The territorial monopoly the government must have is only over the objectification of the principles, laws, and procedures of enforcement so that they will be known or knowable to all subject to them in advance, in order to preclude the arbitrary exercise of force. No anarchy can provide that service.
I know better than to get involved in an argument with a Randroid, but...
Question: can there be more than one Objectivist government, or must it just be a single, united, world-spanning entity?
(To be clear, I mean: let's say Australia unanimously becomes Objectivist tomorrow...first, does it have to enforce its Objectivist law over the rest of the world, or can it restrict itself to today's border? Second: assuming the latter, if, six months later, New Zealand becomes Objectivist as well, do the Australian politicians rule NZ (or the NZ politicians rule Australia?), must they form a single body with both sets of politicians, or can they remain independent countries each with its own Objectivist government?)
Initiate:The point I am trying to get across, in order to foster greater understanding between the two sides, is that the issue is not about the Austrian school of economics versus Objectivism. It is about libertarianism versus Objectivism and their differing approaches to political liberty.
So you basically ignored what I wrote, and just repeated yourself.
You didn't address the difference between an economic and an ethical value.
You are continuing the anarchy red herring.
You haven't verified that you are or are not familiar with praxeology.
You haven't checked your premises.
No, I did address the difference in the second through fourth paragraphs. Do you not get the difference between normative propositions (ethics) and descriptive propositions (economics)?
I didn't ignore what you said, I was responding to more than just your post, but Ryan's request for elaboration.
The anarchy issue isn't a red herring, it's the equivocation of economics with ethics that is wrong-headed.
I am not debating anyone about praxeology, I am just trying to clarify that the issue is not about economic theory here, but rather politics and ethics. Don't confuse them.
liberty student:Law is not objective. This stuff is fantasy from the mind of Ayn Rand. Law has never been objective, just as ethics have never been objective, and they can't because humans arrive at the values (supposedly) underpinning law and ethics subjectively.
Well, literally speaking, law is not objective wherever it is applied. That is the same with the concept value, and ethics. Value, in the sense of what you act to gain or keep, can be called subjective because people pursue lots of values, varying from cars, books, computers, drugs, etc. From what I know about Austrian economics, that's as far as value is really considered, and entirely proper. For you as an individual, what values *should* you pursue, though? Should you decide based on how you feel only? Based on a deity? Based on what society says? An Objectivist would say you should decide based on evaluation of reality through your own mind. By use of reason, you can figure out that life should be your standard of value, then decide what values are most beneficial to your life. So, essentially, value is subjective (determined by the subject), and the subject should determine values objectively, with facts. Law can be evaluated in a similar way. Basically, law is a matter of asserting authority over others. How *should* that authority be used though? The idea I'm pointing out is that a more broad definition of a concept must first be accepted as valid before moving onto the more specific definition. If you think ANY objective evaluation of reality is impossible, that your mind is filled with inherent bias, that certainty is impossible, that's another issue. I don't think that is the case here, though.
Initiate:I am not debating anyone about praxeology, I am just trying to clarify that the issue is not about economic theory here, but rather politics and ethics. Don't confuse them.
Actually, you're the one confusing them. Politics, normative ethics and libertarianism are not Austrianism. You're avoiding the issues Objectivists have with Mises and specifically praxeology, rather than debating them straight up.
If you're not going to discuss praxeology, then you're not discussing the topic at hand at all. You're missing the point. The premise that ethics can even be objective is the bedrock upon which Objectivism lies, and Mises challenges that. This superficial twaddle about defense agencies, politics and constitutions are red herrings. They assume Mises is wrong and Rand was right.
Objectivists reject praxeology because Mises' theory of Human Action wasn't confined only to so-called "economic activities" but to the cognitive processes every person undergoes when making any decision relating to human action, social or not.
How should laws be used, thought of etc?
Well in a Walter Block sense, laws have to be in accordance to the NAP and defending property rights...
My Blog: http://www.anarchico.net/
Production is 'anarchistic' - Ludwig von Mises
Politics, normative ethics and libertarianism are not Austrianism.
But this has been exactly my point this entire time, and anyone can read my posts to see this. You seem to want to take the opposite view, but are unable to articulate why.
In any event, consider this information directed at those others who do not commit the error of mistaking their vehemence against a position for actual argumentative reasoning against a position:
Praxeology does not disprove a rational ethics because praxeology is not concerned with making any normative claims whatsoever, but simply identifying the principles that govern human action (principles which an objective metaethics itself is uses to derive the basis for normative claims.)
Praxeology itself does not evaluate any actions. A rational ethics, however, is concerned with judging what kind of actions an entity is capable of, and prescribing what kind of purposeful behavior it ought to engage in, if it is to preserve its life and satisfy its needs for well-being
Behavior such as "we ought to have anarchy instead of government" falls under this purvue, so the attempt to justify anarchy on the basis of "there are no objective values, therefore we ought to have anarchy" is an exercise in self-refutation.
Initiate:Politics, normative ethics and libertarianism are not Austrianism. But this has been exactly my point this entire time, and anyone can read my posts to see this. You seem to want to take the opposite view, but are unable to articulate why.
What opposite view? This thread is entitled why do Objectivists attack Austrians, not why do Objectivists attack Libertarians.
Initiate: In any event, consider this information directed at those others who do not commit the error of mistaking their vehemence against a position for actual argumentative reasoning against a position:
Oh so small...
Initiate:Praxeology does not disprove a rational ethics because praxeology is not concerned with making any normative claims whatsoever, but simply identifying the principles that govern human action (principles which an objective metaethics itself is uses to derive the basis for normative claims.)
If values, including ethical values are subjective, than there cannot be a "rational ethics". Trying to claim they exist in different domains remains an unsubstantiated assertion on your part.
Initiate:Praxeology itself does not evaluate any actions. A rational ethics, however, is concerned with judging what kind of actions an entity is capable of, and prescribing what kind of purposeful behavior it ought to engage in, if it is to preserve its life and satisfy its needs for well-being
Is and ought...
Initiate:Behavior such as "we ought to have anarchy instead of government" falls under this purvue, so the attempt to justify anarchy on the basis of "there are no objective values, therefore we ought to have anarchy" is an exercise in self-refutation.
Again, you're mixing anarchism and Austrianism. It's a red herring.
Praxeology doesn't make any claims about what is good or bad because good and bad aren't scientific concepts. And the attempt of Objectivism to make ethics scientific is based on the false premise that such a thing is even possible.
Yes, that is the title of this thread. As I pointed out in my first post in this thread, the OP has failed to distinguish between the Austrian school of economics and libertarian politics and ethics. Objectivists do not attack Austrian economics as such (as this can be seen in the numerous Austrians that do not hold Mises' view that there can be no rational ethics or objective values, notably the founder of the Austrian school himself, and the greatest propounder of Mises, Murray Rothbard.) The OP asked “why are we attacked” by Objectivists, confusing “us Austrians” as a genus with “libertarians and anarchists” as a differentia. It is the differentia of “libertarianism,” not the genus “Austrian economics” that Objectivists object to.
If values, including ethical values are subjective, than there cannot be a "rational ethics".
See Eioul's post for clarification. Values are subjective in the sense that they depend on a valuer (a “of value to whom”) but values are objective in the sense of what they are used for (a “of value for what”). The “for what” is what the science of ethics deals with. I think you are making the mistake of equating “objective” with “intrinsic.” Objective values are not intrinsic, don't confuse them. A rational ethics does not posit that there are given obligations or “good and evil” inherent in things apart from any human consciousness. That would be quite literally ir-rational. A rational ethics holds that the good is neither an attribute of “things in themselves” nor of man’s emotional states, but an evaluation of the facts of reality by man’s consciousness according to a rational standard of value.
The objectivity of values originate in a relationship between a man and his survival requirements, that is, they stem from the fact that certain types of action promote human life and are beneficial to human well-being, and certain types of action hinder human life and are detrimental to human well-being. These facts are independent of a particular individual's tastes or desires or preferences. Praxeology deals with, and indeed correctly states that an observer cannot tell a man what his preferences are better than his own actions, but there is nothing in praxeology that rules out an evaluation of his preferences according to any standard (including an objective standard, such as the biological and psychological requirements for an organism's survival and flourishing life, or “man's life qua man” as Aristotle phrased it). It is just the case that praxeology itself cannot fashion such a critique, except to inform a given theory of ethics as to what kind of principles govern human action. Man's need for a specific code of those principles to promote his life and happiness constitutes his need of morality, i.e. a specific code of values and goals based on the principles of action that will accomplish those ends. Thus, as the fundamental source of moral "oughts" rests in the nature of man, including goal-directed nature of human action, the objective identity of the facts of reality, and the requirements and needs for man's life and happiness, a scientific ethics is just as possible and necessary (and indeed is implied by) a scientific praxeology. (Indeed praxeology informs us that we cannot escape our need for morality, because we cannot escape from purposeful behavior.)
And by the way, claiming “they exist in separate domains” is not an unsubstantiated claim, that is precisely the claim Ludwig von Mises puts forth in the first chapter of Human Action on the fundamentals of praxeology, and you yourself presumably agree with this, or this is what I can only infer from with your line “is and ought” in the very next bar of your response.
Before I try to respond to the rest, let me try to clear up a few things with some vague statements.
Initiate: Do you not get the difference between normative propositions (ethics) and descriptive propositions (economics)?
Do you not get the difference between normative propositions (ethics) and descriptive propositions (economics)?
Probably not, because the standard Misesian position is that there's absolutely no difference between them.
Initiate: it's the equivocation of economics with ethics that is wrong-headed.
it's the equivocation of economics with ethics that is wrong-headed.
Just to be clear, the typical Misesian stance is that there's no equivocation possible, because they're the same thing.
Initiate: I am just trying to clarify that the issue is not about economic theory here, but rather politics and ethics.
I am just trying to clarify that the issue is not about economic theory here, but rather politics and ethics.
Again just to be precise, the established Misesian opinion is that politics and ethics are born solely out of economic theory.
Initiate: I am not debating anyone about praxeology
I am not debating anyone about praxeology
But, based on what I've said so far, it's absolutely inescapable to get into praxeology!
Initiate: Praxeology does not disprove a rational ethics
Praxeology does not disprove a rational ethics
Okay, let's see why.
Initiate: because praxeology is not concerned with making any normative claims whatsoever
because praxeology is not concerned with making any normative claims whatsoever
Really I'm not sure what a normative claim is, so I'll move on.
Initiate: because praxeology is[... simply concerned with] identifying the principles that govern human action
because praxeology is[... simply concerned with] identifying the principles that govern human action
One of which is that there's no standard by which to judge somebody's action except based on their or somebody else's action.
Initiate: "there are no objective values, therefore we ought to have anarchy" is an exercise in self-refutation.
"there are no objective values, therefore we ought to have anarchy" is an exercise in self-refutation.
Actually it's more like this: "Ultimately we value X, and anarchy would most lead to X, therefore we should have anarchy."
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan:Actually it's more like this: "Ultimately we value X, and anarchy would most lead to X, therefore we should have anarchy.
I agree that the example given does not demonstrate anything about objective values, as you could choose to value anarchy because it "feels right", or for any variety of reasons. Not all values are objective is the proper way to say it. Objective values are *not* the ONLY kind of values.
As for what a normative claim is, "we should have anarchy" is a normative claim. Use of the word "should" in a claim is a normative claim. As far as I know, Austrian economics does not tell you if you *should* have capitalism, or that you *should* have anarchy. What you should do is a matter of ethics. Economics itself cannot tell you what sort of social system to use.
IF I value X, and objectively speaking anarchy leads to X, then I should strive for anarchy. What is X and why should I care about it though? Why not value an egalitarian world instead? You're bound to say "because a good life would be impossible in such a world" (I would imagine a claim about egalitarianism being bad would be well accepted around here), which is actually a fact, something true regardless of what you feel. Really, the point is if you want to figure out what you should do, you need to at use objective facts to reach your conclusions. If you don't want to waste your time towards fruitless goals, you NEED to check if the values you pick are themselves have some sort of standard based on facts. An objective value is just some value that you determine based on facts and *your* relation to the facts.
Economics CAN'T provide the standard to base your values on, the most it can do in that regard is inform you about which concepts lead to which conclusions. Economics can tell you socialism is destructive, but not that you should avoid destruction.
Initiate:If values, including ethical values are subjective, than there cannot be a "rational ethics".
Thank you. There cannot be a [sic] rational ethics, because ethical values are still values, and praxeology is pretty explicit that all values are subjective, not just some of them.
Mind you, a Praxeologist understands that all ethics are rational, regardless of what those ethics are.
Eioul:Economics CAN'T provide the standard to base your values on, the most it can do in that regard is inform you about which concepts lead to which conclusions.
We're not talking about economics. We're talking about praxeology. Praxeology relates to human action, not economics specifically.
All values are subjective in the sense that it's up to the person to pick values. Doesn't mean a person can't pick their values based on facts.
Eioul: All values are subjective in the sense that it's up to the person to pick values.
All values are subjective in the sense that it's up to the person to pick values.
But that's not what the Misesians mean when they say that "values are subjective".
Eioul: Doesn't mean a person can't pick their values based on facts.
Doesn't mean a person can't pick their values based on facts.
Nobody said that, if "values are subjective", then people "can't pick their values based on facts".
(Note: Between the first and second part of that statement, I'm equivocating between ultimate values and higher level values.)
Eioul: As for what a normative claim is, "we should have anarchy" is a normative claim. Use of the word "should" in a claim is a normative claim. As far as I know, Austrian economics does not tell you if you *should* have capitalism, or that you *should* have anarchy. What you should do is a matter of ethics. Economics itself cannot tell you what sort of social system to use.
Praxeology says that we can't say anything but this:
"X leads to Y."
"So, if you want Y, then you should also want X."
And of course that's all that we need for an "ethics" or to know "what sort of social system to use"!
What a shame it would be then to restrict such a marvelous institution that can actually guarantee such a condition. I mean as long as it's in the business of guarantees, might as well put its power to guarantee to use for a few other more modest necessities like healthcare, social security, education, .... Go ahead and unleash it! No can do. The former inherently precludes the latter.
What a shame it would be then to restrict such a marvelous institution that can actually guarantee such a condition. I mean as long as it's in the business of guarantees, might as well put its power to guarantee to use for a few other more modest necessities like healthcare, social security, education, .... Go ahead and unleash it!
Pro Christo et Libertate integre!
Eioul: Really, the point is if you want to figure out what you should do, you need to at use objective facts to reach your conclusions.
Really, the point is if you want to figure out what you should do, you need to at use objective facts to reach your conclusions.
Of course, but only until you reach your "subjective values"!
(But, wait, aren't our subjective values also "objective facts"?)
z1235: I. Ryan:Who determines what those "principles, laws, and procedures" are? The majority. Just like in ancap, or any other system. In both minarchy and ancap the red-haired will be eaten for dinner if the majority found such action acceptable. Z.
I. Ryan:Who determines what those "principles, laws, and procedures" are?
The majority. Just like in ancap, or any other system. In both minarchy and ancap the red-haired will be eaten for dinner if the majority found such action acceptable.
Z.
Only if the red-haired are disarmed and disenfranchised, because otherwise people are going to find it much easier to eat cows, which do not fight back. Or if those who wish to eat red-haired people have the power to coerce others to risk their own lives for the cause. And those conditions require a state.
I. Ryan:And of course that's all that we need for an "ethics" or to know "what sort of social system to use"!
Why would I even want Y? What does Y lead to? Really, an objective sort of ethics follows the same sort of formulation. "X leads to life. So, if you want life, you should do X." If you don't want life, or ignore that as your end, then it doesn't much matter what you do, though WHATEVER it is that you seek is a value. I would want life because it makes my values possible.
I. Ryan:Actually it's more like this: "Ultimately we value X, and anarchy would most lead to X, therefore we should have anarchy."
Rather, "We value X positively, and Y negatively; anarchy at least enables X and inhibits Y, while the state at least inhibits X and guarantees Y; therefore we should have anarchy."
Eioul: Why would I even want Y?
Why would I even want Y?
Because I want Z.
But why would I even want Z?
And so on.
But how do we break the infinite regression?
Well, we just keep going until we hit our "ultimate values"!
Eioul: I would want life because it makes my values possible.
I would want life because it makes my values possible.
Wouldn't it be less misleading to say "I would want to be conscious, because it makes my values possible"?
(Because even committing suicide requires you to be conscious!)
MacFall: Rather, "We value X positively, and Y negatively; anarchy at least enables X and inhibits Y, while the state at least inhibits X and guarantees Y; therefore we should have anarchy."
Yeah, that would probably be more accurate.
Eioul:I would want life because it makes my values possible.
Whose life? Eating you for dinner could be very high on my list of values. My values were based on facts, does this make them "objective"?
I. Ryan:But how do we break the infinite regression? Well, we just keep going until we hit our "ultimate values"!
Right, and the "end" of that chain is life because all choices and values lead to either your existence (life) or nonexistence (death). It's not *just* that life makes values possible.
z1235:Whose life? Eating you for dinner could be very high on my list of values. My values were based on facts, does this make them "objective"?
Depends how far you trace the basis of your values.
Eioul: Right, and the "end" of that chain is life because all choices and values lead to either your existence (life) or nonexistence (death). It's not *just* that life makes values possible.
Wouldn't it be more accurate to say "I would want to be conscious, because it makes my values possible"?
I. Ryan: Because I want Z. But why would I even want Z? And so on. But how do we break the infinite regression? Well, we just keep going until we hit our "ultimate values"!
Here's a rough illustration of that.
Eioul:Depends how far you trace the basis of your values.
Who appointed you to be the (objective?) judge of my values' "objectivity"? Just for kicks, how far must I trace the basis of my values so they become "objective"?
I never did judge the objectivity of your values, though. A value would be objective if you trace it back as far as possible until you determine if it would, in the long-term, lead to furtherence of your life. That's the objective standard because life is the only standard possible in order to allow values to be objectively defined by you as an individual.
Eioul:A value would be objective if you trace it back as far as possible until you determine if it would, in the long-term, lead to furtherence of your life.
I don't understand. How could tracing back determine a long-term future outcome? What if eating you meant that you won't be eating me for dinner? And wouldn't this require omniscience, or a conduit to God or some other such adviser?
Also, I ask again: Whose life? What's wrong (and who says?) with valuing future outcomes that exclude my existence? Can't I value my daughter's life (or any other future state of affairs) more than my own life, i.e. regardless of whether I live to experience it?
By "trace back" I meant figuring out the hierarchy of values, or in other words, what each of your values depend upon. Then from that information, eventually you'll be able to determine what impact a certain value would have on your life. A lot of the time, only you as an individual can decide ultimately if a value is good, but hopefully you'd use a standard similar to how you probably have certain standards in order to determine if an argument is wrong.
Whose life? Your own. You COULD value your daughter's life more than your own, but the important question is why. Valuing future outcomes that exclude your existence is silly, since there's no way to value those outcomes once you are dead. It's not a matter of "who says?" That's like saying "who says that the Earth revolves around the sun?" No one "says", it's just a fact that values that lead to the hindrance of life are harmful, and therefore wrong to pursue because that's the only measure possible that can indicate whether one value is more beneficial to you than another value.
Eioul:By "trace back" I meant figuring out the hierarchy of values, or in other words, what each of your values depend upon.
Another praxeological insight, value structures change as wants are satisfied and/or other conditions change.
As LS suggested, there's no such thing as "the hierarchy of values". What do you mean by "what each of your values depend upon."? Why can't I just value A over B, period?
Then from that information, eventually you'll be able to determine what impact a certain value would have on your life.
So "no chocolate + longer life" is objectively a better value than "chocolate + shorter life"?
A lot of the time, only you as an individual can decide ultimately if a value is good, but hopefully you'd use a standard similar to how you probably have certain standards in order to determine if an argument is wrong.
No one can decide my subjective values but me. My standard for deciding so can also be nothing but subjectively mine. Any conclusion can be arrived at by applying sound logic (arguments) on top of conveniently chosen premises. What's objective about that?
Valuing future outcomes that exclude your existence is silly, since there's no way to value those outcomes once you are dead.
Silly, to whom? You said you were not going to be the (objective?) judge of my subjective values. Why couldn't I value a future-outcome now? Why must I value it then? Because I wouldn't want to look silly to you?
...it's just a fact that values that lead to the hindrance of life are harmful, and therefore wrong to pursue because that's the only measure possible that can indicate whether one value is more beneficial to you than another value.
Like, chocolate? Whiskey? Cigars? Sex before marriage? Sure about that?
I had no idea what Objectivism was before this thread, but the more I learn about it, the more it smells like just another religious dogma.
z1235:The majority. Just like in ancap, or any other system. In both minarchy and ancap the red-haired will be eaten for dinner if the majority found such action acceptable.
MacFall:Only if the red-haired are disarmed and disenfranchised, because otherwise people are going to find it much easier to eat cows, which do not fight back. Or if those who wish to eat red-haired people have the power to coerce others to risk their own lives for the cause. And those conditions require a state.
I said "if the majority found such action acceptable", hence no power would be necessary to coerce the majority into anything. The majority would be eating the red-haired for dinner purely because they freely chose to do so. Furthermore, no arbitrator who presumably would like to continue doing business there would adjudicate against an action which is so strongly preferred by the majority. No state required, I'm afraid.
Eioul: Valuing future outcomes that exclude your existence is silly, since there's no way to value those outcomes once you are dead.
How's that silly?
As he said, he might care now how his daughter is doing later, even if he's not around to see it.
For a typical example, if right now he believes that setting up a trust fund for his daughter would mean her doing well later, and he wants her to do well later, then obviously he would want to set up the trust fund. And, when he sees the trust fund set up, in a sense now he sees his daughter doing well in the future! And that's not silly at all. I mean, wouldn't you want to do something now to promote your daughter's well-being in the future? Or would you not care even now where your daughter will be when you're dead? Of course you wouldn't care once your dead. But wouldn't you care right now? We're not talking about then. No, we're talking about right at this moment.
z1235:As LS suggested, there's no such thing as "the hierarchy of values". What do you mean by "what each of your values depend upon."? Why can't I just value A over B, period?
It should have said your hierarchy of values, not "The" hierarchy as though apples are always superior to chocolate for all people. By "depend upon", I mean things exactly like stated before, "If I value Y, and X leads to Y, I should value X." Basically, I'm agreeing with everything stated about human action here. I'm only disputing that objective values are impossible. You can have whatever hierarchy you want, doesn't mean it's going to be a good idea.
z1235:So "no chocolate + longer life" is objectively a better value than "chocolate + shorter life"?
Well, by life I don't mean the number of years you exist, I also mean a flourishing life. A dying tree is alive in a literal sense, but it's only on the way soon enough to its death. I don't know if chocolate + longer life is objectively better for you, since I don't know anything about you. Personal context is important; some people are allergic to chocolate.
z1235:No one can decide my subjective values but me. My standard for deciding so can also be nothing but subjectively mine. Any conclusion can be arrived at by applying sound logic (arguments) on top of conveniently chosen premises. What's objective about that?
See, I think the dispute here is just the word "subjective". If you find out, by your own mind, that water allows plants to grow, that's objective. Even though it's up to you to decide if that fact is valid. The word objective basically just means that a conclusion is based on facts rather than your emotions as a standard. "I feel that chocolate chip cookies taste great, therefore, I should eat as many cookies as possible." That's an emotional standard. If you want to use that, fine. It's not very informative though. "I know that chocolate chip cookies bring happiness to me plus there are no adverse health effects, so I should pursue acquiring cookies." That's an objective standard, basically. Lots of cookies can bring problems though, and if you're diabetic, maybe even more problems. I don't have a problem with the word subjective, as long as you accept that you can validate ideas against some standard.
z1235:Like, chocolate? Whiskey? Cigars? Sex before marriage? Sure about that?
Chocolate, whiskey, cigars, and sex before marriage aren't always harmful to your life. Usually, they provide a means of furthering your life, you know. I tried to point out before, I think, that determining what is bad or good isn't something apart from the valuer. I can't say that chocolate is good and leave it at that. Good for whom? That is the proper question to ask, which you did ask. What is good for you though? Anything that improves your life in the long-term (for reasons I said earlier). That varies when you consider individual differences. There are also some things that apply to all people though, such as thinking in order to evaluate the world, like what food to eat.
Responding to I. Ryan: There's nothing wrong with providing that sort of thing for one's own daughter, it would likely help some sort of bond in the present and in the future. There's no immediate answer I can give. I also see no point in ideas like "I want to have kids so my memory will live on" though, since you wouldn't even be able to care about memory of you when you're dead. That's the sort of thing I was thinking of.
Eioul: You can have whatever hierarchy you want, doesn't mean it's going to be a good idea.
You can have whatever hierarchy you want, doesn't mean it's going to be a good idea.
But whether it's going to be a good idea always eventually comes down to your ultimate values.
(By the way, your ultimate values might change over the course your life. I'm not saying that they're always the same.)
Michael M: krazy kaju, "what would the Objectivist government do if I created a competing government that simply aimed at protecting the rights of others more efficiently? If the original Objectivist government tried to shut my government down, then it would be using the initiation of violence and breaking its own moral code." It would do nothing until and unless your "government" exercised force arbitrarily (not subject to verification that it was consistent with the objectified principles, laws, and procedures known or knowable to all in advance.) Since such arbitrary force is a violation of the rights of all members of the populace to a liberty that is absent of such arbitrary force, it would take whatever measures were necessary to stop you from exercising that force just as it would any other violator of their liberty.
krazy kaju,
"what would the Objectivist government do if I created a competing government that simply aimed at protecting the rights of others more efficiently? If the original Objectivist government tried to shut my government down, then it would be using the initiation of violence and breaking its own moral code."
It would do nothing until and unless your "government" exercised force arbitrarily (not subject to verification that it was consistent with the objectified principles, laws, and procedures known or knowable to all in advance.) Since such arbitrary force is a violation of the rights of all members of the populace to a liberty that is absent of such arbitrary force, it would take whatever measures were necessary to stop you from exercising that force just as it would any other violator of their liberty.
So anarchism is completely consistent with Objectivism?
Political Atheists Blog
Eioul:It should have said your hierarchy of values, not "The" hierarchy as though apples are always superior to chocolate for all people.
You missed a more important aspect: Even my own hierarchy (which you accept may be different from others') now is not the same from before and will not be the same in the future. My hierarchy of values before achieving an end may be completely different from the one after. And this dynamics has nothing whatsoever to do with convergence toward some mystical (ultimate? objective? omniscient?) hierarchy of values that supposedly produces the ultimately flourishing, rewarding, fulfilled, happy life. Talk to Dalai Lama about that one.
I'm only disputing that objective values are impossible.
Not doing too splendid a job of it, though. No such things as an objective value. The fact that plants need water is not a value, objective or otherwise.
I don't have a problem with the word subjective, as long as you accept that you can validate ideas against some standard.
I don't have to accept that. Neither do you. A diabetic can perfectly rationally decide to keep eating cookies until he dies. Btw, have you looked at someone's brain and seen an "emotional" sector clearly separated from a "rational" one?
There are also some things that apply to all people though, such as thinking in order to evaluate the world, like what food to eat.
What makes you think that thinking is necessarily (and always!) better for you than not thinking? Ignorance is never bliss? Says who?