I dont believe in a court exacting punitive measures without consent
But you believe in anyone killing an outlaw without consent? What's the difference in your view? This is my point: if you're against the use of violence against people without their consent, then you cannot be for outlawry.
you will have to explain how one achieves restitution through violence because I dont buy it.
Really, can't grasp this one? Bob wants restitution from Mike. Mike says no. Okay, I guess Bob just goes home? No, he uses violence and takes restitution.
no, the question for you is what makes him a defendant? There has to be a grievance. That grievance is with another human being. The court process has to be agreeable to them both or they will settle their dispute another way AND NO ONE AT THE COURTHOUSE GETS PAID. this ensures equitable treatment for all concerned.
If I'm accused of murder, and I am asked whether I consent to being tried, and I know that no one will use violence against me if I say no, why on earth would I say yes? Equity? Who cares? Even if I'm 99% likely to win the case, why would I risk it when I can tell them "thanks but no thanks" and not risk it? Because I would be outlawed, right? The threat of that is what compels me to attend court, right?
no, I specifically maintain that they remain part of the causal universe. There are most definitely results garnered from killing even one outlaw. There are all kinds of consequences that can be reasoned out but you wont listen because you can only extrapolate from data
Legal consequence, obviously. Meaning, to kill an outlaw is not a crime. That is the only sensible meaning of outlawry, and that's how you defined it: I believe you said the outlaw is like a beast, with no legal standing.
These courts exist because people have disputes and choose to settle them this way. If the court compels people to appear that is tyranny. If people voluntarily settle disputes with arbitration, that is civilization. I would prefer not to have a monopoly on law, for precisely the reason that we are arguing about jurisprudence right now and under a monopoly, one of us has to live with the other's system. I would like us both to have our systems, and markets allow for that.
What are you arguing against? Not my position. I believe my very first post (or maybe the second one) in this thread explicity stated that I'm opposed to using force against an accused person any time prior to conviction. The incentive which a person has to attend court is to avoid being tried in absentia, where he would have no representation and be more likely to be convicted: and if convicted (whether he attended the trial or not), violence could then be used against him to get restitution and/or retribution. And while we're here, no I'm nat saying that the court would use violence against anyone. The court merely makes judges. The right to use violence against a convicted person lies with the victim: i.e. the plaintiff.
But you believe in anyone killing an outlaw without consent?
What's the difference in your view? This is my point: if you're against the use of violence against people without their consent, then you cannot be for outlawry.
If I'm accused of murder, and I am asked whether I consent to being tried, and I know that no one will use violence against me if I say no, why on earth would I say yes?
Equity? Who cares? Even if I'm 99% likely to win the case, why would I risk it when I can tell them "thanks but no thanks" and not risk it? Because I would be outlawed, right? The threat of that is what compels me to attend court, right?
What are you arguing against? Not my position.
I believe my very first post (or maybe the second one) in this thread explicity stated that I'm opposed to using force against an accused person any time prior to conviction. The incentive which a person has to attend court is to avoid being tried in absentia, where he would have no representation and be more likely to be convicted: and if convicted (whether he attended the trial or not), violence could then be used against him to get restitution and/or retribution.
The right to use violence against a convicted person lies with the victim: i.e. the plaintiff.
Do you insist on ascribing these views to me because you know that your position is bankrupt, or are you simply not reading my posts? When did I say anything like this? I told you I dont believe in aggressive violence.
You said this:
I will simply add, for the sake of disclosure, that if outlawry were near certain death and the standard for execution were a preponderance of evidence, your assertion fails on its face. The loss of legal standing, whereby a human being becomes no different from a beast of the field in the eyes of the court.
Now, what does that mean if not that killing an outlaw is not a crime in your view, and that therefore the incentive for an accused person to consent to a trial is the threat of being declared an outlaw?
You can't have it both ways. Either people would victimize outlaws, and that's why an accused person doesn't want to become one, and agrees to a trial; or, people don't vicitmize outlaws and then the threat of outlawry is not sufficient to persuade accused people to agree to trials. Which is it?
as I have said numerous times tonight, the incentive for settling disputes via arbitration is that it is preferable to settling disputes without arbitration. If any one court denies legal standing to an individual, it may not mean very much or may mean a great deal. That is for the individuals who are concerned to decide.
also, you said this:
if not that killing an outlaw is not a crime
remember we are talking polycentric law. Just because I say he is an outlaw doesnt mean his family agrees.
because (as you said) outlawry is almost certain death (meaning, the outlaw would likely be victimized by people who know that the outlaw has no access to legal services)?
no, that is not an accurate summary of my views on this matter.as I have said numerous times tonight, the incentive for settling disputes via arbitration is that it is preferable to settling disputes without arbitration. If any one court denies legal standing to an individual, it may not mean very much or may mean a great deal. That is for the individuals who are concerned to decide.
Ok, so you don't think that the threat of outlawry is what motivates accused persons to agree to a trial? Great, but then when I said this:
That's entirely non-viable, and increasingly so as the crime becomes more serious. No (guilty) person accused of murder, facing a possible punishment of execution, would ever prefer trial to "outlawry" (whatever that means).
Why did you say this:
I will simply add, for the sake of disclosure, that if outlawry were near certain death and the standard for execution were a preponderance of evidence, your assertion fails on its face.
Were you not claiming that being an outlaw means "near certain death," and that therefore a person accused of murder is likely to risk a trial over the "near certain death" of outlawry?
Ok, so you don't think that the threat of outlawry is what motivates accused persons to agree to a trial?
Do you have anything *intelligent* to say in response to the question "why would a person accused of a serious offense volunteer to be tried" other than "maybe loss of business contacts or social pressure" (LOL). If so, I'm happy to hear it. Otherwise, there's nothing to "move foreward" to, as you have no position or argument at all. You have a series of ridiculous assumptions based on nothing.
as for your inability to support your beliefs or respond to any criticism whatsoever, all I can say is I understand why you might want a state monopoly on the ultimate settlement of questions via rational discourse to be performed according to your rules and backed by the threat of aggressive violence. I can see why you would consider competing bodies of law to be a a terminal threat.
What's amusing is that I don't want a State monopoly, never said I did, pointed you repeatedly to the thread where I explain this in detail. Throughout the entire debate I was generally granting you a polycentric stateless society. The debate was over your silly semi-pacifistic idea that violence cannot be justly used against anyone without their consent (which contradicts both your view of self-defense and your view of outlawry, but you don't mind contradictions, or even notice them apparently), which, thankfully, is not very common among anarcho-capitalists. And I love how you resort to calling me a statist (or making pedantic non-points about the meaning of phrases like "serious offense") when you have nothing else to say. You don't do you, have anything else to say? Anything about why a person accused of a serious offense (let's say murder) would volunteer to be tried?
What's amusing is that I don't want a State monopoly, never said I did, pointed you repeatedly to the thread where I explain this in detail. Throughout the entire debate I was generally granting you a polycentric stateless society. The debate was over your silly semi-pacifistic idea that violence cannot be justly used against anyone without their consent
And I love how you resort to calling me a statist (or making pedantic non-points about the meaning of phrases like "serious offense
Anything about why a person accused of a serious offense (let's say murder) would volunteer to be tried?
*sigh
Minarchist, please read the article linked above - I feel like I'm re-typing the entire thing piecemeal when you could just click the link and read the whole thing in one shot and skip all the misconceptions.
I did not mean for "the court" to be read as "the only court in the land." I meant whatever court the two parties are employing to settle their dispute, might be the only court, might be one of 10,000 competing courts, makes no difference, the problem is the same.
It makes a difference. A monopolist of law will impose his view of the way things oughtta be.
Re the text I underlined above, I understand what you mean here, but this does not answer the question. You have explained who would be responsible for making the decision about what constitutes a sufficient probability of guilt to warrant the use of force: namely, whoever makes the law which is in effect in this case.
No, you have completely misunderstood me. "Whoever makes the law" is a misunderstanding of my position... no one makes "the law". It's like saying "whoever makes the language". No one makes the language. Language is completely decentralized... new phrases, idioms even words come into being whenever people autonomously and without central control begin using them. No one gets to decide what the language is because no one can. The same is true of law, rightly understood.
Probability of guilt can never justify the use of force. The only thing that can justify force is guilt itself - in fact, I don't even like the language of "guilt" because of the unnecessary eschatological overtones (Great White Throne, Revelations and all that). Please address the illustration I gave where Mike steals Bob's car and show me where there is "probability" in that - the car is definitely in Mike's possession. Hell, Mike will even admit it. He just won't give it back.
If Bob acts on this knowledge and Mike dies in the process (I used homicide in the thought-experiment because it is more extreme than detainment), there was no "probability" involved and Mike's parents won't have a legal leg to stand on because Mike opted out of Bob's offer of non-violent dispute resolution. That Bob "won the war" is no crime. Mike would have happily kept the car had he won the war instead and killed Bob. He rolled the dice and lost.
I appreciate that, but the question is how (on what basis) is it to be decided what constitutes that sufficient level of probability of guilt?
There is no such thing as "sufficient level of probability" there is either guilt or not guilt. The only person who needs to make a "probability" assessment is the victim himself or herself or the PDA which they have hired to act on their behalf.
Now, perhaps your position is that whatever kind of law the stateless society yields is appropriate, but I would disagree - any libertarian would have to disagree. For example, I would not condone the use of torture to extract a confession just because the court (or whatever entity) making the law is not a State. Yet that seems to be the implication of your position: i.e. what is justifiable is what the law (whoever makes the law) says is justifiable, no?
In essence, yes. I'm not saying that common law cannot be improved upon but the only way to improve on it that is consistent with a market in the production of law services is to open up shop as an arbitrator and start offering better legal resolutions to disputes!
Or, maybe your position is that the anarcho-capitalist society will inevitably or very likely yield libertarian law. Maybe, but that point needs to be supported with some kind of argument. The free market will produce a supply of whatever is demanded, but it does not determine what kind of things will be demanded: i.e. what kind of law.
I don't care what kind of law people demand any more than I care what kind of tennis shoes they demand. And, unlike tennis shoes, I don't think that "the law" is something we can control the outcome of. Law is like language: whatever emerges is what emerges.
What I do care about is that parties to a dispute be able to settle it in the manner that they choose. Please, please read the linked article!
In short, one cannot without contradiction set the NAP as one's founding moral principle and at the same time say that any act of violence is justifiable as long as the law recognizes it as such.
I am not a NAP fundamentalist... in my view, NAP is just a good first-order approximation and wipes out about 90% of the nonsense that exists in modern statutory law without breaking a sweat. To go further than that, however, you need something more nuanced than NAP. NAP will not help you derive parental rights and duties or help you derive sensible divorce law, and so on. It will not help you bridge the gap between modern, statutory law and a possible future of smaller political units with more localized, community-oriented law that is a product of culture, not philosophical reflection.
Clayton -
he operative portion of my query had to do with the accusation. Why is this person making an accusation rather than pursuing some other means of resolving the dispute? Is it because the court is willing to perform crimes such as home invasion and abduction? or able to authorize others to do so?
Forgive me, but I assumed that you already understood the basic concept of what a court is/does. It resolves disputes between parties who have been unable to resolve the dispute amongst themselves, precisely because they cannot reach a mutually agreeable resolution. It follows that, if the court is to resolve such a dispute, it will necessarily reach a conclusion which is unacceptable to one or the other party: i.e if the court is able to reach a resolution agreeable to both parties, then the court would never have been involved in the first place, because the two parties would have already arrived at a mutually agreeable resolution. And you can call it a court or a DRO or whatever. The point is that, in cases where two parties to a dispute cannot reach an agreement, the dispute will either be settled through the intervention of a third party, be settled when the two parties physically fight it out, or it won't be settled. Presumably we agree that it would be good to have disputes settled, and to have them settled in some manner other than a physical contest between the two parties? Presumably we agree that it would be best, whenever the parties cannot reach an agreement, for an impartial third party to settle the matter? Now, in some cases, the two parties - even though they can't agree on a settlement - will agree to binding arbitration. But sometimes they won't. In those cases, the third party (the court as I've been calling it) will, repeating myself, rule against one party: e.g. ruling that one party must pay the other party restitution. Now that ruling will either be enforced or it won't. If it's not, well then its worthless. The ruling of the court must be able to be enforced - against the will of the person which the ruling is against: e.g. the person ordered to pay restitution.
If you're claim is that all people accused of some violation of the NAP by their alleged victims will consent to trial, you need to explain why, because it's far from evident. If your claim is that somehow all disputes can be resolved without the ruling of a third party being enforced against the will of the convicted person, you need to explain how, because it's far from evident.
in order to absolve themselves of charges in front of witnesses, of course. In order to retain legal standing in that jurisdiction. Because he is a human being and therefore a social animal and therefore takes part in social processes. What exactly do you want to know? What is it about voluntary interaction that mystifies you?
If your position is that it is logically possible for all people accused of crimes to volunteer to be tried, then I agree. It's also logically possible for a the current U.S. government to be fully funded through voluntary donations. Of course it's absurd to believe that this would actually occur. Something's being logically possible does not mean that we should suppose it likely, or base our political philosophy on the assumption that it will occur. Likewise, for all persons accused of crimes to volunteer to be tried because of social pressure (as opposed to some threat of force) is extremely improbable, and pending some reason for believing otherwise, it would be foolish to found a political philosophy on the assumption that this would occur.
Clayton,
If Bob robs Mike, Mike is due restitution from Bob, correct? How can he get it? He can get it with Bob's consent. But could Bob refuse to give restitution? Sure. What happens then? Is there any circumstance in which it is just for Mike to use violence against Bob to take restitution?
My simple point is that if your answer to this question is "No, it is never just to use violence against Bob (no matter how certain Mike, or some third party hired by Mike, may be of Bob's guilt) unless Bob consents," then Mike cannot get justice. And in a society where Mike cannot get justice, then I say the legal system has failed.
Consider this one case with Bob and Mike. Assume it is occuring in an anarcho-capitalist society. How do we get Bob to pay restitution to Mike without using or threatening to use violence against Bob? (In other words, do not resort to the notion that somehow this question does not apply to a stateless legal order with competing firms. It does. Competition between firms has no role here. Each firms will be faced with situations like this. If they all take the position that violence against Bob without his consent is unjust, then they all face this problem. And that's the question: supposing this idea about using violence only with consent is prevalent, is the legal doctrine which is common, what happens? I say, the Mikes of the world can't get justice.)
O, and I read your article. Very well-written, interesting, but not relevant to my concern. Also, keep in mind I'm not advocating State-law, at all. Never did.
Minarchist:Yes, as I said. And yet any political philosophy which fails to account for the facts of empirical reality (claims based thereupon) is blind and worthless.
That's also outside the scope of logic and cannot be proven, only accepted or rejected. In this case, that's because it's a value judgement.
Minarchist:The idea that anarcho-capitalism rests only on a priori reasoning is simply false, if that's your belief. It rests, as does any other political philosophy, on certain basic assumption about human beings, which assumptions are founded not in a priori reasoning but on empirical observation. Are they certain, no, as I said. Should they therefore be ignored, no, that would be absurd.
Is the notion "all human beings are inherently self-interested" an a priori proposition or an a posteriori proposition, in your view?
Strictly speaking, logic doesn't care where assumptions (premises) come from. It only cares about the consistency of propositions that are claimed to derive from the assumptions.
Does anarcho-capitalism rest only on a priori reasoning? In my opinion, it does not. It also rests on certain premises, which others are entirely free to accept or reject.
Minarchist:Not necessarily, probably. Is it certain that the Sun will rise tomorrow? No. Is it probable? Yes. If I'm considering some question in which the rising or not of the Sun is a factor, should I take into the account the empirical evidence which tells me the Sun is very likely to rise tomorrow? Yes, of course.
Then why do you make claims containing the word "will" without any qualification, such as "probably"? That is, why are you saying things that you don't mean?
Edit: Did you see this post?
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
Forgive me, but I assumed that you already understood the basic concept of what a court is/does. It resolves disputes between parties who have been unable to resolve the dispute amongst themselves, precisely because they cannot reach a mutually agreeable resolution.
It follows that, if the court is to resolve such a dispute, it will necessarily reach a conclusion which is unacceptable to one or the other party:
then the court would never have been involved in the first place, because the two parties would have already arrived at a mutually agreeable resolution.
The point is that, in cases where two parties to a dispute cannot reach an agreement, the dispute will either be settled through the intervention of a third party, be settled when the two parties physically fight it out, or it won't be settled.
also, it defies logic that a solution could be reached without the consent of both parties. If one party has an outcome imposed on him without his consent, then there is still a dispute to resolve. Your courts have not solved anything.
Presumably we agree that it would be good to have disputes settled, and to have them settled in some manner other than a physical contest between the two parties?
Presumably we agree that it would be best, whenever the parties cannot reach an agreement, for an impartial third party to settle the matter?
Now, in some cases, the two parties - even though they can't agree on a settlement - will agree to binding arbitration. But sometimes they won't. In those cases, the third party (the court as I've been calling it) will, repeating myself, rule against one party: e.g. ruling that one party must pay the other party restitution. Now that ruling will either be enforced or it won't. If it's not, well then its worthless. The ruling of the court must be able to be enforced - against the will of the person which the ruling is against: e.g. the person ordered to pay restitution.
you still have not explained how a court is supposed to use violence to force restitution. I want to know the actual mechanics, because "forced restitution" sounds an awful lot like a weasel term for "institutional robbery." you havent been very forthcoming and so naturally that makes me nervous, with all this talk about forcing things upon people without their consent and imposing settlements on people...what is it about coercive violence that infatuates you?
additionally, you need not invent claims for me, simply read my posts. I state my claims in plain language and I never said "all people accused of some violation of the NAP by their alleged victims will consent to trial" or "somehow all disputes can be resolved" so quit trying to inject even more of your hideous strawmen into the discussion.
If your position is that it is logically possible for all people accused of crimes to volunteer to be tried, then I agree.
It's also logically possible for a the current U.S. government to be fully funded through voluntary donations.
Of course it's absurd to believe that this would actually occur.
Something's being logically possible does not mean that we should suppose it likely, or base our political philosophy on the assumption that it will occur.
Likewise, for all persons accused of crimes to volunteer to be tried because of social pressure (as opposed to some threat of force) is extremely improbable, and pending some reason for believing otherwise, it would be foolish to found a political philosophy on the assumption that this would occur.
Very well-written, interesting, but not relevant to my concern.
Thanks. But you must have missed the section "Why We Bargain Rather Than Fight" because that section is precisely about this subject. It explains why people will want to go to an arbitrator to settle a dispute even if they are in the wrong (will lose). From that section of the article: "There cannot be social order without the cattle-prod of the prospect of violent conflict driving disputants to arbitrate their disputes." I've repeated this point several times in this thread and you seem to be missing it or confusing me with one of the other posters. You seem to think that violence is "never an option" but this isn't even the NAP. Violence is an option in defense of property... and defense also includes the recovery of property, by force if necessary.
I said this:
Let's say Mike in fact steals from Bob, but Bob did not catch him in the act. Now, you're saying that Bob deciding that Mike is probably guilty of the theft does not justify Bob's arrest (false imprisonment) of Mike. Is that correct? If so, then under what conditions is Bob justified in using coercion against Mike? Suppose Mike were tried in a court and found guilty, with Bob as the plaintiff - is Bob then justified in using coercion against Mike to retrieve his stolen property? Is the court's decision that Mike is guilty of the crime fundamentally different from Bob's decision that Mike is guilty of the crime? Aren't both decisions about the likelihood (as opposed to certainty) that Mike is guilty?
Let's say Mike in fact steals from Bob, but Bob did not catch him in the act. Now, you're saying that Bob deciding that Mike is probably guilty of the theft does not justify Bob's arrest (false imprisonment) of Mike. Is that correct?
If so, then under what conditions is Bob justified in using coercion against Mike? Suppose Mike were tried in a court and found guilty, with Bob as the plaintiff - is Bob then justified in using coercion against Mike to retrieve his stolen property? Is the court's decision that Mike is guilty of the crime fundamentally different from Bob's decision that Mike is guilty of the crime? Aren't both decisions about the likelihood (as opposed to certainty) that Mike is guilty?
You responded:
It will only have been justified when Bob suceeds in convincing Mike to agree that it was justified (perhaps as part of a settlement for the theft). Please see the link above to my article on "A Praxeological Account of Law."
I took your comment to mean that Bob is only justified in using violence against Mike (e.g. to seize property in the interest of restitution) when/if Mike consents.
Now you say this:
you must have missed the section "Why We Bargain Rather Than Fight" because that section is precisely about this subject. It explains why people will want to go to an arbitrator to settle a dispute even if they are in the wrong (will lose). From that section of the article: "There cannot be social order without the cattle-prod of the prospect of violent conflict driving disputants to arbitrate their disputes." I've repeated this point several times in this thread and you seem to be missing it or confusing me with one of the other posters. You seem to think that violence is "never an option" but this isn't even the NAP. Violence is an option in defense of property... and defense also includes the recovery of property, by force if necessary.
And I am in complete agreement. My point throughout this entire thread has been very simple: without violence and/or the threat violence, justice cannot be done. The idea of restitution/retribution (the essence of justice) being ethically/legally permissible only when the criminal consents is absurd. If we're in agreement on this point, then we have nothing to debate, and this has been a misunderstanding of some kind.
Malachi,
I suspect we may be misunderstanding one another in some way.
The only claim that I've been defending is (as I told Clayton) the claim that violence or the threat of violence is necessary for justice. When one person violates the NAP and, for example, steals property from another person, the victim has a right to restitution. In some cases, the criminal will agree to some kind of settlement or to binding arbitration by a third party. In some cases, the criminal will agree to nothing. In that case, my claim is that the victim has the right to use violence to gain restitution: e.g. recover stolen property. You object to this? You think the victim should not be able to use violence to get justice in the event that justice cannot be obtained without violence? If so, then we have a disagreement. If not, then we have a misunderstanding.
"Man can seldom, if ever, be metaphysically certain, that is, certain that there exists no alternative in the universe to his judgment."
But you can be certain that you can't be certain? Certainty is manipulation, obviousness, and what tools you use to describe and interact with the picture of reality which is relevant to you.
As long as there is necessity to any interaction, there is certainty. It all depends on what game we are playing and what the rules are.
"As in a kaleidoscope, the constellation of forces operating in the system as a whole is ever changing." - Ludwig Lachmann
"When A Man Dies A World Goes Out of Existence" - GLS Shackle
... What?
Once again, you're as incomprehensible as ever to me (at least).
Yeah,lol, we see to have a hard time talking to each other.
The key is you can't say "I can never be certain" - it's literally a nonsense proposition
Sure you can say it - you just did.
And there's a difference between feeling certain and knowing something with certainty, isn't there?
Everything I say is a lie
propositionally speaking: nonsense
Autolykos, it might make sense if you think of it this way:
If you can be certainly certain that certitude is uncertainty, then certainty is uncertainly certain.
The idea of restitution/retribution (the essence of justice) being ethically/legally permissible only when the criminal consents is absurd. If we're in agreement on this point, then we have nothing to debate, and this has been a misunderstanding of some kind.
OK, looks like we were talking past each other.
My point is simply that it is a social norm that if one party is willing to settle a dispute through non-violent means (arbitration) and the other party is not and if the party who wants to use violent means (direct conflict) acts on that desire, they have committed a new, separate tort. Let's say Mike steals from Bob. Mike wants to go to court, Bob wants to beat Mike up. The fact that Mike wants to go to court - instead of fist-fight Bob to keep the stolen property - means that if Bob assaults Mike, he will have committed a separate tort against Mike. But if Mike had said "I'll fight you for it" and Bob agreed, no tort will have occurred since this is how the parties to the dispute had agreed to settle it. Finally, if Bob wants to go to court and Mike refuses and then Bob later decides to take direct action against Mike (it must be proportional force, however, or it becomes a new tort), Mike can't come back and complain that Bob took direct action against him when he refused to go to court in the first place! This is the scenario I was explaining above.
If both Bob and Mike agree to go to court (I'm going through all combinations here), the result should be some sort of new property arrangement... e.g. Mike agrees to pay Bob $1,000 (that is, Mike agrees that $1,000 of Bob's money is presently in Mike's possession and must be transferred to Bob). Now, if Mike doesn't follow up on what he agreed to in court, we're back at Square A above... that is, a new tort is being committed (Mike refusing to transfer Bob's property to him) and we look at each of the combinations of whether Mike, Bob or both agree or don't agree to settle the matter non-violently.
Bear in mind that the legitimacy of proportional violence comes from the agreement of the person who committed the tort. That is, Bob is only entitled to forcefully seize his property from Mike because Mike refused non-violent means to settle the dispute. If Mike desires non-violent settlement but Bob uses force anyway, then Bob has committed a new tort. So, the agreement of the parties is what determines whether violence is simply the chosen method for arriving at a settlement or constitutes a new tort. This is what I meant when I said that, "It will only have been justified when Bob suceeds in convincing Mike to agree that it was justified." If Mike is being reticent and refuses to go to court, there is nothing further that Bob needs Mike's agreement on... Mike has already refused non-violent resolution of the dispute so Mike is implicitly agreeing to the use of (proportional) violence in the settlement of the dispute! If Bob acts on that (forcibly seizes his property back from Mike), he is not committing a separate tort, he is simply resolving the existing dispute between Mike and himself.
Clayton: Bear in mind that the legitimacy of proportional violence comes from the agreement of the person who committed the tort. That is, Bob is only entitled to forcefully seize his property from Mike because Mike refused non-violent means to settle the dispute. If Mike desires non-violent settlement but Bob uses force anyway, then Bob has committed a new tort. So, the agreement of the parties is what determines whether violence is simply the chosen method for arriving at a settlement or constitutes a new tort. This is what I meant when I said that, "It will only have been justified when Bob suceeds in convincing Mike to agree that it was justified." If Mike is being reticent and refuses to go to court, there is nothing further that Bob needs Mike's agreement on... Mike has already refused non-violent resolution of the dispute so Mike is implicitly agreeing to the use of (proportional) violence in the settlement of the dispute! If Bob acts on that (forcibly seizes his property back from Mike), he is not committing a separate tort, he is simply resolving the existing dispute between Mike and himself.
I'm wondering if the section I bolded is exactly what you mean. Suppose the crime had been murder instead of theft. If Mike (the murderer) wanted a non-violent settlement, but Bob refused and used force anyway, are you saying that Bob has now committed a new tort?
It would be great if you could let me know if I'm interpretting what you wrote correctly.
Great question. Yes, things get more complicated at the extremes. I don't think there can be such a thing as capital punishment in a private law society because the whole purpose of going to arbitration is to try to reach a settlement that is better (for both parties) than battling it out. No one would voluntarily agree to go to arbitration knowing they are going to receive "the death penalty"... better to just take your chances in direct conflict.
This is where I think outlawing comes in. If you commit murder or some other kind of extremely violent crime, you are no longer under the protection of law both because you would never agree to go to arbitration and no arbitrator would agree to hear your case (not worth the risk). It is my view that, in private law society, the act of murder (and other violent acts of the same magnitude) is always an act of war. It is still possible that non-violent settlement can be reached (for example, through the payment of a large cash settlement) if the family of the murdered agrees to it. But I believe that the normal case would be that the family of the victim would hunt down the killer and kill him in direct retribution. If the family of the murderer tried to claim he was murdered, the family of the victim would defend themselves by proving that the murderer committed murder and, thereby, had become an outlaw so it was impossible to commit a tort against him or his family. Feuds are possible in such a society but their occurrence in history is extremely rare and has been heavily exaggerated and over-dramatized.
This conversation has been interesting, but all of it has missed the forrest for the trees, in my opinion. My question was: what is the line between possibly, likely, and certainly guilty?
As for the rest of the conversation: I think the debate has mainly derived of semantic misunderstandings. Minarchist has been proposing that if I steal from him and refuse to give him any kind of restitution then I have not consented to give him that restitution. I agree, it would be absurd to have a justice system where I am only bound to give restitution when I agree t give him restitution. Others of you have been saying that by going into arbitration, then I am consenting to the verdict that the arbiter gives out, thus making both parties consent and have the argument resolved. In that sense, you might say that I, the thief, have consented to some form of restitution. Going back to the original question mixed with this conversation so far, What i am wondering, and what I feel like minarchist is really asking, is this: Lets say minarchist walks into his house. He sees me crawling out of his window and before he can stop me I escape but he knows its me because he's known me for years. He sees me get in MY car and drive down the street and go into my house. After he returns to his room, he finds his safe busted open and all of his gold is gone. He also knows of the financially tough times I've been going through, and he remembers telling me yesterday that I should consider buying a safe because thats where he keeps all of his gold. If you havent figured out by now, I'm trying to paint a picture of near certainty that i am the thief. So, how much more evidence do you need to go from "probably guilty" to "certainly guilty", and, to the rest of you, if I refuse to go through arbitration, litigation, courts of any kind, then how have I, in any way, consented to restitution? You say I must only pay restitution if I consent, but also say that violence is a justifiable means to get restitution, but I just dont understand how anybody would consent to violence being used against them, barring perhaps a masochistic streak in them.
I'm sure most of this is misunderstanding. I just want to understand everybody's arguments as much as possible. Thanks. I appreciate the responses, and let me know if I have mis-stated what each of you meant, and if so, rephrase in a different way than before.
Edit: Ok I didn't seem clayton's response when i wrote this so it cleared some things up. However, what if the murdered person has no family or no one that is effected by his death enough to be worth it to go to court. At first glance, it might seem that we are getting back to tribal tendancies because those who have no family would be at much greater risk for murder-robbery because who will take the murderer to arbitration/court? As I have found, I am not saying there isn't a solution, I am just wondering if Rothbard or any of you have spoken on this matter.
caulds: You are committing the complex question fallacy. I've already explained to you that probability of guilt doesn't justify anything. All that matters is guilt or non-guilt.
For example, let's take your scenario (it appears that some guy you've known for years has busted in and stolen your stuff). But let's say that you actually got it wrong... a professional thief intentionally framed your buddy for the express purpose of misleading you and causing you and your buddy to get into a fight, thus distracting you from the real thief. When you go "arrest" your buddy, you are in fact committing a tort against him... kidnapping/false-imprisonment/unjustified detention, whatever you want to call it. When your buddy takes you to court, he's going to say "prove that I stole your stuff." But since he didn't steal your stuff you won't be able to. You can't say "well, I was 99% sure you were guilty of stealing my stuff!" That doesn't matter, it doesn't justify the tort you committed against your buddy. Hence, you will be held liable for the tort you committed.
In private law society, it's up to you to get it right. You will be held legally liable for all your actions at all times under all circumstances, without exception. You don't get a magic get-out-of-jail-free card based on the nobility of your intentions and the appearances of things. "It really looked like he was guilty!" So what? Unless he actually was guilty, then kidnapping/imprisoning/detaining him was unjustified.
We're too accustomed to the modern system where the cops have a million excuses for committing crimes (yes, crimes) against people and then shrugging it off. "Oops, we thought he was the perp." "Oops, we followed policy but it turns out that our policies on the use of force can result in death of innocents." There are a million "oopses" that the cops give for every sort of crime from assault to false imprisonment to murder. In private law society, there is zero room for error, there is no forgiveness, there is no factoring in of the nobility of your motives or the "probability" that someone was guilty/not-guilty. It is a much more precise system.
The world is a dangerous place. It is much more dangerous for those without family and this is just as true in our modern "compassionate" society as it is in a private law society. The plight of the unfortunate is a red herring to the issue of whether a monopolist of law and security can be morally/legally justified.
Ok, fine. but in the same situation you just gave proves that certainty is impossible. The arbiter was 99% sure I had been robbed by you, but what actually happened is you were framed. All evidence pointed to you as the perp. So the arbiter was 1% sure you were not the perp. My point is the burden of proof is on the accuser, but the accuser can never 100% prove it was you. This means that while all that matters is if you are guilty or not guilty, we can never KNOW which it is. We are bound by the evidence we can come up with. So I ask you: if the evidence is a mountain against you but you choose to go into arbitration and you are found guilty, but 20 years later new technology vindicates you, have I committed a tort against you? What if you say "fuck you, im not going to any sort of arbitration. You become an outlaw and I kill you, then new technology comes out 20 years later and it vindicates you. Have I committed a tort then? This isn't an attack. I'm not saying I disagree with you, I am just saying I want to understand your position better.
as for the second post: You are putting words in my mouth when you say I am committing a red herring to the issue. I didn't throw that out there to try and crumble your libertarianism. I am one. I think that in all cases the market can provide a better quality of life than under a state. I asked the question because it was all of you who stated that the world would be much safer in a stateless society. I agree with that, and I am wondering how that applies to the situation of murder of those who have no family. Your saying that my question is a red herring to the issue is a red herring to avoid my question. You could apply this same argument to the entire "for a new liberty". I know you cannot know what would happen in this situation (since I've already talked about how you can't know anything), I am asking what many libertarians might think about that question.
Sometimes the people on these on these forums are so defensive about their ideology that they come off as insecure which is a terrible way to spread your message. Chill out in knowing that the world is wrong about us and that we are right. We are here to argue with other not to verbally beat each other but to understand our ideology more deeply. I doubt any of you would honestly say that the reason you come on these forums is to insult others. How did any of us come to be libertarians. If you are like me, you started ASKING QUESTIONS and finding that most of the time the answers were not satisfying. So, for me to understand you more deeply, I am ASKING QUESTIONS. Libertarians really need to learn to be a little more diplomatic, not compromise, but learn a little about how t market your ideas. Ron Paul didn't get to where he is by griping every time someone asked him why drugs should be legal, did he? Sure, this is an easy question to most libertarians. But on the issue of philosophical certainty/uncertainty, things get a little weightier. Maybe I am not to your level yet. Thats why I come ask the questions. If I am wrong, I will probably admit I am wrong eventually, as long as you are willing to explain your idea in a way that is convincing, but most importantly not so defensive. Libertarians are the brightest, most independent people I know, but Jesus, are they bad at expressing themselves in a way that attracts people. I mean we are talking about Freedom here. Freedom is like booze; its the easiest thing in the world to sell. Yet, people aren't buying it. sorry for the rant. I'm just tired of our message being ignored because its reps' fuses are too short.
I don't know what an arbiter is.
someone who presides over arbitration (the judge if you will)
vive la insurrection:Everything I say is a lie propositionally speaking: nonsense
You didn't answer my question. Please try again.
gotlucky:Autolykos, it might make sense if you think of it this way: If you can be certainly certain that certitude is uncertainty, then certainty is uncertainly certain. Is that supposed to be a joke? Or what? The keyboard is mightier than the gun. Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem. Voluntaryism Forum | Post Points: 20
Is that supposed to be a joke? Or what?
Ok, fine. but in the same situation you just gave proves that certainty is impossible. The arbiter was 99% sure I had been robbed by you, but what actually happened is you were framed.
The judge/arbitrator does not decide what is true. Hence, his confidence in the truth or falsity of something is irrelevant except in his role as a referree of the verbal dispute.
All evidence pointed to you as the perp. So the arbiter was 1% sure you were not the perp. My point is the burden of proof is on the accuser, but the accuser can never 100% prove it was you.
Well, not true. There are at least two ways to be 100% sure... the first way is to catch the person in the act and the second way is for the perpetrator to say (without coercion or torture) "yes, I did it." In the second case, it doesn't even matter if it's true... if someone is taking on the burden of guilt, that is their choice.
This means that while all that matters is if you are guilty or not guilty, we can never KNOW which it is. We are bound by the evidence we can come up with. So I ask you: if the evidence is a mountain against you but you choose to go into arbitration and you are found guilty, but 20 years later new technology vindicates you, have I committed a tort against you?
Yes! Of course! How can there be any doubt about that?
What if you say "fuck you, im not going to any sort of arbitration. You become an outlaw and I kill you, then new technology comes out 20 years later and it vindicates you.
I assume you mean as a result of a false accusation. I think that you have committed murder - you killed an innocent person over a false accusation that you made. As I said above, there is zero room for error. Appearances are irrelevant, all that matters is the case-in-fact. There are no excuses. The nobility of your intentions counts for nothing.
It was supposed to be a joke :(
Anyway, it was utter nonsense, so I have refined it:
If you can be certainly certain that certainty is uncertainty, then certainly you can not distinguish certainty from uncertainty, which is certainly what uncertainty is.
caulds989:This conversation has been interesting, but all of it has missed the forrest for the trees, in my opinion. My question was: what is the line between possibly, likely, and certainly guilty? As for the rest of the conversation: I think the debate has mainly derived of semantic misunderstandings. Minarchist has been proposing that if I steal from him and refuse to give him any kind of restitution then I have not consented to give him that restitution. I agree, it would be absurd to have a justice system where I am only bound to give restitution when I agree t give him restitution. Others of you have been saying that by going into arbitration, then I am consenting to the verdict that the arbiter gives out, thus making both parties consent and have the argument resolved. In that sense, you might say that I, the thief, have consented to some form of restitution. Going back to the original question mixed with this conversation so far, What i am wondering, and what I feel like minarchist is really asking, is this: Lets say minarchist walks into his house. He sees me crawling out of his window and before he can stop me I escape but he knows its me because he's known me for years. He sees me get in MY car and drive down the street and go into my house. After he returns to his room, he finds his safe busted open and all of his gold is gone. He also knows of the financially tough times I've been going through, and he remembers telling me yesterday that I should consider buying a safe because thats where he keeps all of his gold. If you havent figured out by now, I'm trying to paint a picture of near certainty that i am the thief. So, how much more evidence do you need to go from "probably guilty" to "certainly guilty", and, to the rest of you, if I refuse to go through arbitration, litigation, courts of any kind, then how have I, in any way, consented to restitution? You say I must only pay restitution if I consent, but also say that violence is a justifiable means to get restitution, but I just dont understand how anybody would consent to violence being used against them, barring perhaps a masochistic streak in them. I'm sure most of this is misunderstanding. I just want to understand everybody's arguments as much as possible. Thanks. I appreciate the responses, and let me know if I have mis-stated what each of you meant, and if so, rephrase in a different way than before.
As for the rest of the conversation: I think the debate has mainly derived of semantic misunderstandings. Minarchist has been proposing that if I steal from him and refuse to give him any kind of restitution then I have not consented to give him that restitution. I agree, it would be absurd to have a justice system where I am only bound to give restitution when I agree t give him restitution. Others of you have been saying that by going into arbitration, then I am consenting to the verdict that the arbiter gives out, thus making both parties consent and have the argument resolved. In that sense, you might say that I, the thief, have consented to some form of restitution.
Going back to the original question mixed with this conversation so far, What i am wondering, and what I feel like minarchist is really asking, is this: Lets say minarchist walks into his house. He sees me crawling out of his window and before he can stop me I escape but he knows its me because he's known me for years. He sees me get in MY car and drive down the street and go into my house. After he returns to his room, he finds his safe busted open and all of his gold is gone. He also knows of the financially tough times I've been going through, and he remembers telling me yesterday that I should consider buying a safe because thats where he keeps all of his gold.
If you havent figured out by now, I'm trying to paint a picture of near certainty that i am the thief. So, how much more evidence do you need to go from "probably guilty" to "certainly guilty", and, to the rest of you, if I refuse to go through arbitration, litigation, courts of any kind, then how have I, in any way, consented to restitution? You say I must only pay restitution if I consent, but also say that violence is a justifiable means to get restitution, but I just dont understand how anybody would consent to violence being used against them, barring perhaps a masochistic streak in them.
I hope you don't mind that I broke up your paragraph to make the whole thing easier to read.
My opinion is that there are three main incentives for a person to behave according to some moral standard. The first incentive is internal - you could call it his "conscience". In this case, he considers behaving that way to be preferable to behaving otherwise. The second and third are external. First there's the incentive of other people shunning him and otherwise expressing their disapproval of his behavior should he behave contrary to the given moral standard. Then there's the incentive of other people responding to his behavior with violence.
Unfortunately, these days people tend to concentrate on the last incentive. All too often I find someone assuming that people he doesn't know well have no incentive to behave "morally" (by his own standard) except for the threat of violence used against them. Yet when I ask him if he thinks he's the same way, he says that of course he's not. Likewise, people he knows well, like family members and good friends, are like him, not like "most people out there". How can it be that only a select few among us have consciences or care about what others think of us? All of my own observations point me in the opposite direction.
I could be wrong, but I think the hierarchy of incentives for the vast majority of people goes like this: first the internal incentive ("conscience"), then the non-violent external incentive ("public opinion" or "social standing"), and finally the violent external incentive ("coercion" or "retaliation"). So I think that in many cases, even today, people will consent to restitution for reasons other than the fear of coercion. That of course doesn't mean that coercion is never useful.
Anyways, my own take is that a libertarian society would adhere to the clear and convincing standard of evidence when it comes to intentional torts. For unintentional torts, like negligence, I think either that standard would still be used, or the lower preponderance standard would be used. Unless one is a direct witness, it's impossible for him to assign guilt with absolute certainty. However, since presumably all cases in a libertarian society would be civil cases - that is, no one's life, body, or liberty is at risk from conviction - I see no need to use the beyond reasonable doubt standard of evidence.
Of course, this all hinges on the accused agreeing to dispute resolution in the first place. If he doesn't agree to that, then I think he would be considered an outlaw. What would this mean? First off, I think a default judgement would then be rendered against him. This is the equivalent to a trial in absentia for civil cases. That's just the beginning though. I also think he'd lose his job, his bank accounts would be closed, and his insurance and security coverages would be dropped. If he has any loans outstanding, those might be called in immediately due to the catastrophic drop in his creditworthiness. He might be able to get by with paying for things in cash - for a while. But who in their right mind would hire him, cover him for insurance and/or security, or enter into any kind of contractual agreement with him? My point is, he wouldn't have to face violent punishment for his quality of life to diminish tremendously.
caulds989:Edit: Ok I didn't seem clayton's response when i wrote this so it cleared some things up. However, what if the murdered person has no family or no one that is effected by his death enough to be worth it to go to court. At first glance, it might seem that we are getting back to tribal tendancies because those who have no family would be at much greater risk for murder-robbery because who will take the murderer to arbitration/court? As I have found, I am not saying there isn't a solution, I am just wondering if Rothbard or any of you have spoken on this matter.
I personally think that any reasonable person in a libertarian society would have one or more people designated as his "survivors". Those people would be the ones who have the right to pursue a wrongful death claim on his behalf. But if a person doesn't designate anyone as a survivor for him, that's his choice. Maybe some kind of default designation would be customary in that case, like with intestacy.
Hope this helps!
Nope. Done