If I say that A requires B to be A or without B A would not be A and then proceed to give a deductive argument like this:
If B exists then A exists.
B exists.
Therefore, A exists.
Is this sound?
Obviosly the conclusion necessarily follows the premises but is the first premise based upon the previous stipulation circular or a tautology? Or perhaps some other fallacy? It would seem so to me but I am no expert.
Much appreciated.
I may not understand the question, but part of it isn't accurate.
The stipulation that A requires B (let's say cake requires an oven to exist) contains the premise:
If cake (A) exists then an oven (B) exists, not that an oven requires cake.
What if A or B cannot exist without each other. I do not want to prejudice the arguement with the real terms just yet but the person making such would adhere to the stipulations set forth.
If B exists then A exists. B exists. Therefore, A exists.
Yep, that's Modus Ponens, a logically valid form of deductive argument.
A requires B, but it may require other things too. So B existing may not prove that A exists
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It's easy to refute an argument if you first misrepresent it. William Keizer
Yep that's 'Yep, that's Modus Ponens, a logically valid form of deductive argument.'
Yes, but given the stipulations surrounding A and B is the 1st premise valid?
No. it's not. You say "if A then B," but not the reverse.
Wait a second can you clarify - are you saying 'No' to the OP or to my last post?
Sorry. The fisrt premise is not valid given the stipulations by themselves.
Ok! So would you agree that the first premise is a tautology, and because of that, the argument is circular?
A = AB.
B exists. But we don't know if, therefore, AB exists or CB exists.
Because as far as I understand your stipulation, only fitting relation of A and B is if "every A is some B" but "not every B is A," in which case there is also C = CB, at least, so if B exists, either A or C exists.
(Source: Leibniz 1690; Jevons 1874)
Let me be more clear.
A and B are unique
B is subsumed under/in/part of A (In other words B is an attribute of A)
A as defined cannot exist without B
B as defined cannot exist without A
To me this like saying:
If human language exist then humans exist.
Human language exist.
Therefore, humans exist.
To me the antecedant and the consequence are just saying the samething in a different way given the stipulations.
In otherwords if we were to find a person that did not have any language ability they would not be human and if we were to find something using human language it would not be human.
Is the first premise fallacious - a tautology?
In that case, now that you've clarified it:
Yes.
There is easy way to prove your work.
Input: B = AB.
In 2-term system, there are Ab, or aB, or ab, or AB. Select all those that B which are also A. Select those which are not-B.
Output: ab, AB, Ab.
Input: B.
In 2-term system, there are remaining ab, AB, Ab. Select those that are B only, since no new proposition has been entered.
Output: AB.
Therefore, its true, according to your last post, if "B is subsumed in A," and if also B itself is true, then indeed A also is true.
Ok! Would you all like to see the actual argument and it's definitons? It is a religous argument. I think it is fallacious
Look. The argument is valid but not sound. and it's not circular. "A If B then A. B. Therefore A" is a tautology. But tautologies are not generally circular.
"A as defined cannot exist without B
B as defined cannot exist without A"
This was not in the original post and changes everything. If you include this as a stipulation, the argument becomes sound.
Just tell us the actual argument and its definitions. Don't worry so much about bias, I think we can handle it.
Why anarchy fails
Ok it's a moral argument for the existence of God.
If Objective Moral Values exist God exist
Objective Moral Values exist
Therefore, God exist
Now the the definition for Objective Moral Values are those values that are binding despite what any one person believes and which are grounded in the nature of God. (This is obviously to avoid the Euthyphro Probelm).
God is defined as the greatest Conceivable Being (Type of Ontological Argument) and therefore is the greatest good - He is the Good. God is the locus and paradigm of value and His moral attribute, ontologically, is along the same lines as omniscience, eternality, ect. as part of the greatest conceivably Being.
My problem is that he ties objective morals to God's nature along with all other attributes that make up God - God by definition is the Good - the Good is God.
To me there is something wrong with this but I can not put my finger on it. It almost seems like the first premise would read - If God exist then God exist. Although I know that identity is not quite right. God cannot be anything other than all of His attributes and all of these attributes would make God.
I am probably wrong but it seems tricky to me to define Objective Moral Values as haveing their locus in the ontology of God and then using them to prove God.
This argument has other problems so it is no big deal either way - it just seemed odd for him to define it like that.
P.S. - I might add that if Objective moral values existed an a seperate thing apart from God then you would have the Euthyphro problem. In other words according to the Christians God cannot be made up of parts like omniscience, omnipotence ect. He just is always who he is.
There is way too much in there that seems totally incoherent definition-wise to even start to look at the deductive aspects of the argument.
GoldenGoose: Now the the definition for Objective Moral Values are those values that are binding despite what any one person believes and which are grounded in the nature of God. (This is obviously to avoid the Euthyphro Probelm).
First of all, I have no idea how to interpret the term "binding." What would it mean for values to be binding? Also, who is doing the valuing? God?* And if the claim is that there is something called "value" without any entity doing the valuing, then we have to ask what on earth the noun values even means here.
Finally, whatever values turn out to be, it is unclear what it would mean for them to be "grounded in the nature of God" (this looks like an attempt to beg the question, which is probably the problem you can't put your finger on**, although there are some others, as noted above).
*If God, then this is question-begging also; the very notion of "objective moral values" as here defined would be smuggling in the existence of God through the back door.
**EDIT: Actually you pointed out the question-begging when you said, "God is by definition the Good."
Why are objective moral values grounded in nature of god? Why do you know there are in fact objective moral values?
You know, any proposition of form B is in A is judgment that is unproven, unless you have other propositions that make it necessary.
That is, B = AB is contingent because (A or B) = (A and B) or (A not B) or (B not A). AB is only one possible, but not necessary fact.
Only additional premises can make it necessary. (You have to prove that B not A is some kind of contradiction, with these additional premises?) These, however, according to your later post, were not provided deductively. So there is no problem, since you asked something about contingent premises if they were true, but never proved these premises themselves.
Yes, I agree that there are alot of additional problems with these terms which get me all riled up.
Binding - refers to humanities duty to keep them - they will be held accountable to God for their failure to keep them. As an additional sidenote, which causes even more problems, is that he grounds the duty in the commads of God - so these moral values are part of the nature of God but the duty to keep them stems from His commands - Divine Command Theory. Don't get me started on the whole practical problems with this before the commands were given. My main concern for this thread though is the grounding of these morals and the use of that in the first premise. It is the difference between the ontological and epistemological aspects of this argument.
Since objective would have to be in relation to humans the value refers to us - this would be part of his argument - 2nd premise. This is where everything goes bad in my view. He then establishes premise 2 by primarily pointing to humans and thier sense of objective moral values. He does a great job of playing the heart string of people to not say that our moral sense is 'not objective' - hence is Hitler wrong or how about raping a baby? And of course this rubs us the wrong way so most people would agree that objective morals exist.
He then says that because of this the grounding of this objectivity, being in God, gives us a better and more coherent foundation for this sense and the justification to say something is wrong or right - good or bad. The fact that it is in the nature of God is to avoid the Euthyphro problem.
I will read some of his stuff to see how he handles the begging the question problem.
Thanks, your thoughts are appreciated.
GoldenGoose: Binding - refers to humanities duty to keep them - they will be held accountable to God for their failure to keep them. As an additional sidenote, which causes even more problems, is that he grounds the duty in the commads of God - so these moral values are part of the nature of God but the duty to keep them stems from His commands - Divine Command Theory.
Binding - refers to humanities duty to keep them - they will be held accountable to God for their failure to keep them. As an additional sidenote, which causes even more problems, is that he grounds the duty in the commads of God - so these moral values are part of the nature of God but the duty to keep them stems from His commands - Divine Command Theory.
OK, then the argument is plainly circular: Assuming that Divine Commands exists is question-begging, because obviously there cannot be Divine Commands unless there is a God. He is simply assuming what he's set out to prove. Stripped of all the verbiage, the argument is simply, "God exists. Therefore God exists."
GoldenGoose:Since objective would have to be in relation to humans the value refers to us - this would be part of his argument - 2nd premise. This is where everything goes bad in my view. He then establishes premise 2 by primarily pointing to humans and thier sense of objective moral values. He does a great job of playing the heart string of people to not say that our moral sense is 'not objective' - hence is Hitler wrong or how about raping a baby? And of course this rubs us the wrong way so most people would agree that objective morals exist.
This is just distracting wordplay: my subjective moral revulsion to something is no proof of objective morals, no matter how strong that revulsion may be. You could make a case that there are certain quasi-universal subjective moral sentiments, but quasi-universal is not the same as objective (or if he chooses to define objective so that it is, then the premise won't do the work he wants it to*). Ask him to give a coherent definition of "objective morals." Either he won't be able to, or his definition will be something that obviously does not work for his argument.
*Not that it would work anyway. There are at least two fatal errors in his argument; even if one of them could be repaired, which neither can, the other error would still make the argument fail.
GoldenGoose:He then says that because of this the grounding of this objectivity, being in God, gives us a better and more coherent foundation for this sense and the justification to say something is wrong or right - good or bad. The fact that it is in the nature of God is to avoid the Euthyphro problem.
He's being totally circular again.
GoldenGoose:I will read some of his stuff to see how he handles the begging the question problem.
If an argument begs the question, there is no way to repair it without actually changing the argument. It can't be "handled" or "explained away."
It's pretty simple: If I am trying to argue that A exists and my premises involve A doing something (such as issuing commands), I have a broken argument. In fact, if anyone tries to argue that A exists and their premises even mention A (or the definitions of one of the words in the premise mentions A), that should set off sirens in your head that they are probably trying to beg the question.
It's pretty blatant when the example doesn't involve convoluted definitions:
Proof that Unicorns Exist
Premise 1: People get speared by unicorns everyday.
Premise 2: [Whatever]
Premise 3: [Whatever]
Conclusion: Unicorns exist.
Another Proof that Unicorns Exist
Premise 1: People's actions are accountable to the judgments of unicorns.
In both cases, the conclusion was already implied in the first premise.
A.J. is correct. The biggest issue I've had with the Moral Argument is that it doesn't really prove anything in terms of proving that God exists. Everybody knows humans have moral sentiments, but within the framework of the "objective morals can't exist without God" point of view, the legitimacy of these sentiments are dependent on the existence of God. So while it's a valid argument, I take issue with Premise #2 as an evidentiary argument (and I don't necessarily accept Premise 1, but I'm granting that in advance. The key to the argument is Premise 2 more than anything else).
By the way, this all sounds very similar to C.S. Lewis's "proof" that God exists in Mere Christianity.
That's besides the syllogism. I'm not even sure why Golden Goose is rendering it that way; traditionally it's:
1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.
3. Therefore God exists.
The two renderings are logically equivalent by transposition, but this way is far more eloquent, I find. There is nothing circular here. If you think there is, then you just don't understand the nature of circularity. Note that your charge of circularity ONLY occurs after the soundness of the argument is admitted and the conclusion is reached. Nobody is bringing Divine Command Theory into the equation until it is admitted that the syllogism goes through.
After the conclusion is reached, you can then talk about how exactly this morality is grounded (a la Divine Command Theory). You jumped the gun a bit on this one.
I think you've hit the crux of the problem. Are these values subjective, in that they are relative to the individual, society, or any entity X, like social conventions that have you driving on the right side of the road as opposed to the left? There doesn't seem to be anything objective involved there, since it could easily be different in another society or region.
When we say something is objectiive, we mean that it is independent of what people think or perceive (like the laws of logic, the laws of nature, etc.) Subjectivity is really just the negation of this. You are right, however, to say that even the universality of a belief does not make it objective--it could merely be the sum of subjective opinions.
My real problem is how this strange Austrianism, i.e., the doctrine of subjectivism creeps into philosophy. Frankly, it's terrible philosophy. Economic postulates should stay economic postulates and not pretend to dictate other areas of philosophy (as evidenced by Rothbard).
I don't really have a big 'beef' with it, so long as it is confined to the area of economics, though I haven't entirely made my mind up about it. Of course, as it stands now, the labor theory of value is so seriously flawed as to be utterly worthless. This is mainly why I strongly, strongly, lean towards subjectivism in economics.
Take the thesis: Morality is subjective because people have different ideas about moral values.
1. People have different ideas about moral values.
2. Therefore morality is subjective.
This is a very, very large non-sequitor. There is nothing intrinsically strange or incoherent about there being moral objectivity ontologically. It seems to me that the problem you folks would have around here is the epistemological side of things, but that is beside the point.
MrSchnapps:That's besides the syllogism. I'm not even sure why Golden Goose is rendering it that way; traditionally it's: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist. 2. Objective moral values and duties do exist. 3. Therefore God exists.
The problem with this is, what non-believer would accept (1) unless "objective moral values and duties" were defined in such a way as to require God's existence (making it circular)? To see this more clearly, reword (1) equivalently: "If there are objective moral values and duties, God exists" (contrapositive). Then switch the order of the premises, which of course is equivalent. The result:
Premise 1: Objective moral values and duties exist.
Premise 2: If there are objective moral values and duties, God exists.
Conclusion: Therefore God exists.
I take exception to Premise 1, for reasons I will cover below. But even if I didn't, I see no reason to accept Premise 2, which is equivalent to saying that objective moral values and duties require the existence of God. As it stands, it looks like a bald assertion. You could define "objective moral values" so that it is not a bald assertion, but then that is where the action is (the definitions). I can only await a set of definitions that (a) are coherent, (b) make the premises acceptable, and (c) make the argument valid/non-circular (especially without using definitions that depend on Divine Commands). I don't think all three of those can be accomplished simultaneously, but anyone is welcome to try.
MrSchnapps:After the conclusion is reached, you can then talk about how exactly this morality is grounded (a la Divine Command Theory).
Doesn't it seem like a good idea to fully define your terms before you use them in an argument? I mean, you say the morality will be "grounded" later, but I don't see in what sense the word morality is even defined in this context until it is so grounded.
MrSchnapps:My real problem is how this strange Austrianism, i.e., the doctrine of subjectivism creeps into philosophy. Frankly, it's terrible philosophy. Economic postulates should stay economic postulates and not pretend to dictate other areas of philosophy (as evidenced by Rothbard).
Some people might use the subjectivism of economics as justification for complete value subjectivism in all areas, but as you say that would be mistaken reasoning. You are also correct about that big non-sequitur you mentioned. In contrast, the reason I find all value to be fundamentally subjective is that subjectivity is inherent in my interpretation of the word value itself. Why should you care how I interpret the word value? Because you just might interpret it in the same way. Stop me where we differ:
1. It seems to me that the noun value is just a nominalization of the verb to value. Just as we can't have exploitation without an exploiter, I don't see what it would even mean for there to be value without some entity doing the valuing. (Could be man, God, or anyone.)
2. Since I reject methodological collectivism (in both economics and philosophy in general), the entity doing the valuing has to be an individual, not a group. (Could still be God, any individual person, etc.)
3. Therefore the only way I see to interpret the noun value is to refer to some individual entity valuing something (the act of individual valuation).
4. The act of individual valuation of something is exactly what I mean by the term subjective valuation, A.K.A., subjective value. Hence, the only way I can see to interpret the noun value is as (automatically) "subjective value." All value is subjective because all acts of valuation are subjective (that is, done by an individual, even if it is God doing the valuing).
All that said, I think it would be much clearer if we never used the word value as a noun, but instead substituted a word like valuing or valuation. That way, the connection to the verb "to value" would not be lost, and then - I think - anyone who adheres to methodological individualism would automatically understand the word valuation to refer to a subjective phenomenon (something an individual* does).
*Again, the valuer could even be God - a state of affairs which may have implications that could reasonably be called moral, though perhaps not "objective moral value."
Also, to say that all value is subjective does not disallow that people are accountable to what God values. It also does not disallow the possibility that God may have made every human being have a certain moral compass (universal subjective valuation). Although I reject proofs of God's existence via objective moral values, I equally reject the method of disproof of God's existence via subjective moral values/valuation. The subjective nature of valuation has to do with how lanugage is used (and indivualism vs. collectivism, if applicable), so it can say nothing directly about the existence or non-existence of God.
GoldenGoose: If I say that A requires B to be A or without B A would not be A and then proceed to give a deductive argument like this: If B exists then A exists. B exists. Therefore, A exists. Is this sound? Obviosly the conclusion necessarily follows the premises but is the first premise based upon the previous stipulation circular or a tautology? Or perhaps some other fallacy? It would seem so to me but I am no expert. Much appreciated.
I think what you are getting at here are PART-WHOLE RELATIONS, worked out by Barry Smith et al. If B, then A; where A is not equal to B. That is what is called an intelligible-structural dependence relation. Really, you're on the cusp of formal ontology. Check the following out:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mereology
If you want to learn about Austrian philosophy and economics along the way, and particularly if you know a little about Mises and praxeology, I recommend this introduction:
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/CH10.pdf
But part-whole relations are really a major part of the book, which can otherwise be quite technical
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/
also definitely see Barry Smith's site:
http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/
If Objective Moral Values exist God exist Objective Moral Values exist Therefore, God exist
You really brought out the jackass, as Nietzsche might say.
I don't follow premise #1, If Objective Moral Values exist God exists.
I suppose if you were arguing that Objective Moral Values could only be a product of God, then there is some necessary connection between the two, but I think then it would be merely a tautology and wholly analytic. Otherwise, Objective Moral Values could be created by aliens for all I know. I think more likely they are discovered by a combination of intuition and reason. In any case, I can certainly imagine Objective Moral Values coming from something other than God. I don't see a *necessary* dependence relation between the two.
'I suppose if you were arguing that Objective Moral Values could only be a product of God, then there is some necessary connection between the two, but I think then it would be merely a tautology and wholly analytic. Otherwise, Objective Moral Values could be created by aliens for all I know. I think more likely they are discovered by a combination of intuition and reason. In any case, I can certainly imagine Objective Moral Values coming from something other than God. I don't see a *necessary* dependence relation between the two.'
Yes, and this is exactly how he defines it - there is absolutely a connection to God - it cannot be any other way. It is part of His nature. Yet the Objectiveness of the morals that are grounded in God's nature are from our perspective. As Schnapps said it is kinda like saying Objective Subjective Moral Values Exist because of the term value - it can only be in relation to individual humans who value. It is lke a collective agreement of subjective Values because of God. As others have said the main fight would be with premise #2 but I just thought that Premise #1 had something funny about it.
I will read the links that you posted.
Thanks for everyone's insight. Off to Work :)
The problem with this is, what non-believer would accept (1) unless "objective moral values and duties" were defined in such a way as to require God's existence (making it circular)? To see this more clearly, reword (1) equivalently: "If there are objective moral values and duties, God exists" (contrapositive). Then switch the order of the premises, which of course is equivalent. The result: Premise 1: Objective moral values and duties exist. Premise 2: If there are objective moral values and duties, God exists. Conclusion: Therefore God exists. I take exception to Premise 1, for reasons I will cover below. But even if I didn't, I see no reason to accept Premise 2, which is equivalent to saying that objective moral values and duties require the existence of God. As it stands, it looks like a bald assertion. You could define "objective moral values" so that it is not a bald assertion, but then that is where the action is (the definitions). I can only await a set of definitions that (a) are coherent, (b) make the premises acceptable, and (c) make the argument valid/non-circular (especially without using definitions that depend on Divine Commands). I don't think all three of those can be accomplished simultaneously, but anyone is welcome to try.
The result: Premise 1: Objective moral values and duties exist.
Yes, but you haven't quite formulated it right. When you do a transposition/contraposition, the premises stay in the same order. You don't switch around the premises to somehow prove circularity--if you do that, all you're doing is forcing invalidity by an improper operation.
Take the form: 1. P->Q 2. P. 3. Therefore Q. That's Modus Ponens. It's obviously valid. You can't show its circularity by changing the order of the premises. That doesn't make any sense.
Premise 1 is actually:
Premise 1: If there are objective moral values and duties, God exists. (Or: If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.)
Premise 2: Objective moral values and duties exist.
You're right that Premise 1 (in this case when it is properly rendered, Premise 1 is Premise 2) is controversial. I'm not posting to defend that right now, even though I think it is imminently defensible. I'm quite aware that each of the premises requires warrant.
I'm going to flip it back to the original form, though, just because I think it makes a helluva lot more sense.
I was only responding because of the misconceptions about circularity/question-begging and proper logical form. WIth respect to your argument concerning circularity, I want to make it clear that Premise 1 serves to establish that every other sort of ontology for moral values besides God must be ruled out. Obviously this requires rigorous argumentation, but my point is not to delve into that right now. Premise 2, then, is just the negation of the consequent of Premise 1. Because we have already ruled out every other ontology for morality (supposedly) in Premise 1, it follows necessarily and inescapably that the existence of objective moral values and duties means that God must exist.
I think that's enough to clear up condition (c) that you've listed, but if you have any more questions, feel free to keep going on that issue, and I'll see if I can hash this out more clearly.
I'll just go ahead and address some of condition (a): I think when I say objective moral values and duties, what I mean is the existence of values that are completely independent of subject oriented valuation or opion, much like the existence of the external world. As a brief heads up, the justification for the objectivity of the external world is virtually the same as the justification for the objectivity of moral values and duties. Now there may be disagreement if we could ever discern this epistemologically, but that doesn't touch the coherence of objectivity insofar as ontology (proper) is concerned. To be clearer, I like to use Matthew Jordan's definition from his dissertation:
"Objectivity: The truth of a moral proposition is independent of the beliefs of any particular human being or human community."
Before I move on to address the rest of your post, I want to make sure we're on the same page--else we'll just be talking past each other.
MrSchnapps: Yes, but you haven't quite formulated it right. When you do a transposition/contraposition, the premises stay in the same order. You don't switch around the premises to somehow prove circularity--if you do that, all you're doing is forcing invalidity by an improper operation. Take the form: 1. P->Q 2. P. 3. Therefore Q. That's Modus Ponens. It's obviously valid. You can't show its circularity by changing the order of the premises. That doesn't make any sense.
Switching the premises doesn't actually do anything logically. I just did it because it makes the situation easier to see clearly, at least to me. But since you agree that the main premise is controversial, which is what I hoped to make clearer by changing the order, all is fine.
Keep in mind that a controversial premise and circularity are two paths to the same thing: unfounded assertion. A circular argument isn't invalid (in the terminology of propositional logic), so the circularity can be removed by logically acceptable operations. The problem with a circular argument isn't the circularity per se, it's that all a circular argument does is make an (unfounded, to some) assertion. It is tantamount to assertion that has been put into the form of a logical argument. You can get rid of the circularity by making one of the premises into the critical assertion, which makes the form no longer circular, but the unfoundedness of the assertion doesn't change. But you already agree that the assertion requires support, so it seems there is no disagreement in this section.
MrSchnapps: I was only responding because of the misconceptions about circularity/question-begging and proper logical form. WIth respect to your argument concerning circularity, I want to make it clear that Premise 1 serves to establish that every other sort of ontology for moral values besides God must be ruled out. Obviously this requires rigorous argumentation, but my point is not to delve into that right now. Premise 2, then, is just the negation of the consequent of Premise 1. Because we have already ruled out every other ontology for morality (supposedly) in Premise 1, it follows necessarily and inescapably that the existence of objective moral values and duties means that God must exist.
Yes, I agree that if you have established the premise, the argument works. What I am saying is that circularity/question-begging is rejected not because it is logically invalid, but because it is equivalent in effect (though not in form) to stating a premise that requires justification to believe. The idea is that you give premises the reader already accepts, then show that they logically imply a conclusion that the reader would not at first accept.
That doesn't mean you can't start your presentation in the middle, with further argumentation used to back up the unfounded premises later on, but the argument presented by GoldenGoose didn't mention it was starting in the middle, and never hinted at additional arguments to back up the assertion contained in the premises. It was presented as self-contained, which forces the reader to conclude circularity. That doesn't necessarily mean your argument is circular (since you haven't presented some of the parts that come before the syllogism yet).
MrSchnapps:I'll just go ahead and address some of condition (a): I think when I say objective moral values and duties, what I mean is the existence of values that are completely independent of subject oriented valuation or opion, much like the existence of the external world. As a brief heads up, the justification for the objectivity of the external world is virtually the same as the justification for the objectivity of moral values and duties. Now there may be disagreement if we could ever discern this epistemologically, but that doesn't touch the coherence of objectivity insofar as ontology (proper) is concerned. To be clearer, I like to use Matthew Jordan's definition from his dissertation: "Objectivity: The truth of a moral proposition is independent of the beliefs of any particular human being or human community." Before I move on to address the rest of your post, I want to make sure we're on the same page--else we'll just be talking past each other.
We're not on the same page here, because I don't know what it could even mean for values to be "completely independent of subject oriented valuation." As I explained, the only way I can find to interpret the word value (noun) is as a nominalization of the verb to value, which requires someone to do that valuing. Otherwise, I cannot understand the meaning of the word value.
However, Jordan's notion only excludes humans or human communities as the ones doing the valuing. God could be doing the valuing, and I would still call that "subjective valuation." It is a different subjective valuation than a human's subjective valuation and may have vastly different significance, but don't you think it is reasonable to say that valuation requires a valuer? The valuer doesn't have to be a human, but surely it has to be some entity.
Right, and in this instance, the fact that deductive arguments are circular is really inconsequential. In fact, if it isn't circular, then it's not a valid deductive argument. All the deductive argument does is to deduce what is already implicit in the premises.
The difference is, is that it is not viciously circular, per se. Vicious versus non-vicious is an important distinction to be drawn when talking about circularity. I can't vouch for GoldenGoose, but I think I made it clear (and you acknowledged) that the soundness of the argument is in quesiton--that's a given. I don't expect that the major OR minor premises are self-evident. I just wanted to remove some of the confusion surrounding circularity/question-begging, since it really is irrelevant to validity qua validity. It is very important, however, for soundness. All you really need to say is that the premises are unjustified. I agree that they are unjustified, since no evidence has yet been provided for them.
In terms of soundness, all you would have to do is deny any one of the premises for the argument to fail. The only question left, then, is to determine whether the premises are more plausible than their respective negations. I think tomorrow I'll start arguing for soundness, so I'll work at the rest of your post later.
So I believe we're on the same page here, now. In sum, we both agree that it's valid; only the soundness is in question, which is obvious, since not even the slightest bit of justification has been provided. All I have to do now to show soundness is to make the premises more plausible than their negations.
Right, yeah, but I'm also very interested in what you think about subjective valuation. I mean, I don't think it's helpful to call it objective valuation even if it is God doing the valuing. Why not just say it that we are accountable to God and should therefore align ourselves to his values (which are subjective, but there is no negative or belittling connotation there)?
By the way, I don't think objective reality is a coherent concept either, unless it just means consensus reality. To put it in a negative way, objectivity is just an argument ad populum. It is saying, "At least one other person (or entity) agrees with me." If the other entity is God, and that is to be important, it seems a lot clearer just to note that than to call it objective, which is just a massively confusing word to work with.
I would like to add some points from a Christian Apologist, William Lane Craig, as to how he defines Objective moral Values.
' First, if God exists, objective moral values exist. To say that there are objective moral values is to say that something is right or wrong independently of whether anybody believes it to be so... On the theistic view, objective moral values are rooted in God. God's own holy and perfectly good nature supplies the absolute standard against which all actions and decisions are measured. God's moral nature is what Plato called the "Good." He is the locus and source of moral value. ' Elsewhere, he even puts it in the same kind of category as other attributes like omniscience, ect.
Since God's nature cannot be divided in to parts and whatever the nature of God is - that is God, then I see a problem with the first premise based on these stipulations. God has One Nature and yet he says God's moral nature?? If God is the Good then so are the Objective Moral Values. If I were to say: If God exists, then Omnscience, eternality, omnipotence, ect. exists, then what am I really saying? All those things must be of neccesity God - without those things there is no God and no God is God without those things. And yet God cannot be made up of things in the Christian sense. It is almost like saying If God exists, then God exists.
As far as the 2nd premise is concerned - the only way one can establish this statement is to appeal to the subjective minds of individuals who do not want to say something like 'Hitler was not wrong' and we can't say that he was - so Objective Moral Values must exist. All this does is appeal to humanity as the source of Objective moral values and does nothing to show how they are grounded in God. Shaky Indeed. We may ask why is it that they have a sense of Objectivity? Are there reasonble answers to this as oppossed to leaping to a God figure that holds people accountable? Suprisingly, the answer is yes. Are there ways in which we might say Hitler was wrong without some transcendent Objectivity bearing down on humanity? Also, I think so. It may not be Objective in an absolute sense but then again I am not sure that is what people who do not believe in a God or who do but do not think that there is some judgement awaiting those who fail to perform these values think about when they say 'Objective' - Why are we forced to use this definition in the first place? Approaching objectivity about many things regarding ourselves and the external world do not need some transcendence attached to them.
I look forward to those who will be showing the soundness of the premises - particularly #2.
Blargh, I'm not going to be able to address this today. I'm hoping I can get to this sometime later this week.
Just a quick comment to AJ and MrSchnapps I'm very much enjoying this debate. Keep it up!
The atoms tell the atoms so, for I never was or will but atoms forevermore be.
Yours sincerely,
Physiocrat
If I may jump in here:
1. The form of argument presented in the OP is classic modus ponens and is logically valid/consistent, as MrSchnapps already said.
2. However, one is never obligated to accept the initial premise in any modus ponens argument.
3. In the case of the actual argument presented by GoldenGoose, the premise ("If objective values exist, then God exists") seems to me like a non sequitur. That is, I don't see how it necessarily follows that, if "objective values" exist, then "God" exists. Among other things, I'm not sure what exactly is meant by either "objective values" or "God".
4. Additionally, I don't think the second premise ("Objective values exist") necessarily holds. As I mention above, I'd need a clear definition of "objective values" before I can investigate whether they can be said to exist.
Sorry if I've only repeated points that others (namely AJ and MrSchnapps) have already made.
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Thanks for the summary, Autolykos. I agree with everything you've said. All the premises need serious argumentation.
I really want to see if I can carry this on sometime soon; it's more of a time issue right now, though.