Also, even before considering what knowledge actually is, my getting (but perhaps not realizing that I get) a definite twinge of pleasure now for acting as if X now is not the same as my deeming that acting as if X at some later time t will result in pleasure (and/or less pain) being experienced at some time t+n.
(Note: I should have said "operant conditioned" above, not "Pavlovian conditioned.")
Why anarchy fails
AJ: Zavoi, bold added:Yes, it may be the case (as seen by a third party, or, as you say, “at the deep level”) that my beliefs are just what it is useful* for me to act as if By the deep level I mean from an individualist-subjective perspective, where I assume nothing about any "reality" or "third parties." At the deep level, perhaps all that is happening is I get pleasure from certain actions, and by now I have long forgotten or pushed into the subconscious any awareness of this process. At a casual level - that of a third-party observing someone, for example - it might be said that "what she calls her beliefs just turn out to be her deemed useful-to-act-as-ifs; in other words, that is all she really means by belief."
Zavoi, bold added:Yes, it may be the case (as seen by a third party, or, as you say, “at the deep level”) that my beliefs are just what it is useful* for me to act as if
By the deep level I mean from an individualist-subjective perspective, where I assume nothing about any "reality" or "third parties." At the deep level, perhaps all that is happening is I get pleasure from certain actions, and by now I have long forgotten or pushed into the subconscious any awareness of this process. At a casual level - that of a third-party observing someone, for example - it might be said that "what she calls her beliefs just turn out to be her deemed useful-to-act-as-ifs; in other words, that is all she really means by belief."
OK, I think I had that mixed up. If we replace the bolded text with “as seen by a third party, or, as you say, ‘at the casual level,’” how does that sound?
To continue with the PA analogy, you’re saying (right?) that a third party (say, ZFC set theory) observes that everything that PA believes, it believes because it is derived from PA’s axioms; whereas from PA’s internal perspective, all that is happening is that certain statements are derived, and these statements are believed by PA, but PA is not aware of this – PA does not believe that it is committed to believe everything it can derive from its axioms.
AJ:But like I said, intension and extension are matters of language, not of thought.
The distinction also occurs in thought; it’s the difference between thinking of “the morning star” (as in the actual star) and thinking of “the idea of ‘the morning star’” (as in the process of looking to the east in the morning and seeing something). Or, if you prefer, the difference between and . If it were purely a matter of language, then it would take no thought at all to recognize that these refer to the same number.
AJ:Also, even before considering what knowledge actually is, my getting (but perhaps not realizing that I get) a definite twinge of pleasure now for acting as if X now is not the same as my deeming that acting as if X at some later time t will result in pleasure (and/or less pain) being experienced at some time t+n.
How can a feeling of pleasure be “definite” without you realizing that you have it? Should we think of this notion of pleasure as more like the healthiness of food than any direct sensation (like “red” or “pain”)?
Sorry for the wait, computer broke (still broken, but I have been spending some quality time at net cafes recently).
Zavoi:To continue with the PA analogy, you’re saying (right?) that a third party (say, ZFC set theory) observes that everything that PA believes, it believes because it is derived from PA’s axioms; whereas from PA’s internal perspective, all that is happening is that certain statements are derived, and these statements are believed by PA, but PA is not aware of this – PA does not believe that it is committed to believe everything it can derive from its axioms.
For this one, I would say that PA cannot believe, and set ZFC set theory cannot observe - only humans or other actors can. But maybe I missed the point or forgot something.
Zavoi:The distinction also occurs in thought; it’s the difference between thinking of “the morning star” (as in the actual star) and thinking of “the idea of ‘the morning star’” (as in the process of looking to the east in the morning and seeing something).
I think the sensations I'd experience in both cases would be the same; if they weren't, then for example the "idea of 'the morning star'" is taken to have some extra connotation, such as "whatever star you see in the morning, even if it isn't the Morning Star."
Zavoi:Or, if you prefer, the difference between and . If it were purely a matter of language, then it would take no thought at all to recognize that these refer to the same number.
If they are the same number, the sensation I experience when I think of that number would be the same. (But let me know if I'm misreading the context here.)
Zavoi: AJ:Also, even before considering what knowledge actually is, my getting (but perhaps not realizing that I get) a definite twinge of pleasure now for acting as if X now is not the same as my deeming that acting as if X at some later time t will result in pleasure (and/or less pain) being experienced at some time t+n. How can a feeling of pleasure be “definite” without you realizing that you have it?
How can a feeling of pleasure be “definite” without you realizing that you have it?
Because memory is limited. In the case of the above quote, I am saying that I definitely feel it when I feel it, but then I forget it. So I might be feeling it periodically many times a day, but I immediately forget it each time because it is such a mundane occurence that I immediately filter it out of short-term memory. However, if I can even notice (that is, retain in memory long enough to analyze) one of these periodic twinges of pleasure, it makes sense for me to posit that this could be happening periodicaly all the time as I take various actions.
Re: Intension vs. extension, you seem to have been using it in a way different from how Wikipedia defines it, so it may help to use a different distinction, from here:
the signifier — the "sound image" or string of letters on a page that one recognizes as a sign.
the signified — the concept or idea that a sign evokes.
the referent — the actual thing or set of things a sign refers to.
I would add the bold parts to make this more useful (and I would disambiguate "the signified" to "the intent" and "the interpretation," as per the bold text).
the signified — the concept or idea that a sign evokes. (means the thought/sensations in the speaker that prompted the utterance ("the intent") or the thought/sensations evoked in the listener by the sign ("the interpretation"))
the referent — the actual thing or set of things a sign refers to. (not meaningful at a deep level of analysis, where the physical world is not yet hypothesized, only sensations)
I would add the bold parts to make this more useful (and I would disambiguate "the signified" to "the intent" and "the interpretation," as per the bold text). the signifier — the "sound image" or string of letters on a page that one recognizes as a sign. the signified — the concept or idea that a sign evokes. (means the thought/sensations in the speaker that prompted the utterance ("the intent") or the thought/sensations evoked in the listener by the sign ("the interpretation")) the referent — the actual thing or set of things a sign refers to. (not meaningful at a deep level of analysis, where the physical world is not yet hypothesized, only sensations)
This is just begging for a post-structuralist to tear it apart. :)
It’s been so long, I have to refresh myself on what we were talking about…
AJ:For this one, I would say that PA cannot believe, and set ZFC set theory cannot observe - only humans or other actors can. But maybe I missed the point or forgot something.
This is only supposed to be an analogy, not to be taken literally.
AJ:If they are the same number, the sensation I experience when I think of that number would be the same. (But let me know if I'm misreading the context here.)
Can you clarify? (First of all, what kinds of sensations are associated with numbers?) But the main point is: once you’ve understood the two formulas, does it really take no thought at all to recognize that they both refer to the same number? If not, then we have demonstrated the difference between extensional and intensional thoughts: the first is the number itself, and the second is the process by which you calculate the number.
AJ: (not meaningful at a deep level of analysis, where the physical world is not yet hypothesized, only sensations)
If I recall correctly, I think this is ultimately what we were debating about. But I won’t address it yet, not until the conversation is back in swing again.
Brainpolice: I would add the bold parts to make this more useful (and I would disambiguate "the signified" to "the intent" and "the interpretation," as per the bold text). the signifier — the "sound image" or string of letters on a page that one recognizes as a sign. the signified — the concept or idea that a sign evokes. (means the thought/sensations in the speaker that prompted the utterance ("the intent") or the thought/sensations evoked in the listener by the sign ("the interpretation")) the referent — the actual thing or set of things a sign refers to. (not meaningful at a deep level of analysis, where the physical world is not yet hypothesized, only sensations) This is just begging for a post-structuralist to tear it apart. :)
What do you mean? The definitions are not useful?
Zavoi,
I can hardly remember where I was in my thinking last August when we were talking last, but I do remember this thread was very valuable for helping me to develop my, for lack of a better term, "first-person epistemology." I am not the frequent net-user I was back then (for lack of a computer as well as other reasons), so I may not reply quickly, but I welcome any thoughts.
What kinds of sensations that are associated with numbers is a pretty complex and personal thing. For instance, I might see a collection of color splotches for small numbers like 2 or 4, then rows and columns for numbers around the two-digit range, then just various intuitive notions for even larger numbers - like a million is enough dollars to buy a big house, and there is some physical sensation that goes with it as well. Of course it's usually hard to introspect on such things to notice everything.
Anyway, to your main point there, I guess I am still not sure how you are defining extensional thought and intensional thought. I haven't really felt like I understood what the distinction was trying to get at, as you have been using it. I have developed my thoughts on all this quite a lot in the meantime, and I think this intension/extension distinction (or the question of whether there really was such a distinction, or if it was a useful one) was closely related with the issue we were discussing finally, so I might now be able to offer better phrasing that would make my view make more sense.
AJ:Anyway, to your main point there, I guess I am still not sure how you are defining extensional thought and intensional thought. I haven't really felt like I understood what the distinction was trying to get at, as you have been using it.
OK, let's see how this goes... The extension is the thing referred to; the intension is the way you refer to it. The extension is the number, the intension is the formula.
I think where this was going was towards the question of What are thoughts/utterences/etc. actually about? If someone says "There's a bee on the flower," what do they "really mean" by that?
You're saying (correct me if I'm wrong) that such a statement is really just shorthand for "It follows from my premises that there's a bee on the flower," since the reasoning apparatus of a person's mind doesn't have any direct connection to the external world; all they know is what they perceive through their sensations. Therefore, we should interpret any statement made by a person P as saying "It follows from P's premises that..."
What I'm saying is that this is confusing two different levels of analysis. At the meta-level, it is indeed the case that P only thinks/utters X because P's premises (and sensations) entail X -- whether or not X is "actually true" has no direct effect on P's thoughts except as far as it's mediated through P's sensations. However, at the object-level, we can still ask "What is the statement X about?" Certainly, it's not about P or P's premises; it makes no reference whatsoever to them. At the object-level, the statements must be taken purely at face value.
An example might help. In Peano Arithmetic, there is a very clear distinction between the two statements:
Just because PA doesn't have direct access to the "platonic realm of numbers," doesn't mean that the two statements are equivalent.
Or, consider a calculator where you enter "1+1=" and you get "2". What did the calculator just say? Did it say that "1+1=2"? But, says the sophisticated thinker, "Ah, see, the calculator is just a machine; it outputs whatever its machinery dictates it will output -- the mere fact that the calculator output '2' doesn't tell us anything about anything other than what the calculator outputs when input with '1+1='". That's all true enough, but it isn't what the calculator is actually saying. To say otherwise is to confuse the object-level (extension) with the meta-level (intension).
Hopefully some of this is helpful...