AdrianHealey: liberty student: How can someone be mistreated if they want it? Are you arguing against free will? So, you accept behaviorism?
liberty student: How can someone be mistreated if they want it? Are you arguing against free will?
How can someone be mistreated if they want it? Are you arguing against free will?
So, you accept behaviorism?
Answer my questions. How can someone be mistreated when they ask to be treated a particular way?
I'm making a simple praxeological insight. People act rationally.
AdrianHealey: liberty student: Autolykos:Whether the proposition "anything voluntary is moral" can be refuted depends on the definitions being used for "voluntary" and "moral" -- definitions which others are in no way obligated to agree with? What is your point? Probably this: "What are your own definitions for "voluntary" and "moral"?" You know, the part you didn't quote?
liberty student: Autolykos:Whether the proposition "anything voluntary is moral" can be refuted depends on the definitions being used for "voluntary" and "moral" -- definitions which others are in no way obligated to agree with? What is your point?
Autolykos:Whether the proposition "anything voluntary is moral" can be refuted depends on the definitions being used for "voluntary" and "moral" -- definitions which others are in no way obligated to agree with?
What is your point?
Probably this: "What are your own definitions for "voluntary" and "moral"?"
You know, the part you didn't quote?
Autolykos knows I have little patience for semantic debates.
liberty student: AdrianHealey: liberty student: How can someone be mistreated if they want it? Are you arguing against free will? So, you accept behaviorism? Answer my questions. How can someone be mistreated when they ask to be treated a particular way? I'm making a simple praxeological insight. People act rationally.
...given the circumstances, yes. It doesn't follow that people can act immorally, even though people put up with it.
The state is not the enemy. The idea of the state is.
"Yes, it is very clear you don't know what authority is. That ^^ is not an example of authority. Want to try again?"
<= Those are examples of moral authority. If you define the word differently than the common conception of that word, feel free to explicitly say so.
"So you agree, involuntary relations can never be moral?"
<= I don't think so, no.
"I have no idea what this concept or party is. It is meaningless to me. I'm not appealing to tradition. I am appealing to reason."
<= Well, if you use words and concepts, it's best you use words and concepts that have a general meaning. Not that you give them new meanings as it fits you.
"It cannot."
<= That is true.
"Does this make any sense? Besides the blatant appeal to authority that is."
<= Yes, it does. Luckily, they knew what they were talking about when saying so.
"Ancap or voluntarism are not legal/political systems or theories."
<= They are. At least; in the common way that the term political philosophy is used.
"Your subjective opinions beyond voluntary relations are irrelevant to me. I don't care what voluntary choices you make or approve of. They are arbitrary and subjective."
<= They might be irrelevant to you; it doesn't follow that they are irrelevant, period.
Well; can you proof that all ought statements beyond voluntary relations are arbitrary and subjective? In other words; can you proof the assertion that nothing meaningful can be said about how people ought to act, given a libertarian law code?
AdrianHealey:Well; can you proof that all ought statements beyond voluntary relations are arbitrary and subjective?
If ought statements are value statements, then praxeologically they must be subjective.
AdrianHealey:In other words; can you proof the assertion that nothing meaningful can be said about how people ought to act, given a libertarian law code?
The burden is on the person claiming this (you, Scott, Roderick Long etc) to prove it. I can't prove a negative.
liberty student:What is your point?
Isn't it self-explanatory? By the way, that sentence you quoted was supposed to end with a period -- I've edited the post to reflect that.
Please answer my question. What are your own definitions for "voluntary" and "moral"?
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
AdrianHealey: liberty student: Answer my questions. How can someone be mistreated when they ask to be treated a particular way? I'm making a simple praxeological insight. People act rationally. ...given the circumstances, yes. It doesn't follow that people can act immorally, even though people put up with it.
liberty student: Answer my questions. How can someone be mistreated when they ask to be treated a particular way? I'm making a simple praxeological insight. People act rationally.
What does this mean? Your reply is not clear.
liberty student:Autolykos knows I have little patience for semantic debates.
First off: semantics, as premises, can't be debated except as to their consistency in use.
Second: you ask others to define their terms, but you refuse to define your own. Why is that?
Autolykos: liberty student:What is your point? Isn't it self-explanatory?
Isn't it self-explanatory?
If it was, I wouldn't ask.
Autolykos:By the way, that sentence you quoted was supposed to end with a period -- I've edited the post to reflect that.
I'm not sure how that is relevant, but ok.
Autolykos:Please answer my question. What are your own definitions for "voluntary" and "moral"?
I've already answered one on the first page. Have you bothered to read all my posts before I have to hunt back through the thread to see if I answered the other?
Autolykos:Second: you ask others to define their terms
VVVV
Autolykos:First off: semantics, as premises, can't be debated except as to their consistency in use.
Autolykos:but you refuse to define your own. Why is that?
Don't let your laziness be conflated with my dishonesty.
liberty student:If it was [self-explanatory], I wouldn't ask.
My point was that there is no correct definition for "voluntary" or "moral".
liberty student:I've already answered one on the first page. Have you bothered to read all my posts before I have to hunt back through the thread to see if I answered the other?
You're right, you gave a definition for "voluntary". I missed that because I was initially looking only for a post where you defined "moral". Sorry about that -- I stand corrected.
Can you provide a definition for "moral" now?
liberty student:Don't let your laziness be conflated with my dishonesty.
What laziness is that, exactly? I believe I explained myself in my last post.
liberty student: Scott F:"I maintain, anything voluntary is moral. No one has refuted this yet. No one will without making up logical fallacies." Which can only be defended by relativism which is logically contradictory if not impossible. "Non sequitur." Your still hung up on the simplistic thin notion which is that voluntary= moral.The nuance position is that relations are moral insofar as they are voluntary i.e. it is necessary for relationships to be voluntary to be moral (coercive ones are inherently immoral) But not sufficient(or in simple terms, not enough).As I've said repeatedly that two individuals are in a voluntary relationship does not mean that one(or both) cannot be treated badly in a way they dislike, cannot have sexism or racism say directed again them or be lied to or manipulated Etc Etc.... What I've saying is that to ignore this is to say that as long as it's voluntary it's not just moral because being voluntary is a necessary condition of it being moral but that it's sufficient and that's the end of the story.This results in a blanket approval of any relationship which is voluntary but immoral in the sense of being manipulative,controlling,hurtful etc.Essentially it's extreme thin libertarianism taken to the point of moral relativism.It's a caricature almost.It fuels the fire that libertarianism is heartless, 'selfish, conservative,rightwing or functions as apologetics for the status quo.It gives ammo to the critics of libertarianism -statist and anarchist.Furthermore on an ethical level,I consider it disgusting. Thankfully logic and experience together seem to tell me you cannot live this out in action making it just a mere slogan.Philosophy leads us to see that moral relativism is untenable if not contradictory. Scott F:Your essentially saying no voluntary relationship in which someone is being mistreated is immoral.That's absurd. "How can someone be mistreated if they want it?" How does it follow that mistreatment= they want it. Are you telling me that a women whose husband calls her a fat ugly slag ,controls her money and dictates her life down to the smallest details wants it? that's god damn perverse! " Are you arguing against free will?" That has nothing to do with it.It seems your conflating a range of concepts which you are keeping concealed.It also seems you have taken praxeology to be /mean something it does not invalidating in this case the claim AE/praxeology is value free(which of course it is)
Scott F:"I maintain, anything voluntary is moral. No one has refuted this yet. No one will without making up logical fallacies." Which can only be defended by relativism which is logically contradictory if not impossible.
Which can only be defended by relativism which is logically contradictory if not impossible.
"Non sequitur."
Your still hung up on the simplistic thin notion which is that voluntary= moral.The nuance position is that relations are moral insofar as they are voluntary i.e. it is necessary for relationships to be voluntary to be moral (coercive ones are inherently immoral) But not sufficient(or in simple terms, not enough).As I've said repeatedly that two individuals are in a voluntary relationship does not mean that one(or both) cannot be treated badly in a way they dislike, cannot have sexism or racism say directed again them or be lied to or manipulated Etc Etc....
What I've saying is that to ignore this is to say that as long as it's voluntary it's not just moral because being voluntary is a necessary condition of it being moral but that it's sufficient and that's the end of the story.This results in a blanket approval of any relationship which is voluntary but immoral in the sense of being manipulative,controlling,hurtful etc.Essentially it's extreme thin libertarianism taken to the point of moral relativism.It's a caricature almost.It fuels the fire that libertarianism is heartless, 'selfish, conservative,rightwing or functions as apologetics for the status quo.It gives ammo to the critics of libertarianism -statist and anarchist.Furthermore on an ethical level,I consider it disgusting. Thankfully logic and experience together seem to tell me you cannot live this out in action making it just a mere slogan.Philosophy leads us to see that moral relativism is untenable if not contradictory.
Scott F:Your essentially saying no voluntary relationship in which someone is being mistreated is immoral.That's absurd.
"How can someone be mistreated if they want it?"
How does it follow that mistreatment= they want it.
Are you telling me that a women whose husband calls her a fat ugly slag ,controls her money and dictates her life down to the smallest details wants it? that's god damn perverse!
" Are you arguing against free will?"
That has nothing to do with it.It seems your conflating a range of concepts which you are keeping concealed.It also seems you have taken praxeology to be /mean something it does not invalidating in this case the claim AE/praxeology is value free(which of course it is)
I don't really want to comment or read anything here.I have near zero in common with many of you.I may return periodically when there's something you need to know.
Near Mutualist/Libertarian Socialist.
liberty student: AdrianHealey:<= I don't think one can be immoral against oneself. "So then one cannot behave immoral, voluntarily. Thanks." Does not follow. cannot be immoral again self(unproven) = cannot be voluntarily ,immoral(ignoring immorality against others ). AdrianHealey:<= That is true. (Moral) authority doesn't come from 'I have something to say'. Who's claiming otherwise? "Where does moral authority come from?" From arguments based on logic and experience. " I'm under no moral obligation to help someone in dying need. I'm under no moral obligation to report a crime. " proof? "It's irrelevant to libertarianism." I and others have shown it is not. " The point of libertarianism is to facilitate diversity of social views peacefully, " Your assuming this is not occuring. " Again, tolerance is the highest libertarian value." Which is thick libertarianism.Thus you've contradicted your above statement of "it's irrelevant to libertarianism".It've caught you red handed. " What flavor ice cream you like, or which sex you are attracted to, or how much charity you should give, are all irrelevant to libertarianism." This is a strawman attempt to make the position seem absurd when it is more substantial than you claim.Your error comes from misunderstanding. The first two are irrelevant.The latter isn't.
AdrianHealey:<= I don't think one can be immoral against oneself.
"So then one cannot behave immoral, voluntarily. Thanks."
Does not follow. cannot be immoral again self(unproven) = cannot be voluntarily ,immoral(ignoring immorality against others ).
AdrianHealey:<= That is true. (Moral) authority doesn't come from 'I have something to say'. Who's claiming otherwise?
"Where does moral authority come from?"
From arguments based on logic and experience.
" I'm under no moral obligation to help someone in dying need. I'm under no moral obligation to report a crime. "
proof?
"It's irrelevant to libertarianism."
I and others have shown it is not.
" The point of libertarianism is to facilitate diversity of social views peacefully, "
Your assuming this is not occuring.
" Again, tolerance is the highest libertarian value."
Which is thick libertarianism.Thus you've contradicted your above statement of "it's irrelevant to libertarianism".It've caught you red handed.
" What flavor ice cream you like, or which sex you are attracted to, or how much charity you should give, are all irrelevant to libertarianism."
This is a strawman attempt to make the position seem absurd when it is more substantial than you claim.Your error comes from misunderstanding.
The first two are irrelevant.The latter isn't.
AdrianHealey: "Where does moral authority come from? That's the question you and Scott continue to avoid." "if there arguments make sense about what I ought to do, I follow there suggestions (or try to so). " That's the essence of it. " I'm under no moral obligation to help someone in dying need. I'm under no moral obligation to report a crime. Do you understand the difference between positive and negative obligations?" "<= Traditional libertarian taught that has any notion of philosophy and the terms used in that, would say that you don't have legal obligation to help someone in dying need and no legal obligation to report a crime. " It's important to note that legal and moral obligations may overlap but they are distinct subjects. " that people have positive legal obligations against other peoples, i.e. that they have positive obligations that can be enforced by the law to help/assist other people. People only have legal negative obligations. Traditional libertarianism - Rothbard, Long, Friedman, Schmitdz, Nozick, Randians, etc. - doesn't deny the fact that people can have, in fact, positive _moral_ obligations. We just deny that people can have positive moral(*should read legal*) obligations. " Agreed though be careful on the positive legal obligations part because technically a contract is such a thing .
"Where does moral authority come from? That's the question you and Scott continue to avoid."
"if there arguments make sense about what I ought to do, I follow there suggestions (or try to so). "
That's the essence of it.
" I'm under no moral obligation to help someone in dying need. I'm under no moral obligation to report a crime. Do you understand the difference between positive and negative obligations?"
"<= Traditional libertarian taught that has any notion of philosophy and the terms used in that, would say that you don't have legal obligation to help someone in dying need and no legal obligation to report a crime. "
It's important to note that legal and moral obligations may overlap but they are distinct subjects.
" that people have positive legal obligations against other peoples, i.e. that they have positive obligations that can be enforced by the law to help/assist other people. People only have legal negative obligations. Traditional libertarianism - Rothbard, Long, Friedman, Schmitdz, Nozick, Randians, etc. - doesn't deny the fact that people can have, in fact, positive _moral_ obligations. We just deny that people can have positive moral(*should read legal*) obligations. "
Agreed though be careful on the positive legal obligations part because technically a contract is such a thing .
liberty student: AdrianHealey:Well; can you proof that all ought statements beyond voluntary relations are arbitrary and subjective? "If ought statements are value statements, then praxeologically they must be subjective." Nothing in AE or praxeology says this.Your reading into it.If you'd like to show why this is or should(I wouldn't try to prove it should ,you'll undermine your whole claim) be the case then state your claim. AE says economic value is subjective.It says nothing about value statements in general. AdrianHealey:In other words; can you proof the assertion that nothing meaningful can be said about how people ought to act, given a libertarian law code? "The burden is on the person claiming this (you, Scott, Roderick Long etc) to prove it. I can't prove a negative." I doubt you live in accord with your rhetoric LS.I doubt you actually are indifferent in all issues considered moral.Furthermore you miss the larger point.Libertarianism is a political ETHIC. It is a subset of general ethics but applied to legal and political issues largely.
"If ought statements are value statements, then praxeologically they must be subjective."
Nothing in AE or praxeology says this.Your reading into it.If you'd like to show why this is or should(I wouldn't try to prove it should ,you'll undermine your whole claim) be the case then state your claim.
AE says economic value is subjective.It says nothing about value statements in general.
"The burden is on the person claiming this (you, Scott, Roderick Long etc) to prove it. I can't prove a negative."
I doubt you live in accord with your rhetoric LS.I doubt you actually are indifferent in all issues considered moral.Furthermore you miss the larger point.Libertarianism is a political ETHIC. It is a subset of general ethics but applied to legal and political issues largely.
Scott,
Let me see if I understand your position: You say that A) there are certain moral rules that are part of libertarianism. B) This morality is objective (not subject to individual valuations) and C) ascertainable with reason (as opposed to divine revelation). Is this about right?
Even if you were granted the first claim that thick libertarianism is the way to go, you have a hell of a lot of explaining to do about the latter two claims. Despite what you seem to think, B and C are not established truths. In fact, if B is true I'm not so sure it can be discovered with reason.
they said we would have an unfair fun advantage
mikachusetts: Scott, "Let me see if I understand your position: You say that A) there are certain moral rules that are part of libertarianism. B) This morality is objective (not subject to individual valuations) and C) ascertainable with reason (as opposed to divine revelation). Is this about right?" Correct. " you have a hell of a lot of explaining to do about the latter two claims. " That's fair enough.But that's not the task of libertarianism, that's the task of general philosophy especially ethics.The task of libertarianism is to apply moral claims not necessarily justify morality per se.Obviously there will be a need a times to justify certain kinds of claims e.g. equality, concern for the poor etc. " In fact, if B is true I'm not so sure it can be discovered with reason." We can disagree on this but it's philosophy.It is important and right in my view philosophically to argue this way BUT It's not necessary to believe this to be a left-libertarian or a thick libertarian.Left libertarians form a rough consensus on what they consider immoral not how they justify why they think this.Left libertarianism is a specific kind of thick libertarianism.While I'm on this point I've noticed something about LS. LS claims that social issues are irrelevant to libertarianism and that tolerance is a prime value for voluntarism(or anarchism of which libertarian consistently understood is a kind of).Not only are these contradictory(surely tolerance leads to considerations of social issues? I'd certainly argue so) but it seems LS is not opposed to thickness per se but the left libertarian thickness- essentially he is setting himself up as a cultural conservative reactionary.More fulfillment of what I've been repeatedly saying.
"Let me see if I understand your position: You say that A) there are certain moral rules that are part of libertarianism. B) This morality is objective (not subject to individual valuations) and C) ascertainable with reason (as opposed to divine revelation). Is this about right?"
Correct.
" you have a hell of a lot of explaining to do about the latter two claims. "
That's fair enough.But that's not the task of libertarianism, that's the task of general philosophy especially ethics.The task of libertarianism is to apply moral claims not necessarily justify morality per se.Obviously there will be a need a times to justify certain kinds of claims e.g. equality, concern for the poor etc.
" In fact, if B is true I'm not so sure it can be discovered with reason."
We can disagree on this but it's philosophy.It is important and right in my view philosophically to argue this way BUT It's not necessary to believe this to be a left-libertarian or a thick libertarian.Left libertarians form a rough consensus on what they consider immoral not how they justify why they think this.Left libertarianism is a specific kind of thick libertarianism.While I'm on this point I've noticed something about LS. LS claims that social issues are irrelevant to libertarianism and that tolerance is a prime value for voluntarism(or anarchism of which libertarian consistently understood is a kind of).Not only are these contradictory(surely tolerance leads to considerations of social issues? I'd certainly argue so) but it seems LS is not opposed to thickness per se but the left libertarian thickness- essentially he is setting himself up as a cultural conservative reactionary.More fulfillment of what I've been repeatedly saying.
Scott F:Left libertarians form a rough consensus on what they consider immoral not how they justify why they think this.
This is an extremely honest and true sentiment.
"I'm making a simple praxeological insight. People act rationally."
mikachusetts: Scott F:Left libertarians form a rough consensus on what they consider immoral not how they justify why they think this. This is an extremely honest and true sentiment.
Of course.
Now I don't deny I'm arguing that morality is objective but what I'm definately not saying is that to be a left libertarian you must think this.I'm not conflating my philosophical beliefs on morality into the definition of left libertarianism itself. There are many different justifications for what left libertarians consider moral and immoral.
Scott F:Does not follow. cannot be immoral again self(unproven) = cannot be voluntarily ,immoral(ignoring immorality against others ).
Keep thinking about it. It will come to you eventually.
Scott F:From arguments based on logic and experience.
So if I am more logical and experienced than you, I have moral authority over you?
Scott F:" I'm under no moral obligation to help someone in dying need. I'm under no moral obligation to report a crime. " proof?
Learn how the burden of proof works, ok?
Scott F:"It's irrelevant to libertarianism." I and others have shown it is not.
Don't confuse an assertion with a proof.
Scott F:" The point of libertarianism is to facilitate diversity of social views peacefully, " Your assuming this is not occuring.
Source?
Scott F:" Again, tolerance is the highest libertarian value." Which is thick libertarianism.Thus you've contradicted your above statement of "it's irrelevant to libertarianism".It've caught you red handed.
Scott, if you don't understand an argument, and cannot follow it, don't use the bold text feature.
Scott F:" What flavor ice cream you like, or which sex you are attracted to, or how much charity you should give, are all irrelevant to libertarianism." This is a strawman attempt to make the position seem absurd when it is more substantial than you claim.Your error comes from misunderstanding.
This is not a strawman. It might be considered a reductio. They are not the same thing. YOUR error comes from misunderstanding logic.
Scott F:The first two are irrelevant.The latter isn't.
If you can't prove it, why should anyone believe you?
Scott F:"I'm making a simple praxeological insight. People act rationally." Only to some extent.It's more complex than that.In truth,there are degrees of rationally.
Only to some extent.It's more complex than that.In truth,there are degrees of rationally.
Within praxeology, my comment is 100% correct, and your comment is 100% wrong.
Scott F:What Mises seems to have meant is that people act rationally in that they have ends and seek what they consider correct means to do so.
Congratulations, you get a cookie.
Scott F:But that does not mean that the choice of those means are necessary the correct ones.
No one has claimed that.
Scott F:That's simplistic and implies no one can ever act irrationally which is crazy.LS has clearly misunderstood this
That's praxeology, and you do not understand it.
liberty student: Scott F:Does not follow. cannot be immoral again self(unproven) = cannot be voluntarily ,immoral(ignoring immorality against others ). "Keep thinking about it. It will come to you eventually." Somehow I doubt that.Funny how you say this to me but I can't say that to you when your claims are far more counter intuitive than mine.Care to explain? Scott F:From arguments based on logic and experience. "So if I am more logical and experienced than you, I have moral authority over you?" No.Being older does not necessarily mean you are more rational just like being young does not mean you are necessarily more irrational. Anyone willing to , is open to reaching correct conclusions.Rationality is pretty egalitarian in this sense. Scott F:"It's irrelevant to libertarianism." I and others have shown it is not. "Don't confuse an assertion with a proof." I've linked two concepts to show the relation.Others have done so in different ways too.You refuse to answer. Scott F:" The point of libertarianism is to facilitate diversity of social views peacefully, " Your assuming this is not occuring. "Source?" You implied this is not happening now as if libertarianism is or has deviated. Scott F:" Again, tolerance is the highest libertarian value." Which is thick libertarianism.Thus you've contradicted your above statement of "it's irrelevant to libertarianism".It've caught you red handed. "Scott, if you don't understand an argument, and cannot follow it, don't use the bold text feature." You say libertarianism is not relevant to social issues yet in another comment you say tolerance is the highest libertarian value.So either this is a contradiction in your claims or this is only an apparent contradiction so you will need to show why it is not.Instead you chose to say I misunderstood.If that is true,show me how I have done so since to all apparent purposes you have claimed two mutually exclusive things in the same regard.
"Keep thinking about it. It will come to you eventually."
Somehow I doubt that.Funny how you say this to me but I can't say that to you when your claims are far more counter intuitive than mine.Care to explain?
"So if I am more logical and experienced than you, I have moral authority over you?"
No.Being older does not necessarily mean you are more rational just like being young does not mean you are necessarily more irrational.
Anyone willing to , is open to reaching correct conclusions.Rationality is pretty egalitarian in this sense.
"Don't confuse an assertion with a proof."
I've linked two concepts to show the relation.Others have done so in different ways too.You refuse to answer.
"Source?"
You implied this is not happening now as if libertarianism is or has deviated.
"Scott, if you don't understand an argument, and cannot follow it, don't use the bold text feature."
You say libertarianism is not relevant to social issues yet in another comment you say tolerance is the highest libertarian value.So either this is a contradiction in your claims or this is only an apparent contradiction so you will need to show why it is not.Instead you chose to say I misunderstood.If that is true,show me how I have done so since to all apparent purposes you have claimed two mutually exclusive things in the same regard.
liberty student: Scott F:What Mises seems to have meant is that people act rationally in that they have ends and seek what they consider correct means to do so. Congratulations, you get a cookie. Scott F:But that does not mean that the choice of those means are necessary the correct ones. No one has claimed that. Scott F:That's simplistic and implies no one can ever act irrationally which is crazy.LS has clearly misunderstood this That's praxeology, and you do not understand it.
First you say I am correct that all Mises said is people reason from means to ends.Then you say no one has claimed this means the means used to get to the ends are necessarily the correct ones- so far so good- but THEN when I say it's crazy to say no one can ever act irrationally (which should be clear in this context means it's crazy to say no one ever chooses the wrong means to an end) you say this is praxeology. I think you misunderstood me.
What I'm saying is we must be careful to seperate out what we're talking about and not be simplistic and try to claim from "people act rationally in that they reason from means to ends " to "people act rationally because they ALWAYS choose the correct means for their desired ends"- which is clearly false and not what Mises argued.
"Your essentially saying no voluntary relationship in which someone is being mistreated is immoral.That's absurd."
(...)
"Answer my questions. How can someone be mistreated when they ask to be treated a particular way?
I'm making a simple praxeological insight. People act rationally."
"...given the circumstances, yes. It doesn't follow that people can act immorally, even though people put up with it. "
"What does this mean? Your reply is not clear."
That people act using means to achieve ends, within given circumstances. Yes, that's the ultimate datum of praxeology. That is completely correct.
It doesn't follow that 'putting up with something' is the same as 'asking to be treated in a particular way'. Praxeology is irrelevant for thymology, but it's thymology that is relevant here. It's not that hard to understand, we do it all the time. The reasons why people are in a certain voluntary relationship matter for moral philosophy. It's not 'just' praxeology: 'ow, the wife stays with her abusive husband, so what the husband does, is perfectly morally oke!' There is no real requirement for legal action, but there is room for moral condemnation. The wife (in this example) wants to be treated differently, but sees no other way, so just settles for the end and the means she sees fit, given her circumstances. Nobody is denying that she's acting 'praxeological'. (It's impossible to act 'non-praxeological', so that wouldn't make any sense.) Just because the husband can get away with his behavior, because the wife sees no real possibility otherwise, doesn't follow that he's not being immoral.
Obviously, husband and wife can be interchangeable. Abusive wives also exist. I'm just illustrating a point of the possibility of someone who in a praxeological sense chooses for a certain situation, but where there is still immoral behavior.
But, the way you explain your position, I would have to conclude that this husband is not engaging in immoral behavior against the wife, because th wife chooses to stay with her husband. If that is not your opinion, please be more clear with what you mean.
<= Explanatory value subjectivism doesn't flat out deny the possibility of objective values. It could be that there are no objective values where people ought to strive for, but just because there is the concept of explanatory value subjectivism, it doesn't follow that there is the impossibility of objective values. Praxeology is the science/logic of action. To explain certain behavior - and to deduce economic laws - we need explanatory value subjectivism. It doesn't follow that it is impossible to deduce objective values. If you want to proof the impossibility of an objective value, just referring to explanatory value subjectivism, doesn't cut it. If you say 'the burden of proof is on you to proof that there is such a thing', than I agree. But if you deny the possibility, than you have to give an epistemological argument why such a thing is impossible.
I'm not saying I have deduced objective values - that depends on what you mean by it. But it is certainly true, as Mises said, that to achieve certain objectives (ends) we have to use certain means. This relation is objective. If you thus want to aim for that end, you have to use a certain mean. It's definitely true that objective relations exist in that way and thus a conditional objective value exists in that way.
<= The first sentence is obviously correct. I do not say otherwise. The second sentence is obviously false: it is perfectly possible to proof some kinds of negative. Godel has an impossibility theorem, Mises has one and there are many other proofs that proof that something is impossible. Some negatives can't be proven - e.g. is there a teapot on Mars? - but some kind. There is an epistemological argument that proofs that the negative 'there is no teapot around Mars' can't be proven, as there is an epistemological argument that the negative 'socialism can't calculate' can proven. (The necessary requirements to engage economic calculation are not available in a socialist commonwealth.)
So, if you say that you can't proof the assertion that nothing meaningful can be said about how people ought to act, given a libertarian law code, than you ought to be able to give the epistemological argument why this is, in fact, impossible. If not, than I think one ought to be agnostic about it.
I do think that meaningful things can be said about how people ought to behave, given a libertarian law code. At least in the rule-utilitarian sense as Mises applied it. If you want to achieve certain ends, certain moral ought codes follow necessarily. I'm not sure if anything can be said over and above that.
Adrian, wouldn't you say your last paragraph means you all agree here? It seems to me that your use of the term "objective value" was just a way of phrasing Mises's subjective utilitarianism in a way that was unfamiliar to the other posters, so they reacted unfavorably to it (because they thought you meant something mystical by it).
Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems you meant:
"But it is certainly true, as Mises said, that to achieve certain objectives (ends) we have to use certain means. This relation is objective. If you thus want to aim for that end, you have to use a certain mean. It's definitely true that objective relations exist in that way and thus a conditional objective value exists in that way. "
Why anarchy fails
AJ:Adrian, wouldn't you say your last paragraph means you all agree here? It seems to me that your use of the term "objective value" was just a way of phrasing Mises's subjective utilitarianism in a way that was unfamiliar to the other posters, so they reacted unfavorably to it (because they thought you meant something mystical by it).
I'm not sure. To sump up, without any arguments.
- I do think that there is such a thing as a 'natural law'. (And I think Mises rule-utiliterianism is connected to it. I don't buy the strict dichotomy.)
- I do think there is a distinction between a moral ought and a legal ought. (The main difference, probably, being the fact one can legitimately use force to enforce a legal ought, but not a moral ought.)
- I do think there can be a 'science of legal ought' (i.e. natural law, which is an a priori science, based upon the logic of action.) The 'logical' conclusion from this, is something that can be called 'libertarianism'. So, in a legal sense, the science of (natural) law, demands that we have a libertarian-law like world.
- I do think there can be a 'science of moral ought'. I'm not completely sure if this is an a priori science. But to the very least: we can make rule-utilitarian like statements, similar to Misesian rule-utilitarian arguments for what laws should guide a society (where the use of force is permitted.) I do not think it's just 'all subjective'. At least - in the Misesian sense - there are certain objective relations. (If rule x was a generally acknowledged and acted upon moral rule, we would have outcome X. If we desire outcome X, we should have generally acknowledge moral rule x.) So within a libertarian-law like world, there can still be moral discussion about what means we should have to achieve what means. At least in the sense of Misesian rule-utilitarianism, but I'm open to the possibility that it can go beyond that: it might be true that we can proof that people ought to have certain moral ends. But I have no example of this, nor do I know of any argument for it. But I don't have any epistemological argument that this would be impossible either.
Again; I'm not making any arguments for it at this point in time. But, in a nut shell, this is where I stand. You might disagree with this - which some of you probably do. But I don't think this position is in any way anti-libertarian, anti-praxeology or anti-reason.
I would also note that I don't really like/use the term 'objective value'. An 'objective ought' is not the same as 'an objective value'.
I hope my position is clear.
AdrianHealey: "Your essentially saying no voluntary relationship in which someone is being mistreated is immoral.That's absurd." (...) "Answer my questions. How can someone be mistreated when they ask to be treated a particular way? I'm making a simple praxeological insight. People act rationally." "...given the circumstances, yes. It doesn't follow that people can act immorally, even though people put up with it. " "What does this mean? Your reply is not clear." That people act using means to achieve ends, within given circumstances. Yes, that's the ultimate datum of praxeology. That is completely correct. It doesn't follow that 'putting up with something' is the same as 'asking to be treated in a particular way'. Praxeology is irrelevant for thymology, but it's thymology that is relevant here. It's not that hard to understand, we do it all the time. The reasons why people are in a certain voluntary relationship matter for moral philosophy. It's not 'just' praxeology: 'ow, the wife stays with her abusive husband, so what the husband does, is perfectly morally oke!' There is no real requirement for legal action, but there is room for moral condemnation. The wife (in this example) wants to be treated differently, but sees no other way, so just settles for the end and the means she sees fit, given her circumstances. Nobody is denying that she's acting 'praxeological'. (It's impossible to act 'non-praxeological', so that wouldn't make any sense.) Just because the husband can get away with his behavior, because the wife sees no real possibility otherwise, doesn't follow that he's not being immoral. Obviously, husband and wife can be interchangeable. Abusive wives also exist. I'm just illustrating a point of the possibility of someone who in a praxeological sense chooses for a certain situation, but where there is still immoral behavior. But, the way you explain your position, I would have to conclude that this husband is not engaging in immoral behavior against the wife, because th wife chooses to stay with her husband. If that is not your opinion, please be more clear with what you mean.
Thank you for taking the time to carefully explain this.This was what I was arguing.
AdrianHealey:So within a libertarian-law like world, there can still be moral discussion about what means we should have to achieve what means. At least in the sense of Misesian rule-utilitarianism, but I'm open to the possibility that it can go beyond that: it might be true that we can proof that people ought to have certain moral ends. But I have no example of this, nor do I know of any argument for it. But I don't have any epistemological argument that this would be impossible either.
First, your use of the word moral here makes it seem that you would say that, "To get to the store, you ought to take a right on 9th street," is a moral statement. Was that your intent?
Second, what would it even mean to say someone "ought to have moral ends"? I mean, you may want to prove something, but I don't think we readers of this have any way of knowing what it is you may want to prove, so it is hard to respond.
AJ:First, your use of the word moral here makes it seem that you would say that, "To get to the store, you ought to take a right on 9th street," is a moral statement. Was that your intent? Second, what would it even mean to say someone "ought to have moral ends"? I mean, you may want to prove something, but I don't think we readers of this have any way of knowing what it is you may want to prove, so it is hard to respond.
I defined the term 'moral philosophy' (and thus moral statements) as that part of philosophy that tries to analyze what kind of moral rules people ought to follow regarding their interactions with other people - without the use of force being legitimate to enforce these rules. And it's distinguished from philosophy of law, that investigates the legitimate use of force to enforce certain behaviors. I think both definitions fit into the tradition of philosophy, i.e. how those words are commonly used in philosophy.
Well; to say 'one ought to have certain moral end x' would mean that 'someone is morally in the wrong if he doesn't have and act upon moral end x'. Again; I'm not sure if that this is possible to proof, but that's what it would mean. Take for example that 'helping people in dying need when there is no way else around to help him/her' would be a moral end. Than if someone is in that situation, but doesn't try to help that person, he would be morally in the wrong.
One Misesian-kind of argument for it to be a moral rule would be: a society where people help at low cost to themselves other people in dying need could/would be a society where the harmony of interests would even be better served than an alternative libertarian world, where this moral rule wouldn't be generally accepted. So _if_ we want such a world, we ought to adopt that rule. (This would be a conditional argument: if x than y.)
But could it be possible to proof that something ought to be a moral rule just because of what the rules state itself, and not because we can accept that we both want to achieve end x, and therefore we ought to adopt a certain rule. This is, obviously, similar to the discussion regarding natural law versus 'ule-utilitarian approach to law, but in the realm of moral philosophy.
By "morally wrong" do you mean something other than "an inefficient way for a given person to achieve their goals" (including their goal of not feeling guilty, or of getting warm fuzzies from helping other people)? Hence what is morally wrong would vary from person to person, depending on what they care about? (I.e., this would just be a restatement of Mises.)
Liberty Student, can you please respond to these two posts?
Autolykos:Liberty Student, can you please respond to these two posts?
I will not. I'm done with this disussion, in particular, Scott, Adrian and semantics. I apologize in advance if this doesn't satisfy you.
liberty student:I will not. I'm done with this disussion, in particular, Scott, Adrian and semantics. I apologize in advance if this doesn't satisfy you.
All I'm really looking for is your definition of "moral". I'd also like to know how you think I was being "lazy" earlier. Of course, I can't make you honor these two requests, but I see no good reason as to why you wouldn't. They seem simple enough, don't they?
Autolykos: liberty student:I will not. I'm done with this disussion, in particular, Scott, Adrian and semantics. I apologize in advance if this doesn't satisfy you. All I'm really looking for is your definition of "moral". I'd also like to know how you think I was being "lazy" earlier. Of course, I can't make you honor these two requests, but I see no good reason as to why you wouldn't. They seem simple enough, don't they?
Autolykos, no means no. You've done this with me, too. When someone says clearly they'd prefer not to go further into a topic in a given thread, and yet you still continue to ask them about it, it can only serve to irritate. I know you don't mean anything by it; just letting you know how it comes off.
liberty student: Autolykos:Liberty Student, can you please respond to these two posts? I will not. I'm done with this disussion, in particular, Scott, Adrian and semantics. I apologize in advance if this doesn't satisfy you.
I think you got exposed on praxeology and refused to define your terms. By refusing to define your terms, you guaranteed the argument couldn't resolve itself.
Danny Sanchez:Autolykos, no means no.
In this case, I think "no" also means "I'm deliberately evading your questions".
Danny Sanchez:You've done this with me, too.
When and where?
Danny Sanchez:When someone says clearly they'd prefer not to go further into a topic in a given thread, and yet you still continue to ask them about it, it can only serve to irritate. I know you don't mean anything by it; just letting you know how it comes off.
Thanks for that. I already figured it can serve to irritate. That's not my intention, but I can't always help how the other person takes it. My point here was to imply that, as far as I'm concerned, Liberty Student is deliberately evading my questions for no good reason (IMO). Furthermore, he repeatedly asked others in this thread for the definition of "moral", yet he won't provide his own definition when respectfully asked.
So, to be perfectly blunt, I don't care whether it's irritating. If I ask questions in a respectful manner, and they're not answered, I'm going to assume they were deliberately ignored. At that point, I'm irritated. Why should I then care whether the other person becomes irritated as well?
Autolykos:So, to be perfectly blunt, I don't care whether it's irritating. If I ask questions in a respectful manner, and they're not answered, I'm going to assume they were deliberately ignored. At that point, I'm irritated. Why should I then care whether the other person becomes irritated as well?
You can assume anything you like. You seem to assume a sense of entitlement that people are getting tired of being demanded to fulfill.
And if you have to ask why in a social group you have to be concerned about being irritating, well then perhaps its not other people who are having a problem arguing in good faith.