Since any aggressive action is an externality(altering of property without exchange), it contains aggression. And due to externalities being non-economic, they are to be condemned from an economic viewpoint. As such there is no economic justification for punishment of crime because any contrary opinion would mean giving up value free-ness.
Justice rejects property rights by its own action(punishment),
Uh, criminal action rejects property rights and justice seeks to restore them. I didn't waste my time reading this thread, but the idea that libertarians are, or ought to be, pacifists is one of the most ridiculous arguments I have ever heard.
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
Enforcing justice only looks like a loss when you look at a given point in time. If you look to the future you will see that often enforcing justice will create gains (very large ones at that). If everytime someone steals from me I fight back and reclaim what I lost I will probably spend more than I get back (in each individual case), but if I develop a reputation as someone who enforces justice, others will see that the risk-adjusted cost of stealing from me is too high and will refrain from their attempt at stealing from me. The future gains could far outweigh the current losses of upholding justice.
"I cannot prove, but am prepared to affirm, that if you take care of clarity in reasoning, most good causes will take care of themselves, while some bad ones are taken care of as a matter of course." -Anthony de Jasay
are you wrapped up in paradox because you are trying to find a political system compatible with a value-neutral stance?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Uh, criminal action rejects property rights and justice seeks to restore them. I didn't waste my time reading this thread, but the idea that libertarians are, or ought to be, pacifists is one of the most ridiculous arguments I have ever heard. Justice is no different from criminal action, if we avoid getting morals involved in it. It is both infringement of property rights.
Justice is no different from criminal action, if we avoid getting morals involved in it. It is both infringement of property rights.
Justice and criminal action both involve the use of force. They differ in that the former is justified and the latter isn't. On why this is true, read Hoppe here.
When a criminal violates another's property rights he is unable to coherently object to the same sort of things being done to himself, along the lines of the theory of proportionality. Proportionality can be explained in terms of Misesean praxeology.
Now, I'm not sure what exactly you mean by "avoid getting morals involved in it". I've sought to repair people's tendency toward this type of semantic equivocation with the concept of the "ethical-aesthetical" vs. "moral-legal" dichotomy. People use "ethics" and "morals" inconsistently. At times, they refer to actions which respect property boundaries, and at times they do not.
Moderate, plumbline libertarianism qua ideology differs from all other political philosophies in that it is concomitant to libertarianism qua legal philosophy. With all others, the reverse is true. For example, whatever legislators of a dictatorship or democratic republic deem to be lawful is respected by wards of these ideologies based on the political philosophy, and not because of the contents of the legal code, which is indeterminately guiding them. It's very important to recognize the difference between libertarianism qua ideology and libertarianism qua legal philosophy. The former is necessarily guided, in its procedure of codification and practical application, by its adherents valuing libertarian ends, while the latter is a wertfrei subdiscipline of praxeology alongside Austrian economics.
Justice and criminal action both involve the use of force. They differ in that the former is justified and the latter isn't. On why this is true, read Hoppe here. When a criminal violates another's property rights he is unable to coherently object to the same sort of things being done to himself, along the lines of the theory of proportionality. Proportionality can be explained in terms of Misesean praxeology. Now, I'm not sure what exactly you mean by "avoid getting morals involved in it". I've sought to repair people's tendency toward this type of semantic equivocation with the concept of the "ethical-aesthetical" vs. "moral-legal" dichotomy. People use "ethics" and "morals" inconsistently. At times, they refer to actions which respect property boundaries, and at times they do not.
Didnt read the whole thing but the large font paragraphs used a concept of a "right" which is not value free
Incorrect. Read about Reinach's Apriorische Rechtslehre here.
and he seemed to point at argumentation ethics in his other quote and we know about the fallacy of that..
If you say so...
In response to your edit:
Also no mention of proportionality was in the article.. im curious as to how such a concept is tied to praxeology when even Rothbard in his ethics books struggled to find a "just" basis of proportional punishment within the ethics concept and only hinted at different possibilities
Rothbard said something like, "The theory of punishment is woefully underdeveloped." Of course, this was before Hoppe's time. After AE, people have bothered with attacks from every angle rather than attempt to extend the work. All that is needed is a basic understanding of praxeology and proportionality to see the situation in the right way, rather than as a math equation. Also, you are still equivocating on ethics/morality.
What pages was it.. i think you deleted it with your edit, surely you dont expect me to read the whole thing
That's like you hiring me to cater your wedding, and me saying, "Surely you didn't expect me to do more than put these Bagel Bites in the toaster and buy some donuts from 7-11."
I deleted the pages because I accidentally cited a work which isn't available online. I'd recommend you also tackle DuBois' Judgment and Sachverhalt, which certainly requires a dose of philosophical training. Still, if you want to stick with the basics, you have read Human Action right? Can you state the basic "equation" of proportionality? The (one or) two teeth aspect is from the idea that certain categories of actions are representative of social cooperation and others aren't. Where they are not, coercive action is justified within the greater theme of societal cooperation, whether the criminal subjectively, personally sees this as just or not.
The coercive action used as punishment would itself be breaking the same rules of "social cooperation" as the original aggression. The system would be inconsistent in applying its rules.
Gotta up this, the criticism must be answered to!
Aggression is the initiation of violence, not the use of violence per se. Yours is such an obviously invalid argument that if I have to spell it out, it isn't worth my time to continue the discussion.
But then you give up the value free context. It changes from an attempt to create a praxeological category for it, to an arbitrary theory, as the concept of initiation involves a value judgement over the comparison of extent of use of violence of one side and possible previous violence by the other side.