@Epicurus: You don't think guilt associated with killing another human being is culturally universal?
Clayton -
Haha, no. Not at all. See, human history. For a more pertinent example, the.... Yaninami, or something like that. Yanonami, something. I am sure you can find some resources on them. Killing to them is just a natural part of the culture.
In States a fresh law is looked upon as a remedy for evil. Instead of themselves altering what is bad, people begin by demanding a law to alter it. ... In short, a law everywhere and for everything!
~Peter Kropotkin
Let me repharse that. There is probably a universal on killing that I am not taking into account. I guess i misunderstood the question. There is probably a universal on killing, but who it is bad to kill and when it is appropriate is not very universal.
Everything we think about how humans cope with killing is wrong. It's never "acceptable" to your brain* to kill another human being and almost all individuals who do kill another human being (in war) generally experience massive psychological after-effects, including guilt.
*I mean by this that casual killing, i.e. ritual human sacrifice, is never acceptable to the human brain (sociopaths excepted, of course). I would love to see a study into how people cope with killing they did when they were in a genuine defense situation.
I have to go so I dont have time to watch it right now. Do they only take the modernized world into account, or do they study 3rd world and indigenous cultures as well? As far as I know, the Yanonami gain clan pride in their ritual warfare.
Yes, Lt. Col. Grossman discusses (in more detail in his book On Killing) tribal warfare. Tribal warfare is, as you said, largely a "ritual" affair, meaning that there was lots of display of force, lots of spear-shaking, lots of bright colors, big masks, and so on, but very little actual blood. A few people might actually get killed and the whole affair generally ended by sunset. This is a stark contrast with modern warfare, of course, which is a 24x7 all-weather, all-hands affair in which millions can be killed. But research shows that a tiny percentage of soldiers (2%) are responsible for almost all the killing. Modern military training since the end of World War II has actively subverted this "shortcoming" of the human brain and today's soldiers are much more deadly than soldiers even 60 years ago, as measured by the percentage who will fire their rifles in combat, actively aim for individual enemy combatants and succeed in killing. The long and short of it is that all but a tiny percentage of humans are loathe to kill one another, a "problem" the military has had to actively counteract in order to get its recruits to actually kill in combat.
now that you mention it, I think I remember reading excerpts of this paper in one of my classes. If I remember correctly he, or the movie, reference the Yanonami, since they are such a stark example (their warfare is far from ritual).
I would tend to agree with this, but I still think there are specifics like a person feeling less guilty of killing a black than a white, or things along those lines.
Like I said, little bit nature, whole lot of nurture.
little bit nature, whole lot of nurture
Well, of course there are exceptions... people kill. Whether they kill from a lack of conscience or through conquering the psychological obstacles to killing, they kill. But I disagree with your characterization of guilt as being primarily determined by nurture. If anything, the latest research suggests that (parental) nurture is almost irrelevant to human behavior. Steven Pinker discusses this in The Blank Slate.
I think it is a matter of semantics we are arguing here. I am not saying it is quantifiably this much nature, this much nurture. My position is that nature lays the backdrop of emotions, ethics, morality, etc. Nurture and personal desire decide the specifics.
Studying the biological bases of our "moral" emotions (guilt, empathy, disgust, sense of justice/fairness, etc.) seems worthwhile, because if these factors are near-universal, it hints at there being certain near-universal aspects appearing in emergent legal codes. However, the words morality and ethics carry so much baggage that it seems expedient to choose different terminology entirely. Maybe "social emotions."
Otherwise every time this comes up we'll have to re-enact a whole series of threads like this just to reclaim the level of clarity we have achieved here (the forum history shows this to be a recurring debate covering the same ground each time).
Why anarchy fails
Clayton,
I'm going to be that guy who suggests something to read, but who doesn't really contribute anything substantial to the conversation. That being said, I think that these books will answer your questions, or at least clarity the amoral position. They certainly did for me.
LA Rollins - The Myth of Natural Rights. (A critique of Rand, Rothbard, and their followers. He argues that man's "needs" and his "rational nature" don't have any normative implications.)
Richard Joyce - The Myth of Morality. (Argues that moral claims don't make any sense.)
I Samuel 8
ClaytonB:Well, how and why we feel guilt about some actions is definitely rooted in our biology.
Care to provide some evidence?
ClaytonB:More useful to stick to the facts and just analyze whether guilt arising from specific actions is culturally universal or culturally relative.
I can't think of an action that was/is universally condemmed.
Epicurus Ibn Klahoun:As far as I am aware, the incest taboo is really our only universal phenomena
ORLY!?!?!?!?
Jesse,
Neither of the books you've recommended really dispute what Clayton seems to be saying, in fact, the latter book points out that moral claims are rooted in biology.
I hate to be the party pooper here, but this tread is in danger of becoming silly. It is wholly irrelevant if one action or another is genetically abhorrent to a majority of the human population. You are still relying on a majority to determine the truth. This is no more or less valid than simply following the ten commandments. But since Science is so much more appealing to the Humanist than a divine-revelatory ideology, it seems to be considered a much more reliable method of reckoning. Other than for personal preference, I don't see why that is the case.
Sure, there is no culture that does not hold that murder is immoral. That's at least one moral which is culturally universal (rooted in our biology).
With the exception of pathological individuals who exhibit a lack of common moral sense, there are many such actions: murder, rape, infidelity, cuckoldry, and so on.
It is wholly irrelevant if one action or another is genetically abhorrent to a majority of the human population.
Now that's silly. Humans build houses because living in the elements is abhorrent to us. We value living in dwellings that shelter us from the elements. Such an observation is not irrelevant to understanding the particulars of human nature anymore than an observation that most birds prefer to nest in trees is irrelevant to understanding the particulars of bird nature.
You are still relying on a majority to determine the truth.
I think you're incorrectly characterizing the issue. If you can find a pattern in a population (of any species, not just humans), that pattern must have a cause (otherwise, it wouldn't be a pattern, it would be random). The fact that humans have a pattern of finding certain actions morally revolting solicits an explanation. How did this moral revulsion arise in the ancestral environment? Of course, I would also like to understand the wider issue of how moral revulsion arose in the first place and why other animals seem to exhibit behavior which is consistent with moral revulsion or even regret.
Yes, really.
actions: murder, rape, infidelity, cuckoldry
You're going to have to provide substantive evidence that any of these things are universal.
And there's a difference between having a universal taboo, and how the specifics are divided. Murder may be fine, if it is another tribe member. Rape may be fine if it is a member of your houlsehold or one of your slaves. Etc, etc
Clayton:Sure, there is no culture that does not hold that murder is immoral. That's at least one moral which is culturally universal (rooted in our biology).
The Aztecs?
That exception negates universality, no?
Murder - Aztecs
Rape - Romans
Infidelity - Take Your Pick
Cuckoldry - essentially the same as infidelity
and so on.
Humans build houses because living in the elements is abhorrent to us. We value living in dwellings that shelter us from the elements.
This does not therefore make it a moral "good" to live in a shelter. So crude preference is irrelevant to the topic at hand.
I think you're incorrectly characterizing the issue. If you can find a pattern in a population (of any species, not just humans), that pattern must have a cause (otherwise, it wouldn't be a pattern, it would be random). The fact that humans have a pattern of finding certain actions morally revolting solicits an explanation.
Granted, but it seems that some of the contributors of this thread are jumping the gun in declaring some sort of "natural morality" as the causal agent.
other animals seem to exhibit behavior which is consistent with moral revulsion or even regret
Any examples?
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun:Yes, really
What about the Pharaoh?
FIrst it is a cultural universal, not a biological universal. There are absolutely no biological universals, as their is always someone who doesn't follow it.
Second, there was probably someone in or outside his kinship he was not allowed to fornicate with. Incest taboo doesnt mean incest = bad, it can also mean non-incest=bad.
it is a cultural universal, not a biological universal. There are absolutely no biological universals
I recommend you read Why Beautiful People Have More Daughters by Kanazawa and Miller for an introduction to evolutionary psychology. The term "culturally universal" is opposed to "culturally relative". I don't think anyone uses the term "biological universals" - I would think such a thing would refer to something that is universal in all species of life. DNA would probably be the only biologically universal thing.
An example of something that is culturally relative is the color red. The color red has positive or negative connotations in different cultures. But secondary sexual attributes of females that males find attractive are culturally universal - large, full breasts, red lips, smooth, light-colored eyes, skin and hair. Why does every race and culture pursue this same set of sexual attributes in their females? Evolutionary psychology provides the answer. In the ancestral environment, youth is the primary factor in determining a woman's reproductive success and large breasts that don't sag, red lips that haven't yet faded, smooth light-colored skin and hair that have not yet darkened are non-counterfeitable tokens of a woman's youth*. Those men who pursued and reproduced with women who exhibited these tokens in the ancestral environment were more reproductively successful. Hence, there is a culturally universal (biological) predisposition towards these attributes in every culture and every race.
You and Jackson are both mistaking a descriptive theory that explains identifiable patterns of human behavior for a prescriptive norm. That large, full breasts, red lips, smooth, light-colored eyes, skin and hair are culturally universal ideals of female beauty obviously does not mean that every man without exception prefers these attributes. Some men are even homosexual and are not attracted to women at all. But the pattern of preference is identifiable in every culture, so not only does it solicit explanation, it solicits an adaptive, evolutionary explanation of how this preference arose in the ancestral environment.
The same goes for moral sensibilities. There are clearly identifiable moral norms that do, in fact, transcend culture (no, the Aztecs are not an exception) and these moral norms must have evolutionary explanations in the ancestral environment. Unfortunately, Kanazawa and Miller's book does not discuss the origins of morality so I cannot give detailed examples but Steven Pinker often identifies a number of culturally-universal mores (and I'm 100% certain he has the data to back up his claims). Research in progress.
*It turns out that explaining why men prefer light-colored eyes in women is more challenging... read the book.
It is wholly irrelevant if one action or another is genetically abhorrent to a majority of the human population. You are still relying on a majority to determine the truth. This is no more or less valid than simply following the ten commandments. But since Science is so much more appealing to the Humanist than a divine-revelatory ideology, it seems to be considered a much more reliable method of reckoning. Other than for personal preference, I don't see why that is the case.
Whats silly is thinking morality should even be qualified as truth-apt. Human population is the only thing that is relevant in this case. If most people find the taste of dog meat to be revolting a chef ought not to cook with it. It doesn't make a difference that taste cannot be proven or disproven. Same for morality.
Epicurus Ibn Kalhoun:See, human history. For a more pertinent example, the.... Yaninami, or something like that. Yanonami, something. I am sure you can find some resources on them. Killing to them is just a natural part of the culture.
Here's an article debunking the Yanomamo myth. Part II. Part III. Here's an interview of Steven Pinker where he discusses culturally universal moral sentiments.
I actually agree with both Clayton and Jackson.
It is certainly the case that due to evolution, all human beings share certain characteristics. We're empathetic, we can reason, we have, at least to some extent, free will, etc. Ofc some people have more/less of certain characteristics than others. But I think it's safe to say that people with zero empathy just like people with zero ability to reason are not ... normal. Ofc that may or may not be morally relevant and this is where I agree with Jackson. It is not easy to go from "our biology is X" to "therefore we ought to do Y". It's pretty hard to say that because most human beings (some do NOT think this btw) think murder is wrong, we ought not to kill. That's not morality. It's merely a majoritarian type of ethics in which what most people think seems to have some sort of significance. It does not. And libertarians should know better. If we were to listen to what most people think in order to determine what is right and what is wrong, with respect to political philosophy, then we would have to be some kind of... centrists/statists.
I am afraid our biology is not and can not be used as a moral compass (just like it does not and can not be used as a political compass). At least in most cases it can't be. I don't remember Berlin's exact quote about the crooked timber that is humanity but I agree with it.
P.S. I am sure Jackson will denounce me as a "humanist"!
P.S.2. Interesting discussion guys.
I actually agree with both Clayton and Jackson. It is certainly the case that due to evolution, all human beings share certain characteristics. We're empathetic, we can reason, we have, at least to some extent, free will, etc. Ofc some people have more/less of certain characteristics than others. But I think it's safe to say that people with zero empathy just like people with zero ability to reason are not ... normal. Ofc that may or may not be morally relevant and this is where I agree with Jackson. It is not easy to go from "our biology is X" to "therefore we ought to do Y". It's pretty hard to say that because most human beings (some do NOT think this btw) think murder is wrong, we ought not to kill.
It is certainly the case that due to evolution, all human beings share certain characteristics. We're empathetic, we can reason, we have, at least to some extent, free will, etc. Ofc some people have more/less of certain characteristics than others. But I think it's safe to say that people with zero empathy just like people with zero ability to reason are not ... normal. Ofc that may or may not be morally relevant and this is where I agree with Jackson. It is not easy to go from "our biology is X" to "therefore we ought to do Y". It's pretty hard to say that because most human beings (some do NOT think this btw) think murder is wrong, we ought not to kill.
If the only reason a person can think of not to murder another human being is that most other people think murder is wrong, then something is already out of place. What most people do or don't think about right and wrong cannot be a sufficient condition for deciding what is right and wrong. Furthermore, I think that right and wrong is more of an inborn sense (like aesthetic sense or taste) that, if not present, cannot be replaced by ethical arguments.
The purpose of looking to our biology is to try to understand the "scaffolding" in which ethical sentiments exist. While I cannot yet fully articulate my thoughts on the subject, I have reached a point where I am convinced that we can, in fact, construct a useful and meaningful framework for discussing what is, in fact, right or wrong (and I think we can do this without being ethical realists or objectivists!)
That's not morality. It's merely a majoritarian type of ethics in which what most people think seems to have some sort of significance. It does not. And libertarians should know better. If we were to listen to what most people think in order to determine what is right and what is wrong, with respect to political philosophy, then we would have to be some kind of... centrists/statists.
Yep. Ethical discussion is incredibly nuanced and I think it is really easy to lose one's way in the labyrinth which explains part of the reason humanity has made so little progress in the realm of moral philosophy.
I am afraid our biology is not and can not be used as a moral compass
That is certainly the case.
Thanks.
'No, I mean that value-free praxeology can encompass discussion of value statements... if it could not, we would have no praxeology of economic actions. I am then trying to make a direct comparison between ordinary economic value-statements and ethical value-statements to show that if value-free methods can be applied to discussion of economic valuations, then they can be applied to discussion of ethical valuations, as well.'
But how can ethical valuations be treated like economic valuations? It seems like your trying to cross the is-ought barrier by linking economics to ethics.
'Well, let me put it this way - ethical valuations are no more nonsensical than other kinds of valuation. The absurdist might argue that everything is nonsensical but so what? I am just saying that ethics is not especially nonsensical.'
Well again to play devil's advocate...why not?
'Well, they're not. That's the whole point in characterizing ethical sentiment as a kind of aesthetic sentiment.'
But that still leaves me asking the question, how do you know that others see ethical sentiments as a type of ascetic considering that you stated that ethical sentiments are subjective.
'Well, that's not a problem; if you grant that any sort of valuation evolved, then it is possible for subjective valuations to evolve (including ethical ones).'
Perhaps but we are talking about ethical sentiments that are held by a vast majority of the populace. You believe it a coincidence that such widescale acceptance came from subjectivity?
'I think this may be the key to distinguishing between merely aesthetic or economic valuations versus ethical valuations. It seems that humans have an extremely powerful set of hardwired emotions and even physiological reactions (blushing) which are triggered by feelings of shame, rejection and disapproval by peers. We refer to certain complexes of these reactions as "guilt"'
But earlier you seemed to be stating that ethical valuations are just ascetic valuations.
'Ethical assertions can be interpreted in terms of guilt, such as, "Any normal person will feel guilty if he murders someone." This is value-free since it is really just a conditional statement, "Either you feel guilty after murdering someone or you're not normal." Of course, we can substitute "good" for "normal": "Any good person would feel too guilty to attempt to murder someone" which translates roughly to the idea that, for a good person, any attempt to commit murder would result in so much anticipated guilt that he would be unable to go through with the contemplated action.
However, my primary interest in guilt is not for its own sake but, rather to see if it provides the defining distinction between ethical valuations and other kinds of valuations. In other words, what sort of fruit I buy or what sort of music I like to listen to is not likely to evoke very strong feelings within you but what sort of sexual practices I desire just might evoke a very strong feeling in you, even if you are not a party to it. Sex - like life itself - is surrounded with extremely powerful ethical sentiments.'
Well you seem to be thinking that what we do is governed by how we feel. What exactly are the 'ethics' of sex? Are you trying to draw the line between ascetics and ethics by how powerful the emotion we feel because you seem to be saying that buy fruit isn't a powerful emotion so therefore it is a question of ascetics but guilt over murder is a powerful emotion therefore it is an ethical valuation.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
Clayton:You and Jackson are both mistaking a descriptive theory that explains identifiable patterns of human behavior for a prescriptive norm.
If I am, it is the result of a conflation of issues. This thread is in regards to the prescriptive norms known as "morals", upon which ethics is based. If we are strictly talking value-free observations, that's a different conversation. You seem to be eager to take one (the science) to make the other (morals). I disagree with this, and have argued accordingly.
Angurse:If most people find the taste of dog meat to be revolting a chef ought not to cook with it.
The "Ought" in this statement only makes sense if there is a definite end the chef is attempting to accomplish (best chef in town award, keeping his job, etc.). The market will determine what he "Ought" and "Ought Not" do. The simple majority consensus about "Good" and "Bad" does not adaquetly determine what actions people will take.
Left-libertarian:I am sure Jackson will denounce me as a "humanist"!
Why would I do that? You just stated your belief that Man is incapable as Law-Giver. That's about as "un-Humanist" as you can get.
Clayton:I am convinced that we can, in fact, construct a useful and meaningful framework for discussing what is, in fact, right or wrong (and I think we can do this without being ethical realists or objectivists!)
This statement seems inheirently contradictory to me.
Andrew Cain:You believe it a coincidence that such widescale acceptance came from subjectivity?
I know this was for Clayton, but if I may interject...
Yes. If there were certain commonly held goals which the populations you refer to were attempting to achieve, certain actions would prove to be better at achieving them. If village unity was one, I could see how killing, raping, and looting would be discouraged. Or perhaps (at least for the Divine-Revelatory laws) those in power attempted to enact laws that they felt would keep the peasants content and generating income. Whether or not these conclusions are "true" or not really has no bearing on people's acceptance of them.
You bring up some interesting quotes, AC. Like this one:
Clayton:That's the whole point in characterizing ethical sentiment as a kind of aesthetic sentiment.
OK, fair enough. But then,
I have reached a point where I am convinced that we can, in fact, construct a useful and meaningful framework for discussing what is, in fact, right or wrong
Hmm, so ethics can be considered equitable to aesthetics, and ethics can also be reasoned into absolutes.
So tell me Clay, what is the "right" color to paint my house next spring?
You seem to be eager to take one (the science) to make the other (morals). I disagree with this, and have argued accordingly.
If my language has been unclear, I apologize. I rule out from the outset any possibility of deriving "ought" from "is", including Rothbard's, Hoppe's, Rand's and other attempts at this. However, I think that what we mean by "ought' is not even well-understood and rarely discussed in a useful manner. My only contention in this thread is that ethics (the discussion of oughts) is not nonsense. That's it. Beyond that, I'm just in exploratory mode.
Hmm, so ethics can be considered equitable to aesthetics, and ethics can also be reasoned into absolutes. So tell me Clay, what is the "right" color to paint my house next spring?
Well, aesthetics is not as relative as people in the post-20th century art era might be led to believe. Steven Pinker discusses, in a TED lecture reviewing his book The Blank Slate, the significant blowback he received from the academic community for his observation that elite art since the 1930's has been in decline precisely because it is no longer artistic, that is, it does not appeal to human aesthetics.
That there are human aesthetics is undeniable. Symmetry, variation on a theme, natural subjects (and even, as Pinker notes in the above lecture, the color white) are assigned an aesthetically pleasing place in every culture. Things that resemble bodily fluids, dead things and other potential disease vectors are assigned an aesthetically unpleasing place in every culture. We can identify evolutionary reasons why this should be the case. The human aesthetic is not arbitrary.
However, patterns of group behavior have never been a limitation on individual choice since the individual has plenipotentiary power over his own body and no one and nothing else can have anything but proximate power over his body (inalienable will). Individual exceptions to identifiable patterns in group behavior do not disprove the group behavior. Of course, identifiable patterns in group behavior are not normative but that's irrelevant to my point. My point is that what people mean by "beautiful" or "ugly" is not arbitrary nor is it subject to unilateral redefinition by an aesthetic crank. Similarly, what people mean by "good" or "bad" is not arbitrary nor is it subject to unilateral redefinition by ethical nihilists or other ethical cranks.
I'm not attempting to assert that all aethetic or moral judgements are purely arbitrary, but the fact that the aggregate of humanity has overlying preferences is wholly irrelevant to the validity of normative statements, which ethics and morals are. I've read a couple posters here who happen to think that ethics and morals don't have to necessarily be normative statements, but if they aren't, I would like to know what they are. Without the normative implication, they simply become statements of preference, so to differentiate them is non-sensical. You may argue that the difference is the subject matter in which morals/ethic deals in, but I don't understand how the line gets drawn.
Collective experience, and an attempt to be un-biased.
Merely an attempt, the nature of minds doesn't allow complete detachment (arguably).
I don't understand how aesthetics are relevant to ethics. Jackson is correct. Merely saying this painting is beautiful or this woman is beautiful is NOT a normative statement. You can not say to other people you SHOULD find this painting beautiful or else I will lock you up. Which is what ethics are about. If they aren't about that, if people aren't obliged to obey certain rules then I'm afraid ethics are as useless as aesthetics.
Jackson LaRose:I've read a couple posters here who happen to think that ethics and morals don't have to necessarily be normative statements, but if they aren't, I would like to know what they are. Without the normative implication, they simply become statements of preference, so to differentiate them is non-sensical.
They are suggestions (a manual) about (precedent and experience derived) means toward an (assumed desired) end. In other words, you may paint your house whatever color you want, but painting it pink may not be the best means towards the end of selling it.
Z.