At http://dmitrychernikov.com/
“Keynesism is Marxism lite…” Such is the inescapable conclusion of the 100 chapters in this Summa on numerous things Keynesian, Austrian, and economic.
Come partake of an exciting yet rigorous and eye-opening excursion into the intricacies of systematic economic theory and policy with Dmitry A. Chernikov who has been mastering economics and the Austrian school for over 12 years under the tutelage of Mises, Rothbard, Hayek, and other luminaries and is a graduate of Mises University. You are bound to enjoy this exquisite blend of economics and philosophy, zooming all the way out for a view of the biggest picture of it all and focusing on the tiniest of details. This book is an application of sound economic logic to Keynes and his school and is a result of years of meditation on economic problems.
Book I begins with a thorough guide to Keynes’ General Theory. Keynes’ arguments are given the most charitable interpretations; at the same time his many errors are with no qualms pinpointed and exposed. This process is punctuated with several forays into philosophy and methodology in order to situate economics within the big picture. These prepare a ground for and enlighten the reader’s encounter with a treatment in the Austrian tradition of labor and unemployment, the time factor of production and time preferences, uncertainty and risk preferences, interest rates, rates of confidence, profits and losses, entrepreneurship, consumption / investment / hoarding trade-offs, and the theory of business cycles.
Book II goes into detail on various mainstream and Post Keynesian doctrines and alternatives to the Austrian approach, especially regarding the business cycle and the monetary and fiscal policies.
TY for what looks like an exciting book.
My only fear is of tl;dr. Not an obstacle for the serious minded.
My humble blog
It's easy to refute an argument if you first misrepresent it. William Keizer
What is tl;dr?
after years of meditation on economic problems you dont know how to do a search on the internet?
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=tl%3Bdr
^ Too long, didn't read.
Uh oh, I thought it was a typo of some sort. Well, it is a 600 page book.
But I think it advances economics and philosophy a little bit, so read it at your pleasure.
For example, do I succeed at solving the Gettier problem?
In philosophy of science, knowledge is any proposition that is well-justified, so far as we can tell; in epistemology, knowledge is simply true belief. Thus, in science, “we” know something, so long as it is reasonable to believe it; but it need not be true, and a scientist need not actually believe it. With respect to (1) truth, one is reminded of Robert Nozick’s desire to be “non-coercive” in philosophical argumentation. He has a point, even if he took it too far in his own work. A scientist does not put forward true propositions that ought by all rational people to be believed. Rather, he suggests ideas that might be interesting to entertain, if one is inclined to spend his time doing this sort of thing. On very little there are such things as final words and final authorities. With respect to (2) beliefs, one would need to assent to a proposition, if something practical depended on it. If an architect is designing a bridge, then he is ipso facto believing a great deal of things about math and physics. But a purely speculative endeavor like much of science and philosophy can easily be started by saying, “Let us provisionally assume such and such to be true and see where this leads us.” Though one would want to assume things that appear to be well justified, so as not to waste his time building edifices on false foundations, the things assumed but not believed may be vast in number and actually seemingly fundamental to modern technology. This touch of anti-realism allows us to reconcile the notion of knowledge with progress in science. Notice also how neatly this understanding dissolves the Gettier problem.
In philosophy of science, knowledge is any proposition that is well-justified, so far as we can tell; in epistemology, knowledge is simply true belief. Thus, in science, “we” know something, so long as it is reasonable to believe it; but it need not be true, and a scientist need not actually believe it.
With respect to (1) truth, one is reminded of Robert Nozick’s desire to be “non-coercive” in philosophical argumentation. He has a point, even if he took it too far in his own work. A scientist does not put forward true propositions that ought by all rational people to be believed. Rather, he suggests ideas that might be interesting to entertain, if one is inclined to spend his time doing this sort of thing. On very little there are such things as final words and final authorities.
With respect to (2) beliefs, one would need to assent to a proposition, if something practical depended on it. If an architect is designing a bridge, then he is ipso facto believing a great deal of things about math and physics. But a purely speculative endeavor like much of science and philosophy can easily be started by saying, “Let us provisionally assume such and such to be true and see where this leads us.” Though one would want to assume things that appear to be well justified, so as not to waste his time building edifices on false foundations, the things assumed but not believed may be vast in number and actually seemingly fundamental to modern technology.
This touch of anti-realism allows us to reconcile the notion of knowledge with progress in science.
Notice also how neatly this understanding dissolves the Gettier problem.
This is actually a footnote in the book. So, here is a more elaborate and advanced discussion.