Jonathan M. F. Catalán:He actually is. He's adding valuable quality control, because your first response was tantamount to trolling.
The quality of my content is poor, relative to other contributors?
I am astounded I am ever called a troll; I admit that my counterarguments are presented more colorfully than others, but I never directly insult anyone.
"I'm not a fan of Murray Rothbard." -- David D. Friedman
Jon Catalan:Non-instinctual behavior is pre-meditated behavior, while instinctual behavior is behavior based on human instinct (instinct usually being defined as something produced from our nervous system, or an automatic reaction by our brain, as opposed to reason [which is still biological, in any case]).
As I've detailed elsewhere, though, we cannot rely on ourselves to properly differentiate deliberative processes from automatic ones.
In regard to the Austrian preference for circular reasoning, if it is true that "action" is "purposeful behavior," then what determines the logical connection if not a definitional equivalence? If one wants to claim that "one's highest value" is one's observed choice, then how is that necessarily true besides Austrian makeshift definitions? I am not actually expecting answers; I've heard them before. But I am still befuddled by how Austrians consider their outmoded epistemology the last bastion of economic truth. The fields of neuroscience, psychology, and empirical economics have all made significant inroads in questioning our old beliefs, as all science should; to Austrians, a dictionary is all that is needed to deduce universal truths.
The Austrian argument need not rely on the ontological distinction whether a given phenomenon "really is" or "really is not" purposive conduct, just as the mathematical argument need not rely on whether 24 "really are" or "really are not" present.
If purposive conduct is present, then what formally applies to purposive conduct applies. If 24 is present, then what formally applies to 24 applies.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
StrangeLoops,
Um, what do other contributors have to do with standards of quality? There might be a worse troll, but that doesn't make trolling less OK. The standard isn't set, in other words, by the worst member of society.
Regarding that thread, we've already been over this before. That our rationality is the result of biology is irrelevant, and I actually addressed this in my response to you.
If one wants to claim that "one's highest value" is one's observed choice, then how is that necessarily true besides Austrian makeshift definitions?
It's actually not true because of Austrian definitions, rather it is true by the definition of the person in question. That's the entire point of the "Austrian definition".
But I am still befuddled by how Austrians consider their outmoded epistemology the last bastion of economic truth.
Because critics, such as yourself, have yet to offer a substantive and valid criticism of the epistemology.
In Austrian economics as it has been developed through Mises 'rationality' is synonymous with 'goal-directed conduct.' It is a formal definition with no reference to the particular goal sought and no reference to the means utilized. It is not the same conception of rationality as that used by objective/normative ethics and objective/normative moral theories.
It is a formal definition with no reference to the particular goal sought and no reference to the means utilized.
It is not the same conception of rationality as that used by objective/normative ethics and objective/normative moral theories.
To be clear, when I say that rationality is normative, I'm not only refering to ethics. Ethics is included under that umbrella, but I'm also and in fact more primarily speaking about epistemic norms. Austrian methodology may rule out any consideration of specific norms when it comes to rationality, but it is not within its epistemic rights to totalize itself by claiming the authority to automatically negate all normative senses of rationality used outside of its own disciplinary scope, as if it encompasses social science as a whole or is a complete philosophy in and of itself. At a minimum, this is an issue of overextending the context of a domain.
I have a thing against particular domains making claims to universality for its modes of description, to the effective negation of other domains. Austrians (rightfully) level a charge along these lines against positivists and such ilk, who tend to do it with the natural sciences or physics. I don't see why a similar charge couldn't be leveled against (at least some) Austrians with respect to how Praxeology is wielded.
The notion that the Austrian definition of rationality might be trivial or meaningless probably rests on the premise that tautologies are 'empty' or meaningless. But tautologies need not be considered empty or meaningless.
I don't assert that it's literally "meaningless" but that giving it apodictic status is problematic, and the whole house of cards can fall down the moment that the "axioms" are actually critically examined rather than being assumed to be absolutely true by definition. One bumps into all the issues surrounding foundationalism. And we learn immediately in logic 101 that if your base premise happens to be false, no amount of logical necessity has weight any more. Logical proof can be an empty excersize if what you plug into it is erroneous. This is why I consider the assertion of such "axioms" to be question-begging.
The only question begged is whether or not the premise is true. So, can you please actually respond to our posts, namely the demand for this supposed conclusive evidence in support of your thesis [that the axiom of purposeful human action is wrong]?
The point is that Austrian methodology rules out pursueing that question by giving it apodictic status. It literally defines out of existence the very possibility of it being wrong or there remotely being an exception.
Okay, again, can you please provide evidence to the contrary. That Austrians believe it to be apodictic is based on the belief that it can't be wrong. You're the one who challenged this notion. The burden of proof is on you. So, please stop beating around the bush, and provide the evidence.
The Austrian/Misesian concept of rationality, as distinct from other conceptions of rationality, is identical to the concept of goal-directed conduct, so in speaking of Austrian theory we could re-write your passage as:
"... when I say that [the concept of goal-directed conduct] is normative, I'm not only refering to ethics. Ethics is included under that umbrella, but I'm also and in fact more primarily speaking about epistemic norms. Austrian methodology may rule out any consideration of specific norms when it comes to [the concept of goal-directed conduct]...."
*****
"...it [Austrian economics]is not within its epistemic rights to totalize itself by claiming the authority automatically negate all normative senses of rationality used outside of its own disciplinary scope, as if it encompasses social science as a whole..."
As I understand the Austrian method, it does not negate normative senses of rationality ontologically as you imply. It negates other senses of rationality in the sense of excluding other definitions of rationality from its rational scheme, since it chooses only one sense of the notion of rationality for its scheme. Objective/normative ethics is free to attempt to utilize a different conception of rationality. All Austrian economics will say, as I understand it, is that we are talking about two different conceptions of rationality. Austrian economics is using X concept of rationality, while objective ethics is using Y concept of rationality. The insurmountable theoretical problems that objective ethics invariably encounters in trying to establish a content-based definition of rationality is a separate issue.
"..or is a complete philosophy in and of itself."
I believe in science the commonly used expression is "a closed and coherent set of concepts, axioms, definitions and laws..." (Heisenberg)
******
"I don't assert that it's literally "meaningless" but that giving it apodictic status is problematic, and the whole house of cards can fall down the moment that the "axioms" are actually critically examined rather than being assumed to be absolutely true by definition."
As I understand both Mises and Menger (and I can quote Hayek in support of this view also), the "truth" of the tautological relation derives from the difficulty in making theoretical or practical sense of alternatives to it. If we say it is a tautological "truth" that in walking toward one location a person necessarily walks away from another location, what this means is that we haven't been able to make sense of the idea that one could walk toward one location and not walk away from another location. All of our thinking and acting is based on the tautological premise that in walking toward one location we will be walking away from another location.
"But the characteristic feature of a priori knowledge is that we cannot think of the truth of its negation or of something that would be at variance with it. What the a priori expresses is necessarily implied in every proposition concerning the issue in question. It is implied in all our thinking and acting."
"If we qualify a concept or a proposition as a priori, we want to say: first, that the negation of what it asserts is unthinkable for the human mind and appears to it as nonsense; secondly, that this a priori concept or proposition is necessarily implied in our mental approach to all the problems concerned, i.e., in our thinking and acting concerning these problems." (Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science)
Maybe we can't say that it is "absolutely true" that the tautology in question holds for all time, in all senses, and in all possible worlds. But the first problem is to show how the given tautology doesn't hold now in various assumed circumstances. Until it is shown how it doesn't hold, our belief that it does is reasonable.
The second problem is that a demonstration of how a particular tautology isn't valid under certain circumstances may not, in the end, serve to invalidate the usefulness of tautological knowledge generally. It could be that a demonstration of a case where tautology X doesn't hold would entail the use of a different system utilizing tautology Y (either implicitly or explicitly). In other words, it could be the case that in order to demonstrate a sense in which a particular tautology doesn't hold, it may be necessary to utilize a separate tautological system. This is similar to what Austrians mean when they sometimes argue that one acts in trying to demonstrate that there is no action. In short, you may need a tautology to invalidate a tautology.
"Logical proof can be an empty excersize if what you plug into it is erroneous."
Reminds me of this:
"The method of imaginary constructions is indispensable for praxeology; it is the only method of praxeological and economic inquiry. It is, to be sure, a method difficult to handle because it can easily result in fallacious syllogisms. It leads along a sharp edge; on both sides yawns the chasm of absurdity and nonsense. Only merciless self-criticism can prevent a man from falling headlong into these abysmal depths." (Human Action)
****
"This is why I consider the assertion of such "axioms" to be question-begging."
I interpret this as the assertions that tautologies are empty or meaningless. However.....
24 = 2 x 12 = 4 x 6 = 3 x 8 is tautological. But three groups of eight may not be immediately apparent upon an apprehension of twenty four.
Logical or tautological reasoning fleshes out the implications of given suppositions, and these 'hidden' implications are important for action and life.
Aprioristic reasoning is purely conceptual and deductive. It cannot produce anything else but tautologies and analytic judgments. All its implications are logically derived from the premises and were already contained in them. Hence, according to a popular objection, it cannot add anything to our knowledge.
All geometrical theorems are already implied in the axioms. The concept of a rectangular triangle already implies the theorem of Pythagoras. This theorem is a tautology, its deduction results in an analytic judgment. Nonetheless nobody would contend that geometry in general and the theorem of Pythagoras in particular do not enlarge our knowledge. Cognition from purely deductive reasoning is also creative and opens for our mind access to previously barred spheres. The significant task of aprioristic reasoning is on the one hand to bring into relief all that is implied in the categories, concepts, and premises and, on the other hand, to show what they do not imply. It is its vocation to render manifest and obvious what was hidden and unknown before. (Human Action)
In the Misesian conception, just as mathematics expounds the tautological implications of 24, praxeology expounds the tautological implications of goal-directed conduct or rationality or intentionality or human action (all terms here considered synonymous).
"The analytic method is simply a way of discovering necessary consequences of complex collocations of facts---consequences whose counterpart in reality is not so immediately discernible as the counterpart of the original postulates. It is an instrument for "shaking out" all the implications of given suppositions. Granted the correspondence of its original assumptions and the facts, its conclusions are inevitable and inescapable."
(Robbins, An Essay on the Nature & Significance of Economic Science)
I find such a demand of negative evidence in response to the claim that one's own knowledge claim is apodictic to be strange. Presumably you must be able to account for the apodictic status of the axioms, as well as justify the very concept of apodictic knowledge.
It negates other senses of rationality in the sense of excluding other definitions of rationality from its rational scheme
I'm claiming that it is impossible for such a scheme qua scheme to be "objective" or "complete".
All Austrian economics will say, as I understand it, is that we are talking about two different conceptions of rationality.
At least the way it sometimes is expressed by particular people, it seems to say something different than that, effectively using its own conception of rationality to counter any other usage that could function as an exception or limitation to its application. I think that this is, at a minimum, a demarkation abuse of austrian economics.
All of our thinking and acting is based on the tautological premise that in walking toward one location we will be walking away from another location.
The issue, of course, is that the fact that our thinking and acting is based on something does not necessarily make it true, let alone apodictic. This could include the category of useful fictions, or perhaps evolutionarily influenced practicalities that constitute the background of a world picture.
My premise is, rather, that apodictic truth is a mistaken category to put anything in, and that a closed axiomatic system will generally be more problematic than an open one that has considerations for its limitations or exceptions.
StrangeLoop:to Austrians, a dictionary is all that is needed to deduce universal truths.
*boinks the austro-bolshevix* :)
Adam Knott:If 24 is present, then what formally applies to 24 applies.
Adam, excellent and elucidating posts, as usual.
Z.
How does it even make any sense whatsoever to speak of rationality without an accompanying concept of what irrationality actually is?
There is no positive without a negative.
How does it even make any sense whatsoever to speak of rationality without an accompanying concept of what irrationality actually is? There is no positive without a negative.
Indeed. And in the context of Austrian economics, the opposite of rational would be not rational. Human action is rational. Photosynthesis is not rational. To quote one of my favorite posters here:
On one hand, every single person is rational in the sense that they possess the faculty of reason and are self-aware. They have the ability to freely make choices. In this sense of the word, noone can be more rational then anyone else because this is merely a description of our fundamental natures. On the other hand, in terms of their actual beliefs and choices, noone is consistantly rational if we are using rational to mean in accordance with objective reality and their actual best interest. People make all sorts of choices that can easily be demonstrated to be harmful to them, and people believe plenty of things that are not in accordance with objective reality. In this sense of the word, some people are simply more rational then others, make more coherant arguements and better choices. But when [Austrians] describe human beings as inherently being rational, we are using the first sense of the word, not the second. It would be disingenous to act as if we are argueing that everyone is consistant in their beliefs, sharp as a bell and makes wonderful lifestyle choices.
faber est suae quisque fortunae
"I'm claiming that it is impossible for such a scheme qua scheme to be "objective" or "complete"."
For me that would be a new thread.
"At least the way it sometimes is expressed by particular people, it seems to say something different than that, effectively using its own conception of rationality to counter any other usage that could function as an exception or limitation to its application. I think that this is, at a minimum, a demarkation abuse of austrian economics."
I agree. But I consider the demarcation abuse an attribute of 'particular people' and not an attribute of 'Austrian economics.'
Here are three separate meanings:
1. If goal directed conduct, then XYZ (formal/epistemological meaning)
2. That being over there is an acting being. (zoological or ontological meaning)
3. If he does not believe that being over there is an acting being, he is a fraud and a liar. (ethical and moral meaning)
Praxeology consistently carried through only needs and only relies on #1.
"The issue, of course, is that the fact that our thinking and acting is based on something does not necessarily make it true, let alone apodictic. This could include the category of useful fictions, or perhaps evolutionarily influenced practicalities that constitute the background of a world picture."
Perhaps. But this falls far short of a demonstration of how the tautology presented above is invalid. Thus, one is on reasonable grounds in believing that the tautology is valid. We are on reasonable grounds in believing that in walking toward one location we will be walking away from another location, until a more useful fiction (theory) is developed.
As evidence of how difficult it is to avoid referring to action and its categories, both of your proposed substitutes refer to action:
"Useful fictions" Fictions that are used (i.e. utilized) for some assumed purpose.
"Practicalities" X has been found to be a practical means to attaining Y.
Lastly, if we are arguing for fictions and evolutionary influenced practicalities in earnest (not just using them as debate tactics), then I assume these labels for the theories people develop apply to leftist, rightist, and statist theories as well ??
"My premise is, rather, that apodictic truth is a mistaken category to put anything in, and that a closed axiomatic system will generally be more problematic than an open one that has considerations for its limitations or exceptions."
Again, perhaps. But then we need to compare the open system side by side with the axiomatic system and see which system provides a more satisfactory explanation. Austrian theory did this in supplanting the older objective or labor theory of value. Currently Austrian theory is competing with other theories to explain the current economic situation. If you believe there exists an 'open' theory or system that explains economic, ethical, or moral phenomena better than Austrian or formal analysis, then I assume you will be referring readers to that theory as embodied in particular essays or books.
Or you might mean that you don't care for Austrian analysis, and you believe that in the future a normative-oriented theory will emerge that surpasses Austrian theory?
Both the limitations of Austrian theory and the acknowledgement that exact science is not the only kind of science have been acknowledged from the beginning:
"Nothing is so certain as that the results of the exact orientation of theoretical research appear insufficient and unempirical in the field of economy just as in all the other realms of the world of phenomena, when measured by the standard of realism. This is, however, self-evident, since the results of exact research, and indeed in all the realms of the world of phenomena, are true only with certain presuppositions which in reality do not always apply. Testing the exact theory of economy by the full empirical method is simply a methodological absurdity, a failure to recognize the bases and presuppositions of exact research. At the same time it is a failure to recognize the particular aims which the exact sciences serve. To want to test the pure theory of economy by experience in its full reality is a process analogous to that of the mathematician who wants to correct the principles of geometry by measuring real objects, without reflecting that the latter are indeed not identical with the magnitudes which pure geometry presumes or that every measurement of necessity implies elements of inexactitude. Realism in theoretical research is not something higher than exact orientation, but something different." (Menger, Investigations Into The Method of the Social Sciences)
Here Menger acknowledges both that praxeological knowledge is limited to those circumstances in which its presuppositions apply, and that praxeological knowledge and research is something different than realistic or empirical knowledge and research. Menger conceives at least two orientations to the world of phenomena: the exact orientation, and the realistic or empirical orientation.
The case has already been made. You are the one questioning the validity of the claim, but you have so far been unable to provide a substantive argument towards this end (instead, you prefer to post cryptic responses that don't really say anything at all).
It is generally considered (at least in economics) that humans tend to (or always) make rational decisions. Rational decisions can vaguely be defined as actions with the benefits exceeding the costs (a decision arrived after a cost-benefit analysis). According to classical view of economics, it is these rational decisions that will ensure the harmony of a market. The invisible hand. But this brings about a lot of criticism and skepticism because there are a lot of everyday decisions that people make that don't necessarily make "sense" or at least fail the cost-benefit analysis.
According to classical view of economics, it is these rational decisions that will ensure the harmony of a market. The invisible hand.
But this brings about a lot of criticism and skepticism because there are a lot of everyday decisions that people make that don't necessarily make "sense" or at least fail the cost-benefit analysis.
But only on some system of valuation other than their own. Rationality is a higher-order effect or outcome of purposive action that is directed by sheer preference. Like the vast majority of people on the planet, I don't eat to survive or even to avoid hunger pangs, I eat because I like to eat. People act rationally (that is, in their own interest) because those who didn't value rational action died out without leaving offspring, leaving only those who did act rationally to pass on their rational genes.
In fact, there are numerous irrational decisions people make all the time. For instance, texting while driving,
I value communicating with my friends on a timely basis more than I disvalue the increased risk of collision that results from texting while driving. The benefits and costs are purely psychological. I may really underestimate the increase in the risk that results from texting while driving (I almost certainly underestimate the risk of driving itself, let alone texting while driving) but that doesn't change the psychological calculus.
being religious and believing in a God,
I don't see how these even prima facie qualify as "irrational." What are the costs?
election of Obama, etc. are example of certain irrational behaviors humans perform. So does this mean the classical view is flawed and that we humans don't always make the right choice and therefore need intervention?
So does this mean the classical view is flawed and that we humans don't always make the right choice and therefore need intervention?
Intervention by aliens/angels? Or just other humans? If other humans, what reason is there to believe that the 'interveners' will make more rational choices than the 'intervenees'?
No and there is a reason why. In order to answer the question, there needs to be a little tweak in the assumption of the rational behavior in humans. It is a simple change with wide implications. Instead of saying "People exhibit rational behavior in a market" it should be changed to "the successful decisions made by people in a market tend to be rational (in the long run)."
In order to answer the question, there needs to be a little tweak in the assumption of the rational behavior in humans. It is a simple change with wide implications.
Instead of saying "People exhibit rational behavior in a market" it should be changed to "the successful decisions made by people in a market tend to be rational (in the long run)."
True, but so what? I think you're still fundamentally confusing rationality with valuation. The two are entirely separate. Humans do not act on the basis of rationality, they act on the basis of valuation. The outcome of value-driven action is rational because, if it weren't, our species would long ago have perished. To survive in this biosphere, you have no choice but to be rational.
By successful decisions, I mean decisions that satisfy the cost-benefit analysis (i.e. benefits exceeds the cost). So a person who texts while driving is likely to crash and so will punished (either through injuries or financial loss).This person is now at a disadvantage in comparison to others. The person who was not texting will escape these costs and thus will likely have more chances in trying to achieve whatever he desires. The same applies to someone who elected Obama. He will likely suffer more compared to a nation that did not elect him. Therefore putting him at an disadvantage. So in the long run, the decisions made (intentional or unintentional) that end up being rational are more likely help the individual/group to survive and excel at life. The astute reader might have already drawn some parallels between this contention and the theory of natural selection. Just like old adage "survival of the fittest" by Herbert Spencer is the common notion in nature, "survival of the rational" is the rule that applies more specifically to humans. Nature "selects" the most rational of decisions and let them survive over time. Of course, nature in this sense can be described as the market aka “the invisible hand” fueled by the drive of self interest (will to power).
So a person who texts while driving is likely to crash and so will punished (either through injuries or financial loss).This person is now at a disadvantage in comparison to others. The person who was not texting will escape these costs and thus will likely have more chances in trying to achieve whatever he desires. The same applies to someone who elected Obama. He will likely suffer more compared to a nation that did not elect him. Therefore putting him at an disadvantage.
So in the long run, the decisions made (intentional or unintentional) that end up being rational are more likely help the individual/group to survive and excel at life.
The astute reader might have already drawn some parallels between this contention and the theory of natural selection. Just like old adage "survival of the fittest" by Herbert Spencer is the common notion in nature, "survival of the rational" is the rule that applies more specifically to humans. Nature "selects" the most rational of decisions and let them survive over time. Of course, nature in this sense can be described as the market aka “the invisible hand” fueled by the drive of self interest (will to power).
"Will to power"... pshaw. Natural selection is genetic and the only traces left by natural selection are in our genes. "Will to power" sounds Lamarckian or, even worse, Nazistic. Those groups that survive and out-reproduce all other groups are the "winners" of natural selection. There is no other sense to natural selection.
Of course, all of this applies only if it is assumed that people are truly let to be free. I.e. a limited government with laissez faire approach to markets. All of this will be distorted in a society that is based on force. Then, the whole rule flips. It will no longer be the "survival of the rational' but rather "survival of the powerful".
All of this will be distorted in a society that is based on force. Then, the whole rule flips. It will no longer be the "survival of the rational' but rather "survival of the powerful".
Who says power is irrational?? Do not kings and generals calculate how to win and do so on the basis of cost-benefit analyses? Do not successful kings survive and accrue wealth??
In a society based on force, there is no competition.
Yeah, Ancient Greece was non-competitive.
For instance, A society where the government controls everything (central planning) usually leaves no choice for the people regarding any aspects of their lives. The basic necessities for survival such as food and shelter are dictated by the state. Now that the officials in the state control the population, we have therefore given way for a society that disciplines its inhabitants based on the level of power rather than extent of rationality. In this society, the higher up an individual is in the state (aka higher power), the better chances he has at excelling at his life. Thus, everyone will strive to be part of the state because that is the only way to be prosperous. The worst part is that they achieve power not by following by being rational but rather through corrupt practices such as bribery and political linkage. On the other hand, a society based on freedom will fine tune nature to select only the rational because one of the consequences of freedom is competition. The competition between private individuals will keep a constant check on every person and especially on private businesses. The opposing interests will keep trying new ways to defeat each other until one of them hits the chord. This usually occurs when the rational choice has been made.
On the other hand, a society based on freedom will fine tune nature to select only the rational because one of the consequences of freedom is competition. The competition between private individuals will keep a constant check on every person and especially on private businesses. The opposing interests will keep trying new ways to defeat each other until one of them hits the chord. This usually occurs when the rational choice has been made.
C F# Bb E A D ... the Rational Chord :-P (inside joke for music theory nerds)
Clayton -
Using the example of texting while driving again. Though it is true that some individuals value communication over safety, decisions like these are being tried out in the market constantly (sort of liike mutations in the genetic code that will be tried out in nature) and tested for its survivability. But the difference is that it is the market/nature that selects only the reasonable behavior in the long haul.The decision of texting while driving doesn't always end happily even though you might get lucky once in a while so it is highely iunlikely it will surive in the long run. So, nature has "weeded out" this action as unprofitable even though some humans followed this action at some point in time, despite the risks.
For example, we all eat food everyday because the benefits (fulfilling hunger, nutrition & health etc) usually outweigh the costs (time, money etc). EVERY human being does this (atleast wants to) because nature has selected this as an action that is reasonable enough to be a universal action. That is the key concept. Universal actions all tend to be reasonable in the long run because they are the only ones that work without actually having to get lucky. Unreasonable ones are kicked out even though they are tried out now and then.
We think in a similar model of equation but it is the inputs that makes us different. The one that uses the right inputs wins (most of the time).
For Barnanke and Obama, it is perfectly rational to deny the negative effects of the Federal Reserve. As members of the political class, they have a vested interest in maintaining the power of the state and in inculcating a sense of the state's legitimacy among the masses. It is precisely because politicians need this that they confer such great prestige onto Keynesian and Friedmanite economists by providing them with positions on the Federal Reserve board.
In short, they will deny it, not because they are incapable of rational thought, but precisely because their interests are against admitting they are wrong.
So a person who texts while driving is likely to crash and so will punished (either through injuries or financial loss).This person is now at a disadvantage in comparison to others. The person who was not texting will escape these costs and thus will likely have more chances in trying to achieve whatever he desires.
The problem with this is your analytical focus. Your analysis focuses only on the MEASURABLE facts of the past: that is, on the fact that the texting person crashed, and subsequently paid for it. The problem with this analysis is that it ignores completely the benefit the person gained by texting. Clearly, the person wanted to text. And clearly, the person knew---or at least should have known---that texting introduces some extra risk to the act of driving. Your analysis assumes the person didn't weigh the extra risk of texting vs. the extra benefit of texting.
What if the person was texting his/her stockbroker, sealing the deal on a massively profitable stock purchase? There's no denying the gross benefit gained by the texter in this case, even though the gross cost is high. On the other hand, what if the person was texting a loved one, or Santa Claus? Does the value of the text suddenly disappear because we can't measure it, or because we consider it silly?
The problem here is your empirical method of analysis:
(1) It is powerless to weigh risk vs. reward accurately. It cannot see everything it needs to see. Worse yet, it fails to recognize that it has blind spots.
(2) It is retrospective only. It looks exclusively at the market data of the more-immediate and less-immediate past. And as a result, the only questions this inquiry can answer are these: "If actors wished to allocate resources efficiently, how well did they do? What could they have done differently to use resources more efficiently next time?"
However, your analysis misses the point, because resource efficiency isn't the supreme human value---i.e. the primary value for all actors at all times. It's an important one, to be sure, but we know that humans text loved ones while driving---and some text Santa Claus. That is, humans value many things, and resource efficiency is but one of them.
So, where DOES resource efficiency show itself in human action, and therefore where is its proper place in economic analysis? We know that resource efficiency IS incredibly important, after all.
It shows up in the fact that actors constantly weigh the record of the more-immediate and less-immediate past to inform them of the efficiency of their past resource use (and that of others) (1) in light of previously chosen ends; and (2) in light of the ends now available for choice. Three results of action are possible:
(a) resource use resulted in positive net gain of additional resources---and ends now available are greater, ceteris paribus
(b) resource use resulted in zero net gain of additional resources---and ends now available are equal, ceteris paribus
(c) resources use resulted in negative net gain of additional resources---and ends now available are fewer, ceteris paribus
Of course, in real life, ceteris paribus doesn't exist, and is replaced with uncertainty. The actor is tasked with making his/her best decisions nevertheless. Action must occur, and actors must use knowledge of the past to determine the best use of current resources, given their individual subjective preferences.
Subsequent to action, the range of possible ends available to a particular actor may or may not change. In either case, the actor will reprioritize his/her ends to suit the present and future conditions he/she more-correctly and less-correctly perceives. Here is where resource efficiency of the past---both the immediate past and the more distant past----is important. Subsequent to all previous action, and prior to all future action, each actor judges the efficiency with which his/her various chosen ends of the past have been achieved. These judgements of efficieny are then used to estimate the ends now achievable by the actor, given his/her command of resources.
In short, economics is not about looking over one's shoulder into the past only. It is about using information gleaned from the past to formulate educated guesses, in the present, about possible future ends. Praxeological economics is, for all intents and purposes, true because it considers all time dimensions of human action vis-a'-vis resources: the past, the present, the future.
Or, in other words, you smash together "survive" and "excel" in formulating your question, when in fact "survive" and "excel" aren't necessarily the same thing when it comes to any given individual's preferences and decisions vis-a'-vis his/her resources. Again, the ultimate cause of this ambiguity is your empirical method of analysis: It is powerless to account properly for the fact of human subjective valuations, and must therefore revert to the makeshift of assuming theoretically the supremacy of resource efficiency---i.e. that resource efficiency is the highest esteemed end in human action, at all times, for all actors. Thus, you are forced to equate the meaning of "excel" with the meaning of "survive" and bind them together permanently in your inquiry, where they become theoretically indistinguishable. But this smashing together causes you to miss the essential point---to miss the economics---i.e. to miss the ORDINAL calculus of humans prioritizing and choosing specific ends---in the present---in concert with a CARDINAL calculus based on past experience and applied to predicting and determining the future.
disillusionist:So in the long run, the decisions made (intentional or unintentional) that end up being rational are more likely help the individual/group to survive and excel at life.
If 72 virgins are waiting one in heaven, wouldn't a more "rational" decision be to not prolong his life by "surviving and excelling" on Earth?
You're balking at 'rational' because you're equivocating the term.
Brainpolice: The point is that Austrian methodology rules out pursueing that question by giving it apodictic status. It literally defines out of existence the very possibility of it being wrong or there remotely being an exception.
The term "apodictically certain" doesn't mean knowledge which we are definitely correct about, but just means knowledge, which, if we are correct about it, we will always be correct about it.
But, either way, that doesn't mean that I would recommend that we try to carry that term into the next generation. Lest we let this confusion continue, let's just leave it, along with the term "rational", with Ludwig von Mises.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan:The term "apodictically certain" doesn't mean knowledge which we are definitely correct about, but just means knowledge, which, if we are correct about it, we will always be correct about it.
I'm sorry, but I don't understand this statement at all. If A=A, then we know, with absolute certainty, that A does not equal b, or c, or d, or pajama. A is definitely not B if A=A. This statement is always correct no matter what.
In fact, and this is not directed at you, any true statement is true no matter what, whether individuals realize it or not. To call this an "unsubstantiated assertion" is to resort to a level of stupidity that is entirely unforgivable. I don't care how many "philosophers" find that statement controversial.
BrainPolice:The point is that Austrian methodology rules out pursueing that question by giving it apodictic status. It literally defines out of existence the very possibility of it being wrong or there remotely being an exception.
It's not Austrian methodology that rules this out but rather the real world and discursive reasoning. Your objection extends far beyond the realm of economics; it's an attack on reason. The fact that I'm writing this response necessarily means that I value this action over all other known alternatives. The fact that I have to choose amongst different alternatives necessarily means that there are certain constraints preventing me from doing everything simultaneously. I must economize my time. The fact that you find this statement somehow objectionable or controversial says absolutely nothing about the validity of Austrian economics or its method. The fact that economic theory invalidates your entirely arbitrary and subjective value judgements is your problem, not ours.
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
I'm sorry, but I don't understand this statement at all. If A=A, then we know, with absolute certainty, that A does not equal b, or c, or d, or pajama. A is definitely not B if A=A. This statement is always correct no matter what. In fact, any true statement is true no matter what, whether individuals realize it or not. To call this an "unsubstantiated assertion" is to resort to a level of stupidity that is entirely unforgivable. I don't care how many "philosophers" find that statement controversial.
I think I know where you're going, but this is horribly stated. Both mathematically and logically, A=B does not contradict A=A. Without further definition, that is, actaully establishing that A=/=B, your second and third sentences are simply false.
I think I know where you're going, but this is horribly stated. Both mathematically and logically, A=B does not contradict A=A. Without further definition, that is, actaully establishing that A=/=B,
If A=A then A=/=B if B=B. Do you find this objectionable?
your second and third sentences are simply false.
What that A cannot equal A and not A at the same time and in the same sense? Or that truth is entirely objective, independent of any and all subjective beliefs. Is there a difference between facts and beliefs?
What the hell is going on here?
Esuric: This statement is always correct no matter what.
This statement is always correct no matter what.
Of course.
Esuric: In fact, any true statement is true no matter what, whether individuals realize it or not.
In fact, any true statement is true no matter what, whether individuals realize it or not.
Being apodictically certain means that it is true in every conceivable world.
Esuric: I'm sorry, but I don't understand this statement at all.
I'm sorry, but I don't understand this statement at all.
I might be wrong, but I think that he thinks that "apodictically certain" is something psychological, like being "really, really certain" about it. He said that saying that the "action axiom" is "apodictically certain" means that we can't even ask whether the "action axiom" is wrong. But it doesn't mean that at all. It just means that, if it isn't wrong, it will never be wrong.
But, then again, I don't even know what it would mean for the "action axiom" to be wrong. So let's talk about something else. Wouldn't we say that the regression theorem is "apodictically certain"? But we wouldn't say that it was totally obvious, and that it would be "resort[ing] to a level of stupidity that is entirely unforgivable" to doubt that it is true. Didn't Benjamin Anderson doubt it at one point?
Something being "apodictically certain" doesn't mean that we think that doubting it would be "resort[ing] to a level of stupidity that is entirely unforgivable", but just means that, if we think that it is true, we think that it is true in every conceivable world.
Brainpolice: I don't believe there is such thing as "value-free science".
I don't believe there is such thing as "value-free science".
I don't either.
But, then again, I don't think that anybody would say that there is such a thing as "value-free science" in the sense in which I think that you mean it. Nobody who understands these words would say that Ludwig von Mises built his system without using "value-laden conventional processes" or by "avoid[ing] normative judgments". Ludwig von Mises of course wanted to be an economist because of his values. He enjoyed learning about economics because of his values. He did what he did simply because of his values. How could anybody who understands these words even doubt what I am saying?
We can be value-free in the sense that we can explain relationships which have the value component only as a variable, if you know what I mean. We can say that X leads to Y, which means that, IF you want X, THEN you SHOULD want Y. But that doesn't mean that we SHOULD want somebody to want X. Maybe X is something that we don't want somebody to want, or maybe X is something that we want people to want. Who cares? Either way, the relationship is value-free as far as it is just a relationship between two things, which somebody with one desire might use in one way, but which somebody with another desire might use in another way. If I want Y, I will use the statement that X leads to Y by doing X; but, if I don't want Y, I will use the statement that X leads to Y by not using X. The statement itself is "neutral" with regard to whether I SHOULD or SHOULDN'T want Y. (Of course another statement might tell me that Z leads to Y, which could tell me that I SHOULD want Y, if I in fact already want Z, and so on. But the point is that you will eventually reach a point where you need to have an "ultimate desire" to break the infinite regression, and no statement could tell you whether you should have that ultimate desire or not, because it would of course be neither correct nor incorrect.
Feel free to disregard the previous paragraph. I didn't explain it very well.
So let's talk about something else. Wouldn't we say that the regression theorem is "apodictically certain"? But we wouldn't say that it was totally obvious, and that it would be "resort[ing] to a level of stupidity that is entirely unforgivable" to doubt that it is true. Didn't Benjamin Anderson doubt it at one point?
Oh, you're talking about the analytic/synthetic distinction.
A=A all the time. I was not commenting on that. My point was, the fact that A=A does not mean that A cannot equal B, as you originally stated. I was not attacking the idea, merely suggesting that it is stated poorly.
EDIT:
Plugging in names to your variables:
Superman is Superman. Therefore, Superman is not Clark Kent if Clark Kent is Clark Kent.
There is nothing in your equasion that esablishes the A is not equat to B, and A=A does not preclude it.
Indeed. And in the context of Austrian economics, the opposite of rational would be not rational. Human action is rational. Photosynthesis is not rational.
Didn't you just confirm or repeat precisely what the problem is? You've reasserted a definition of rationality that excludes the possibility of irrationality in any human context.
It's not Austrian methodology that rules this out but rather the real world and discursive reasoning. Your objection extends far beyond the realm of economics; it's an attack on reason.
It's an attack on extreme rationalism, not reason qua reason.
The fact that I'm writing this response necessarily means that I value this action over all other known alternatives.
Only given a certain set of implied assumptions that people can debate about.
The fact that economic theory invalidates your entirely arbitrary and subjective value judgements is your problem, not ours.
Such a claim of invalidation is dubious, and declaring what are essentially epistemological objections "arbitrary and subjective value judgements" simply doesn't make sense.
exactly.
Brainpolice: Didn't you just confirm or repeat precisely what the problem is? You've reasserted a definition of rationality that excludes the possibility of irrationality in any human context.
This whole issue is solved easily if you just think of the idea of action, rationality, or whatever as a model that we can use to understand regularities in spatial movements, which could be useful or not. And we find that it is very useful, in that modeling other people as "rational", or as "actors" tends to let us predict how their body will move in the future. And, of course, that model is also very useful in predicting how the bodies of animals will move in the future!
We don't need to have some sort of aprioristic reason why other people are rational. We just look inside ourselves, come up with the idea of our own action (I presume you can do this, but maybe you can't, I don't know), and then use that idea as a model to predict the movements of other people and animals. In that sense it is an empirical question whether the "action axiom" even "applies" to anything. (And by "applies", again, I mean lets us understand the regularity in the succession of certain perceptions - that is lets us predict the future movements of other certain people or animals.)
Also note that Ludwig von Mises understood this. See the section in Human Action called "The Alter Ego". He admits that the question of whether his understanding of his own action applies to anything else is an "empirical" question solved by the fact that it "works". Nobody can deny that it works. And it should be admitted that it is impossible to say whether somebody else is "really" conscious. Who cares? The question is in vain. The point is that modeling them as conscious works!
Ask yourself this: What if somebody isn't an actor, but just moves like one? What if somebody isn't conscious, but his movement is exactly the same as that of everybody else? What would happen to Austrian economics? Would it cease to be "apodictically certain"? No. Saying that he moves like one is giving away the whole thing. The fact that he moves like an actor is enough to let the "action axiom" apply to him. In fact, we can't establish anything other than the fact that other people move like they are actors! I don't know whether you are "really" conscious, and that might be a meaningless question anyway.
Again, this whole issue is instantly solved if you just consider it like this: You look inside yourself, come up with an idea of your own volition or will, and then use that as a model to predict the movements of other people (and even animals). All of the metaphysical problems are gone, and all of your concerns are solved.
Your concerns are valid. But I think that my answer not only totally solves them, but isn't at all out of step with Ludwig von Mises.
Here are three separate meanings: 1. If goal directed conduct, then XYZ (formal/epistemological meaning) 2. That being over there is an acting being. (zoological or ontological meaning) 3. If he does not believe that being over there is an acting being, he is a fraud and a liar. (ethical and moral meaning) Praxeology consistently carried through only needs and only relies on #1.
Part of the problem I'm having here is the restriction of the category "epistemological" to only the more broad, general formal sense that does not consider any particular question of truth value. What's "epistemological" is not exhausted by talk of what is construed as the basic necessities of thought. It's not simply that praxeology only relies on #1 vs. #3 I'm taking issue with, but #1 vs. the unmentioned rest of epistemology as something that can be applied to something more particular.
That's because it was not presented as a proof that it is invalid. It was presented as a possibility, or in reaction to the justification that such things are necessities of thought. I'm presenting, at some level, the Neitzschian alternative to Kant on the issue of "a priori knowledge".
As evidence of how difficult it is to avoid referring to action and its categories, both of your proposed substitutes refer to action: "Useful fictions" Fictions that are used (i.e. utilized) for some assumed purpose. "Practicalities" X has been found to be a practical means to attaining Y.
So what? What's in dispute isn't action itself. It's that the specific claims put foreward as a priori "axioms" are not necessarily truths at all so much as unavoidable foundations ingrained into the way that our minds function - in a sense that is neither provable or disprovable. We simply cannot concieve of them not being the case. Both formal skepticism and certain-knowledge just don't apply in this murky territory.
When I talk about open vs. closed systems, I'm not saying that an open system is an alternative to Austrian theory. I'm talking about, even if we agreed on the theory, how it is treated in relation to what is outside of its borders, so to speak. It's a question of how Austrian theory is treated, I.E. as a complete ideology in and of itself (closed system) or as a useful yet incomplete theory that can only give us part of the picture and be used side by side with other methodologies, only working within a certain context. I'm a methodological pluralist about epistemologies.
I mean that even if Austrian theory is 100% correct, it would not negate normative theories in other domains. The moment it has the pretense of doing this, I think that it's being overextended into an all-encompassing philosophy.
I. Ryan: if what was in dispute was nothing more than two words ("humans act"), then I wouldn't be debating in this thread (although I would deny that "humans act" is known a priori, and I would say that "humans act" is a triviality that hardly anyone disagrees with). However, this "axiom" is generally used in a way that is loaded with much more specific premises, or a whole slew of claims and an entire social theory is said to deductively derive from it with absolute truth value (which I find to be an extraordinary claim). If one doesn't believe in foundationalism, such a project would seem to be doomed from the start. It would be possible for at least some of its claims to be valid but for completely different reasons, and it wouldn't stand up as a complete theory. What people find bizarre is the claim that everything else you claim is somehow justified by these two words.
I. Ryan: if what was in dispute was nothing more than two words ("humans act"), then I wouldn't be debating in this thread (although I would deny that "humans act" is known a priori, and I would say that "humans act" is a triviality that hardly anyone disagrees with). However, this "axiom" is generally used in a way that is loaded with much more specific premises, or a whole slew of claims and an entire social theory is said to deductively derive from it with absolute truth value (which I find to be an extraordinary claim).
So why don't you try to refute the arguments that are deduced from this premise, which you admit is so obviously true, and which no one would disagree with? To be honest, it seems like this thread is a reaction to the fact that you could not demonstrate that a voluntary and mutually beneficial exchange can be, at the same time, exploitative. In other words, you don't like the fact that economics, a value-free science, reveals that your subjective normative judgements are entirely arbitrary.
Brainpolice: I would deny that "humans act" is known a priori
I would deny that "humans act" is known a priori
To be clear, I agree.
The category of action is known a priori (in the sense that it is a matter of fact of your private world which you can't conceive of as different), but whether it applies to anything isn't.
Brainpolice: and I would say that "humans act" is a triviality that hardly anyone disagrees with
and I would say that "humans act" is a triviality that hardly anyone disagrees with
The category of action obviously isn't trivial, considering it is the foundation of economics.
Did you mean to deny that?
Brainpolice: However, this "axiom" is generally used in a way that is loaded with much more specific premises, or a whole slew of claims and an entire social theory is said to deductively derive from it with absolute truth value (which I find to be an extraordinary claim). [...] What people find bizarre is the claim that everything else you claim is somehow justified by these two words.
However, this "axiom" is generally used in a way that is loaded with much more specific premises, or a whole slew of claims and an entire social theory is said to deductively derive from it with absolute truth value (which I find to be an extraordinary claim).
[...]
What people find bizarre is the claim that everything else you claim is somehow justified by these two words.
Well, I agree. I think that a lot of people on here (and even some of the big names!) are guilty of this.
My goal was nothing other than to defend Misesian methodology. If you are just attacking the crude offshoots of that (of which there are countless!), well, my response doesn't apply.