I 've come to the conclusion that there are no defenses against immorality, that does not lead to an argument of utility.
In short, I'm asking if there is any argument for morality that does not deduce to utility?
Relatively speaking, there is nothing moral or immoral about murder. If I murder I have my reasons:
a) Ended my hatred of this person, I feel releaved
b) I gain more amount of oxygen by his death
c) Not resisted my will
d) gained his things
Everyone one of these reasons leads to my utility. A) less stress B) my abundance of oxygen for my body C) less stress and anxiety D) less labor but more goods
If I decide not to kill, I have my reasons:
a) I let him live his life, he may come to help me later in life directly or indirectly
b) I feel it is unnatural to murder
c) His kin or friends may kill me
d) I am contributing to the wiping out of the human race
Everyone of these is based on utility: A) benefits for me by friendship or exchange B) It will cause me guilt if I do C) I am able to live / 2 men will be killed D) I preserve my species for the future
Is not everyone of these a basis of utility for the individual or majority?
Can someone find a different reason why murder is immoral that is not based on utility?
Democracy is nothing more than replacing bullets with ballots
If Pro is the opposite of Con. What is the opposite of Progress?
Murder is immoral because it violates someone's rights. Respect towards others is a constitutive part of one's eudaimonia. What constitutes respect towards others leads us to a rational investigation of human nature. This investigation shows that the right to liberty is essential to one's eudaimonia. From the right to liberty, one can establish the right to life (one's own life, that is) and the NAP, as violating the NAP leaves a person unable to act towards their own flourishing. One respects others because one respects one's self.
Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.
But why should one respect one's self?
Because self-respect is in one's rational self-interest. Having virtue and possessing goods such as self-respect/self-esteem, honor, health, friendship and knowledge (among others, of course) is intrisically valuable, because they are the virtues and goods that make a human life (the life of a rational, political, and social animal) more human.
What you mean is that ultimately ethics will appeal to self-interest. Perhaps, but why should this be utility in the utilitarian sense, which is fitting even for a pig? Why should it not differ for a being capable of thoughtful reflection?
-Jon
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Jon Irenicus: What you mean is that ultimately ethics will appeal to self-interest. Perhaps, but why should this be utility in the utilitarian sense, which is fitting even for a pig? Why should it not differ for a being capable of thoughtful reflection? -Jon
I'm not sure I follow? The OP was looking for a reason why murder is wrong that is not based in utility.
wombatron: One respects others because one respects one's self.
Having virtue and possessing goods such as self-respect/self-esteem, honor, health, friendship and knowledge (among others, of course) is intrisically valuable, because they are the virtues and goods that make a human life (the life of a rational, political, and social animal) more human.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
In the first place, those individuals are in error - they hold beliefs about themselves that are factually devoid of justification. As regards the constituent components of flourishing, these will differ from individual to individual, and especially which particular emphasis will be put on which virtues, but the ones he mentioned, it is pretty easy to assume, are integral to the happiness of most humans.
Wombatron, the only ethical systems which can achieve that are transcendental ethical systems which are purely deontological. My point was that a lot of ethical systems to appeal to self-interest, but it need not be so narrowly conceived as in the utilitarian models.
In the first place, those individuals are in error - they hold beliefs about themselves that are factually devoid of justification.
As regards the constituent components of flourishing, these will differ from individual to individual, and especially which particular emphasis will be put on which virtues, but the ones he mentioned, it is pretty easy to assume, are integral to the happiness of most humans.
I don't see how. Soldiers are nominally human and they enjoy killing people - not only that, they think it's very honorable to do so. Cops think that beating people is fun as long as they don't get caught - cops also are nominally human. These humans like to torture their fellows - where is the 'error' ?
Their error lies in the fact that these actions have about as much to do with honour as 1 + 1 = 5 has to do with being a correct statement. Otherwise, please do tell what honour means exactly, for I had no idea it is intimately related to the notion of sadism. It amuses me how people lose their ability to use words properly when it comes to philosophical discussions.
I don't think that answers my question. What about people who are not interested in what you consider 'integral' to happiness ?
Oh I think it answers it just perfectly. Why would they be "subhuman" (my, what a cute little epithet)? More importantly, why should it matter? Yes, a life that fails to live up to an examined, rational life is one that has failed in reaching its potential. The agent is still, of course, human, it is their choices that are bad. Which virtues an agent will consider more important to cultivate, are a matter for themselves to decide. In the unlikely case of a human that is utterly asocial, fine, to that individual friendship would not be a virtue, or more correctly, would be one to which that virtue did not matter. Is this difficult to comprehend? I've asked before if you've read a single book, even, on Aristotelian ethics, and got no answer. No wonder. The only people who I have a problem with are those who intentionally violate the pursuit by others of happiness via aggressive force.
Jon: Their error lies in the fact that these actions have about as much to do with honour as 1 + 1 = 5 has to do with being a correct statement. Otherwise, please do tell what honour means exactly,
Yes, a life that fails to live up to an examined, rational life is one that has failed in reaching its potential.
The agent is still, of course, human, it is their choices that are bad.
I've asked before if you've read a single book, even, on Aristotelian ethics,
The only people who I have a problem with are those who intentionally violate the pursuit by others of happiness via aggressive force.
Jon Irenicus:Wombatron, the only ethical systems which can achieve that are transcendental ethical systems which are purely deontological. My point was that a lot of ethical systems to appeal to self-interest, but it need not be so narrowly conceived as in the utilitarian models.
Ah. I see now. Thanks. I agree that self-interest is broader than conceived in some systems. I am also somewhat uncertain on the question of virtue ethics being based in self-interest. Meta-ethics can get confusing...
Well, you should ask the military, not me. I don't think there's such a virtue as honor, but they do. And you talk about honor too, just like they do. So, who's right ?
No, I will ask you. Is someone who can barely read three words "educated"? Would you take them seriously if they said so? Likewise, should one take the military seriously when it says it's honorable? Unless you're some sort of extreme relativist, I think the answer is clear.
Examined by whom ? What potential are you talking about ?
Examined by the individual in question (i.e. reflectively adopting courses of actions), and the potential to actually live this examined life. So hard to get, right?
Bad ? According to what standard ? Yours ? The community's ? Aristotle's ? or ?
Yes, bad. Drinking yourself stupid to avoid the consequences of your actions is what I'd call "bad", and most definitely not a human that has attained flourishing, in the same way that I can call a plant that has been infested by a disease on a bad course. To preempt any further questions on this, no, this would not mandate coercive interference - only violations of the rights of others mandate force in equal measure.
I read Nicomachean Ethics some time ago. Of course I didn't like it. But what's the point ? Now let me ask : can you read classical Greek ? If you can't, are you sure you know what Aristotle is talking about ?
Gee, what a pointless question. Yes, I can actually read ancient Greek. Didn't expect that, eh? But why should it matter, when brilliant modern translations exist? Even if they failed to convey what Aristotle thought, if I thought they were more correct than what he actually thought, I'd still stick with them, albeit no longer refer to them as Aristotelian. Yet there is no reason to do so. Plus, I rely on modern works based on Aristotelianism, so see below.
Fine - that has nothing to do with Aristotle, right ? That's the 'modern' doctrine of natural rights - it has nothing to do with classical antiquity either ?
Nope, as natural law (per the Thomist tradition, which is, incidentally, Aristotelian) and natural rights in the sense I speak of them are grounded in Aristotle's eudaemonist ethics. I was referring, in particular, to works by Roderick Long, Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas den Uyl.
Jon: No, I will ask you. Is someone who can barely read three words "educated"? Would you take them seriously if they said so? Likewise, should one take the military seriously when it says it's honorable? Unless you're some sort of extreme relativist, I think the answer is clear.
Drinking yourself stupid to avoid the consequences of your actions is what I'd call "bad", and most definitely not a human that has attained flourishing, in the same way that I can call a plant that has been infested by a disease on a bad course.
To preempt any further questions on this, no, this would not mandate coercive interference - only violations of the rights of others mandate force in equal measure.
Yes, I can actually read ancient Greek. Didn't expect that, eh?
...natural law (per the Thomist tradition, which is, incidentally, Aristotelian) and natural rights in the sense I speak of them are grounded in Aristotle's eudaemonist ethics.
I'm certainly not a relativist. I'm trying to point out that there's no clear definition for the word virtue. Of course it's much easier to realize, and 'objectively agree', that 1+1 is not five, but the same is not true for 'virtue' or 'honor'.But let's say some people don't understand the 'objective' meaning of virtue. At the same time, they are happy aggressing against their neighbors. Is that aggression the outcome of their lack of intellectual understanding ? Or is it something else ?
It is still stupid to associate the word with things it has little to do with, and the fact that it isn't as clear-cut as 1 + 1 =/= 5 is irrelevant. If they do not understand the meaning of virtue, and have never reflected on whether it is permissible to aggress against their fellowmen, they have failed in the exercise of their rational faculty, so it is, pretty much.
Fine. On the other hand the person drinking maybe thinks that drinking is okay. Maybe drinkers won't say that drinking is a virtue, but they can argue that drinking suits 'their nature'. Your judgment here is perhaps irrelevant ? A lot of people take a lot of different drugs. Is that 'bad' ?
Nope, not irrelevant at all. If one drinks to the point where they damage themselves, yet they profess and want to remain in good health, yet are too weak to overcome the temptation, the more base preference that is, it most certainly does not suit it. And yeah, it can be bad, depending on context.
Is that the same natural law that modern libertarians talk about ? And is that the same Aquinas who advocated the death penalty for 'heretics' ?
Yeah, it is. Also, is this the same sort of objection as "Aristotle advocated slavery"? Because it is perhaps the most shallow, puerile objection I can think of when it comes to a theory. to pounce upon errors of the theorist and treat them as indictments of the theory.
Jon: It is still stupid to associate the word with things it has little to do with, and the fact that it isn't as clear-cut as 1 + 1 =/= 5 is irrelevant.
If they do not understand the meaning of virtue, and have never reflected on whether it is permissible to aggress against their fellowmen
If one drinks to the point where they damage themselves, yet they profess and want to remain in good health, yet are too weak to overcome the temptation, the more base preference that is, it most certainly does not suit it.
Jon: Juan: Is that the same natural law that modern libertarians talk about ? Yeah, it is.
Juan: Is that the same natural law that modern libertarians talk about ?
Also, is this the same sort of objection as "Aristotle advocated slavery"?
Because it is perhaps the most shallow, puerile objection I can think of when it comes to a theory. to pounce upon errors of the theorist and treat them as indictments of the theory
What I think is irrelevant is your analogy. Arithmetic has nothing to do with moral philosophy.
My second example, of the adjective "educated", does.
Wait a second. You're talking about beings that, according to your philosophy, are defined as 'rational' animals. However, it turns out that despite the fact that their very nature is to be rational....they are not acting rationally. So, what's going on ?
What's going on? What is going on is that I am debating someone with a scant understanding of natural-end ethics. Yeah, humans are rational animals, with the ability to choose between various courses of action. They can choose to not fulfill their potentiality.
Some people want to take drugs - whether they want to remain in good health or not I don't know and I don't care. And it's beside the point. There's no accounting for taste - your 'objective' system fails here ?
But it isn't besides the point. Is someone who is suicidal living a "good life"? Based on what? Is someone taking drugs to escape the realities of their life, as opposed to dealing with them, one who has moral strength? This is not a matter of "taste" so don't think you're going to succeed in just brushing this off. It is a matter of using concepts appropriately.
Really ? I think you're rather confused.
That has not been demonstrated.
Indeed it is. (Btw, did he advocate slavery or not ?)
He did. Relevance?
The fact is, slavery and the burning of heretics seem to be 'integral' parts of the theory - calling my objection 'shallow' or 'puerile' is pointless. I suggest you better deal with the facts - your 'theorists' had some very flawed ideas. I'd also add that Mr. Aquinas was a high ranking official in one of the most brutal states ever, the so called catholic church.
No, I suggest you deal with the fact that you're clueless on this matter and excel in setting up strawmen and throwing in red herrings. How are they integral parts? Glorified ad hominem attacks will not suffice.
Juan: The fact is, slavery and the burning of heretics seem to be 'integral' parts of the theory - calling my objection 'shallow' or 'puerile' is pointless.
Spoken in obvious ignorance.
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.Adjunct Instructor, Buena Vista UniversityWebmaster, LibertarianStandard.comFounder / Executive Editor, Prometheusreview.com
Geoffrey Allan Plauche: Juan: The fact is, slavery and the burning of heretics seem to be 'integral' parts of the theory - calling my objection 'shallow' or 'puerile' is pointless. Spoken in obvious ignorance.
Jon: My second example, of the adjective "educated", does.
What's going on? What is going on is that I am debating someone with a scant understanding of natural-end ethics.
Yeah, humans are rational animals, with the ability to choose between various courses of action.
Is someone taking drugs to escape the realities of their life, as opposed to dealing with them, one who has moral strength?
This is not a matter of "taste" so don't think you're going to succeed in just brushing this off.
Jon: Juan: (Btw, did he[Aristotle] advocate slavery or not ?) He did. Relevance?
Juan: (Btw, did he[Aristotle] advocate slavery or not ?)
Your second example is also irrelevant. You are confusing moral qualities with 'knowledge'.
No, it's relevant. Honor, courage &c. are not necessarily moral qualities, so they're hardly different from being "educated", at least not in any relevant way. If they're fuzzy in the way you postulate, I maintain that "intelligent", "educated", "artistic" are all equally fuzzy and meaningless.
Yet another irrelevant remark which almost sounds like a personal attack. I suggest you explain the basic contradiction of your system instead ?
This being?
That's obvious - humans can choose. What you need to explain is how and/or why a 'rational' being acts in irrational ways.
Rational = capable of acting rationally. Please do show where I said "will always act rationally".
You haven't got the slightest idea why people take drugs. Even If it was true that some people prefer to take drugs instead of 'facing reality', what's wrong with that ?
Oh, speaking from experience? Stick to the context, though. What does it say about one's character if they refuse to face the facts of reality? It is a form of weakness.
Actually you're trying to brush off the problem. You can't say whether taking drugs is 'good' or 'bad' without invoking an arbitrary 'moral' system, which you claim is objective - but it is not. Even with regard to people who commit suicide, using whatever means, you should remain silent - you don't know the ultimate ends of each individual.
Oh, and why is that? Yes, one can ruin themselves if they so please. But, why should I regard this as moral behaviour, that is behaviour conforming with one's capacity for thoughtful reflection? The arbitrariness is a figment of your own imagination, stemming from your utter lack of in-depth understanding of natural-end ethics.
Relevance ? You are talking about a system of 'natural' rights and 'natural' ends that starts with somebody advocating slavery and you claim that the current libertarian system is related to it (or even identical?). I find that rather odd.
Yes, again I ask what this has to do with the logical validity of the claims raised by these systems. Mises advocated conscription (which is a form of slavery.) Am I to thus discard his contributions, because I mean how could I possibly agree with someone who advocated slavery?
Juan: Geoffrey Allan Plauche: Juan: The fact is, slavery and the burning of heretics seem to be 'integral' parts of the theory - calling my objection 'shallow' or 'puerile' is pointless. Spoken in obvious ignorance. Very enlightening remark.
I hope so. Now if only you'd act on your newfound enlightenment and seek more.
Jon: Juan: That's obvious - humans can choose. What you need to explain is how and/or why a 'rational' being acts in irrational ways. Rational = capable of acting rationally. Please do show where I said "will always act rationally".
Juan: That's obvious - humans can choose. What you need to explain is how and/or why a 'rational' being acts in irrational ways.
Jon: Juan: You haven't got the slightest idea why people take drugs. Even If it was true that some people prefer to take drugs instead of 'facing reality', what's wrong with that ? Oh, speaking from experience?
Juan: You haven't got the slightest idea why people take drugs. Even If it was true that some people prefer to take drugs instead of 'facing reality', what's wrong with that ?
Jon: Stick to the context, though. What does it say about one's character if they refuse to face the facts of reality? It is a form of weakness.
Jon: Yes, one can ruin themselves if they so please. But, why should I regard this as moral behaviour, that is behaviour conforming with one's capacity for thoughtful reflection?
Jon: ...again I ask what this has to do with the logical validity of the claims raised by these systems.
Mises advocated conscription (which is a form of slavery.) Am I to thus discard his contributions, because I mean how could I possibly agree with someone who advocated slavery?
What difference does that make ? If the nature of man is to be a 'rational' animal, then he's supposed to act rationally - period. What happens when man doesn't act rationally ? Maybe his nature is magically changed into something else for a while ? A==A from 10:00 to 20:00 but A!=A from 20:01 to 9:59 ?
Please spare me your black and white nonsense. A rational animal is one that has the capacity for rationality, not one that will unfailingly act rationally. It can choose otherwise. A = A always and everywhere. You're discounting the possibility that A can change to B.
Haha. What a clueless remark =]
Nothing that surpasses anything you've said, though, in this regard.
Now, can you please explain why your views on what is virtue should be valid for everybody ?
Which views would those be, in particular? All a virtue is generally, is a mean between two extremes (e.g. courage is the mean between courage and cowardice), and it consists in one using one's judgement to exert control over their emotions and react appropriately to each challenge as it presents itself.
So what. I asked "what's wrong with that" and you are not answering. People who can't face reality are weaklings you say ? - great. But maybe they are acting according to their weak natures ?
And doing nothing to overcome them.
It turns out it's not aggressive behaviour, so it is 'moral' as far as I'm concerned. I imagine that some people, after thoughtful reflection, decide that suicide is a good option. What exactly makes you think that you know better than them ?
It may indeed be their best option, the most rational one to undertake. If, on the other hand, they have obligations to others of their own making, it may be that they're shirking them and seeking a quick escape.
Please specify which 'claims' you're referring to.
For instance, their arguments on the nature of morality.
Do whatever you please. I personally would be very careful with the ideas of a philosopher who advocated conscription.
I forget, why are you on a forum dedicated to such a philosopher?
I believe there is some confusion here on the part of Juan about what is meant by the term "rational". I'd propose that there are two different ways in which the term can be used. In the first sense, all human action is rational in that the very nature of action involves a volitional process. Man is inherently a "rational agent" in this sense, as this is a mere description of fundamental features of being a human being and the process by which people think and act. In the second sense, rationality refers to whether or not one's means actually obtain their ends or whether or not their judgement for favored ends actually makes sense. When rationality is being mentioned by the above posters, I believe the former and more broad meaning is being used. If this distinction is not recognized, I totally understand the objection that "how can one say that man IS rational while simultaneously saying that they SHOULD be rational, implying that they may sometimes NOT be rational?", but if one understands the context this objection should easily be cleared up.
A similar objection to the concept of natural law (I.E. "if it's natural, it simply IS; everything is natural, so the natural law would reduce to whatever happens to occur and hence it would truly be impossible to defy the natural law") and natural rights can be cleared up in a similar way.
Yes, which is why Rothbard's latest article on the Mises.org is relevant, as he criticized Mises's argument that all action is rational.
Jon Irenicus: Yes, which is why Rothbard's latest article on the Mises.org is relevant, as he criticized Mises's argument that all action is rational. -Jon
Well, within the confines of economics and as a mere descriptive agent-relativity, Mises is absolutely correct. The problem comes into play when one tries to rigidly adhere to this outlook while ignoring the other sense of rationality; in effect, refusing to investigate as to whether or not one's ends make any sense or are conductive to ethics. So I agree with Rothbard that a purely economic outlook is dangerous in that it is ethically neutral. If one wants to make a meaningful case for liberty, one cannot confine oneself to value-free economics, and in some cases confining oneself to economics actually functions to legitimize unethical things.
Some may accuse Rothbard of trying to inject ethics into economics (as I saw on the comments section of that article), but this is a straw man and if one actually reads what he's saying he quite clearly is suggesting the ethical approach as something separate from economics. He's merely saying that economics isn't enough to make the case for liberty and that if one wants to make such a case they make have to step outside of their role as a mere economist and more broadly act as a political philosopher.
Right, though I'm still wary of using Mises's concept of rational even in economics, as it can lead to misunderstandings, but it does help shed the illusion that catallactics is purely concerned with some homo oeconomicus.
Please spare me your black and white nonsense.
A rational animal is one that has the capacity for rationality, not one that will unfailingly act rationally.
A = A always and everywhere.
You're discounting the possibility that A can change to B.
All a virtue is generally, is a mean between two extremes (e.g. courage is the mean between courage and cowardice), and it consists in one using one's judgement to exert control over their emotions and react appropriately to each challenge as it presents itself.
Jon: Juan: But maybe they are acting according to their weak natures ? And doing nothing to overcome them.
Juan: But maybe they are acting according to their weak natures ?
BrainPolice: I believe there is some confusion here on the part of Juan about what is meant by the term "rational". I'd propose that there are two different ways in which the term can be used. In the first sense, all human action is rational in that the very nature of action involves a volitional process. Man is inherently a "rational agent" in this sense, as this is a mere description of fundamental features of being a human being and the process by which people think and act.
In the second sense, rationality refers to whether or not one's means actually obtain their ends or whether or not their judgement for favored ends actually makes sense.
The problem comes into play when one tries to rigidly adhere to this outlook while ignoring the other sense of rationality; in effect, refusing to investigate as to whether or not one's ends make any sense or are conductive to ethics.
What you call b&w nonsense is also known as logic.
Not really. The "contradiction" you came up with isn't one at all.
So man is not a rational animal. At the very least you should call him a 'potentially' rational animal - which of course only pushes the moral problem back a step.
Nope. Just because something possesses a distinctive active property (namely, rationality), it does not mean it will necessarily exercise it. One can attain one's rational potentiality, or one can be closer to the animal level, ruled by impulses.
Which means that for something to exist it must have a definite form or nature. If man had a definite nature, then man would be compelled to act according to it. But man can choose, so maybe you'd be better off calling man a 'choosing' animal ?
But why should I do that, when man's defining characteristic is his rationality?
So, you also subscribe to Greek mythology and metamorphosis ? =]
No, I acknowledge that change is a part of the world. Your pissant little remarks bore me.
The typical Aristotelian 'formula'. But aren't emotions a given which can't be controlled ? Furthermore, aren't some emotions, or sensations, part of a signaling mechanism that helps keeping organisms alive ? Fear happens to be a signal that tells an organism that something dangerous is threatening it ?
That's often asserted, that emotions are simply inescapable. In a large number of cases that's nonsense. Through habituation, one can overcome one's emotive responses. A man immensely fearful of mice, for no reason other than evolutionary mechanisms, is one who is displaying disproportionate fear.
Again, so what ? Why should a being with a definite nature do something to overcome its nature ? Because you don't like 'weaklings' ?
Again, why don't you actually stick to the topic, which was why could I say X action is immoral? Next time you criticise someone's preferences (e.g. when you begin a rant about 'racism') I will bring this up. After all, it's just because you don't like 'racists'.
That's often asserted, that emotions are simply inescapable. In a large number of cases that's nonsense.
Again, why don't you actually stick to the topic, which was why could I say X action is immoral?
Next time you criticise someone's preferences (e.g. when you begin a rant about 'racism') I will bring this up.
Morality is for bums. Anyone who tells you that whatever best serves you is not 'good' either does not know what the word means or has fundamentally skewed views about reality. Appealing to irrational, impersonal ideals can only promote irrationalism and slavery. For an example, look at the so-called 'egoist' Randroids. Morality is a way to control people.
Juan:This is the third time or so that you fail to answer why people should follow your arbitrary idea of virtue. You indeed stick stubbornly to...evasion.
A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End by Douglas Rasmussen
In Defense of Natural-End Ethics by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl
Eudaimonia, Virtue, and the Right to Liberty by Geoffery Plauche
Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action by Roderick Long, especially the last chapter on Socrates
Also, Rand in the essay "The Objectivist Ethics" in The Virtue of Selfishness, Henry Veatch in For An Ontology of Morals and Rational Man and Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics defend natural-end ethics.
wombatron: Juan:This is the third time or so that you fail to answer why people should follow your arbitrary idea of virtue. You indeed stick stubbornly to...evasion. A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End by Douglas Rasmussen In Defense of Natural-End Ethics by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl Eudaimonia, Virtue, and the Right to Liberty by Geoffery Plauche Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action by Roderick Long, especially the last chapter on Socrates Also, Rand in the essay "The Objectivist Ethics" in The Virtue of Selfishness, Henry Veatch in For An Ontology of Morals and Rational Man and Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics defend natural-end ethics.
One of the funniest things about libertarian ethics is that most libertarians will not admit that a solid proof has been put forth, that most arguments for libertarian rights are tenative or incomplete at best and that (what's more) many of these theories are mutually exclusive. Yet they preach it as though it had absolute certitude.
In response to many of the above authors I would cite the little known but very insightful Myth of Natural Rights by LA Rollins. I had to manually type this up using Wordpad, so it's missing footnotes. Some of the text is too blocky, but it should be readable.
R.J. Moore II: wombatron: Juan:This is the third time or so that you fail to answer why people should follow your arbitrary idea of virtue. You indeed stick stubbornly to...evasion. A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End by Douglas Rasmussen In Defense of Natural-End Ethics by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl Eudaimonia, Virtue, and the Right to Liberty by Geoffery Plauche Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action by Roderick Long, especially the last chapter on Socrates Also, Rand in the essay "The Objectivist Ethics" in The Virtue of Selfishness, Henry Veatch in For An Ontology of Morals and Rational Man and Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics defend natural-end ethics. One of the funniest things about libertarian ethics is that most libertarians will not admit that a solid proof has been put forth, that most arguments for libertarian rights are tenative or incomplete at best and that (what's more) many of these theories are mutually exclusive. Yet they preach it as though it had absolute certitude. In response to many of the above authors I would cite the little known but very insightful Myth of Natural Rights by LA Rollins. I had to manually type this up using Wordpad, so it's missing footnotes. Some of the text is too blocky, but it should be readable.
So are you some kind of Stirnerite?
Yes, and I knew you'd pick that up. I'd call myself a functionally left-libertarian Stirnerite.
Juan:"But if natural rights are merely fake or metaphorical rights, what then are real rights? Real rights are those rights actually conferred and enforced by the laws of a State or the customs of a social group." ha ha.
It may sound funny to a libertarian, so well versed on explaining how state-granted rights are inconsistent and nonsensical, but the position of Rollins is precisely that 'natural rights' is categorical nonsense. Right and law in fact have no 'moral basis', nor does anything else, rights and laws are things which are actually enforced, no matter how contrary and baseless they may be.