Micah71831: Humans do think in a spoken language (English, French, Japanese, etc.)
Humans do think in a spoken language (English, French, Japanese, etc.)
Most do, but are you sure that they have to?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
That's the big question that cognitive psychologists are trying to answer. There are definitely indicators that this is the case but there are also indicators that language is a side effect of thought as well. If you are interested in the topic I can try to dig up some some relevant research articles on the subject.
Micah71381: Am I correct in understanding that the key here is an object's capability of argumentation? If so, does that mean a human with a mental deficiency causing them to be unable to argue becomes a scarce resource rather than a human with the ability to homestead (including homestead his own body)? What if this deficiency is temporary such as in children (they grow out of it) or while asleep/in a coma (it ends once you awaken)? What about people who are born with a permanent deficiency (mentally retarded)? What about people who develop a permanent deficiency later in life (dementia, damage to the prefrontal cortex, etc.)? I am not arguing your point, just trying to understand it. In fact, I don't necessarily have a problem with your definition of "capability of argumentation" as the defining factor, I just want to make sure I understand it before I really think it through and try to poke holes in it.
Am I correct in understanding that the key here is an object's capability of argumentation? If so, does that mean a human with a mental deficiency causing them to be unable to argue becomes a scarce resource rather than a human with the ability to homestead (including homestead his own body)? What if this deficiency is temporary such as in children (they grow out of it) or while asleep/in a coma (it ends once you awaken)? What about people who are born with a permanent deficiency (mentally retarded)? What about people who develop a permanent deficiency later in life (dementia, damage to the prefrontal cortex, etc.)?
I am not arguing your point, just trying to understand it. In fact, I don't necessarily have a problem with your definition of "capability of argumentation" as the defining factor, I just want to make sure I understand it before I really think it through and try to poke holes in it.
I am sorry for my late response.
Please correct me if I am wrong in my understanding of your question. Are you asking me whether a thing that can not argue ought to coerce and/or ought to be itself coerced?
No argument can be thought of by a thing that can not reason; and even if it could reason, an argumentation between it and another thing would not exist if there is a cognitive barrier between them. Hoppe's axiom addresses arguments for coercion which presupposes an agent that made it, because arguments are not merely a "meaningless noise" floating in the air. What is else, argumentation ethics does not propose "ought" statements.
Hoppe is a philosopher who has recognized the fundamental reason for the emergence of conflicts. And this reason is the lack of superabundance of goods. He attempts at coming with a solution that eliminates (or more precisely, minimize their absolute number) otherwise unavoidabe conflicts. These conflicts are otherwsie unavoidable when there are no norms to regulate interaction. The intended purpose of every moral norm is to coordinate action, so that these previously unescapable conflicts be prevented from arising. Originator of conflict can be every actor, no matter human or non-human. An act of eating my arm, executed by a lion, constitutes a conflict over a scarce good, i.e. over my body. It is, of cource, most preferable to come up with a solution that addresses conflict regardless who/what is the actor that produced it. I believe that you know all of this. Most philosophers know it, too. There are some differences, though. Hoppe recognizes that non-human potential creators of conflicts are not moral agents. They are not capable of reasoning; they do not act purposefully, rather instinctively. Which means that they do not have the capacity of choosing different means for achieving their end. The means they employ are ones antagonistic to property rights. When a lion wants to eat, it goes and kills a gazelle. What is of significance is that their means are natural and more importantly do not succumb to consideration and followed alteration. Ergo, no argumentation can take place with these potential creators of conflicts regarding proper and non-proper behaviour. And as Hoppe says, then, the problem becomes technological, i.e. if they are to be submitted to us thanks to our species' supremacy, there isn't a property rights violation.
What about a brain dead guy, or a guy with dementia? Well the brain dead guy can not act, so he can not possibly inflict someone's property rights. The guy with dementia also can not argue, but he can act. If he does not have a guardian who makes sure that he does not go on a rampage, then if he is imprisoned or killed, that is not a violation of property rights.
liberty student: vaduka:How does exactly the specified person who made the argument which Conza proved invalid relates to the validy of Conza's own argument? I never claimed it did.
vaduka:How does exactly the specified person who made the argument which Conza proved invalid relates to the validy of Conza's own argument?
I never claimed it did.
Well if you then did not claim and don't now that the concrete person whose argument Conza addressed does not relate to the validity of Conza's own argument , why did you demand to be told who this person is? I speculate that you are one of the people who Conza referred to when he wrote this: "I find it hilarious that some here are all about actions & principles, non hypocrisy and yet their own very own refute their notion of it." I traced this back in the first page of this thread.
liberty student: vaduka:What does it matter whether a theorist who has demonstrated that another theorist's argument is invalid has named this other theorist or not? Laughing at people isn't an argument. It's good form to give the other side an opportunity to respond, instead of taking a vague swipe at what could have been several posters, in this thread and others, non-specifically. If his refutation was strong, he should have no issue with identifying the source of the flawed rgument.
vaduka:What does it matter whether a theorist who has demonstrated that another theorist's argument is invalid has named this other theorist or not?
Laughing at people isn't an argument. It's good form to give the other side an opportunity to respond, instead of taking a vague swipe at what could have been several posters, in this thread and others, non-specifically. If his refutation was strong, he should have no issue with identifying the source of the flawed rgument.
Conza has made several postings in the first page of the thread. Most of them are addressed to your writings. I think that they substantiate a refutal of your 3rd posting in the thread. So, if we agree that he has refuted your writings, what is the significance of his laughing on his argument. None. Maybe you will perceive his personality in a different way, but his argument still holds.
liberty student: vaduka:But I see that you are the one participant in the debate who questions the feelings and emotions of another participant as a way may be to proof him wrong? Am I? Where have I done this? Please source it.
vaduka:But I see that you are the one participant in the debate who questions the feelings and emotions of another participant as a way may be to proof him wrong?
Am I? Where have I done this? Please source it.
You either did not understand that he addressed you in some of his postings or you deliberately prentended that he did not address you. Then you call him a coward for not explicitly mentioning your name. He, not directly naming you, does not demolish his arguments. Why do you bring in the "cowardness"? What is he supposed to be coward about? How does this relate to his argument? I will speculate again and say that it looks like this: "Hey, you even did not dare to speak my name, so I will just neglect your arguments, no matter whether they are sound or not."
I. Ryan: vaduka: I was surprised to see the reputation of the following thread, which contains at least several non-sequiturs in the OP that completely corrupt what he is trying to articulate: http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/22196.aspx Care to elaborate in the original thread, or open up your own for that purpose?
vaduka: I was surprised to see the reputation of the following thread, which contains at least several non-sequiturs in the OP that completely corrupt what he is trying to articulate: http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/22196.aspx
I was surprised to see the reputation of the following thread, which contains at least several non-sequiturs in the OP that completely corrupt what he is trying to articulate: http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/22196.aspx
Care to elaborate in the original thread, or open up your own for that purpose?
My opposition to the mentioned thread will be constructed on the premises and conclusions that are contained in the quotes given by Conza in the first page of the current thread I am writing in.
I feel inclined to say this: Capitalism does not encourage people to do anything. Capitalism is not a norm, a motivator, or something like this. Capitalism is a mode of production. Capitalism in itself as a conception does not include the way (i.e, with initiation of aggression or without the initiation of aggression) you ought to acquire the means you are using for your engagement in such a production. It neither recognizes property rights, or not recognizes them.
vaduka: Micah71381: Am I correct in understanding that the key here is an object's capability of argumentation? If so, does that mean a human with a mental deficiency causing them to be unable to argue becomes a scarce resource rather than a human with the ability to homestead (including homestead his own body)? What if this deficiency is temporary such as in children (they grow out of it) or while asleep/in a coma (it ends once you awaken)? What about people who are born with a permanent deficiency (mentally retarded)? What about people who develop a permanent deficiency later in life (dementia, damage to the prefrontal cortex, etc.)? I am not arguing your point, just trying to understand it. In fact, I don't necessarily have a problem with your definition of "capability of argumentation" as the defining factor, I just want to make sure I understand it before I really think it through and try to poke holes in it. I am sorry for my late response. Please correct me if I am wrong in my understanding of your question. Are you asking me whether a thing that can not argue ought to coerce and/or ought to be itself coerced?
What I was trying to get at is how you define whether or not a thing is capable of argumentation? At first glance to me it seems like it must necessarily be arbitrary. A good example is a child. When they are born they are incapable of argumentation. When they are adults they are capable of argumentation. However, at what point between those two times do they switch from incapable to capable? How is such a thing measured? The same goes for the spectrum of intelligence found in humans. I would assume that we can state a severely mentally retarded individual is incapable of argumentation while a genius is very capable of argumentation. Where in this spectrum do you draw the line between capable and incapable? There are humans all along that spectrum and no clear way in my mind to divide the populous.
I like the idea of using argumentation to determine whether a thing has rights or not but I don't like the fact that the dividing line has to be arbitrarily set.
Micah71381: vaduka: Micah71381: Am I correct in understanding that the key here is an object's capability of argumentation? If so, does that mean a human with a mental deficiency causing them to be unable to argue becomes a scarce resource rather than a human with the ability to homestead (including homestead his own body)? What if this deficiency is temporary such as in children (they grow out of it) or while asleep/in a coma (it ends once you awaken)? What about people who are born with a permanent deficiency (mentally retarded)? What about people who develop a permanent deficiency later in life (dementia, damage to the prefrontal cortex, etc.)? I am not arguing your point, just trying to understand it. In fact, I don't necessarily have a problem with your definition of "capability of argumentation" as the defining factor, I just want to make sure I understand it before I really think it through and try to poke holes in it. I am sorry for my late response. Please correct me if I am wrong in my understanding of your question. Are you asking me whether a thing that can not argue ought to coerce and/or ought to be itself coerced? What I was trying to get at is how you define whether or not a thing is capable of argumentation? At first glance to me it seems like it must necessarily be arbitrary. A good example is a child. When they are born they are incapable of argumentation. When they are adults they are capable of argumentation. However, at what point between those two times do they switch from incapable to capable? How is such a thing measured? The same goes for the spectrum of intelligence found in humans. I would assume that we can state a severely mentally retarded individual is incapable of argumentation while a genius is very capable of argumentation. Where in this spectrum do you draw the line between capable and incapable? There are humans all along that spectrum and no clear way in my mind to divide the populous. I like the idea of using argumentation to determine whether a thing has rights or not but I don't like the fact that the dividing line has to be arbitrarily set.
There isn't a line, a measure and whatever. Hoppe addresses arguments for coercion. Behind every argument stands a thing that made the argument. It does not matter whether a 40-year old professor made it or 5-year old that says to his brother "I ought to coerce you". Let me repeat my question: Are you asking me whether a thing that can not argue ought to coerce and/or ought to be itself coerced?
It was my understanding that you were suggesting that if something can't argue then it has no "rights". So a rock has no rights because it cannot argue. A dog has no rights because it cannot argue. A newborn has no rights because it cannot argue. All of those things are property and subject to the whims of those who can argue. They can be owned, bought, sold, traded, coerced, etc.
Assuming this interpretation is correct, how does one determine whether a thing is capable of argumentation or not?
How is a baby different from a dog or a tree? Why isn't the dog the ultimate decision-maker of its body? Why isn't the tree the ultimate decision maker of it's body?
We are talking here about potential creators of conflicts. How would one year old baby that does not have a custodian go on a street rampage. First of all, it would not have survived this first year of it's life without someone taking care of it. Second, is a baby physically capable of acting in a way that violates someone's property rights? Third, while it is under a custodianship this someone is responsible for it's actions. And while in this custodianship it improves it's reasoning. Later when it is capable of taking care of itself and can reason, also can understand that murdering a man is an unsubstantiated claim over a scarce resource. A dog can not reason neither when is young, nor when is older. A dog can harm people when is young and when is old.
I suggest you read EEPP.
My question wasn't one of whether a baby could do harm or not, it was whether a baby has rights or is property (owned by it's mother). I gather that you are suggesting that it has rights since in the future, given the opportunity to develop, it will be capable of argumentation. A dog on the other hand is incapable of argumentation now and in the future therefore it has no rights. Is this correct?
How does this ruling apply to humans who are incapable of argumentation now and will not become capable of argumentation in the future? Examples such as the mentally retarded and people with degenerative brain diseases come to mind. They cannot argue now and they will not be able to argue in the future. Does this mean they are treated as property, much like a dog is property?
I can see how once you establish which collections of matter can own property and which collections of matter cannot own property you can then logically deduce all other property rights, trade, anti-coercion rules, etc.. My problem is that I don't understand how you can identify which collections of matter can own property and which cannot. What makes a gorilla less worthy of property rights than a newborn child (the dolphin is arguably smarter)? Is it just a matter of special casing our own species? Is it a matter of whether or not the thing can argue now? Can argue in the future? What happens if dogs evolve to be capable of argumentation, do they gain property rights over themselves?
It is all about the timing. When the baby can not reason, i.e., it can not be argued with, it also can not act in a violent way, or if it acts in such way - it's custodian is responsible for it's actions. So, it is of no significance that the baby can not argue for itself. A dog can not be argued with through the extent of it's whole life and there are unowned dogs that can and do initiate aggression. No conceivable ethical norm could exist in order to avoid this possible conflict. Then the problem is merely technological, i.e. if it is unowned and you do not want to live your life in a constant fear of it attacking you, you can submit it to your control. I do not say you ought to submit it, I am saying that if you do, you are not a violater of property rights. Property rights as a concept can be perceived only by creatures that can reason.
Liberty Student: "Then why did you say anything at all?"
Because I lose respect for those unwilling to address something that, imo, refutes their position and yet they choose to pretend it doesn't exist... and carry on in that fashion. I was indirectly calling those people out.
"Cool red herring bro."
Wow, so cheap, wrong & petty. You're the one whose gone on this red herring path, not me. I'm the one who has actually been trying to avoiding.
"My question was simple and direct. Who specifically were you calling out? If you can't name names, then spare us your condemnation. Internet cowards are a dime a dozen."
Fine. Since you insist. Liberty Student. It was you specifically who I had in mind when I made my statement. But it goes for whoever else fits the bill.
Micah71381: "It's possible that this is because I am reading this section out of context in which case would you mind including his premises?"
Yeah or you could go read the source document, freely available in pdf form with the specific pages mentioned.
"Conza chose to make an appeal to riddicule against some set of people on this forum. Liberty student wanted to know who they were. Conza indicated that he didn't want to derail the conversation. Liberty student pointed out that Conza initiated the derailing by appealing to riddicule in the first place, which started the whole chain."
Haha! What a re-write of history. How about ya'll scroll up in this thread, because I don't know which one you were reading - it certainly wasn't this one. As you forgot the part where I directly responded to the arguments put forward by others (specific individuals) many times. And they were ignored every time and treated as they didn't exist. No doubt I am not owed a response. But when my arguments [the arguments I agree with] are being ignored, be it out of intellectual cowardice or whatever [and when all others are being addressed & they carry on as if their position has not been put into question], I'm going to lose respect for those individuals. And so what else is there to do but laugh at them? See below in bold.
vaduka: "I do not see the red herring... But I see that you are the one participant in the debate who questions the feelings and emotions of another participant as a way may be to proof him wrong?" If a theorist has already made a sufficient refutal of someone's argument how does it matter if he even starts making flying somersault?
! That's why they must make it personal, as they are doing now. Red herring & ad hominem all the way!
I speculate that you are one of the people who Conza referred to when he wrote this: "I find it hilarious that some here are all about actions & principles, non hypocrisy and yet their own very own refute their notion of it." I traced this back in the first page of this thread.
. Spot on.
. I don't think he'd agree that his writings have been refuted. And yet I value the truth & I am open to reason. I also value LS's take on things, which makes it all the more frustrating when the norm seems to be acting as if my arguments / postings don't exist, especially since they differ on his. I know/assume he doesn't agree - what is frustrating is having no idea why.
. Certainly looks that way. And then I am the one he chides in another thread "that I can do so much better" [what makes it even more hilarious is the fact that the fellow mod I was responding to, had previously made false accusations against me. At the time I asked for an apology , none was forth coming. True colours. In the new instance I was merely taking the mickey, both out of him & the thread that was also indirectly about false accusations! Granted I guess I could have done better... not lower myself to the same level. Anyway, I'm surprised someone hasn't piped up and suggested this be taken to the members issues forum - I guess it's only a matter of time lol!
vaduka: It is all about the timing. When the baby can not reason, i.e., it can not be argued with, it also can not act in a violent way, or if it acts in such way - it's custodian is responsible for it's actions. So, it is of no significance that the baby can not argue for itself. A dog can not be argued with through the extent of it's whole life and there are unowned dogs that can and do initiate aggression. No conceivable ethical norm could exist in order to avoid this possible conflict. Then the problem is merely technological, i.e. if it is unowned and you do not want to live your life in a constant fear of it attacking you, you can submit it to your control. I do not say you ought to submit it, I am saying that if you do, you are not a violater of property rights. Property rights as a concept can be perceived only by creatures that can reason.
Would you agree or disagree with these statements?
A dog is and always will be incapable of argumentation/reason therefore it is property and cannot own property.
A human that is and always will be incapable of argumentation/reason is property and cannot own property.
If you don't agree with them, how would you reword them to be more in line with your views?
Please read EEPP - all of it.
But the following several pages, I think, will answer your questions: 280, 284, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318.
In this Introduction of his newest paper he talks about a perversion of a norm (that is when a supposed conflict-minimazing norm instead creates conflicts):
"A dog is and always will be incapable of argumentation/reason therefore it is property and cannot own property."
For an elaboration on the difference between man and animal; see a small excerpt from Hoppe here.
"The first lecture, I want to talk about the nature of man. Comparing men with animals and illuminating the major differences, and characterizing what one can call the human condition, the condition that mankind finds itself confronted with."
"So with this, let me begin talk about the nature of man and the human condition. And speak in particular about three elements that are unique, so to speak, to mankind. One is language, the second one is property, and the third one is production or technology."
Cont...
A human that is currently incapable of argumentation/reason [eg. coma] falls into a third possible status. Guardianship rights go to those with the best claim. Should someone wish to end their guardianship "the concept of guarding" [ because of eg. costs associated with such a status] they lose the rights. If you want this elaborated on - I can endeavour to find some sources.
"It is worth mentioning that the ownership right stemming from production finds its natural limitation only when, as in the case of children, the thing produced is itself another actor-producer. According to the natural theory of property, a child, once born, is just as much the owner of his own body as anyone else. Hence, not only can a child expect not to be physically aggressed against but as the owner of his body a child has the right, in particular, to abandon his parents once he is physically able to run away from them and say "no" to their possible attempts to recapture him. Parents only have special rights regarding their child - stemming from their unique status as the child's producers - insofar as they (and no one else) can rightfully claim to be the child's trustee as long as the child is physically unable to run away and say "no."[8] ~ Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, n.9 to ch. 2, on p. 212; emphasis added.
Conza88:Fine. Since you insist. Liberty Student. It was you specifically who I had in mind when I made my statement. But it goes for whoever else fits the bill.
Well, that wasn't so hard, was it? I mean, considering how I regard you as a friend, I'm surprised that you would take a passive/aggressive swipe at me online. Or maybe I shouldn't be?
Remember who started it Conza.
Conza88:I don't think he'd agree that his writings have been refuted. And yet I value the truth & I am open to reason. I also value LS's take on things, which makes it all the more frustrating when the norm seems to be acting as if my arguments / postings don't exist, especially since they differ on his. I know/assume he doesn't agree - what is frustrating is having no idea why.
I had no idea you were talking to me.
I missed this post, figured I should respond before someone accuses me of ignoring you.
Naevius:You know, Libertystudent, this has been a question I've been meaning to ask of someone for a while, so I hope you don't mind if I ask it here: If there is no objective moral value, how do you validate using force against those who murder and steal if it's only your subjective moral value over another's?
If someone aggresses (initiates violence) then they can't really claim force shouldn't be used against them.
I read that Q&A with Hoppe and I still have the same questions which I feel like are being misunderstood. It sounds like you and him are both stating that there are some distinctions between humans and animals such as language, argumentation, etc. I can accept this.
Utilizing reductio ad absurdum though, we can then come to the conclusion that some humans do not meet these requirements (cannot talk, cannot reason, cannot argue, etc.) and therefore would be considered the same as dogs as far as rights go. I don't have a problem with this.
I suspect that some people who agree with Hoppe's diferentiation between man and beast would not accept the logic to the extreme, meaning they would not consider some humans to be equivelant of dogs as far as rights are concerned. If you don't accept the theory in all cases then you are just drawing a fuzzy line in the sand and you are not using logic/reason to come to factual differentiator.
The alternative would be to simply special case out humans for no other reason besides "we can". From there you can apply all the same logic across the board to humans, regardless of whether or not other species can communicate, reason or argue and regardless of whether or not every human can communicate, reason or argue.
Neither Hoppe, nor I state all the differences between a human animal and a non-human animal (this is the proper biological distinction). I am negligent about a comprehensive comparison between all the characteristic properties a human animal possesses and all the characteristic properties a non-human animal possesses. That is because the construction of the concrete argument; and ethics as a whole, does not need to integrate such details. Whether or not a potential creator of conflict has or has not fur, has 4 legs or 2, has wings or doesn't, is a mammal or not, is of no significance to the perceived goal of argumentation ethics. What is important is that potential creators of conflicts do exist, insignificant of their matter, shape and etc. Of course before naming what or who is a potential creator of conflict, a definition of a conflict must be provided. Hoppe recognized what a conflict is and why it occurs. A conflict is a dispute over a scarce resource. It is a disequilibrium of at least two agent's satisfaction as a result of coercive action performed бъ at least one of them. There are several ways to deal with the possibility of conflicts to arise. One of them is to passivеly accept what other actor does. If he wants your meal, you do not speak with him, do not use physical force to prevent him from taking your meal. Another one is to not stay passive, but rather when he comes for your meal, you try to force him away. Third one is not only you protect yourself from attacks but you yourself initiate aggression. In every one of these scenarios a conflict is present. If we assume that we are talking about two actors that are humans, there is, though, a forth scenario. And that is argumentation. The two humans are capable of choosing different means to meet their ends. They can prefer not to fight, but instead talk and consequently come to some sort of a action-coordination system intended to make their future interaction also non-violent. I say also because the very act of arguing is not violent, too.
An argument between a human animal and non-human animal can not take place. This leaves out of the question a scenario in which these two parties could possibly not come into a fight over a scarce resource. In such a case the only way that one of the parties can make sure that he will not be harmed (with which way he assures himself a life freed from coercion from this particual other party,i.e. he will not be coerced by it) is the one in which he takes control over the other party. There is not any other conceivable way. (Again, this does not mean that each one of the parties ought to coerce the other. This is not an appeal for violence.)
Argumentation between two parties is needed to prevent coercion. This does not mean that because a baby can not argue, it ought to be coerced or that if it is coerced, then, no property rights are violated. A baby is also the ultimate desicion-maker of its body and also can not argue but it does not pose a threat of violence. This means that a justification for coercion against babies on the premise that they can not argue is invalid. This is not what argumentation ethics is about.
Hope you will have the time to read EEPP. :)
Micah71381: That's the big question that cognitive psychologists are trying to answer. There are definitely indicators that this is the case but there are also indicators that language is a side effect of thought as well. If you are interested in the topic I can try to dig up some some relevant research articles on the subject.
Before we get into that, it might be useful for me to question what those words means anyway. What would it even mean for "thought to beget language" or the other way around? What are you referring to by the word "language"? And what about the word "thought"? I must be misinterpreting you. I can't figure out why anybody would debate this topic. If I'm not misinterpreting you, they're both trivially true. They influence each other. I might say something because I thought something, and I might think something because I said something. What's the big deal?
But whatever. I'll give an example anyway. Maybe it will help. Let's say that I have a negative association with the phrase "on fire" because I burned my old house to the ground by using a candle. After that happened, I yelled to myself "NEVER LET ANYTHING IN MY HOUSE THAT'S ON FIRE". But now all I remember are the words. So you tell me that your grill cooks by lighting something "on fire" (the words!), and I refuse to let you bring it into my house. I don't go through all the images of what the fire could do to my house or anything; all that happens is that you say "on fire" about it, and I instantly feel a huge bolt of dissatisfaction while imagining it in my house. So I don't allow you to bring it in.
So what's the point? It's this. In that example, all I did was hear you say that it cooks by lighting something "on fire", and then I immediately transitioned to feeling an extreme aversion to the idea of it being in my house. All I really did was apply a certain symbol to it ("on fire"), and then start feeling a certain way about it (bad in my house!). I didn't go through any sort of long reasoning process; I just reacted to the symbol. But however crazy that sounds, it's pretty normal. That's usually how we function. We're usually on autopilot just reacting to established good and bad symbols. Those symbol associations drive our action. So if that's thought (deciding not to let you bring the grill in my house), then language (namely the phrase "on fire") begot it. Language begot thought. I guess.
And another example. This one will be a lot simpler. Let's say that I want something to drink, and I imagine saying "I'm thirsty" followed by my friend getting me some water. I want B (the drink), and I believe that doing A (saying those words) would lead to having B, so of course I do A (say those words). If imagining that saying something ("I'm thirsty") would get you what you want (the drink) is thought, and actually saying it is language, then it's pretty safe to say the opposite in that situation. Thought begot language. I assume.
I. Ryan:...
I should have clarified. By thought I meant "complex/abstract thought". Thinking about events, creating associations, etc. are things that any animal can do. However, complex/abstract thought seem to be something unique to humans. The ability to participate in scientific and philisophical thoughts that are not directly related to experiences, feelings, etc.
The simplest way to describe it is with the question, "If humans didn't have language, would they be able to think about abstract and complex things or would they be limited to thinking only about their personal history, experiences and desires?" That is, could humans without language participate in science, philosophy, etc.
When you participate in scientific or philisophical thought, do you use sensory information to put it all together in your head and contemplate or do you formulate it into words and then contemplate using that? It has been a while since I have read the research on the topic so I am a bit rusty as to the specifics of the research behind it but the debate is an active one and there is empirical evidence that suggests that without language humans would not be able to participate in complex abstract thought.
As for the language begets thought or thought begets language, it's a question of which came first in human evolution. Did we start talking and that created an opportunity to have complex/abstract thoughts or did we start having complex/abstract thoughts and that lead to the development of language?
For thought beget language, the human brain evolve and needed ways to store complex and abstract information. This created a need for a language to satisfy that requirement so humans developed an internal language in their brain. This then lead to the desire to communicate those abstract/complex ideas to other humans which lead to the outward language (spoken or sign).
For language beget thought, humans evolved and found a need to communicate with each other so they developed language. This language then provided a platform for the brain to leverage and allowed it to start contemplating more complex ideas as the language became more complex.
vaduka:A baby is also the ultimate desicion-maker of its body and also can not argue but it does not pose a threat of violence. This means that a justification for coercion against babies on the premise that they can not argue is invalid. This is not what argumentation ethics is about.
I disagree with this assertion. I would say that a baby is capable of aggressive and violent action before it is capable of argumentation. A baby can bite, grab, hit, etc. at a very early age. A baby can also fire a gun before it is capable of argumentation, though in the case of a gun it's unlikely the baby would use it aggressively unlike biting, grabbing, hitting, etc.
Also, this still doesn't address the question of a mentally retarded person who may be physically stronger than me yet incapable of argumentation, similar to a lion who has a physical advantage but not the mental capacity to argue. Would these people classify, by your definition, as humans when it comes to the right to own/be owned or would these people classify as non-human animals when it comes to the right to own/be owned?
I am not disagreeing with any you or Hoppe's other assertions. I am just curious if you are willing to take this line of thinking to the logical extreme and segregate the human race into owners and owned (though, the % of the population that would be property is minute). In this case, the owners would be the vast majority of people and the owned would be those incapable of argumentation due to retardation, brain degeneration, etc.
Micah71831: I should have clarified. By thought I meant "complex/abstract thought". Thinking about events, creating associations, etc. are things that any animal can do. However, complex/abstract thought seem to be something unique to humans. The ability to participate in scientific and philisophical thoughts that are not directly related to experiences, feelings, etc.
What's it mean to not be directly related to experience, feelings, or whatever?
Micah71831: The simplest way to describe it is with the question, "If humans didn't have language, would they be able to think about abstract and complex things or would they be limited to thinking only about their personal history, experiences and desires?" That is, could humans without language participate in science, philosophy, etc.
How could somebody think about anything past their personal history, experiences, and desires?
Micah71831: When you participate in scientific or philisophical thought, do you use sensory information to put it all together in your head and contemplate or do you formulate it into words and then contemplate using that?
When you participate in scientific or philisophical thought, do you use sensory information to put it all together in your head and contemplate or do you formulate it into words and then contemplate using that?
If I'm doing useful science or philosophy, then the former. But if I'm confusing myself, then the latter.
Micah71831: It has been a while since I have read the research on the topic so I am a bit rusty as to the specifics of the research behind it but the debate is an active one and there is empirical evidence that suggests that without language humans would not be able to participate in complex abstract thought.
It has been a while since I have read the research on the topic so I am a bit rusty as to the specifics of the research behind it but the debate is an active one and there is empirical evidence that suggests that without language humans would not be able to participate in complex abstract thought.
I would agree only in the sense that a natural language is a useful memory device.
Micah71381: As for the language begets thought or thought begets language, it's a question of which came first in human evolution. Did we start talking and that created an opportunity to have complex/abstract thoughts or did we start having complex/abstract thoughts and that lead to the development of language? For thought beget language, the human brain evolve and needed ways to store complex and abstract information. This created a need for a language to satisfy that requirement so humans developed an internal language in their brain. This then lead to the desire to communicate those abstract/complex ideas to other humans which lead to the outward language (spoken or sign). For language beget thought, humans evolved and found a need to communicate with each other so they developed language. This language then provided a platform for the brain to leverage and allowed it to start contemplating more complex ideas as the language became more complex.
I would hear you out on your opinion, but that's not a question that I would be interested in pursuing on my own at this point.
To bring the conversation back to the original dispute.
Micah71831: I. Ryan: But why would you need the words to contemplate the topic? I try to translate their word language (whatever variant of English) into my thought process (pictures, sounds, and so on), and then that is what I contemplate. If I want to share my contemplations with them, I translate my thought process into my word language (some other variant of English). That's all. I try not to contemplate the words unless I'm trying to figure out how to make one of the translations. Knowing their word language and my own at the same time isn't categorically different than knowing both Spanish and French. It's just a matter of degree, and it doesn't pose any problems for my thought process. This is a very interesting topic currently heavily discussed at the academic level of cognitive psychology and one that no one can answer yet. Last I read up on the current research (about a year ago) the majority consensus was that there is a very strong correlation between thought and language but it is heavily debated whether thought begets language or language begets thought. Humans do think in a spoken language (English, French, Japanese, etc.) but researchers aren't entirely sure if thought requires language in order to occur or if language is a side effect of thought and it's optimization mechanisms. There is some very interest research on the topic, particularly the studies on people who never learned a language growing up (very rare cases) and people with certain types of brain damage that impact speech, cognitive function, etc. The research supports both language begets thought and thought begets language so some think the two may be interdependent.
I. Ryan: But why would you need the words to contemplate the topic? I try to translate their word language (whatever variant of English) into my thought process (pictures, sounds, and so on), and then that is what I contemplate. If I want to share my contemplations with them, I translate my thought process into my word language (some other variant of English). That's all. I try not to contemplate the words unless I'm trying to figure out how to make one of the translations. Knowing their word language and my own at the same time isn't categorically different than knowing both Spanish and French. It's just a matter of degree, and it doesn't pose any problems for my thought process.
But why would you need the words to contemplate the topic?
I try to translate their word language (whatever variant of English) into my thought process (pictures, sounds, and so on), and then that is what I contemplate. If I want to share my contemplations with them, I translate my thought process into my word language (some other variant of English). That's all. I try not to contemplate the words unless I'm trying to figure out how to make one of the translations. Knowing their word language and my own at the same time isn't categorically different than knowing both Spanish and French. It's just a matter of degree, and it doesn't pose any problems for my thought process.
This is a very interesting topic currently heavily discussed at the academic level of cognitive psychology and one that no one can answer yet. Last I read up on the current research (about a year ago) the majority consensus was that there is a very strong correlation between thought and language but it is heavily debated whether thought begets language or language begets thought. Humans do think in a spoken language (English, French, Japanese, etc.) but researchers aren't entirely sure if thought requires language in order to occur or if language is a side effect of thought and it's optimization mechanisms.
There is some very interest research on the topic, particularly the studies on people who never learned a language growing up (very rare cases) and people with certain types of brain damage that impact speech, cognitive function, etc. The research supports both language begets thought and thought begets language so some think the two may be interdependent.
What's the question of which came first in the evolution of our species have to do with whether my thought process is in English or not?
The language/thought evolutional ordering is dependent on the assertion that humans "think" (complex/abstract) in language. If you don't agree with that assertion then the question of which evolved first is not a reasonable question. Cognitive psychologists believe that humans do think in language, not sensory information. Beyond that though, I can't provide much more information since I haven't researched it for quite a while. All I remember is that back when I did the research I was convinced by it, but I wouldn't be able to argue the point to you now.
As for the language/thought evolutional ordering, the same applies. It's been too long since I did the research to argue the point on it's behalf and while it is an interesting subject to me, I don't care quite enough about it to go do all the research again. :D
I. Ryan: What's the question of which came first in the evolution of our species have to do with whether my thought process is in English or not?
It appears I got off track quite a bit. The point I originally meant to get at is that humans think in language, which it sounds like you disagree with. From there I kind of went on a mental tangent to the evolution ordering thing and then ended up typing that up instead. Fail.
Since it is relevant to this conversation though, I will see if I can find some basic research that argues in favor of humans thinking in language and come back here with it.
As always, Wikipedia has a nice overview of the subject:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
Micah71381: vaduka:A baby is also the ultimate desicion-maker of its body and also can not argue but it does not pose a threat of violence. This means that a justification for coercion against babies on the premise that they can not argue is invalid. This is not what argumentation ethics is about. I disagree with this assertion. I would say that a baby is capable of aggressive and violent action before it is capable of argumentation. A baby can bite, grab, hit, etc. at a very early age. A baby can also fire a gun before it is capable of argumentation, though in the case of a gun it's unlikely the baby would use it aggressively unlike biting, grabbing, hitting, etc.
Whose hands a baby could bite, grab and hit? Could a baby travel the distance from its crate to the street or a neighbour's home? The only individuals that are affected by this so-called aggressive baby behaviour are either his guardians or guardians' friends, both of which have explicitly or implicitly agreed to bear such behaviour. The other thing is that whatever the baby/child does while under a guardianship - the guardians are responsible for it's actions. Because by agreeing to be its guardians these people agree to make sure it does not hurt someone while it can not argue for itself. Nevertheless, you can ask many as such questions. I would again suggest you read the book.
vaduka: Whose hands a baby could bite, grab and hit? Could a baby travel the distance from its crate to the street or a neighbour's home? The only individuals that are affected by this so-called aggressive baby behaviour are either his guardians or guardians' friends, both of which have explicitly or implicitly agreed to bear such behaviour. The other thing is that whatever the baby/child does while under a guardianship - the guardians are responsible for it's actions. Because by agreeing to be its guardians these people agree to make sure it does not hurt someone while it can not argue for itself. Nevertheless, you can ask many as such questions. I would again suggest you read the book.
I am starting to feel like you are avoiding my inquiry about mentally retarded people and those with degenerative brain diseases. The baby is an easy example but falls short because it eventually will develope into a human capable of argumentation. However, a mentally retarded human will not develope into such a thing so what makes him special compared to a non-human animal with a similar mental capacity?
It is my understanding that the book you have suggested does not address this particular topic and instead assumes that all humans are capable of argumentation at some point, which in my opinion is an inaccurate assumption. If I am wrong would you mind pointing me to a chapter/page that directly addresses this issue (since it is the only issue I have)? I am hesitant to read an entire book in search for the answer to one question that I don't believe it has when the rest of the book doesn't bring anything to the table that I don't already know/agree with.
The book addresses this topic with the sole explanation of the conception of argumentation ethics. Look at my previous posts for pages from the book that may help you.
vaduka: The book addresses this topic with the sole explanation of the conception of argumentation ethics. Look at my previous posts for pages from the book that may help you.
I understand what the book is about. It is my understanding though that the book assumes all humans are capable of argumentation. Am I incorrect in this understanding? Does the book actually address the fact that not all humans are capable of argumentation or is the entire book written on the assumption that the "all humans are capable of argumentation" premise is true?
Micah71381:I understand what the book is about. It is my understanding though that the book assumes all humans are capable of argumentation. Am I incorrect in this understanding? Does the book actually address the fact that not all humans are capable of argumentation or is the entire book written on the assumption that the "all humans are capable of argumentation" premise is true?
The particular 'humans' you have in mind in your question.... are they mere bags of meat with no thoughts in their heads and whose link to humanity is mere biological similarity us thinking humans, or did you have something else in mind?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
nirgrahamUK: The particular 'humans' you have in mind in your question.... are they mere bags of meat with no thoughts in their heads and whose link to humanity is mere biological similarity us thinking humans, or did you have something else in mind?
What you described would fall into the category I was thinking of. However, there are steps above that which are still below the definition of capable of argumentation. Someone with severe autism can be said to be incapable of argumentation but I would not classify them as a bag of meat with only biological similarity to humans. The same could go for someone with a degenerative brain disease that has caused them to now lack the mental capacity to argue. They were definitely human and capable of argumentation at one point, perhaps even a prime specimen. However, now they are no longer capable of argumentation but they aren't just bags of meat.
by argument is meant only the ability to consider propositions, make truth evaluations, deductions etc, it does not rely on physical attributes or the ability to perform physical behaviours like speaking or waving ones arms.
I think one of two things is going on here. You are either saying that you are concerned that some people who have 'inner lives' not be excluded from the moral agent pool... well, if they do have inner lives, if they 'think', then we haven't yet found a reason to exclude them from the pool...on the other hand, if they do not have this, but the only reason you wont call them 'bags of meat' is that they either share appearance with moral agents, or used to be moral agents before being entirely zombified then I think you are being led by your emotions.
It seems to me that if a thing cannot effectively communicate with me then I can have no way of knowing whether or not it is capable of considering propositions, making truth evaluations, deductions, etc. internally. I can only assume that a non-communicative thing does not think critically because the alternative, assuming that things unable to communicate can critically think, results in me having to assume that dogs and spiders can also do these things.
Note: By "communicate" I do not necessarily mean spoken or signed language. This could also including running tests for cognitive thought on the thing.
I want to make clear that my only argument at this point is that the definition of which things have rights and which don't is fuzzy and arbitrary rather than rationally defined.
From my understanding, Hoppe attempts to rationalize this definition by using capability of argumentation as the defining characteristic. However, this can only hold true if we accept that not all humans meet this criteria and therefore not all humans have rights. If you accept that not all humans have rights by this definition then the logic holds and you are not drawing a fuzzy line (though we can still debate on how to test for argumentation capability, loss of it, future prediction of it, etc.). If you state that all humans have rights, regardless of their meeting this requirement then the argument that "things who have rights is rationally defined" does not logically hold and you are instead drawing a fuzzy line around humanity.
Micah71381:It seems to me that if a thing cannoct effectively communicate with me then I can have no way of knowing whether or not it is capable of considering propositions, making truth evaluations, deductions, etc. internally. I can only assume that a non-communicative thing does not think critically because the alternative, assuming that things unable to communicate can critically think, results in me having to assume that dogs and spiders can also do these things.
... but... you are the one that said "think of all these people that have inner lives and thoughts but are unable to communicate (i.e. your severe autists)"
so you are trying to have it both ways a little...