Dude, just copy and paste from a text editor.
To paraphrase Marc Faber: We're all doomed, but that doesn't mean that we can't make money in the process. Rabbi Lapin: "Let's make bricks!" Stephan Kinsella: "Say you and I both want to make a German chocolate cake."
A ridiculously complex unconscious, uncontrollable, automatic process in the brain, recieving input, adding it to dynamic databases, and referring to them in order to calculate an ever-growing algorythm, results in action. Your concscious ego is blocked by design from percieving that process. Just because your conscious ego percieves the result, and fails to percieve the cause of that result, doesn't mean it is the cause.
To say a person's ego, his personality, is responsible that which output his personality, is to disregard the vast majority of brain activity which is automatic, uncontrollable, and unconscious. Like statism or other religions, such a theory refuses to address the root cause in favor of a comfortable myth. It's popular, and ancient; cavemen probably believed it. So it's probably also wrong and I think science is helping to reveal that.
@hashem: Naw. This is why we employ methodological dualism. While we know for sure there are lots of gears and levers in our brains - the operation of which we are not aware and do not yet even have a first inkling of what they do or how they contribute to conscious experience - it does not follow that the mechanism is comprehensible to human beings, even in principle. And even if the overall operation of the mechanism is comprehensible, the specific conditions which give rise to specific actions are too numerous to be controlled and studied in a systematic way. The majority of human behavior is, for human intelligence, beyond scientific study, now or ever.
There are actually theoretical arguments to back this up (deriving from the limits of computation established by Algorithmic Information Theory, a branch of computability theory).
The correct answer is to acknowledge, simultaneously, the two following conditions:
a) Human experience is an undivided whole... it is monistic
b) Yet human experience cannot be analyzed as an undivided whole... we cannot treat all aspects of human experience causally. We can apply scientific methods to the study of those aspects of human experience that are clearly causal. For the rest of human experience, we have no choice but to shrug our shoulders and admit that - at least for now - it is a mystery.
The hubris of the modernist dogma - that one day, we will have a completely scientific map of human nature - is leading us down a wrong path. Human beings have free will in any sense that matters to actual science. Whether we have free will in some "ultimate" sense is an open question whose correct resolution is irrelevant to the practice of science on the basis of methodological dualism.
Clayton -
I disagree that we will never know fully how the brain works. It's not magic, and therefore science will eventually explain it.
Really though if you're saying we do or don't have free will, a few things must be clarified. If someone says, "a person has free will" what is meant?
His whole brain, or just a tiny portion of it like his conscious ego? What is meant by free will? That the conscious ego within a massive structure called the brain can violate laws of physics? Free will to what extent? Free to alter the uncontrollable, automatic, unconscious functionality of the brain?
In my understanding, the brain is an automatic machine. Just because a part of it, say, the conscious ego, experiences a tiny fraction of its functions, say, a portion of its output in the form of action, that doesn't mean that brain's conscious ego caused the automatic unconscious processes which resulted in that output.
You're missing the obvious point. Whatever we mean by free will we mean within the context of what we are, whether that be gears-and-levers-all-the-way-down or something more subtle. Hence, human responsibility and liability are enforced within the framework of the human sense of free-will, however much of an "illusion" it is. In other words, liability is a category of human action.
Also, even if we are gears and levers all the way down (no magic), that doesn't mean the human brain is comprehensible to the human brain*. Another way to say it is the way Arthur C. Clarke put it: "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." Or as Leibniz put it, "But when a rule is extremely complex, that which conforms to it passes for randomness." Our brain is the most advanced technology, the most complex thing we know of or likely will ever encounter and is strictly more advanced than any technology we devise (because any spinoff technology is itself a creation of the human brain).
So, yet again, we're back to methodological dualism. You can assert "no magic" and "incomprehensible" at the same time. The human brain has a lot more in common with a Rube Goldberg machine than it has with a supercomputer.
*In fact, it is provably the case that the human brain is not comprehensible to the human brain on mild assumptions about the nature of consciousenss (namely, that the brain is a Turing machine).
Tell me this isn't freaky:
Whatever [the flying spaggheti monster] means by [dancing faries], [he] means within the context of what [he is], whether that be gears-and-levers-all-the-way-down or something more subtle. Hence, [monster] responsibility and liability are enforced within the framework of the [monster] sense of [dancing fairies], however much of an "illusion" it is. Seems legit...
But I beg to differ. If you want to claim the flying spaghetti monster controls dancing fairies, then it makes no sense whatsoever unless it's clear what you mean by 'the flying spaghetti monster' and by 'dancing fairies', and then to what varying extents he excersises control, and when, and so forth. At the very least, it doesn't make sense to say "people have free will" as a blanket statement with no qualifications or explanation. We might as well all agree that we have invisible spiders on our heads, because whatever we mean by that, we mean within the context of whatever we want it to mean.
What we do know is that the brain uncontrollably, unconsciously, and automatically, processes input, and outputs, among other things, conscious perception, and action. Just giving up and invoking some all-encompasing magic answer under the banner of undefined so-called "free will" or "dancing fairies" simply because it's all too complex is the mindset of statists and other religious cranks.
I don't see any reason why we won't eventually completely understand the brain and even be able to control and even enhance it. Surely, pharmacology is already involved in understanding the brain and controlling it.
In any event, it isn't clear why it should follow from the fact of humans having human brains that they therefore can't produce things more advanced than the human brain. Why should there be any limit to what we can do with technology, other than the limits of physics? And what if a human produces something on accident, couldn't it then be more advanced than his brain since he didn't rely on his brain for the development of it?
Solipsism beats every argument. It's like noting that zero times anything is zero. So what?
So you can't just invoke some magic and say we all use it because "it means whatever we want it to mean".
I don't see any reason why we won't eventually completely understand the brain
Do you think that the brain is a computer? (Note: I do)
But that's exactly what language is. Please tell me where the absolute, formal, rigorous definition of the English language (or any language or better yet, every human language) resides?
Please tell me where the [definition of the english language] resides? It has no meaning except to the extent we are aware of and agree on what is meant by it. So please tell me, what do you mean by "free will" and by "a person" when you say "a person has free will".
Do you think that the brain is a computer? I think the brain automatically, unconsciously, and uncontrollably stores and processes input, develops algorithms, and produces output. Does that mean I think it's a Dell? No. But a Dell is certainly capable of some of the functions of a brain, by some very similar means (i.e. sending information as electricity through media, storing that information, processing it, producing an output, and so forth).
I also think the brain has a conscious aspect, which is a tiny fraction of its overall activity, and which is a resulting product, not the primary cause, of its function.
It has no meaning except to the extent we are aware of and agree on what is meant by it.
So, basically, language comes about by magic. What, really, is the difference between emergence and any other kind of order? When we say "emergent order", this is in contrast to what? What is non-emergent order??
So please tell me, what do you mean by "free will" and by "a person" when you say "a person has free will".
You know exactly what these mean and it would be an offense to common sense for me to explain it any further. What do we mean by "a good back-rub" or "he has heart"? These phrases are no less definite in their meaning than the definition of the International Prototype Kilogram. Our consciousness is no less a part of the Universe than anything else that exists, whether protons, quarks or electro-magnetic waves.
the brain automatically, unconsciously, and uncontrollably
Relative to what?? I would not describe any of my conscious decisions as "automatic" "unconscious" or "uncontrollable" because, well, they're not. My heartbeat is automatic, my reflexes are uncontrollable. I understand as a matter of theory that there are many, intricate automatic and unconscious circuits and responses that go into making up my conscious action.
But the end result is unaltered by the character of the things that make it up - just like the video in the Low Content thread on Spontaneous Order and Anarchy. Just because my body is made up of cells doesn't mean it is a cell or should be thought of as a cell. Just because my brain is made up of automatic circuits doesn't mean my consciousness is an automatic circuit or should be thought of as an automatic circuit. Please read Mises on methodological dualism, it will clear up a lot of issues for you.
Let's bring it down to brass tacks. Jimmy steals my TV. I take Jimmy to court. He hires you as his defense lawyer. "Mr. Baker, my client is made up of cells that respond automatically to inputs like the operation of any automatic device. You cannot hold him accountable for things which he cannot help. Because he stole your TV, we know that his inputs have led - automatically - to the result of television theft. Hence, Jimmy is not responsible for his actions. This case should be dismissed."
This is obviously gibberish. Metaphysical speculation about whether the Universe is clockwork all the way down is absolutely irrelevant and immaterial to the case at hand. What matters is that we all have "choice" in the sense in which the word is commonly used so that - no matter what "bad circumstances" went into making Jimmy the monster he is - he can be reasonably held accountable for his actions and forced to make amends for torts he commits.
It is possible to prove that the human brain will never fully comprehend the human brain, nor will it ever supersede itself with its own creations, on the mild assumption that consciousness is Turing computable (which I would argue is an eminently reasonable assumption). But I'm not going to get into details with you because you always just play difficult. Note that there is a distinction between "the Universe" and "the human brain" when discussing the possibility that the human brain could be surpassed - do you think that ape brains created the human brain? By the same token, the human brain will never create a superhuman intelligence. Again, this isn't just supposition, it's provable on the mild assumption that the brain is Turing computable.
So, basically, language comes about by magic. Sure, if you refuse to define 'magic' and refuse to explain the cause through science. Then yes, everything is 'magic' or 'flying spaghetti monsters' or whatever anyone wants to say, and people will continue to have no clue what you're talking about. The actual pattern of symbols is meaningless. The pattern begins to have value for communicating information to the extent people are aware of and agree on what is meant. If you say "a person" has "free will", what do you mean?
You know exactly what these mean and it would be an offense to common sense for me to explain it any further. It is completely undefined. Nobody knows what you're talking about. People may think they know what you're talking about, in their comfortable undefined myth. So why not give us a little explanation to make sure we're all on the same page.
undefined
You're caught in a vicious circle... please, define for us... what is definition? Oh wait, you can't, since any answer you give would depend on some prior definition of definition...
Come on!
It is possible to prove that the human brain will never fully comprehend the human brain, nor will it ever supersede itself with its own creations
These proclamations sound like sophistry, and I think they are reckless.
As "I, Pencil" explains, no one knows how to create a pencil, yet pencils are created. It just takes an organization of lots of small know-hows and capital.
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Brain_Project
The Blue Brain Project is an attempt to create a synthetic brain by reverse-engineering the mammalian brain down to the molecular level... The initial goal of the project, completed in December 2006,[3] was the simulation of a rat neocortical column, which can be considered the smallest functional unit of the neocortex (the part of the brain thought to be responsible for higher functions such as conscious thought). Such a column is about 2 mm tall, has a diameter of 0.5 mm and contains about 60,000 neurons in humans; rat neocortical columns are very similar in structure but contain only 10,000 neurons (and 108 synapses)... "It is not impossible to build a human brain and we can do it in 10 years... If we build it correctly it should speak and have an intelligence and behave very much as a human does."
I think it's only a matter of time before our electronic progeny surpasses us.
But understanding the inner workings of the brain will never dislodge the significance of the mind. As von Mises explains in Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science,
[materialism] wipes out any difference between what is true and what is untrue and thus deprives all mental acts of any meaning. If there stands between the "real things" of the external world and the mental acts nothing that could be looked upon as essentially different from the operation of the forces described by the traditional natural sciences, then we must put up with these mental phenomena in the same way as we respond to natural events. For a doctrine asserting that thoughts are in the same relation to the brain in which gall is to the liver, it is not more permissible to distinguish between true and untrue ideas than between true and untrue gall.
You're caught in a vicious circle... No...no I'm not...I'm not the one saying anyone has some meaningless "free will", or suggesting that, if I did say that, anyone would understand what I meant.
Maybe stop trying to dodge the question: When you say "a person has free will", what do you mean?
Note there is a difference between building something that goes on to surpass us and building something which - as built - surpasses us. The Universe is responsible for the former, we for the latter. It is the latter that I deny is possible. I cannot write a program which is smarter than I am.
As for the sophistry accusation, please read this as a jumping off point. In particular, I would like to draw your attention to his statement, "So if you have N bits of axioms, then no program larger than N +c bits in size can be proven to be elegant." Given that you believe the brain can be simulated by a computer (so do I!), you admit that the brain is Turing computable. Hence, there is some shortest program which represents "the human brain". The length of this program is what Chaitin is referring to when he says "N bits of axioms" - a shortest computer program of length N is incompressible and constitutes N bits of axioms (pure information).
When he says "no program larger than N+c bits in size can be proven to be elegant", this means that, in general, a program of length N cannot prove that a program of length N (let us take c=0 for convenience) is elegant. Proving that a program X is elegant is basically "discovering the ultimate theory of X", that is, the most parsimonious possible expression of X. The shortest form of a program that proves other programs elegant (finds their shortest form) must, generally, itself be much larger than the shortest length of the programs it operates upon.
In other words, the brain - looking at itself in the mirror of a computational simulation of itself or any other form of reflection - is provably unable to find its own ultimate theory. This is not sophistry, it's the purest form of logic, the same logic that has given us the modern miracle of computers. Every step is provable.
Before you start pooh-poohing and looking for ways to weasel out of the conclusion, I strongly recommend you read as much of Gregory Chaitin, Cristian Calude, Marcus Hutter and Ray Solomonoff as you can, at least, if you have an interest in this topic. Try to understand why Algorithmic Information Theory leads directly to the conclusion that the human brain - if it can be simulated by a computer - is provably unable to comprehend itself. If you think deeply enough, you might even realize that this provides a reasonable basis for compatibilism (ahem hashem). ;-)
When you say "a person has free will", what do you mean?
As I said before, I consider it an offense against reason to explain it any further. If you want to be difficult, that's your choice.
>> I cannot write a program which is smarter than I am.
I'm not so sure, I think much software dealing in expert domains, can solve problems in that domain better than a mind, even if we grant that mind rudimentary pens, papers, even calculators... but its a semantic question about 'smarter'. and besides I agree with you in your Monism, and Methodological Dualasism exegisis, and also agree with your point about the infeasibility of modelling such complex systems as the brain to the point of being able to accurately predict precise future states of such systems.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
I'll take a stab, and I'm prepared to get shot from all sides but it seems to me that when we talk about a 'will' or 'choosing' we mean something like that there is an object that we can usefully abstract apart from its environment to which we ascribe more explanatory power to the systems inner state than to its environment when we consider how it transitions to a future state .
so this deals with the difference between a cockroach running towards or away from a wall, and a coin landing tail side when caused to fall.
The former cockroach 'chose' the direction to run, and the coin didnt decide which side to fall on. It also gives some meaning to a computer chess program choosing a move.
What then of 'free will' , or choosing in the specially human sense with which praxeology is concerned?
So heres my understanding of 'free will'. This is an example of a continuum problem where at one end, we have primitive yet still complex systems, but they are relatively more coupled with their environments than systems like us, over here in an advanced state, that are more-decoupled, and that perhaps go so far as to have internal representations, and 'illusions of choice'.
Thankfully seeing as how in economics people are mostly interested in human action, the notion of free will is therefore a lot less ambigious and tractable than if we were trying to understand animal behaviours in social contexts, or robot 'choices', in which case there would perhaps be a YET MORE vigorous debate about methodology (monism/dualism - mechanistics/teleological analysis).
Imagine that nightmare.
its a semantic question about 'smarter'
I mean it in a very well-defined sense. That is, I cannot write a program which can compress data better than I can. This is trivially true since whatever program I write is itself a device I can use to compress data.
There are very good reasons why data-compression is an "ultimate" measure of smartness/intelligence/whatever-you-want-to-call-it.
I want to underscore that the problem with predicting brain behavior is much deeper than other kinds of chaotic systems. Sure, it's really difficult to predict the weather. But there is always the possibility that we will have a breakthrough which will vastly increase our ability to predict weather. But there is a qualitative difference to the human brain... the problem inherent in developing a "theory of everything" of the human brain is ineradicable, no matter what technological advances are made. It's not just really hard, it's impossible and provably so.
But is it 'you' that compresses data when you command your OS to tell WinRar to compress a file.
Your argument sounds like you are saying that no machine you can make is ever stronger than you, because whatever machine you design and build is itself a machine that you use to lift things.
@nir: Let us treat the brain as a computer program (say, by imagining we are running Blue Brain). Let us call this program B.
Let us further say that program X produces program Y and then we execute Y to produce output Z; the division between X and Y is wholly arbitrary, we may as well say that X outputs Z.
By the same token, if B writes a program Q that compresses a file F from 100KB to 10KB, then we can say B compressed F from 100KB to 10KB.
Just clicking on WinRAR is not the same as writing it. But a human brain wrote it, so it really doesn't matter to the question of the capacity of the human brain whether you or someone else wrote it. Whoever wrote it was human.
Note that the form of compression that algorithmic information theory deals with is much more absolute than the kind of compression that WinRAR does... it is the smallest form to which each particular string can be compressed (relative to some reference machine, such as a Universal Turing Machine... and it turns out that the choice of reference machine doesn't matter that much). Programs like Winzip or gzip or WinRAR are designed to compress "statistically", that is, to perform well across many kinds of strings by looking for "statistical patterns" in them. But algorithmic compression results in the shortest possible string. It is an uncomputable problem, meaning, no one could ever write a program of finite size that does algorithmic compression on any given string.
Ok, so you are saying that you are as tall as the tallest thing you can build, as strong as the strongest thing you can build, and as fast as the fastest thing you can build. It strikes me as an odd way off looking at the world which I am not used to, but you have given your reasons for it (it hinges on the arbitrary distinction between the builder and the built), and who am I to argue with you on that.
I cannot write a program which is smarter than I am.
Can two people write a program which is smarter than you are?
Do you think the Blue Brain project will simulate a human brain in the end? What will stop researchers from simulating something with 10x the neurons and 100x the synapses?
Human brains aren't compression algorithms. I think your use of theorems from information theory is quite a stretch here.
the human brain - if it can be simulated by a computer - is provably unable to comprehend itself
I think this depends entirely on your definition for "comprehend". I already know that my brain has a scale of values and it plans and causes actions so as to remove felt uneasiness. My brain also gathers external information to assist in making efficacious plans. Maybe predicting my own behavior to the minutest detail without the help of external technology is impossible, but certainly understanding gross properties of the brain is conceivable.
I can't comprehend 325,796 objects all at once, but I can perform mathematical operations on that quantity or understand it as a small sequence of digits or possibly break it into prime factors.
I can't comprehend a 100-line computer program all at once, and know which bytes are going where and when at which CPU cycle. But I can certainly break it into manageable conceptual chunks and manipulate it to achieve desired goals.
It seems full comprehension is overrated.
@nir: The obvious difference is that software is merely a pattern/abstraction. I am not the building I build. But in the same sense that tools merely extend the hand and notes extend the memory, so software is just an extension of the brain (in particular, its discursive logical capacity).
But the theoretical point stands in any case. The output of an intermediate program Y output by a program-writing program X can just as well be thought of as the output of X. Any distinction between X and Y is merely prejudicial.
Perhaps, though neither one of them alone will be able to comprehend it. This is a bit like how the market itself works. It is the sum of individual actions though no one individual could ever really comprehend it.
There is no reason I see why it won't work. However, I don't think it will help with the most fundamental questions of consciousness (namely, what exactly conscious awareness is or how it arises within the "gears-and-levers" physical world).
Well, I didn't assert that the human brain is a compression algorithm. The arguments regarding compression have to do with setting bounds on what sorts of problems can be solved by a program of a certain size. It turns out that harder problems require bigger programs. This is an indirect consequence of Godel's theorems; the harder the problem you want to solve, the bigger a program you will need to solve it (this is not a performance issue, either, I mean to solve it in any finite time).
I mean full comprehension as measured by the ability to find the most compact scientific theory (to "compress the brain program" to its smallest size). Again, I commend Chaitin, Calude, Hutter, Solomonoff, Li, Vitanyi, et. al. to your attention.
I mean full comprehension as measured by the ability to find the most compact scientific theory (to "compress the brain program" to its smallest size).
No one comprehends the motion of individual molecules in a 1 mililiter container of gas. And, really, no one cares. Rather, people speak of a few variables like temperature, density, pressure, mean free path, etc. Likewise, for some purposes, a greatly simplified approximation to a human brain could suffice. It's another reason why your pedantic arguments from computation theory aren't very compelling. You can't prove the non-existence of a workable math formula that predicts Clayton's brain with 99% accuracy.
I don't think it will help with the most fundamental questions of consciousness (namely, what exactly conscious awareness is or how it arises within the "gears-and-levers" physical world).
This kind of thing is arguably an unanswerable metaphysical question. I guess, to me, "superhuman intelligence" doesn't mean cracking these things. I'm thinking more along the lines of this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holly_(Red_Dwarf) "Holly prides himself on the fact he had an IQ of 6,000 [2] (apparently the same IQ as 6,000 PE teachers or 12,000 car park attendants)"
No one comprehends the motion of individual molecules in a 1 mililiter container of gas. And, really, no one cares. Rather, people speak of a few variables like temperature, density, pressure, mean free path, etc.
But there's a crucial difference here. In the case of a gas, the macroscopic phenomena emerge from the statistical properties of the microscopic phenomena. There is clearly no such simple relationship between the microscopic state of the brain and macroscopic behavior.
Likewise, for some purposes, a greatly simplified approximation to a human brain could suffice.
Of course. And this is precisely what we operate with already. The human brain already contains an intuitive model of human behavior.
It's another reason why your pedantic arguments from computation theory aren't very compelling. You can't prove the non-existence of a workable math formula that predicts Clayton's brain with 99% accuracy.
But that's beside the point. Of course we can predict behavior (what the hell do you think praxeology is???) and of course we can analyze, reverse engineer and understand to a greater and greater degree the function of the brain. But we'll never get a "theory of everything" with respect to the brain, and that was the original point. We're so far from ever being able to surpass the human brain that the best we can hope to do is to understand the human brain better and better over time. We could also create brain-like machines and put them in an environment where they might evolve greater intelligence and see what happens. But we'll not be designing a super-brain that will outwit us all, ala SkyNet or HAL 9000.
Clayton: - Human beings have free will in any sense that matters to actual science. - Whatever we mean by free will we mean within the context of what we are
So just to be completely clear, you have no idea what you mean when you say, "a person has free will". As a result, nobody else knows either. Fair enough, however typical of the free willy types. I won't embarrass you any further.
Clayton:You know exactly what these mean and it would be an offense to common sense for me to explain it any further.
Clayton:I consider it an offense against reason to explain it any further.
@nirgrahamUK, if you mean to describe "free will", then what is it free relative to? Is there will that is separate from "free" will? And if you say "a person has free will", what do mean by "a person"? An identifiable portion of his brain? Or the brain as a whole? Really, I'm just wondering from the perspective of a free willy, I've had trouble in the past trying to establish what any given person means when they say "a person has free will".
the 'free' of free will is a modifier, meant to highlight that we are a long way on the continuum towards having complicated systems that we point to as choosers that are in this regard decoupled from their environments, than the other end where knees reflexively jerk when hit, and where rocks fall off cliff edges.
/Just my interpretation, others likely have their own ways of thinking about it.
My point in bringing all of this up is in objection to the theory that "a person" should be held accountable for his actions. The brain's unconscious, uncontrollable, automatic processing and storing input, and constructing an ever growing algorith for cost-benefit, precedes action. It makes no sense to hold the the acting portion of the brain accountable for the instructions, which were out of its control.
That doesn't mean the brain may not instruct the acting portion to influence the brain. Obviously (to me) that's what we consider "a person changing his mind". But it seems the acting portion isn't responsible for the fact that it must act according to the instructions it recieves.
EDIT: So the brain may cause a knee-jerk reflex. But the brain also causes action. The acting portion can't be held responsible for the unconscious, uncontrollable rest of the brain's failure to send instructions to influence a change in the brain's direction. Neither can an unconscious, automatic, and uncontrollable rest-of-the-brain be held responsible for failing to produce those instructions.
What are you doing? positing a homunculous that is the acting part of the brain, that just has to put up with the inputs of the robot part of the brain?
I don't think it makes any sense to divy up the brain quite like that....
Your brain-body, is you, an object that I point to and say that you chose this or that action, not that the sky did it , or that your parents did it. Is that really so complicated and so contested? Are you pleading for the truth of a position of philosophical skepcticism, on whether 'you' exist to be held 'accountable' for 'actions', with or without further arguments that might explain why you don't demonstrate your philosophy in your daily dealings ?
I'm not positing unconscious brain activity. It's a given, nobody even denies unconscious brain activity. Neither does anyone deny that most brain activity is unconscious. When I say automatic and uncontrollable, I mean it doesn't require conscious instruction, nor is there a route for it to respond to such. You can't will that your hair grow faster.
Otherwise yes, it is a fairly accurate representation of my understanding to say that the automatic, uncontrollable, unconscious brain activity recieves, stores, accesses, and processes input, and produces output, some of which is conscious thought and action. I don't think anyone challenges this. I think a lot of people have completely bypassed ever thinking about this, and have therefore jumped to conclusions about responsibility.
Do you deny that automatic, unconscious, uncontrollable brain activity precedes conscious action?
I deny a heirarchy. I'm sure there are automatic unconscious and 'uncontrollable' brain activity. (actually not sure what is meant by uncontrollable here), but that the activities, are happying simultaneously with the activities you classify as willed/conscious, and that there is feedback going both ways between these 'sub-systems'.
but, anyway, all this talk about brains might just miss the point about moral responsibility. If you look instrumentally at a morally suspect action, if I can criticise you, and that is a way to mechanicaly influence your unconcious brain to reduce in the future the likelihood of you doing similar morally suspect actions, that would seem to be effacious. And looking at the situation askance, there is no basis to launch a claim against being held responsible for an aggregious act on the basis of a lack of free will, as any person who one might claim this against would by the premise of irresponsibility, not be responsible for holding you responsible for an eggregious act. (cool eh ?)
Ok well slow down, let's see if I can get a straight answer the second time around. Do you deny that automatic, unconscious, uncontrollable brain activity precedes conscious action?
This has nothing to do with a hierarchy. But it's silly to say you were conscious and acting before your brain ever functioned automatically, unconsciously, and uncontrollably.
A flock of birds is emergent of indvidual birds located proximate to each other in the sky. Do I deny that individuals bird activity precede flock activity? well, in the sense that individual birds have to gather together to get the flock started, they do proceed it. Is that the only sense in which you mean what you are challenging me with? My point was that whilst there is a flock, the birds and the flock system are simultaneous (the flock pretty much just is the birds right?) its not like the birds do stuff -> then the flock does stuff. The birds do stuff and the flock does stuff simultaneously.
Conciousness is what, activity under a mode of self-awareness, but does anyone think that it is not emergent of a non-self aware substrate? But what does this have to tell us about moral responsibility anyway. Its not clear to me that you or I should even particularly care whether I am right or wrong about the details of how brains work, because if issues of moral responsibility are at the heart of our *real* disagreement, didn't my other comments that weren't directly related to this brain stuff address that more directly?