Wondering where people stood on this..
I expect that most people here are deontologists, since a teleological perspective is not consistent with the nonaggression principle. If one does subscribe to deontological ethics, then anarcho-capitalism is clearly the best political philosophy. If one is teleological, then I still think anarcho-capitalism has a pretty strong case, but I think it could be argued that there is room for a small amount of government, if only to tax those making more than, say, $1mil per year, and using that money to buy food for poor people or whatever.
Myself I am not sure which set of ethics are right, I think both can make effective arguments. So this is a two-part question; first, is morality in the consequences or in the actions? And secondly, are you an anarcho-capitalist?
I think alot of the philosophy of ethics gets too caught up on making a self contained argument. Personally I adhere to that modernized form of deontological ethics that Rawls and Nozick both agreed upon which changes Kant's categorical imperative into a modern more flexible scenario called the Ideal Observer theory. Check it out if your interested, it is good stuff.
To the OP, do you even know what you're talking about?
You're confusing teleological ethical systems in general with consequentialism. Aristotelianism is a form of teleological ethics, and many neo-Aristoteleans have made a compelling case for liberty on Aristotelian grounds (one, I think, that avoids the pitfalls of both deontology and consequentialism.) The Rawlsian approach, BTW, is a holistic contractarian approach. Nozick's is a pure intuitionist deontological approach, not so much a contractarian approach IIRC.
At any rate, I support anarcho-capitalism on account of the fact that it is the most efficient, and also by extension of its being practical, the most moral system.
The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science
6. Causality and Teleology
Action is a category that the natural sciences do not take into account. The scientist acts in embarking upon his research work, but in the orbit of natural events of the external world which he explores there is no such thing as action. There is agitation, there is stimulus and response, and, whatever some philosophers may object, there is cause and effect. There is what appears to be an inexorable regularity in the concatenation and sequence of phenomena. There are constant relations between entities that enable the scientist to establish the process called measurement. But there is nothing that would suggest aiming at ends sought; there is no ascertainable purpose.
The natural sciences are causality research; the sciences of human action are teleological. In establishing this distinction between the two fields of human knowledge, we do not express any opinion concerning the question whether the course of all cosmic events is or is not ultimately determined by a superhuman being's design. The treatment of this great problem transcends the range of man's reason and is outside the domain of any human science. It is in the realm that metaphysics and theology claim for themselves.
The purpose to which the sciences of human action refer is not the plans and ways of God, but the ends sought by acting men in the pursuit of their own designs. The endeavors of the metaphysical discipline commonly called philosophy of history to reveal in the flux of historical events the hidden plans of God or of some mythical agency (as, for instance, in the scheme of Marx, the material productive forces) are not science.
In dealing with a definite historical fact, for instance with the first World War, the historian has to find out the ends sought by the various individuals and groups of individuals who were instrumental in organizing these campaigns or in fighting the aggressors. He has to examine the outcome resulting from the actions of all people involved and compare it with the preceding state of affairs as well as with the intentions of the actors. But it is not the historian's business to search after a "higher" or "deeper" sense that manifested itself in the events or was realized by them. Perhaps there is such a hidden "higher" or "deeper" purpose or significance in the succession of historical events. But for mortal man there is no way open to learn something about such "higher" or "deeper" meanings.
I hope that helps.
Individualism Rocks
I am a teleologist, in that I believe that man's proximate objective norm is the perfection of his own nature. I would disagree vociferously with the idea that my philosophy is utilitarian, for I believe that utility cannot be measured and often boils down to a crude measure of animalistic pleasure/pain (i.e. democracy is good because the idea that is pleasing to the greatest number of people is made into law, not because that law is just and renders each their due.) I believe that market-anarchism is the only teleologically justifiable ideology, as it is the only one that recognizes man's nature as a self-owner and does not coerce him.
I think you might have meant "Are you a consequentialist or a deontologist?"
Teleology isn't inconsistent with libertarian views of ethics. Notably, Mises held a teleological view of the good.
I am a deontologist, of the Kantian variety. I don't know a whole lot about the offshoots mentioned by earlier posters, but I don't know of any particular part of Kant's ethics that needed any "modernizing." Perhaps a few points that could be interpreted differently and a few times where Kant didn't follow his own system on deciding duty/morality, but Kant didn't give exhaustive examples of what was good and what was bad - he simply laid out the framework from which you could deduce on your own what was good and bad.
Kantianism, in my opinion, is a perfect fit for anarchism. It is very easy to deduce from the categorical imperative that taxation, initiation of force, etc is wrong. Even though under the moral imperative you have positive obligations, there would be no way to morally force someone to fulfill these obligations.
I really have to wonder why so many libertarians are Kantians.
Trevor Goodchild: The will to evil is like an iron in a forge, there is only one way to shape it right - with a conscience which is the fire! My children, Judy and Bambara, it was for them that I created the custodian, an artificial conscience, a fire for those who have none!
Inquisitor, I don't recall mentioning anything about teleological ethics in my post. Also have you read Nozick's "Invariances". He is not an intuitionist, at least not at the time of his death since he justifies a basic morality in the same manner as Rawls. I personally have nothing against Teleological views I just happen to disagree with the whole theory behind metaphysics. I guess I am more influenced by Wittgenstein these days and the Analytic school. All that aside I dont see the need to not be civil. After all I am sure you and I agree on alot more things then we disagree on.
Also I think Teleological ethics has done much good, especially since I enjoy the natural law approach and realize that libertarianism is deeply in debt to it. I just have a problem with metaphysical theory.
I know you didn't, hence I said: to the OP. Perhaps I should've separated my remarks to you. As for Nozick, I haven't read Invariances, but in Anarchy, State and Utopia he most definitely offers an intuitionist basis for rights.
What metaphysics do you mean in particular? Its ontological commitments?
Ah I am very sorry for my confusion, I am new to talking online (past few months) and I dont know what OP stands for and I figured it meant me since I was who you replied too. By ethical intuitionism do you mean the type that GE Moore adheres too? As far as "Invariances" go he comes round to a similar contract theory for mutual gain. I have not read "Anarchy State and Utopia" in seven years so my memory on it is very foggy.
As far as what I mean by metaphysics I will just paste an excerpt from wikipedia (I know it is not the most reliable source but this paragraph sums up my particular view):
"Another view is that metaphysical statements are not meaningless statements, but rather that they are generally not fallible, testable or provable statements. That is to say, there is no valid set of empirical observations nor a valid set of logical arguments, which could definitively prove metaphysical statements to be true or false. Hence, a metaphysical statement usually implies an idea about the world or about the universe, which may seem reasonable but is ultimately not empirically verifiable. That idea could be changed in a non-arbitrary way, based on experience or argument, yet there exists no evidence or argument so compelling that it could rationally force a change in that idea, in the sense of definitely proving it false."
Once again sorry for the confusion and accusation.
Essentially it is the placement of strict logic, in the mathematical sense within a very limited area. For instance 2 + 2 = 4 is strict logic that demands realization but someting like "Liberty is right" or "Communism is correct" might be reasonable but not inherently verifiable, empirically or logically.
He seems to be an intuitionist from ASU, simply because he argues that there are certain boundaries we have, that it is intuitively wrong to violate.
As for metaphysical commitments... I don't see anything too fantastic about the Aristotelean ontology, which is what usually grounds natural law arguments - the arguments themselves are empirically and logically justified though, even if metaphysics is out of this domain.
Deist:Inquisitor, I don't recall mentioning anything about teleological ethics in my post. Also have you read Nozick's "Invariances". He is not an intuitionist, at least not at the time of his death since he justifies a basic morality in the same manner as Rawls. I personally have nothing against Teleological views I just happen to disagree with the whole theory behind metaphysics. I guess I am more influenced by Wittgenstein these days and the Analytic school. All that aside I dont see the need to not be civil. After all I am sure you and I agree on alot more things then we disagree on.
There are important differences between Aristotelian virtue ethics and consequentialist theories. The deontological vs. teleological distinction fails to capture these differences. Speaking of Wittgenstein, Roderick Long is a big fan of him, is trained in analytic philosophy, and is an Aristotelian libertarian who grounds natural law and natural rights in virtue ethics.
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.Adjunct Instructor, Buena Vista UniversityWebmaster, LibertarianStandard.comFounder / Executive Editor, Prometheusreview.com
Thank you for pointing out Roderick Long, I have not heard of him before. True, there are very important differences between virtue ethics and consequentialist ethics. I also personally adhere to virute ethics myself as do several other followers of the Analytic school. When I mentioned deontology I was merely refering to the application of the ideal observer theory, which is considered a modern form of the categorical imperative. But it is worth mentioning that both Rawls and Nozick are not Kantian but are considered Analytical philosophers.
Perhaps Nozick wasn't a Kantian, but to suggest that he didn't rely on Kant seems to go too far.
I never stated that he did not rely on Kant. Afterall Nozick does agree with Rawls Ideal Observer theory which is inspired by Kant's Categorical Imperative. But it should be noted that just because he liked an idea that Kant formulated does not make him distinctly "Kantish". He had serious disagreements with Kant over his epistemology and metaphysics.
Also the meaning of ethical intutionism that I am use too and aware of, is one that lacks moral clarification since it is the belief that morals are inherently emotional and instinct driven so they do not apply to the realm of reasonable justification. Essentially it is the belief that trying to make sense of any morality is pointless and to try and make a consistent ethical code is likewise doomed. In the end it believes ethics is no more than emotional reaction biologically or psychologically hardwired into our being.
That may be a semantic problem in this discussion that has arisen so far. Clearly the intuitionism that Inquisitor was speaking of (and correct me if I am wrong) was one that believed that ethics is something ingrained in our beings but is not beyond clarification, justification and reason.
OK now I understand. Thank you.