Maybe she likes being mistreated. Perhaps you're not familiar with the BD/SM scene. Would you argue that alternative sexual lifestyles and relationships are not mutual? How would you determine what is and is not?
Once again, you're dropping the context and bringing up a special case as a red herring. Clearly, the context of what he was talking about was not BD/SM. Plenty of people are in perpetually abusive relationships without really enjoying the treatment they get, often because they are scared or dependent on some way. It doesn't mean it's a mutually beneficial relationship.
You're stuck with BP and others with this argument, because you're saying that YOU the 3rd party can void any exchange or interaction.
This strawman of "you're advocating forcing people to act in certain ways" is old, and it always is an evasion of what people are actually argueing.
Or you're saying, that one party can always void a transaction by claiming exploitation. Which almost works, except which party gets to claim this? What if they both do?
This too is a false framing of what is being said. What makes it exploitation is not that a party in any exchange, for whatever arbitrary reason, says it is or suddenly doesn't like something. What makes it exploitation is that the systematic context in which they live or the particular situation creates power dynamics that give them little choice but to submit to control by others, that people's unfortunate circumstances are used as an oppurtunity to get the most out of them while still leaving them in the same basic situation. If that context is established, then they can meaningfully claim exploitation.
Where I get stuck here is the "lack of options" and "unfortunate circumstances" part. Don't those things necessarily imply subjective value judgements to begin with? My problem is that judgement has already been made out of the circumstances, and that the circumstances are "bad". This would imply that wether something is exploitation or not is subjective.
The kind of things being refered to are such that literally whoever was the party in them, it would be "bad" or an "unfortunate circumstance" for them, not only from their perspective, but objectively in terms of survival and flourishing. If your requirement is that it has to be "bad" from their perspective, you'll be hard pressed to find any functional human being who would not find it to be "bad" or "unfortunate" when they themselves were in the situation. Thus, no "3rd party imposition" necessary.
So I think that bringing "subjective value judgements" into this is irrelevant, and furthermore, as I implied in my earlier posts in this thread, subjective value theory in economics is not the same thing as ethical subjectivism. Some "Austrians" conflate the two, which is a categorical error. But even *within* an ethical subjectivist framework, my arguments can work.
Brainpolice:By "non-legal ethics", do you mean a presumed part of ethics where violations thereof do not justify coercion or punishment of the violators? Yes, and/or that portion of ethics that doesn't have to do with physical aggression.
By "non-legal ethics", do you mean a presumed part of ethics where violations thereof do not justify coercion or punishment of the violators?
Yes, and/or that portion of ethics that doesn't have to do with physical aggression.
Okay, fair enough. I myself make the same kind of distinction, although I use different terms. Here's what I see as the mapping between our different semantics:
Does that make sense?
Brainpolice:Again, how do you define "position of power"? Do you define "power" like I do -- "ability to coerce"? Or what? See above.
Again, how do you define "position of power"? Do you define "power" like I do -- "ability to coerce"? Or what?
See above.
Gotcha. I'll address your definition below.
Brainpolice:About the "position of power thing", I definitely think that in the drowning scenario, the non-drowning person is *situationally* in a position of power. It's not political power, but it is a position of power relationally, in the sense that their decision can significantly effect the life of someone else - and in this case, their decision equates to life or death for someone else. The fact that it's a position of power becomes even more clear when we add that they are making demands of servitude from someone else based on the fact that the other person is in a vulnerable position. I don't see how we can look at such a scenario and not see that there is an obvious power dynamic that can be taken advantage of.
With all due respect, this suggests to me that you do think that A would be killing B by refusing to help him.
Furthermore, I can only infer from this that you're defining "position of power" as simply "inequality of circumstance(s)". If I'm wrong here, please help me understand better.
Brainpolice:Likewise, in my original bottle-of-water scenario, the non-dehydrating person is in a position of power in that they possess something that is instrumental towards saving the other person's life; the power to withhold that, their decision to share it or not, determines someone else's fate. Are they Hitler? No. But there obviously is a power dynamic that they can use to gain as much as they can from someone else, while that someone else is essentially helpless. I would say that someone who knowingly, willing tries to gain something in such a way from someone in a vulnerable position, to make a power play, is basically engaged in exploitation.
Here it sounds like you're using "exploitation" and "make a power play" to mean "enhance an inequality relationship (particularly an economic inequality relationship". This seems to be consistent with your previous paragraph. Essentially you're saying that you find it unethical (in terms of your non-legal ethics) for one to use another's disadvantage as a means to gain an advantage for himself.
As far as I can tell, the only thing that can keep you (or anyone else) from considering coercion to be justified in such situations is if you see such coercion as being aggressive. And the only thing that can let you see such coercion as being aggressive is if you distinguish refusing to help from causing harm. However, it doesn't seem to me like you constistently distinguish between the two. Does this make sense?
Brainpolice:This is essentially what I understand "exploitation" to mean, no LTV necessary. It has to do with the power dynamics of particular situations, basically taking advantage of other people's lack of options and unfortunate circumstances to either control them are gain as much as one can from them. And absolute land property rights (potentially) justifies exploitation because a chunk of land functions as an unlimited sphere of power in which one can control others (do whatever I tell you to do within these lines, or be forced outside of these lines).
How do you define "control" there?
I think the issue with land ownership is more complex and nuanced than "do whatever I tell you to do within these lines, or be forced outside of these lines". To put it that way seems like an oversimplification and hence a strawman, IMO. Or is that the point you're making?
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Okay, fair enough. I myself make the same kind of distinction, although I use different terms. Here's what I see as the mapping between our different semantics: My "morality" equals your "legal ethics". My "ethics" equals your "non-legal ethics". Does that make sense?
That seems about right. I just call it "ethics" and split it into a legal and non-legal domain, although I think the two can relate to each other in certain ways (I.E. I don't think that libertarianism as a political doctrine can actually be applicable in the real world without a certain level of ethics within the culture, and in this sense I think non-legal ethics is a prerequisite for the legal portion of ethics to work). I generally avoid the word "morality", partly because it tends to have more religious connotations and skeptic/nihilist types are more likely to get oppositional by the use of the word.
Brainpolice: Maybe she likes being mistreated. Perhaps you're not familiar with the BD/SM scene. Would you argue that alternative sexual lifestyles and relationships are not mutual? How would you determine what is and is not? Once again, you're dropping the context and bringing up a special case as a red herring.
Once again, you're dropping the context and bringing up a special case as a red herring.
I wrote, "maybe she likes being mistreated". How does Scott know she does or does not? There are many people engaged in BD/SM that interact in what I consider to be abusive manners, but I certainly don't claim that the exchange isn't mutual.
Calling it a red herring is in itself a red herring. My point is clear and substantive. How does Scott know what is voluntary sado-masochism and what is not?
Brainpolice:Clearly, the context of what he was talking about was not BD/SM.
Now you're special pleading.
Brainpolice:Plenty of people are in perpetually abusive relationships without really enjoying the treatment they get, often because they are scared or dependent on some way. It doesn't mean it's a mutually beneficial relationship.
Who is responsible for your or my feelings of fear and dependence?
Brainpolice:You're stuck with BP and others with this argument, because you're saying that YOU the 3rd party can void any exchange or interaction. This strawman of "you're advocating forcing people to act in certain ways" is old, and it always is an evasion of what people are actually argueing.
What are you advocating then? Can you or can you not pass judgment on whether Scott and my relationship is exploitative, regardless of how we feel about it?
Brainpolice:Or you're saying, that one party can always void a transaction by claiming exploitation. Which almost works, except which party gets to claim this? What if they both do? This too is a false framing of what is being said. What makes it exploitation is not that a party in any exchange, for whatever arbitrary reason, says it is or suddenly doesn't like something. What makes it exploitation is that the systematic context in which they live or the particular situation creates power dynamics that give them little choice but to submit to control by others, that people's unfortunate circumstances are used as an oppurtunity to get the most out of them while still leaving them in the same basic situation. If that context is established, then they can meaningfully claim exploitation.
Who establishes this context? Party A, B or 3rd party C?
Brainpolice:Okay, fair enough. I myself make the same kind of distinction, although I use different terms. Here's what I see as the mapping between our different semantics: My "morality" equals your "legal ethics". My "ethics" equals your "non-legal ethics". Does that make sense? That seems about right. I just call it "ethics" and split it into a legal and non-legal domain, although I think the two can relate to each other in certain ways (I.E. I don't think that libertarianism as a political doctrine can actually be applicable in the real world without a certain level of ethics within the culture, and in this sense I think non-legal ethics is a prerequisite for the legal portion of ethics to work). I generally avoid the word "morality", partly because it tends to have more religious connotations and skeptic/nihilist types are more likely to get oppositional by the use of the word.
Yeah, I can understand the hang-up about the term "morality". I'm confused about your statement that "non-legal ethics is a prerequisite for the legal portion of ethics to work" -- can you explain what you mean there?
FYI, I edited my last post to address your definition of "position of power".
MaikU:And I am not saying you would or anyone in his right mind would do that. At least on this forum. What I am saying is that it is quite arbitrary. Especially it is noticeable in the drowning man example, that's why I am trying to defend B's position. One doesn't have to use force to be ethicaly wrong. I think I am the only one in this thread who believes in objective morality so I now understand why it's hard for you to walk in my shoes. I am not propagating using violence against A if he doesn't help B, I am merely observing people's actions and try to understand intentions. Why human act the way it acts?
You're saying that the definition of "voluntary exchange" is quite arbitrary? Well, of course it is. All definitions are quite arbitrary, and inherently at that.
To me, it's not a question of whether one has to use force (better: commit aggression) to be ethically wrong. Rather, it's a question of whether force/coercion is justified against someone when that someone hasn't initiated it already. It can also be a question of what constitutes force/coercion to begin with. For example, in my example, one could say that A is coercing B because B is drowning. Of course, that would imply a different definition of "coerce" from "using or threatening physical force/violence".
I'm not sure how you can believe in objective morality. Maybe I'm not sure about your sense of "objective"?
liberty student: Scott F:A psychologically mistreats his girlfriend B but never beats her or threatens it.I'd hardly say that's mutual.You don't need to be an LL to see that.I've always though this way.By saying it's mutual your essentially saying it's moral which doesn't make much sense. "Maybe she likes being mistreated." Possibly.However if you look at examples of BD/SM and actual abusive relationships of any kind the differences are in the majority of cases clear.In any case I have shown that not all voluntary relationships(which involve a trade in the sense of values and non material things) are mutual.Maybe you wish to change your claim to all voluntary trade in economic terms is mutually beneficial? then I might reconsider.Though I can see the issue of context there too at least under statism. " Perhaps you're not familiar with the BD/SM scene." Not personally but I know of it. " Would you argue that alternative sexual lifestyles and relationships are not mutual?" Sometimes.I tend to think polygamy cannot work. " How would you determine what is and is not?" whether it's a relationship in which just behaviour prevails i.e. the person is not expected to blindly obey,adherence to NAP, kindness etc not all of it is required to be a mutual relationship but some things are. "You're stuck with BP and others with this argument, because you're saying that YOU the 3rd party can void any exchange or interaction." Well my argument differs in some respect to him.I don't think an immoral relation is any less voluntary but if it's abusive/ immoral then that's irrelevant. And what do you mean by "void"? void suggests cancel,invalidate or null.None of which I am suggesting. " Or you're saying, that one party can always void a transaction by claiming exploitation." I've never argued that.I haven't seen BP argue that either though he may hold that position.I do not.
Scott F:A psychologically mistreats his girlfriend B but never beats her or threatens it.I'd hardly say that's mutual.You don't need to be an LL to see that.I've always though this way.By saying it's mutual your essentially saying it's moral which doesn't make much sense.
"Maybe she likes being mistreated."
Possibly.However if you look at examples of BD/SM and actual abusive relationships of any kind the differences are in the majority of cases clear.In any case I have shown that not all voluntary relationships(which involve a trade in the sense of values and non material things) are mutual.Maybe you wish to change your claim to all voluntary trade in economic terms is mutually beneficial? then I might reconsider.Though I can see the issue of context there too at least under statism.
" Perhaps you're not familiar with the BD/SM scene."
Not personally but I know of it.
" Would you argue that alternative sexual lifestyles and relationships are not mutual?"
Sometimes.I tend to think polygamy cannot work.
" How would you determine what is and is not?"
whether it's a relationship in which just behaviour prevails i.e. the person is not expected to blindly obey,adherence to NAP, kindness etc not all of it is required to be a mutual relationship but some things are.
"You're stuck with BP and others with this argument, because you're saying that YOU the 3rd party can void any exchange or interaction."
Well my argument differs in some respect to him.I don't think an immoral relation is any less voluntary but if it's abusive/ immoral then that's irrelevant.
And what do you mean by "void"? void suggests cancel,invalidate or null.None of which I am suggesting.
" Or you're saying, that one party can always void a transaction by claiming exploitation."
I've never argued that.I haven't seen BP argue that either though he may hold that position.I do not.
I don't really want to comment or read anything here.I have near zero in common with many of you.I may return periodically when there's something you need to know.
Near Mutualist/Libertarian Socialist.
Brainpolice:My perspective is that it is kind of absurd to try to think of situations like this strictly in terms of economic exchange. I don't think it makes sense to reduce all human relations to "trade". Quite simply, I don't think these economic categories are universalizable to describe human relations. We're not economic calculation machines who act solely on the basis of exchange-utility.
All human action, regardless of how seemingly insignificant, is subject to calculation. That is, to perform one action is to postpone or refrain from all other possible actions. The action performed at any given moment is the action the actor belives at that moment will provide the most increase in utility.
That is praxeology, not economics. It looks like you are confusing praxeology with economics. It's easy to do, as economics is a branch of praxeology, and many of the same terms are used.
faber est suae quisque fortunae
Scott F:However if you look at examples of BD/SM and actual abusive relationships of any kind the differences are in the majority of cases clear.
Right, consent. Which you guys say is not enough.
Scott F:In any case I have shown that not all voluntary relationships(which involve a trade in the sense of values and non material things) are mutual.
You haven't demonstrated that. It's still just an assertion.
Scott F:Maybe you wish to change your claim to all voluntary trade in economic terms is mutually beneficial? then I might reconsider.
I don't know what you mean by that sentence. Are you sure you are accurately representing my claim? Care to source it?
Scott F:Sometimes.I tend to think polygamy cannot work.
Work for who? If the people in the relationship feel it is working, then who could argue otherwise? Do people need to check with Scott before doing things in their own life?
Scott F:" How would you determine what is and is not?" whether it's a relationship in which just behaviour prevails i.e. the person is not expected to blindly obey,adherence to NAP, kindness etc not all of it is required to be a mutual relationship but some things are.
You haven't answered the question. What are the "some things"?
See, this is the bizzare part of your position. You are staking out a moral claim, and yet you can't clearly define what is and is not moral behavior. How can you seriously use words like "just" when you can't define what just is, and how you arrive at that conclusion?
Scott F:Well my argument differs in some respect to him.I don't think an immoral relation is any less voluntary but if it's abusive/ immoral then that's irrelevant.
See above. You don't even have a definition for morality, but you use the word immoral. What is immoral? What is moral? How can I know what is right and wrong in Scott's world?
What you seem to be missing is that, yes, while "nature" may be the cause of the person's unfortunate circumstances, one is taking advantage of someone else's unfortunate circumstances to control them and get them to do something they obviously do not want to do.
Sloppy language reveals sloppy thinking.
The person is not doing "something they obviously do not want to do". They do want to do it more than they want to do the alternative(dying), or else they wouldn't do it.
What you should have said is "one is taking advantage of someone else's unfortunate circumstances to control them and get them to do something they obviously would not otherwise do"
But whats so special about that? All mutual exchange works that way; someone doing something they would not otherwise do, like fix my car. Normally if I simply asked a person to fix my car they would refuse, but after I offered them $100 in exchange for fixing my car they would likely gladly do it.
The two situations are perfectly analogous. In both situations one person releaves the other from an undesireable situation in exchange for compensation.
What you are are suggesting amounts to putting a price ceiling on rescues, which as everyone else on this forum knows, will reduce the amount of rescues provided. You can hardly claim to be acting in the interests of the drowning person. Like all real social planners, you're placing your aesthetic preferences above the welfare of the people you claim to be looking out for.
Peace
LS, I'll cut the nonsense and give you the line that you should be expecting from those who wish to impose their sense of morality on everyone else:
You're missing the context.
:p
That's the line people tend to fall back on when they can't clearly explain their position on such matters, but insist that they have figured out what is right and what is wrong.
I've heard all sorts of excuses and justifications. These debates have been going on here for nearly 2 years.
No one from the thick side of the argument finishes a debate. Usually it devolves to name calling, bogus accusations, blatant trolling or as we see here, abandonment.
Autolykos: MaikU:And I am not saying you would or anyone in his right mind would do that. At least on this forum. What I am saying is that it is quite arbitrary. Especially it is noticeable in the drowning man example, that's why I am trying to defend B's position. One doesn't have to use force to be ethicaly wrong. I think I am the only one in this thread who believes in objective morality so I now understand why it's hard for you to walk in my shoes. I am not propagating using violence against A if he doesn't help B, I am merely observing people's actions and try to understand intentions. Why human act the way it acts? You're saying that the definition of "voluntary exchange" is quite arbitrary? Well, of course it is. All definitions are quite arbitrary, and inherently at that. To me, it's not a question of whether one has to use force (better: commit aggression) to be ethically wrong. Rather, it's a question of whether force/coercion is justified against someone when that someone hasn't initiated it already. It can also be a question of what constitutes force/coercion to begin with. For example, in my example, one could say that A is coercing B because B is drowning. Of course, that would imply a different definition of "coerce" from "using or threatening physical force/violence". I'm not sure how you can believe in objective morality. Maybe I'm not sure about your sense of "objective"?
By arbitrary I mean that just because something is done on a voluntary basis doesn't mean it is right and many ancaps tend to forget it. So that's my issue with voluntaryism (which is a part of ancapism as far as I know), even though I do not reject it. I like to improve things.
I wouldn't call A's actions towards B "coercion", we have other word - exploitation. Even though radical leftists (I mean here marxists) abused it too, haha. I'd like to use coercion only talking in legal context.
Talking about objective morality, I mean that it is possible to find consistent moral norms that could be applied to all humans universally. To most ancaps it is just NAP, to me, objective morality. After all, NAP is a consistent principle and it was known for thousands of years in different names. But to know a principle doesn't mean to use.. and that's the sad part of human history. I am rambling, sorry.
(english is not my native language, sorry for grammar.)
All voluntary transactions are inherently mutual, but in a sense that may end up being superficial in some contexts. If the systematic context in which it takes places greatly limits people's options or if disparities of power are used as leverage to milk people, a voluntary transaction can manifest as simple submission. In this way I think that the concept of "voluntary-ness" can be ambiguous.
The concepts of "greatly limited options" and "disparities of power" are themselves ambiguous.
I can "voluntarily" submit to power because I have no other choice besides death or extreme misery, not necessarily because my values are being genuinely represented.
Obviously you genuinely value life. So theres one.
The power dynamics of the particular situation is what determines whether the "mutual benefit" is meaningful.
Giant_Joe: LS, I'll cut the nonsense and give you the line that you should be expecting from those who wish to impose their sense of morality on everyone else: You're missing the context. :p That's the line people tend to fall back on when they can't clearly explain their position on such matters, but insist that they have figured out what is right and what is wrong.
And I don't disagree. It may be the language issue. If one's mind was able to be put into other person's mind and to see through his eyes, maybe THEN he could understand his opponent :) Until then, keep talking and trying to understand the other side. It's the best we can do now.
This entire debate can be summed up quite succinctly actually.
Side A: Its wrong. Side B: No, it isn't.
Side A: Its wrong.
Side B: No, it isn't.
(There may be some fringe commentators I've overlooked but thats the basics). It would seem that the side crying foul would have to prove it, but (as we all should know) morality isn't provable.
Not exactly. It's that one uses the scenario as an excuse to make extreme demands that I'm objecting to. Whether or not the agent is considered liable in killing them is a separate issue from what I'm focusing on.
Well that's certainly part of it, but the focus is on how people use those inequalities as leverage to control others or get things from them. The circumstances themselves aren't what the ethical question revolves around.
Yes, although the kind of "advantage" need not be explicitly economic or in terms of tangible goods.
I really don't think the refusing to help vs. causing harm distinction is particular relevant to what I'm taking issue with. My distinction is between willingly taking advantage of and helping.
There is more to it than that, but I'm quite series that this is what absolute land property rights amounts to.
Basically, it's the thick libertarianism thing. To be more specific, I don't think that you can have a functional free society without at least a base-line egalitarian ethos being dominant and that ethos manifesting itself in a lack of extreme heirarchies.
Except this line only works in conditions in which no party is under duress and they have the ability to actualize their values in an autonamous manner. The whole problem is that in some contexts this is clearly not the case. In some cases, people clearly are not engaging in the action that represents their values or actually increases their well-being in any meaningful way. That's the whole "context" thing that apparently can just be ignored.
Not only is someone capable of being wrong in what they believe will provide the most utility, not only can they conclude that it did not provide the most utility for them, but the conditions in which they live or the circimstances of a particular situation can limit their capacity to achieve the most utility. The only way to ignore this is by basically defining "utility" in such a way that it is impossible for any action to not increase utility, which seems absurd.
But this line is also dubious in the sense that it doesn't work as a totalistic description of how humans actually behave. Humans don't strictly act on the basis of calculations of utility. They can act on whim and be influenced by a whole slew of emotions that have nothing to do with any thought process on their part weighing costs and benefits. The homo-economicus doesn't exist. If one wishes to basically assert praxeology as a universal psychological model, you're going to run into loads of problems.
LS, I'll cut the nonsense and give you the line that you should be expecting from those who wish to impose their sense of morality on everyone else: You're missing the context. :p That's the line people tend to fall back on when they can't clearly explain their position on such matters, but insist that they have figured out what is right and what is wrong.
With all due respect, this post is ridiculous. Firstly, the "imposing your morality on everyone else" canard has been addressed ad nauseum. Since I'm not talking at the level of legal enforcement, any claim of "statism" rings hollow. If you object to the application of norms to others in general, well, then libertarianism in general (far from a "value-free" doctrine) has to be ruled out along with everything else, and you've implicitly embraced a very absurd form of moral nihilism which is impossible for anyone to follow. Applying interpersonal standards to others is what we do as humans.
As for the talk of "context", that certainly isn't a simple cop-out, it's a response to arguments that seem to be stuck thinking in general terms without consideration for factors which may constitute exceptions to the rule that one has adopted a priori. The "context" is precisely what determines whether or not your principles apply to something particular.
Brainpolice: All human action, regardless of how seemingly insignificant, is subject to calculation. That is, to perform one action is to postpone or refrain from all other possible actions. The action performed at any given moment is the action the actor belives at that moment will provide the most increase in utility. Except this line only works in conditions in which no party is under duress and they have the ability to actualize their values in an autonamous manner. The whole problem is that in some contexts this is clearly not the case. In some cases, people clearly are not engaging in the action that represents their values or actually increases their well-being in any meaningful way. That's the whole "context" thing that apparently can just be ignored.
Absolutely not. It works in all cases, in all situations and in all contexts. Human action is human action. One of the pillars of praxeology is the idea that one acts to ease one's discomfort. It is even more apparent when one is under duress. That is, if one is extremely uncomfortable, one will perform an action that will make one less so, even though the expected result of that action may still be less comfortable than "normal".
Brainpolice:As for the talk of "context", that certainly isn't a simple cop-out, it's a response to arguments that seem to be stuck thinking in general terms without consideration for factors which may constitute exceptions to the rule that one has adopted a priori. The "context" is precisely what determines whether or not your principles apply to something particular.
Oh, I see. "Context" is you're all wrong for being stuck thinking in general terms.
Still two questions unanswered,
liberty student:Who is responsible for your or my feelings of fear and dependence?
liberty student:Who establishes this context? Party A, B or 3rd party C?
Quite frankly, this is a laughable dogma that is disproven by psychology 101. It's basically a simplistic form of an outdated teleology and an assertion of a form of psychological egoism, and the most cursory observation of human behavior disproves it as a universal claim about what motivates people. Hell, even Ayn Rand knew that this is wrong. At best, it's trivially true by stretching definitions to the point of covering everything.
LS, "context" is the factors that may constitute whether your rules apply or if there is an exception.
I don't understand what your first question has to do with anything or what it's trying to prove.
Your second question doesn't even make sense. Context isn't something people decide upon, it is the circumstances in which what's in question takes place. The purpose of the question, in either case, is obviously meant to imply the old canard of imposition.
Quite frankly, this is a laughable dogma that is disproven by psychology 101.
Quite frankly, every attempt to disprove it has been laughable. I'd be happy to look over your source(s) though.
It's basically a simplistic form of an outdated teleology and an assertion of a form of psychological egoism, and the most cursory observation of human behavior disproves it as a universal claim about what motivates people.
That also is laughable. "[T]he most cursory observation of human behavior" proves it beyond all dispute.
Hell, even Ayn Rand knew that this is wrong.
Fallacy! Appeal to medicore novelist and worse philosopher...
At best, it's trivially true by stretching definitions to the point of covering everything.
Trivially true is still true. Which definitions are being stretched?
Brainpolice:LS, "context" is the factors that may constitute whether your rules apply or if there is an exception.
And those factors are what?
Brainpolice:I don't understand what your first question has to do with anything or what it's trying to prove.
You claim that feelings of fear and dependence are part of the context, yes? Who is responsible for creating/causing those feelings?
Brainpolice:Your second question doesn't even make sense. Context isn't something people decide upon, it is the circumstances in which what's in question takes place. The purpose of the question, in either case, is obviously meant to imply the old canard of imposition.
I asked you how the context arrived at? How have YOU determined the context of A and B in a drowning scenario? From A, B or by yourself?
Thats pretty interesting actually. I, a thick libertarian, don't think you can have a functional free society with an egalitarian ethos. (Merit is whats most important)
Quite frankly, this is a laughable dogma that is disproven by psychology 101. It's basically a simplistic form of an outdated teleology and an assertion of a form of psychological egoism
So long as human beings act to remove a source of dissatisfaction, it could not be said that they act in a void of self-interest. They act in the persuit of satisfaction, which is their percieved self-interest. They employ means for the purpose of obtaining desired ends. The statement that humans act in self-interest on a fundamental level and that human beings are rational animals does not mean that humans will always make correct choices, that the ends they desire are necessarily logical and ethical, or that the means they employ in the persuit of such ends are the proper or most efficient ones toward obtaining their goals. It is merely a description of how human action works, that human beings are volitional creatures with goals and the capacity to choose among means for the purpose of obtaining their goals.
On one hand, every single person is rational in the sense that they possess the faculty of reason and are self-aware. They have the ability to freely make choices. In this sense of the word, noone can be more rational then anyone else because this is merely a description of our fundamental natures. On the other hand, in terms of their actual beliefs and choices, noone is consistantly rational if we are using rational to mean in accordance with objective reality and their actual best interest. People make all sorts of choices that can easily be demonstrated to be harmful to them, and people believe plenty of things that are not in accordance with objective reality. In this sense of the word, some people are simply more rational then others, make more coherant arguements and better choices.
Quoted from Guess Who?
Crickets.
(no surprise)
Wait Rand wasn't chasing windmills when she attacked the dreaded altruists? Seriously, what psychology 101 class have you taken, as mine covered the the Law of Effects as well as the Reward System (anatomy) seem to buttress the case for psychological egoism.
If what anti-egalitarians generally favored really was meritocratic, and if we construed egalitarianism as necessarily being a premise assuming that everyone is inherently equal in their intrinsic capabilities, I'd be more inclined to agree with you. But I don't think either of those are the case. So we then have, at least, a definitional distinction over the use of egalitarianism, and more substantively we have disagreement over the extent to which various disparities can be chalked up to a meritocratic natural order. I generally view such talk as bad apologetics.
I don't see what possible difference it could make what other anti-egalitarians favour and that of yourself (or myself, do you have any reason to doubt my my favour of merit?) There are, after all, many forms "egalitarian" you don't seem to have a problem making distinctions with them (I assume you don't believe that people are equally capable, but are still maintain some form of "egalitarian" regardless), so why not amongst the antis? Also, I cannot see any reason to assume such a definition of egalitarianism just to be dismissed. Is there a point?
Also, I cannot see any reason to assume such a definition of egalitarianism just to be dismissed. Is there a point?
The point would be to pre-emptively deflect a common line of criticism of egalitarianism (which Rothbard also engaged in; see some of the essays in "Egalitarianism As A Revolt Against Nature" without rose-colored glasses) that is based on a strawman. From this strawman one can attempt to derive all sorts of reductio ad absurdums, but of course that all becomes an elaborate mischaracterization or what ends up being a groundless appeal to consequences.
The point would be to pre-emptively deflect a common line of criticism of egalitarianism (which Rothbard also engaged in; see some of the essays in "Egalitarianism As A Revolt Against Nature" without rose-colored glasses) that is based on a strawman.
So the point is to deflect positions that haven't been presented? Wouldn't not bringing it up at all have been easier? I'm not sure how Rothbards attacks on Egalitarianism were a strawman, he definitely did attack egalitarianism, perhaps not the "egalitiarianism" of your own persuasion, but a form of egalitarianism nontheless.
The problem is that I know of just about no egalitarians who genuinely believe some of the things that Rothbard argues against.
Brainpolice:With all due respect, this suggests to me that you do think that A would be killing B by refusing to help him. Not exactly. It's that one uses the scenario as an excuse to make extreme demands that I'm objecting to. Whether or not the agent is considered liable in killing them is a separate issue from what I'm focusing on.
Earlier you wrote:
Brainpolice:About the "position of power thing", I definitely think that in the drowning scenario, the non-drowning person is *situationally* in a position of power. It's not political power, but it is a position of power relationally, in the sense that their decision can significantly effect the life of someone else - and in this case, their decision equates to life or death for someone else. The fact that it's a position of power becomes even more clear when we add that they are making demands of servitude from someone else based on the fact that the other person is in a vulnerable position. I don't see how we can look at such a scenario and not see that there is an obvious power dynamic that can be taken advantage of. [Emphasis added.]
I think the issue of causality is paramount to our discussion. To say that refusing to help a drowning person (for example) can significantly effect the drowning person's life is to put the responsibility for the drowning person into the hands of the non-drowning person. I can see of no other way to parse the phrase "can significantly effect the life of someone else". Now as far as I can see, this treatment of the hypothetical situation is inaccurate. The drowning person would have drowned anyways if the other person had not come upon him.
Even more clearly do you seem to put the blame on the would-be rescuer by saying "their decision equates to life or death for someone else". Again, the drowning person would have (presumably) drowned anyways. To say that the decision not to help equates to death for the drowning person implies (to me, at least) that the drowning person was supposed to have lived. Where does that supposition come from?
As before, I mean no disrespect here. I'm just trying to highlight what I see as a potential mistake in reasoning.
Now with that said, I have to ask about whose definition of "extreme demands" should be followed in these kinds of situations.
Brainpolice:Furthermore, I can only infer from this that you're defining "position of power" as simply "inequality of circumstance(s)". If I'm wrong here, please help me understand better. Well that's certainly part of it, but the focus is on how people use those inequalities as leverage to control others or get things from them. The circumstances themselves aren't what the ethical question revolves around.
How are you defining "control others"? I can understand the part about getting things from people, but not about "controlling them".
Brainpolice:Here it sounds like you're using "exploitation" and "make a power play" to mean "enhance an inequality relationship (particularly an economic inequality relationship". This seems to be consistent with your previous paragraph. Essentially you're saying that you find it unethical (in terms of your non-legal ethics) for one to use another's disadvantage as a means to gain an advantage for himself. Yes, although the kind of "advantage" need not be explicitly economic or in terms of tangible goods.
Of course, it can be difficult, at best -- impossible, at worst -- to determine intangible advantages.
Brainpolice:I really don't think the refusing to help vs. causing harm distinction is particular relevant to what I'm taking issue with. My distinction is between willingly taking advantage of and helping.
If A promises to rescue B in exchange for B's life savings, how is that not helping B? Presumably B would die otherwise.
This is just one example of why I think the distinction is of great importance here.
Brainpolice:I think the issue with land ownership is more complex and nuanced than "do whatever I tell you to do within these lines, or be forced outside of these lines". To put it that way seems like an oversimplification and hence a strawman, IMO. Or is that the point you're making? There is more to it than that, but I'm quite [serious] that this is what absolute land property rights amounts to.
There is more to it than that, but I'm quite [serious] that this is what absolute land property rights amounts to.
Let me ask you this: by "absolute land property rights", do you mean property rights in land that trump the self-ownership rights of other people?
Brainpolice:Yeah, I can understand the hang-up about the term "morality". I'm confused about your statement that "non-legal ethics is a prerequisite for the legal portion of ethics to work" -- can you explain what you mean there? Basically, it's the thick libertarianism thing. To be more specific, I don't think that you can have a functional free society without at least a base-line egalitarian ethos being dominant and that ethos manifesting itself in a lack of extreme heirarchies.
I'm afraid I'm not sure what you mean by "egalitarian ethos" or "extreme hierarchies". Can you elaborate?
Did Rothbard specifically direct his criticism towards you and people you know?
I'm not simply talking about me or people I know, a red herring you keep returning to. I'm talking about just about anyone in the history of social philosophy who identifies as an "egalitarian".
Yes, the non-drowning person did not *cause* the initial situation, but that is not what is ethically relevant here. What's relevant is the social context of the non-drowning person being added to the scenario - who knows exactly what is going on and is perfectly capable, without any particular risk, of saving the drowning person's life. Once such a context is established, the *decision* to help or not is the essential factor determining if they well live or die. You're focusing on necessity, I'm talking about decision-making. You're also shifting the focus to the issue of not doing anything at all, when my initial objection was brought up in relation to using the situation to try to make a power move. Those are two separate things.
The supposition is that knowingly allowing someone to die when one has the power to save their life makes you a relevant factor, no longer making the scenario a matter of necessity.
There is a certain overlap between the two. By "control others", I mean get them to do things for you. If someone is a guest in my house and I say "take your clothes off or leave", I'm using my ownership as leverage to control others.
In basic terms of survival, as well as physical and mental health, I don't think it's difficult at all.
To grant the self-ownership concept for a moment, I mean to say that I have trouble seeing how the kind of land property rights that anarcho-capitalists generally favor doesn't come into conflict with self-ownership at some point because of how it manifests as territorialism.
I mean a basic sense of empathy or some notion of reciprocity. As for extreme hierachies, I mean social conditions with a fairly steep level of disparity in power that ends up forming classes with problematic double-standards between them.
Yes, the non-drowning person did not *cause* the initial situation, but that is not what is ethically relevant here.
How is this irrelevant? This is, in fact, extremely relevant to the matter at hand.
What's relevant is the social context of the non-drowning person being added to the scenario - who knows exactly what is going on and is perfectly capable, without any particular risk, of saving the drowning person's life......The supposition is that knowingly allowing someone to die when one has the power to save their life makes you a relevant factor, no longer making the scenario a matter of necessity.
We are all in a position, every single day, to dramatically improve, and in fact save the lives of others without any risk. There are millions of individuals, across the world, that are about to die from malnutrition precisely because they live in nations that do not facilitate entrepreneurship and the accumulation of capital. The fact that we do not devote significant portions of our annual income (any amount beyond what we need for survival) in order to save such lives would mean, according to you, that we are all ethically "guilty" of some crime. But you have failed to establish what crime we, and the individual in your initial example (the person that does not save the other person from drowning) are guilty of.
Additionally, we are completely ignoring the socioeconomic effects of this kind of welfare (forced redistribution, where individual property rights are supplanted by the "needs of society").
Again, you're implicitly conflating persuasion with coercion. There's nothing wrong with persuasion. You could have just as easily said: If someone is physically touching my body and I say "be gentle or get off me," I'm using my ownership as leverage to control others. So far, the only thing you've been able to demonstrate is that people may act in ways that are not agreeable to you. That is, they do not do what you think they should do. But you refuse to acknowledge that your normative judgments are entirely subjective and arbitrary (unless you can show otherwise).
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."