Again, how do you know the definition of parallel without some form of observation of direction and boundaries? To a rock, the idea of shapes is utterly meaningless.
Because you set up the rule and definition. the logic states a parallel line can never cross. Once again, it is up to a person to arrange, define, and catagorize how to make sense of the world.
I don't think anyone here is stating that we don't share a reality, the world is anything but cosmological stuff (materialism), or a thing can't contradict itself. I think everyone is prepared to accept those assertions
z1235:Sorry, I have no idea what you just said. How is saying that bears (and your consistent escapes from them) are real, "righteous" in any sense of the word?
It is a statement of truth. It is "Right". Any truth, law, or right, no matter how seemingly benign, is a threat in my eyes.
We can say M's are Y's all we want. That could be mice are rodents, or strawberries are good. But we have to know what countries, lands, boundaries, mice, rodents, languages, cultures, at least in some small degree, are if we are going to give any meaning to those statements are.
Suppose I said "all flibblejraps are oogityblaggle." Does that make any sense? Now suppose I told you, fibblejraps meant lives and oogityblaggle meant finite. Now you can make sense of it based off your kowledgeable observation of the terms fibblefraps and oogityblaggle.
What came first, the chicken or the egg, is the same argument we're having really lol.
In States a fresh law is looked upon as a remedy for evil. Instead of themselves altering what is bad, people begin by demanding a law to alter it. ... In short, a law everywhere and for everything!
~Peter Kropotkin
And for the record: according to any natural science, logic, or the language of philosophy I still say subjective ethics has no meaning. It may have meaning in psychology?
William:I don't think anyone here is stating that we don't share a reality, the world is anything but cosmological stuff (materialism), or a thing can't contradict itself. I think everyone is prepared to accept those assertions
Depends on how careful I am being. For some purposes it would be superfluous to assume "reality" to mean anything other than "those sensations that seem more lasting and regular, and are not to be directly manipulable by pure thought, only by means of my (assumed) physical body." Or, this could all be a dream, but if it's a dream that last decades and contains oodles of both agony and joy, and also has regularities that I seem to be able to reliably use to reduce pain and increase pleasure, what the heck is the difference for everyday life? None, but it could be important for certain sufficiently deep philosophical or scientific investigations.
Why anarchy fails
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun: We can say M's are Y's all we want. That could be mice are rodents, or strawberries are good. But we have to know what countries, lands, boundaries, mice, rodents, languages, cultures, at least in some small degree, are if we are going to give any meaning to those statements are. Suppose I said "all flibblejraps are oogityblaggle." Does that make any sense? Now suppose I told you, fibblejraps meant lives and oogityblaggle meant finite. Now you can make sense of it based off your kowledgeable observation of the terms fibblefraps and oogityblaggle. What came first, the chicken or the egg, is the same argument we're having really lol.
I addressed this already. One more time:
As long as all the words are coherent concepts, if we start with
Premise 1: "Flibblejraps are a type of hoozlemrat"
Premise 2: "All hoozlemrats are oogityblaggle"
Then "All flibblejraps are oogityblaggle" indeed follows from the premises. Do I have to draw you a picture?
Jackson LaRose:It is a statement of truth. It is "Right". Any truth, law, or right, no matter how seemingly benign, is a threat in my eyes.
It doesn't have to be. Those monsters under your bed must have done a job on you when you were little. I don't have to accept that things around me are 100% true or real in order to operate. 95% is good enough for me and for most people. There could be 5% noise, sometimes 30% noise, and sometimes 100% noise (schizophrenia) but people don't talk about it. People don't say: "I think there's a bear running towards us with 95% probability.", as these disclaimers get tiring to repeat every single time.
Finally, even if there really was no bear, and no running and we're all just brains in jars exchanging impulses via a Matrix-like network of tubes, why would that matter to us? "Truth" and "real" is whatever produces the least amount of contradictions to our limited senses and brains, but that's the best we've got, so we may as well use it.
[EDIT: Btw, I don't think ethics or morality exist independently from a subjects mind. Though bears do, very much so. No need to throw out the bears with the bath-water. ]
William: And for the record: according to any natural science, logic, or the language of philosophy I still say subjective ethics has no meaning. It may have meaning in psychology?
Read the beginning of Human Action. It is only in that very trivial sense that I mean the term, and I also don't consider the term a useful one except in debates with objective ethicists. In other words, my subjective ethics are always: It's good if it gets me more pleasure (now or in the future*), bad if it doesn't.
*This reference to time structure is crucial; if it's all about what gets me more pleasure right now we are talking about crude hedonism...or are we? This is a difficult philosophical point (I'm Amanojack in that thread)
http://lesswrong.com/lw/20w/open_thread_april_2010/1uhf?c=1&context=1#comments They really didn't like what I had to say - it's an emotionally touchy subject.
1) About the "shared reality" assertion, etc: Perhaps it may be better to say "none of us are capable of asserting or proving we do not share a reality (in at lest some sense, that is it, it is impossible to state in any meanigful way of a "non shared reality" as it goes beyond our world and logic), immaterialism, or a thing can not be itself" or something better stated along those lines? You may have to get a little techincal with "not shared reality" and equating it to nonsense, but I think it is doable, particularly if we can discard psychology from the discussion.
2) Read the beginning of Human Action. It is only in that very trivial sense that I mean the term, and I also don't consider the term a useful one except in debates with objective ethicist
Interesting you should bring that up. I have been pouring through Ludwig Wittgenstein for the 1st time since reading anything about Mises, and I feel it has profited me greatly in clearing up my thoughts. This is the approach I am trying to apply now (at least the way I understand it currently). But to sum up, it is about "untangling" various languages to their appropriate context. This would lead to an anti psychological approach when discussing, logic, economics, and natural science. We can not speak of "true" (e.g. "self") preference, pain, happiness, value, aesthetics etc in any meaningful way in such a context and any aknowledgment of such words will be counter productive to the topic on hand.
So when referring to pleasure/pain all we can discuss is what is presented and agreed upon as a form of measurment (in this case pleasure/pain are the measuments), it does not in any way reflect what is going on "inside one's mind". "Pleasure" is not a psychological term, it is a logical one in this case.
There are 3 Rodrick Long articles that deal specifically about this (of which I have only read one so far) on this page:
http://praxeology.net/praxeo.htm
EDIT
William:none of us are capable of asserting or proving we do not share a reality
Of course, and neither am I capable of proving that we do (nor, I presume, are you or anyone).
William:But to sum up, it is about "untangling" various languages to their appropriate context.
Always a worthwhile task in philosophy (usually the only one that needs doing!).
William:This would lead to an anti psychological approach when discussing, logic, economics, and natural science. We can not speak of "true" (e.g. "self") preference, pain, happiness, value, aesthetics etc in any meaningful way in such a context and any aknowledgment of such words will be counter productive to the topic on hand. So when referring to pleasure/pain all we can discuss is what is presented and agreed upon as a form of measurment (in this case pleasure/pain are the measuments), it does not in any way reflect what is going on "inside one's mind". "Pleasure" is not a psychological term, it is a logical one in this case.
This all depends heavily on how you're defining psychological, logical, natural science, etc. On the surface, you appear to be talking about consensus reality and empiricism, quite divorced from Mises's strict methodological individualism - but that all depends on how we untangle your language to its appropriate context (told you it's usually the only task that needs doing ). For instance, if you're talking about normal scientific investigation, this approach has obviously worked quite well. "Logic" means a million different things. Economics - that's a big can of worms. As for pleasure, I am using the term to mean nothing more and nothing less than a particular subjective physical sensation I feel, and that I presume you are also familiar with (covered in detail in the Grayson-Neoclassical debate and sidelines).
On Long and his take on Mises and Wittgenstein, see my very partial response here (that whole thread contains probably the best elucidation of my position on epistemology so far).
Ya, got it. I know how logic works lol. But none of these sentences make any sense. And they most certainly are not true, no matter how valid the logic behind them. We can only reason because we make observations of reality. The differences seperating man from the beasts is one of degree, not design.
Evidence > Logic To put it in other words, all logic comes after observation. Newborns dont reason, until the dr smacks their behind and they scream in pain, an observation of reality.
1) On shared reality and "sorting out language":
Forgive me, I have to virtually parrot Wittgenstein (hopefully I don't butcher this too badly), as I failed to explain this in my own words:
If I say "here is my hand" or "the world has existed for more than one hour"; While they may have the form of empiracle propositions, they actually have more in common with logical propositions. That is, these sorts of propositions may seem to say something factual about the world, and hence be open to doubt, but really the function they serve in language is to serve as a kind of framework within which empirical propositions can make sense. In other words, we take such propositions for granted so that we can speak about the hand or about things in the world—these propositions aren’t meant to be subjected to skeptical scrutiny. The key, then, is not to claim certain knowledge of propositions like “here is a hand” but rather to recognize that these sorts of propositions lie beyond questions of knowledge or doubt.
This isn't a refutation of skepticism, but a side stepping of it; as a skeptic's (or nihilist's) doubts simply don't work as they are intended to. "Here is a hand" is a definitive definition as the word is defined by the example. If doubted, any structure of communication collapses. There has to be a common ground between people for communication to work. In this framework skepticism, if used, undermines the very basis of doubt itself.
Doubting the existence of the external world is a philosophical activity. A skeptic can doubt away, but it is impossible to live out this type of skepticism. A skeptic can only doubt when an idea like "the external world" is abstracted from every day activity. The proposition "the world exists" has no meaning unless placed within a particular context; on it's own "the world exists" means nothing. Only by removing language from all context, which in turn renders language uselss, can the skeptic function.
So perhaps to rephrase myself better: We can "prove" the external world to exist, if we follow a specific context and accept it. This of course, is based off of context and language.
It is funny how painfully obvious this seems now (and perhaps where my "intuitions" always were). It is not the job of philosophy to "abstract" language, but clarify it; if you do otherwise the word (and hence world) loses all meaning. One ought not be amazed at what philosophy can do, but what it can not solve (such as ethics), as it has to be passive neutral observer in things if it is to have any use.
2) This all depends heavily on how you're defining psychological, logical, natural science, etc. On the surface, you appear to be talking about consensus reality and empiricism, quite divorced from Mises's strict methodological individualism - but that al
Logic definition I am using (at least I hope): Not a science, nor a set of laws. There are no "objects" of logic, nor relations. Logic is 100% form 0% content. It says nothing, but determines the form and structure everything can be said. It is inherently deterministic, there can be no "accidents".
I was mostly using the "psychological"/"praxeological" dividing line as Mises refered to it. I am very short on time for the rest of the day, if you feel as if you need anything else defined let me know, as this post may be a bit messy. I ought to be able to go into at least somewhat more detail. That said, I doubt I am willing or prepared to defend economics and natural science with psychology on this thread. I can attempt to define them in better terms if you need it though. I would much rather focus on language, logic, ethic/aesthetic, and perhaps psychology. Perhaps I unwittingly opened a bigger can of worms than I expected (much less handle) by being over enthusiastic when bringing up those examples. That was not the Long piece I read, I'll have to give it a read before I comment.
Hopefully I am explaining myself at least somewhat clearly, and understanding your thoughts clearly as well. I have to admit, I have been "struck by lightning" these past two weeks by re-reading Wittgenstein. I think the thoughts and ideas are hitting me much quicker than my ability to express them (this is the 3rd time in a year and a half this has happened, as Stirner/Kirkegaard and von Mises had similar effects that I am still sorting out, lol). Perhaps I am a little too over enthusastic/ affected by new thought (That is Wittgenstein) to enter into productive conversation at this point.
LibertarianfromGermany:Well put. If you define the limitations into the term, it is possible to state results in absolutes. The problem when applying this mindset to perceived phenomena is our inability to make a perfect observation, which makes it impossible to know the limitations and boundaries of the theoretical observer-independent reality. Therefore, it is a faulty analogy.
It seems like you get my point so why would you call it faulty? I have never stated that the knowledge gained would be perfect knowledge. It obviously wouldn't be as human logic is not perfect. Yes, the observer-independent reality could be entirely different than the reality we do observe, but it would still be wrong do assume that the signals that we get from the observer-independent reality (which we obviously cannot be sure that we can interpret them correctly) depend on us. I mean, it's a possibility that there really is nothing but a subjective world, but I see no evidence suggesting so and therefore I don't think it makes sense to simply create the relation myself.
LibertarianfromGermany:I mean, it's a possibility that there really is nothing but a subjective world, but I see no evidence suggesting so and therefore I don't think it makes sense to simply create the relation myself.
There is an equal lack of evidence supporting an objective external reality, since all of the observations we make to conclude one way or the other are necessarily subjective. Why prefer one over the other as the "truth"? Why accept either as truth? As z1325 demonstrated, one doesn't need the answer in order to function as if one had the answer. The action could be considered an indication of faith in either conclusion, rather than mere lip-service.
Well, then there is no disagreement between our sides. As I've said before, I distinguish between "absolute truth" which we have no access to and "human truth" which is sort of a concept that humans build to have a basis to act on. By "wrong" I mean contrary to human reasoning because there is no logical connection there, but I recognize that for something to be a certain way it does not need to follow the human laws of logic.
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun:Ya, got it. I know how logic works lol. But none of these sentences make any sense. And they most certainly are not true, no matter how valid the logic behind them.
Then we're back to mathematics, which you apparently don't find useful. Look, if you're just trying to make the point that we can only know logic is valid through experience, I agree. However, you are jumping around among levels of analysis like it was going out of style.
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun:To put it in other words, all logic comes after observation.
This is wording it too fuzzily to be useful. Let me disambiguate: the reliability we place in logic comes after observation (as we grow up). However, this should not be construed to mean that any given logical deduction that can be applied to a state of affairs must rely on a particular observation or experience of that particular state of affairs for its validity. That this would render applied mathematics (and praxeology) useless ought to set off alarm bells in your head. To be fair, I know you were just speaking loosely and may agree with my disambiguation, but to speak loosely in critiquing people who are speaking more carefully is not good form.
Look, if you're just trying to make the point that we can only know logic is valid through experience, I agre
I am stating the point that babies don't reason, they react. You don't develop reason until much later. I am using this as evidence that observation comes before reason.
However, this should not be construed to mean that any given logical deduction that can be applied to a state of affairs must rely on a particular observation or experience of that particular state of affairs for its validity.
I never posited that. I merely stated that observation is more natural than reason, this should not be a point of contention.
I am also positing that logical validity has no impact upon the truth-value of a claim. Logical validity says the "answer" relies upon its premises. It makes no difference if that premise is "all elephants are robots." Logical validity is a weak form of establishing the truth value of a claim, I find observation, especially those that can be repeated for any given actor, to be a much stronger system of verification.
William,
I have a sneaking suspicion we are in perfect agreement but the phrasing makes it look like I, you, and Wittgenstein are all saying slightly different things. I can prove reality to exist as well in the Wittgensteinian sense, when I define reality as I have above - essentially as "those sensations that matter for my long-term happiness and cannot be manipulated through mind control alone."
Wittgenstein is elucidating, but all elucidation through words can only be relatively so. He does it better than most any philosopher I have read, but words are just a really imperfect communication device, hence consensus reality explicated in words will always be somewhat contradictory or at least fuzzy. As we try to clarify one verbal ambiguity we cannot help but introduce another. In the end we have to arrive at our own conception of things, and it will always be ever so slightly different than any words we have read, and different even than words we have written ourselves.
That is why we are all arguing here but most of us are really agreeing. My contention is even stronger than Wittgenstein's: I say nearly all disagreements in philosophy are rooted in the words we used to express ourselves. Communication is THE bottleneck we face as a social species, but we are uncomfortable acknowledging that precisely because we are a social species and hence words are apt to take on a larger-than-life character to us.
"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." -John 1:1
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun:I am also positing that logical validity has no impact upon the truth-value of a claim.
So are you saying that if you observe something and draw a logically invalid conclusion about it, then it can still be true?
Epicurus,
Then we have no disagreement. (Just words.)
There was a post not long ago about wave-particle duality that addressed this. I am saying that if you observe a phenomena and have no logically valid way to explain it, it is your logic that is wrong, not the phenomena.
Isn't that a failure of observation regardless?
Not neccesarily. If I see you standing 12ft to my right, and 12ft to my left at the same time, I cannot logically explain that (assuming I know you don't have a twin, or clone). But it is happening.
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun:Not neccesarily. If I see you standing 12ft to my right, and 12ft to my left at the same time, I cannot logically explain that (assuming I know you don't have a twin, or clone). But it is happening.
You think it is happening. There is no way to know if it is actually happening. An interesting thought, though. Perhaps this can serve as an example why claims of absolute knowledge are "nonsense", which would place ethics and morality squarely in the "nonsense" category.
Liberty Student:Isn't that a failure of observation regardless?
Failure against what standard? The assumed "truth" of our collective observation?
I dont neccesarily disagree with any of this. But if you are attempting to equate observable, testable, collective knowledge with faith, you are in the wrong. One is a supposition based on evidence, the other cares not if the evidence even contradicts it.
It would go; We can never know if anything is true > observable, testable, collective data > faith
[
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun:But if you are attempting to equate observable, testable, collective knowledge with faith, you are in the wrong. One is a supposition based on evidence, the other cares not if the evidence even contradicts it.
I wasn't, but since you bring it up...
You must still have faith that what you observe, no matter how repeatable, testable, collective, etc., is a "true" representation of "reality". The difference is that Science is a flexible doctrine (as you wrote, it's laws are based upon the intersubjective consensus of its adherents), which makes Humanism such a well-adapted meme. It does not risk becoming an anachronism, as the rigid, codefied, divine-revalatory faiths have.
You will get no argument from me there.
'I can say "I prefer bananas to apples" without violating value-free praxeology just as much as I can say, "I prefer not killing to killing.'
Clayton, I don't understand how you can say you value something while still remaining value free. Now if you were talking about the values of another individual irregardless of your own then I would understand. However, the understanding component, which I think is what you are trying to deduce here is not in the realm of praxeology. Praxeology just shows action, simply what is or what would be. How we understand evaluation is in the class of thymology.
'So, ethics is subjective and relative to the individual. But that doesn't make it nonsense'
To play devil's advocate, why not? If ethical theory is dependent upon the individual 'viewer' then why can it not be nonsense to them? Why does it follow that it has to be sensical? Furthermore how can you prove that ethical evaluations exist, which you claim, if they are completely dependent on a differing individual?
Concerning your belief about ethics being ascetic emotions, how can you come to such a conclusion whereby other individuals are governed by the same outlook? Why do you perceive that human interaction is governed by these feelings considering you admit that such interaction is completely subjective? How can these ethics evolve if they are subjective? Perhaps you are saying that there exists in humans a trait in which they desire peace, non-violence, harmony etc which demands that they acquire certain societal ethical beliefs in order to achieve goal but then such a system would no longer be subjective. It would exist regardless of what individual you are looking at.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
'I can say "I prefer bananas to apples" without violating value-free praxeology just as much as I can say, "I prefer not killing to killing.' Clayton, I don't understand how you can say you value something while still remaining value free.
Clayton, I don't understand how you can say you value something while still remaining value free.
No, I mean that value-free praxeology can encompass discussion of value statements... if it could not, we would have no praxeology of economic actions. I am then trying to make a direct comparison between ordinary economic value-statements and ethical value-statements to show that if value-free methods can be applied to discussion of economic valuations, then they can be applied to discussion of ethical valuations, as well.
Now if you were talking about the values of another individual irregardless of your own then I would understand. However, the understanding component, which I think is what you are trying to deduce here is not in the realm of praxeology. Praxeology just shows action, simply what is or what would be. How we understand evaluation is in the class of thymology. 'So, ethics is subjective and relative to the individual. But that doesn't make it nonsense' To play devil's advocate, why not? If ethical theory is dependent upon the individual 'viewer' then why can it not be nonsense to them? Why does it follow that it has to be sensical? Furthermore how can you prove that ethical evaluations exist, which you claim, if they are completely dependent on a differing individual?
Well, let me put it this way - ethical valuations are no more nonsensical than other kinds of valuation. The absurdist might argue that everything is nonsensical but so what? I am just saying that ethics is not especially nonsensical.
Concerning your belief about ethics being ascetic emotions, how can you come to such a conclusion whereby other individuals are governed by the same outlook?
Well, they're not. That's the whole point in characterizing ethical sentiment as a kind of aesthetic sentiment.
Why do you perceive that human interaction is governed by these feelings considering you admit that such interaction is completely subjective? How can these ethics evolve if they are subjective?
Well, that's not a problem; if you grant that any sort of valuation evolved, then it is possible for subjective valuations to evolve (including ethical ones).
Perhaps you are saying that there exists in humans a trait in which they desire peace, non-violence, harmony etc which demands that they acquire certain societal ethical beliefs in order to achieve goal but then such a system would no longer be subjective. It would exist regardless of what individual you are looking at.
Hmm, not quite. However, I think this may be the key to distinguishing between merely aesthetic or economic valuations versus ethical valuations. It seems that humans have an extremely powerful set of hardwired emotions and even physiological reactions (blushing) which are triggered by feelings of shame, rejection and disapproval by peers. We refer to certain complexes of these reactions as "guilt".
Guilt is pretty important in regulating human affairs. People do many things they otherwise would not (and vice-versa) out of guilt or to avoid feelings of guilt. This capacity for feeling guilt must have evolved for a reason.
Ethical assertions can be interpreted in terms of guilt, such as, "Any normal person will feel guilty if he murders someone." This is value-free since it is really just a conditional statement, "Either you feel guilty after murdering someone or you're not normal." Of course, we can substitute "good" for "normal": "Any good person would feel too guilty to attempt to murder someone" which translates roughly to the idea that, for a good person, any attempt to commit murder would result in so much anticipated guilt that he would be unable to go through with the contemplated action.
However, my primary interest in guilt is not for its own sake but, rather to see if it provides the defining distinction between ethical valuations and other kinds of valuations. In other words, what sort of fruit I buy or what sort of music I like to listen to is not likely to evoke very strong feelings within you but what sort of sexual practices I desire just might evoke a very strong feeling in you, even if you are not a party to it. Sex - like life itself - is surrounded with extremely powerful ethical sentiments.
Please don't mistake any of these ramblings as a cogent theory, I'm in the exploratory phase on this whole subject right now. </rambling>
Clayton -
Clayton B:Guilt is pretty important in regulating human affairs. People do many things they otherwise would not (and vice-versa) out of guilt or to avoid feelings of guilt. This capacity for feeling guilt must have evolved for a reason.
This raises an important question. Do some actions make us feel guilty naturally, and as a result begin to define ethical questions, or are we led to feel guilty after commiting said specific actions due to cultural conditioning?
Well, I think the answer is pretty clear that both are the case. The same action that is a faux pas in one cultural context (say, burping) may be acceptable in another cultural context. The person who commits the faux pas in the one cultural context will probably experience a feeling that is closely related to guilt, namely, shame or embarrassment. But what actions will trigger feelings of embarrassment clearly varies significantly from culture to culture. If you include religion in the analysis, I think you can say the same for feelings of guilt, as well.
But other actions trigger feelings of guilt in any culture. The feelings of guilt associated with these actions, then, must transcend culture and have their root in our biology. The feeling of loathing at the thought of killing another human being and the powerful feelings of guilt usually associated with killing another human being are not the result of cultural conditioning.
If morality is rooted in biology I wouldn't write it off as nonsense.
Like most things, a little bit nature, a whole lot of nurture.
Well, how and why we feel guilt about some actions is definitely rooted in our biology. But I don't see why anything not rooted in biology is nonsense, except if you mean something that is supposed to be entirely untethered to our biology and the constraints of the physical world (e.g. an intangible soul). There are complex reasons why some people feel guilt over not attending church on Sunday. This clearly has no simple biological explanation, the explanation would be cultural. But I think that a good explanation for this kind of guilt would not be nonsense.
I think it is clear that morality itself is a biological things. Feeling like certain things are wrong is pretty universal for humans (like every society has an insest taboo). But the specific things that are wrong are almost entirely dependant on culture.
a little bit nature, a whole lot of nurture
Most of human behavior is less the result of nurture than the last century and a half of study of human behavior would lead you to believe. Read Steven Pinker's The Blank Slate or watch this.
Edited to add: Actually, watch this first before watching the above link.
the specific things that are wrong are almost entirely dependant on culture
I loathe having to be the pedant but in this case, I will cast doubt on the ability to quantify how much guilt or how many actions give rise to guilt is or is not dependent on culture. More useful to stick to the facts and just analyze whether guilt arising from specific actions is culturally universal or culturally relative.
Well, how and why we feel guilt about some actions is definitely rooted in our biology. But I don't see why anything not rooted in biology is nonsense, except if you mean something that is supposed to be entirely untethered to our biology and the constraints of the physical world (e.g. an intangible soul).
I didn't mean to imply the inverse in my statement. I'm not claiming that things rooted outside of our biology are de facto nonsense, just that something that is rooted in our biology isn't. I wouldn't write off all outside factors, such as a community, as nonsense either.
As far as I am aware, the incest taboo is really our only universal phenomena, and even the specifics of the taboo are not the same. Guilt is natural, the specifics of what cause guilt are mostly culture. BUt I agree that it would be nearly impossible to quantify guilt.