rule, and in the second it is the probable consequences of an act considered in isolation and apart from any general rule. Perhaps a better name for this would be ad hoc utilitism.
The principle of acting in accordance with general rules has had a most curious history in ethics. It is implicit in religious ethics (the Ten Commandments); it is implicit in "intuitive" ethics and in "common-sense" ethics--in the concept of the "man of principle" and the "man of honor"; it is explicitly stated by the first utilitist, Hume; then it is almost completely overlooked by the classical Utilitarian, Bentham, and only fitfully glimpsed by Mill; and now, practically within the last decade, it has been rediscovered by a group of writers.[18] They have given it the name rule-utilitarianism as contrasted with the older act-utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. The former designation is excellent (though I would prefer rule-utilitism as a little less cumbersome), but the aptness of the latter is more questionable. In both cases it is the probable consequences of an act that are being judged, but in the first it is the probable consequences of the act as an instance of following a rule, and in the second it is the probable consequences of an act considered in isolation and apart from any general rule. Perhaps a better name for this would be ad hoc utilitism.
Great post/quotes, I. Ryan. Very elucidating.
Via a what? Is this something like the "dynamic signalling argument" jargon you created which google had zero results besides your babbling?
I really don't have time to repeat the same arguments which you fail to meet the challenge of. If you want to actually try, instead of running off-topic to irrelevant matters, respond in the above thread to my points you never addressed.
Property rights develop as a way to resolve conflict between scarce goods. Ideas, concepts and patterns are not scarce things. Assigning pseudo-rights to ideas creates conflicts.
What this thread is about is IP proponents proving that R&D would fall without IP law.
I am trying to get the best understanding I can of Kinsella's paragraph and also of your criticism of it.
So lets say that I want to argue that redistributing Bill Gates's wealth will lead to a superior welfare distribution, or argue pro that horrid rape example, what would be the correct time horizon?
nirgrahamUK: So lets say that I want to argue that redistributing Bill Gates's wealth will lead to a superior welfare distribution[...] what would be the correct time horizon?
So lets say that I want to argue that redistributing Bill Gates's wealth will lead to a superior welfare distribution[...] what would be the correct time horizon?
Well, my first question would be this, what makes that distribution "superior"?
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
hayekian: See, this is the problem with you argue with slogans. You end up making ridiculous comparisons, like between bakeries for whom the marginal cost of innovation is negligible to other firms whose investments require fixed costs of multiple millions.
See, this is the problem with you argue with slogans. You end up making ridiculous comparisons, like between bakeries for whom the marginal cost of innovation is negligible to other firms whose investments require fixed costs of multiple millions.
So does that mean that you accepted my argument that it is a different of degree, not one of kind?
>>Well, my first question would be this, what makes that distribution "superior"?
>>the sum total of the welfare gains to the thousands of recipients be greater than Gates's reduced utility
Quite possibly, I'll go over and give your post another read sometime soon. But in the meantime, I'm not sure it makes the slightest bit of difference. The fact of the matter is that the degree is so large between the two markets. R&D for a bakery is limited and bakeries are far more personal and can engage in greater product differentiation. On the other hand, R&D for pharmaceutical companies involves millions and millions dollars, which they may see minimal return on if they're not granted a monopoly over it.
nirgrahamUK: the sum total of the welfare gains to the thousands of recipients be greater than Gates's reduced utility
the sum total of the welfare gains to the thousands of recipients be greater than Gates's reduced utility
Which is the justification of much of what democracies do. But there are two problems: (a) I am not aware of how to compare "utility" between people. And (b) if you do that, in the long run, people will not try to acquire such wealth, because they may fear that, once they acquire it, people will just take it away. That is, it will mess up the incentives to acquire wealth. Whenever you make keeping wealth less secure, you make creating wealth less attractive. (And we know that, when you create wealth, in a "free market", you are serving other people, not just yourself; that is, we know that, in creating wealth, you are creating wealth not only for yourself but also for other people.) So redistribution seems not to be in the long term interests of people; that is, redistribution of wealth does not seem to be in the interests of people who have a long "time horizon" and understand what I am saying, that redistribution destroys the incentives to build wealth for yourself and others, in the long term.
But then the question is this, how do we judge whether a "time horizon" is correct or not? What if people know that they will be worse off in the future, but want to go ahead and do these things anyway, because their time preference is so high? How can we say that these people are "incorrect"? How do we choose whose time preference is "correct" and whose is not?
Well, the only people that are relevant to this discussion are the people who both (a) have high time preferences and (b) because of that, want to redistribute wealth to themselves through the processes of a democracy, through petty theft, or whatever. If the people with the high time preferences just smoke weed constantly or something because of it and do not commit any sorts of crimes, they are not relevant; for, because they are not commiting any sorts of crimes, they are only a part of society as far as they are producing things for other people and getting things in return, which, of course, is what society is. Who we are talking about are people who both (a) have high time preferences to the extent that they barely care about the future and (b) threaten the security of property rights. (Notice that most criminals are people that we would characterize as having high time preferences.)
So how can we feel justified in beating these people into submission because they possess a higher time preference than us? Well, I think that saying it that way is misleading. For we do not directly care about the fact that they have a high time preference. What we directly care about is how they threaten the security of property rights because of that. So the real line of questioning is this:
I. Ryan: Don't we need to bring in a sort of "objective" morality here to show that we are "correct" but the people trying to destroy society, like murderers, thieves, rapists, or whatever are "incorrect"? How else would be feel justified in killing these people? Why are our ends more important than theirs? Why is the end of a person A, that is, to raise a family, more important than the end of a person B, to kill people, including people like person A? We feel so passionate about our hatred toward people like B; so, surely, there is a reason why the ends of the person A are more important than those of the person B!
Don't we need to bring in a sort of "objective" morality here to show that we are "correct" but the people trying to destroy society, like murderers, thieves, rapists, or whatever are "incorrect"? How else would be feel justified in killing these people? Why are our ends more important than theirs? Why is the end of a person A, that is, to raise a family, more important than the end of a person B, to kill people, including people like person A? We feel so passionate about our hatred toward people like B; so, surely, there is a reason why the ends of the person A are more important than those of the person B!
I explore those questions in the rest of the post that I just quoted above and those that I link to in it.
hayekianxyz; boldfaced added by I. Ryan: Quite possibly, I'll go over and give your post another read sometime soon. But in the meantime, I'm not sure it makes the slightest bit of difference. The fact of the matter is that the degree is so large between the two markets. R&D for a bakery is limited and bakeries are far more personal and can engage in greater product differentiation. On the other hand, R&D for pharmaceutical companies involves millions and millions dollars, which they may see minimal return on if they're not granted a monopoly over it.
Indeed.
So you concede?
scineram: So you concede?
Concede what?
The argument. You accepted his counterpoint.
scineram: The argument. You accepted his counterpoint.
I wrote this:
I. Ryan: So does that mean that you accepted my argument that it is a different of degree[?]
So does that mean that you accepted my argument that it is a different of degree[?]
To that, he said "quite possibly" but then elaborated that the difference of degree is huge.
The long answer is to read Against Intellectual Monopoly and Against Intellectual Property.
My favorite short example is music. Look at all the development in music from the time primitive humans started banging two rocks together until IP started to take off in the late 1700s. And even today in genres like hip-hop, is more or less music created if we allow sampling? I think the answer is clearly more; IP only stifles creativity. And would a band like U2 suddenly stop touring if Joe Shmoe is allowed to publish a cover version of Zoo Station without paying a royalty? It seems unlikely, to say the least.
Here is a simple use of the estoppel approach, curtesy of Kinsella.
- If it weren't for IP laws, a given piece of intellectual property would not exist.
- Therefore you are estopped from complaining, that you havo to pay for its use.
scineram: Here is a simple use of the estoppel approach, curtesy of Kinsella. - If it weren't for IP laws, a given piece of intellectual property would not exist. - Therefore you are estopped from complaining, that you havo to pay for its use.
Huh?
Even if IP rights aren't legitimate, you can still sell your product under the condition that the buyer not copy or distribute it... IP rights might not exist a priori but they are certainly valid if they are the result of voluntary exchange.