February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Well, Rollins may say that natural rights are categorical nonsense. Too bad he's wrong.
That's certainly what your position is, but the entirety of the essay was devoted to showing that no one has demonstrated that 'natural rights' actually exist or make any sense. State-granted rights are facts, IE they are things that are enforced. Existing rights are also real in the situation of a libertarian society which would have private-property institutions. But the reality of these rights is the fact of their enforcement, but no argument has been (or, I contend, could be) advanced which demonstrates either the existence or necessity of a moral basis for 'rights'.
Juan:You mean, there is a moral basis for aggression ? You are saying that the 'right' and 'moral' thing to do is to attack people ? Rob, kill, etc ?
I will quote Rollins, because what you are saying is a very common mistake moralists make about these views:
So what about Cooney's claim that those who reject the idea of natural rights must concludethat the Nazi regime "had a perfect justification for recalling the rights, including the right to life" ofsix million Jews? Well, I find it interesting that moralists like Cooney seem incapable of looking atthings from the amoral point of view. They almost invariably present amoralism in "moral" terms.But it is only the moralists who think in "moral" terms, who think that actions are (or are not)"perfectly justified." As I've already said, if one sees through the myth of morality, one realizesthat there is no "moral justification" for anything anyone does. So the rejection of the idea ofnatural rights does not entail the conclusion that the were "perfectly justified" in killing sixmillion Jews. Rather, the rejection of the idea of natural rights entails the conclusion that the were neither "justified" nor "unjustified" in killing six million Jews.
I will quote Rollins, because what you are saying is a very common mistake moralists make about these views
"I find it interesting that moralists like Cooney seem incapable of looking at things from the amoral point of view. "
Rather, the rejection of the idea of natural rights entails the conclusion that they were neither "justified" nor "unjustified" in killing six million Jews.
I attempted to answer you, but apparent it was too indirect. In answer to your question "You mean, there is a moral basis for aggression ? You are saying that the 'right' and 'moral' thing to do is to attack people ? Rob, kill, etc ?" I reply that no, there is no 'right' or 'wrong' action at all in the moral sense. Aggression is not just, nor is it unjust, it is a fact, like weather, a relationship which exists between people.
I attempted to answer you, but apparent it was too indirect.
Okay, I get it now =] So, again, according to amoralists there's no right or wrong. Well, great. Now, why are you discussing this ? Why does Rollins bother to prove that morals don't exist ? What's the point ?
Because I want to. No one ever said values didn't exist. Just that values are held, and in some sense created by, the individual. Do you want to deal with reality? Reason is the only way you're going to do it. Do you find it interesting to understand all sorts of complicated philosophical points? I do. And that's the only reason I need. And you know what? That's the only reason that anybody's ever gonna have.
And it doesn't bother me one bit.
Roderick Long replies to some of Rollins's criticisms in The Nature of Law, Part IV. Stirnerite libertarians have always been interesting to me, though. How does one support the abolition of the state without an ethical basis for it? Is it mere utility? (note: I'm not trying be inflammatory or trollish; I am honestly curious)
Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.
Most of Long's arguments can be retorted to in that he is explaining that morality is supposed to be guidance and not protection. That is, however, understood. The point is that there can be no imperatives outside of your own preferences and judgement, thus there can be no 'guidance' except from what an individual does desire and how he might achieve it.
Later he says this:
More importantly, though, the question is why we should accept Rollins' claim that nothing is right or wrong and nothing is entitled to reverence.
First of all, I disagree. I postulate that the Moralist is in the position of the theist. What most people think or believe is irrelevant, the fact is the claim to a positive universal norm is not and could not ever be 'experienced' by anyone since no one has a 'universal' value sense, only their own. And a point of fact against 'morality' is that value exists only as specific values held by specific individuals who are in specific situations with limited resources and knowledge. A value can not be 'universal', though it may be omnipresent, because only individuals ever experience it. There is no 'outisde' perspective. I am not here doubting that reality is objective, I am saying that values can not even be imagined as being 'outside' of a specific viewpoint of someone. It has no cognitive content.
I think of little as moral 'reasoning' as I do of religious 'reasoning'. I consider it literally impossible nonsense with no implication in reality except as a factual influence of beliefs on people. The only reason libertarian 'ethics' are so interesting to me is because it is the source of the most consistent non-violent dispute resolution methods (arbitration). Libertarianism is, I think, the best theory of legality ever developed.
I support the abolition of the State because it's obnoxious and it's a stupid idea that people parrot all the time. It's damn annoying. Debate helps me to refine my own understanding, but I don't do it to convince anyone. That's just a side effect. I am fairly certain that the libertarian insurrection won't be coming any time soon, and I won't have much of an influence either way, so I'm certainly not a libertarian 'activist' or anything. I just find it really interesting. Analytic reasoning is what my genes are good for, it would seem.
R.J. Moore II:In response to many of the above authors I would cite the little known but very insightful Myth of Natural Rights by LA Rollins. I had to manually type this up using Wordpad, so it's missing footnotes. Some of the text is too blocky, but it should be readable.
Rollins? Give me a break! Roderick refuted him a long time ago.
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.Adjunct Instructor, Buena Vista UniversityWebmaster, LibertarianStandard.comFounder / Executive Editor, Prometheusreview.com
R.J. Moore II:The point is that there can be no imperatives outside of your own preferences and judgement, thus there can be no 'guidance' except from what an individual does desire and how he might achieve it. [...] First of all, I disagree. I postulate that the Moralist is in the position of the theist. What most people think or believe is irrelevant, the fact is the claim to a positive universal norm is not and could not ever be 'experienced' by anyone since no one has a 'universal' value sense, only their own. And a point of fact against 'morality' is that value exists only as specific values held by specific individuals who are in specific situations with limited resources and knowledge. A value can not be 'universal', though it may be omnipresent, because only individuals ever experience it. There is no 'outisde' perspective. I am not here doubting that reality is objective, I am saying that values can not even be imagined as being 'outside' of a specific viewpoint of someone. It has no cognitive content.
I don't agree about the theism. The objection that no one has a 'universal' value sense is a chimera. As is the idea that values can be imagined 'outside' of a specific viewpoint of someone. These are essentially straw man arguments. Irrelevant with regard to Aristotelians since we hold nothing resembling either view.
R.J. Moore II:I think of little as moral 'reasoning' as I do of religious 'reasoning'. I consider it literally impossible nonsense with no implication in reality except as a factual influence of beliefs on people. The only reason libertarian 'ethics' are so interesting to me is because it is the source of the most consistent non-violent dispute resolution methods (arbitration). Libertarianism is, I think, the best theory of legality ever developed.
That's nice. But I don't see any arguments here. Just assertions of your beliefs.
R.J. Moore II:I support the abolition of the State because it's obnoxious and it's a stupid idea that people parrot all the time. It's damn annoying.
That's not much of a leg to stand on. The strongest objection one can make is that it is annoying, obnoxious and stupid? Stupid...how so? In terms of economic efficiency?
Right. Why should you stick to a consistent use of definitions ? It's much better to use words loosely and be able to spout any kind of nonsense. Well, have fun, I'm not wasting any more time.
You've wasted enough of mine after all.
And in 'some' cases it is true, which means your 'theory' has been disproved. Too bad logic is not your strong suit.
Hmm, how does that work? Does this also disprove economic conceptions of rationality? Actually, logic is my strong suit. Unlike you, I've done philosophy, so I'm not apt to make moronic mistakes like you've made thus far, e.g. conflating rational potentiality with deterministic fatalism, to always be rational. The theory would only be disproved if one said it is always possible. Where did I say this?
This is the third time or so that you fail to answer why people should follow your arbitrary idea of virtue. You indeed stick stubbornly to...evasion.
Because it'd require more effort than I am willing to expend on you, and because it is not even pertinent to this topic. In future, when you're going to attack an idea, make sure you comprehend it.
R J Moore, whereby did you come across this absolute truth that there is no morality? Sounds like "theism" to me...
-Jon
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
I myself used to be a sort of "post-objectivist, 'rights are natural and must not be violated!', 'you are objectively evil'" kind of guy. Then I realised what utter useless nonsense it really is. Without reading any Stirner, Nietzsche, or something like that (which I still haven't).
Not only has noone actually proven the existence of these natural/objective/whatever rights, but even if someone were to do just that, I fail to see the point in them. I don't understand what I would get out of knowing what is and what isn't objectively good and evil...
I think the whole argument from morals is one of the things holding the libertarian movement back. I don't think it's anything but choir-preaching.
Well that's nice. I'm sure the statists would love to know we have no real problem with their rule over us, other than it hurts our feelings. BTW, when you say no one has proved it, does this mean you've read and fully understood most NR ethicists, or any ethicist for that matter? Or are you akin to many people who read some philosophy, don't go into much depth in it, get disillusioned with it, and then proclaim from high that it's all nonsense?
Jon Irenicus: Well that's nice. I'm sure the statists would love to know we have no real problem with their rule over us, other than it hurts our feelings. BTW, when you say no one has proved it, does this mean you've read and fully understood most NR ethicists, or any ethicist for that matter? Or are you akin to many people who read some philosophy, don't go into much depth in it, get disillusioned with it, and then proclaim from high that it's all nonsense? -Jon
I don't understand how ethics and morals can be anything other than subjective but i'd be more than willing to read arguments to the contrary if you wouldn't mind pointing me in the right direction. Books/Articles would be most appreciated. Thanks!
The ones Wombatron quoted will suffice for the time being. Transcendental arguments also try work around the so-called subjective element.
Whoops, i missed those links. Thanks for pointing them out, i'll give them a read.
Jon Irenicus: Well that's nice. I'm sure the statists would love to know we have no real problem with their rule over us, other than it hurts our feelings.
Well that's nice. I'm sure the statists would love to know we have no real problem with their rule over us, other than it hurts our feelings.
I sure do have problems with their rule over me. I think they're fucking pricks, and if it weren't for the police actually having some decent investigators I'd gladly defend myself using a lot of violence. I think people supporting oppressing states, which do nothing but hurt the poor and productive and feed the rich and parasitical, are a bunch of stupid idiots who I'd rather not have in my life at all.
However, that does not mean I have to call on some "god" or "universal morality" in order to justify my position. I don't need to justify anything. Every action is emotion and feelings. People who act certain ways do so because of their emotions, regardless of whether I say they're "objectively wrong" or not. So why not take a look at their actions, have them see what their actions are actually doing, and then take it from there?
Sure, if you want to, you can point out contradictions in people's thinking. The lack of logic and all that. But I fail to see the point in calling someone "objectively wrong", especially if it isn't even properly proven. I think it will change absolutely nothing - the people who "fall for it" will already have the spirit of freedom in them (hence my thinking it's preaching to the choir).
Jon Irenicus:BTW, when you say no one has proved it, does this mean you've read and fully understood most NR ethicists, or any ethicist for that matter? Or are you akin to many people who read some philosophy, don't go into much depth in it, get disillusioned with it, and then proclaim from high that it's all nonsense?
I've read a bunch of theories from all over the place (and even took some to heart), but after closer examination I found everything to be packed with nothing but arbitrariness.
And like I said, even if there was some brilliant lad who proved the law of gravity; if I didn't have to abide by it and could hover anyway, what good would it do me?
It just renders one toothless against a State, or its minions, because conversely, they do not have to justify their actions either. What more could they want? I think this is skirting the issues. Nazi genocide is no less nor more justifiable than aiding the poor, one says? But why? Do these actions not differ qualitatively? Why can one not use reason to judge varying ends and qualities of action? Sure, one can violate it, just as one can ignore economics. So what?
Some excerpts from Henry Veatch's "Concerning the Distinction Between Descriptive and Normative Sciences," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
"[ E ]very man recognizes the pertinence of this question "Why?" to his own conduct, and even in his own behavior he acknowledges at least by implication that it is incumbent upon him to try to answer the question and to give a justification for the things which he does. And to prove the point, let us consider the hypothetical case of a man who pointedly denies that he feels any such responsibility. We may suppose that he honestly believes he need render no accounting to any man. Yet inevitably his belief must serve as a reason in his own mind for his refusing to render any such accounting. But to consider that he has a reason means that he has accepted the very responsibility which he thought he was denying. For what is it to give a reason in such a context but to recognize both the validity of the question "Why?" and the necessity of answering the question with some sort of self-defense? In short, even to refuse to consider oneself accountable is an action for which any man will quite inescapably and unwittingly consider himself accountable."But let us make the case even stronger. Let us suppose - which is contrary to fact - there to be a man who has never felt called upon to defend himself for anything he has ever done. In short, he has never felt any sense of responsibility of any kind whatever. He has not even felt called upon to justify his very irresponsibility. Still it must be admitted that such a man has had to make decisions from time to time as to courses of action that he would follow. Moreover, such decisions have naturally been based on considerations as to which course would be better or preferable or pleasanter or more profitable. But what is this but to give a reason for what he does? And to give a reason is simply to justify or defend his own behavior, at least to himself if not to anyone else."Thus, there is no getting around the fact: all voluntary human acts, i.e., all acts that are truly and characteristically human, do call for justification. They are, so to speak, within the universe of discourse of the justifiable, which means that while they may be unjustifiable, they can never be non-justifiable."[...]"But with this the skeptic has given away his case. For no sooner does he give a reason than he is engaged in the act of justification. Indeed, it is as if he felt that in reply to the question "Why?," whether put by himself or someone else, he could successfully defend himself. And how does he defend himself? By appealing to the proposition that all ethical norms and standards are non-existent. But what is this but to claim justification on the ground that there are no possible grounds for justification? In other words, the very denial of all natural laws of right and wrong, of all moral norms and standards, becomes itself a standard in terms of which the skeptic tries to defend himself for acting in disregard of all standards. Certainly, no more untenable situation is conceivable."Moreover, it is interesting to note the sense in which such a self-contradiction is, as I said earlier, practical rather than theoretical. For in itself there is no self-contradiction involved in the proposition "there are no normal norms," comparable to the self-contradiction involved in the proposition "there is no truth." Rather the contradiction emerges only subsequently and after action, so to speak. For as soon as we act, we must act on our knowledge, but the knowledge on which the skeptic acts is that there is no knowledge on which to act. This, then, is what I meant by my expression practical self-contradiction in contrast to theoretical."But with this, it seems to me that my thesis has been sustained: norms do exist and hence normative science is possible. Why? Because man is a justifying animal, and because this justification in which he engages is necessarily a significant process. Moreover, if human justification is significant, then it is simply true that human actions have the quality of being either right or wrong. And if they be either right or wrong, then there must be natural moral laws in terms of which this rightness or wrongness is determined. Further, from all this it would follow that the positivistic account of human nature is unquestionably misleading and oversimple. For the question as to whether an act is right or wrong has been shown to be pertinent to human behavior. Accordingly, man cannot be regarded just like any other object of nature, nor must it be supposed that the ordinary scientific description of human conduct is in any way adequate.[...]"However, in order to make clear how such a thing is possible ["moral norms being at one and the same time natural laws and human prescriptions"], let me revert once more to the simple fact that man is a justifying animal. For just what does this mean? As I have already shown, it means that man acts, not just as one blindly impelled by the forces of nature, but rather as one who must be convinced of the wisdom and justice both of what he has done and of what he is about to do. From this two consequences follow. First, if human action necessarily involves justification, and if justification is a meaningful process, then moral norms must have some sort of real existence, i.e., they must be natural and not man-made, they must be recognized as principles that are true and not mere products of our own wishful thinking. Second, if justification is presupposed in all truly human conduct, in the sense that a man must be convinced that what he is doing is right and just, otherwise he would not do it, then it follows that a human being not only knows what he is doing in the sense of having a purely theoretical or speculative knowledge of what he actually does do, but also in the sense of having a practical knowledge of what he ought to do and wants to do. In short, man has the kind of knowledge by virtue of which a person can govern,regulate, and prescribe his own conduct."But with this, the difficulties about prescriptions being natural laws, as well as the difficulty about how a practical or normative judgment could constitute real knowledge, would seem to be largely dissolved. To be sure, men do prescribe for themselves the courses of action which they are convinced they ought to follow. But this does not mean that such prescriptions are mere human creations and in no sense natural. On the contrary, the reason men prescribe for themselves a certain way of life is in the final analysis only because they are convinced that such a way of life is prescribed for them by the very nature of things."Similarly, the ultimate objective of all normative science is to prevail upon men to behave in a certain way. Hence, all the propositions of ethics and politics are practical judgments, that is to say, they are implied commands, stating what men ought to do and ought not to do. And yet it is a feeble argument indeed to infer that because the ultimate purpose of normative science is to order certain things be done and other things not to be done, therefore, it is impossible in normative science ever to attain any such thing as a real knowledge of what ought to be done or ought not to be done."But now, supposing this suffices to call attention to the simple fact, viz., that moral norms enjoy a sort of dual existence, as prescriptions issued by human beings and also as natural laws rooted in the very order of things, there still is required a more careful description of this fact and of what it implies. To this end I should like to rely upon the very illuminating analysis which Professor Simon has given of the various possible states or conditions under which a law may be said to exist. Following St. Thomas, Professor Simon asserts that "the first and most essential element of the definition of law" is that it is "an ordinance of reason." Nevertheless, St. Thomas points out that law is also capable of existing under another state or condition: not only may a law exist in the prescribing reason, but it may also exist in that which submits to the prescriptions of reason. The whole passage from St. Thomas will bear quoting: "Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were.""Accordingly, if it be asked how that which is by nature a prescription as to what ought to be can be regarded as a description of what actually is, the answer is that it all becomes clear in the light of the distinction between a law as it exists in mensurante and that same law as it exists in mensurato. For instance, Professor Simon cites an example from the field of positive law: "Observing the behavior of cab drivers in a crowded city, I see that it embodies a certain rule; this rule has been issued by a governing reason, it has existed in a governing reason before existing in the factual behavior of these cab drivers. We must say that the rule, as existing in this factual behavior, is subordinated to, or participates in the rule as existing in the governing reason.""However, when it is of natural laws that we are speaking, the conditions under which they may exist are more complicated. Thus like mere positive laws, they too are capable of existing in the governing reason of some human being and also in the factual behavior of that same human being or of others over whom he may happen to exercise authority. But in addition to these states of existence, a law, if it be natural, must also have an existence prior to that which it enjoys in human reason. "Now the rule," Simon says, "is one and the same; if rightly enforced it has the same content, both in the factual behavior which embodies it, and in the governing reason which issues it, in mensurato et in mensurate. This is the way that natural law, as a precept of the human reason, is subordinated to the natural law immanent in human nature." "By this simple device, then, of distinguishing between the various states or conditions under which a law is capable of existing, the ground is cut right out from under the current prejudice that the prescriptive character of moral laws makes it impossible for them to be natural."
"By this simple device, then, of distinguishing between the various states or conditions under which a law is capable of existing, the ground is cut right out from under the current prejudice that the prescriptive character of moral laws makes it impossible for them to be natural."
"But let us make the case even stronger. Let us suppose - which is contrary to fact - there to be a man who has never felt called upon to defend himself for anything he has ever done.
Arguments such as this have been dealt with in the essay (it's similar to some of Tibon Machan's comments). The fact that people can or do argue about what they think is 'moral' is irrelevant. People argue over what they think supernatural dimensions consist of, they're still talking nonsense. The fact that people engage in forms of speculation and debate does not mean that there are rational premises for that debate.
These are essentially straw man arguments. Irrelevant with regard to Aristotelians since we hold nothing resembling either view.
It does when you consider that no matter what you think you have proven to be universally true as moral still has absolutely no meaning to any individuals actual utility scales and rational choices except insofar as he is concerned with air castles and susceptable to nonsensical arguments. No one can ever have any reason to do anything except their own. Insofar as whatever you may call 'justice' contradicts with their ends, they would be behaving foolishly to be stopped by it. Furthermore, no one has to justify their actions. The need for justification is circular reasoning since it presumes the existence of morality. The attempt at 'justifying' actions according to ends or standards outside the personal preferences of oneself (or to another according to his preferences) is to misuse the word.
Well, none of its defenders have any sensical arguments, they typically don't even acknowledge what it actually is. I am fond of civilization and many of the things that come with it, therefor I dislike the state; a stateless society would be superior to one with a state for myself and for most things that I would want to be around. It's true that I can't make absolute claims that somehow 'command' other people to prefer libertarianism. But, from my perspective, neither can you. I don't have to be the 'good guy'.
Then I realised what utter useless nonsense it really is. Without reading any Stirner, Nietzsche, or something like that (which I still haven't)
It's all a con game. It's a kind of power or perceived legitemacy that almost all 'movements' strive after, but it's not only nonsensical but pointless.
I'm sure the statists would love to know we have no real problem with their rule over us
You act like the State gives a damn what we think, anyway. It's in the rational interest of 98%+ of the population to evade the state whenever possible, and most of them obey it as much as they do because of ...*drumroll*...'moral' obligation.
It just renders one toothless against a State, or its minions, because conversely, they do not have to justify their actions either.
Rollins made a response precisely to the point, that rights do not protect you from the state. Only actual positively enforced 'rights' will protect you, the only thing that can make you safe is to have more power than your adversary (which includes the ability to avoid, circumvent, deceive etc). Of course ideas are very important and powerful in human society, but the standards of society at large are objective and positive facts which will protect you, all the theoretical rights in the world will not.
It does when you consider that no matter what you think you have proven to be universally true as moral still has absolutely no meaning to any individuals actual utility scales and rational choices except insofar as he is concerned with air castles and susceptable to nonsensical arguments
It's in the rational interest of 98%+ of the population to evade the state whenever possible, and most of them obey it as much as they do because of ...*drumroll*...'moral' obligation.
What about soldiers who after happily massacring hundreds of their fellows, one day they find that they have a guilty conscience ? That is, you know, a fact. Do you think that such a feeling of guilt is the result of 'air castles and 'nonsensical arguments' ?
No, humans are influenced by social norms as well as evolutionary traits. No one ever said people did not have emotions or a great interest in one another. Everyone knows they do. I wouldn't be here if that weren't the case. But there is nothing moral to this. They may be factually held values, but they are individual and specific values; they are unique as he is unique.
I thought the state is obeyed because it has a tendency to kill dissidents ?
You should read La Boetie or many of the anarchists available on mises.org. The State's power rests in ideology, the state, democracy, social justice and irrational ideas about the legitemization of violence for some arbitrary group - these sorts of ideas are all deeply rooted in 'justification psychology', which is where I think the moral error comes from. It is not entirely an intellectual error, we do wish to make statements to other people which we expect them to accept. For this we must appeal to certain commonly held values and objective facts about reality. But this is incorrectly interpreted if called 'moral', it is merely communication of one thinking, valueing entity with another; both of whom share an objective reality.
No, humans are influenced by social norms as well as evolutionary traits.
You should read La Boetie or many of the anarchists available on mises.org. The State's power rests in ideology
the state, democracy, social justice and irrational ideas about the legitemization of violence for some arbitrary group -
I look at it from the point that their are no Rights. They are a social construct. I believe no morality exists at all outside what person think and feel.
I do not need an ethical justification for opposing the state because it by its very existence opposes me. The state degrades my integrity of being an individual and imposes its will upon me. Not only does it do this to me, but others as well. No individual is going to do the actions of his will if someone stops him from doing it. How is one suppose to form their own opinion of personal ethics if they can not pursue that action. What brings the most pain and pleasure will be learned, and either the individual engages these ethics or he will re-evaluate his own.
My biggest defense of viewing things from a amoral point of view is that one can claim something is moral and create damage to me and others. Morality and god are always the last argument for an action or thought. People do not question things if people tell them they are moral and are the "right" things to do. What is moral to one person can be immoral to another. Then creating this social construct to apply to all by force subverts individual thought into group think.
I posted a forum a long time ago about one's feelings about the state and why one opposes it. Two primary reasons I see are individual and social. Individualism sees the state as evil because it gets in the way of one's will. It is almost a crushing of my spirit when I can't do something I want to do. Granted I wish someone people could die from my hand, but I view that as against my personal ethics and would not do so, or the impact on my spirit would not be so great to subvert that action. But the state controls my actions and this enslaves me to others' will, and I do not feel like a person. And I only have one life to live, so I will rebel to the end against those which poison my life. That is why I oppose the State. I need no other grounds, even though I have them, to justify my rebellion.
The social reasons are the fact that the state is destructive of society/economics/ and people and retards civilization's progress. Nearly everyone blends these positions, but I think either one is the core position of a person.
Democracy is nothing more than replacing bullets with ballots
If Pro is the opposite of Con. What is the opposite of Progress?
Well, actually that isn't what he is saying at all. He is saying justification is inescapable.
Furthermore, no one has to justify their actions. The need for justification is circular reasoning since it presumes the existence of morality. The attempt at 'justifying' actions according to ends or standards outside the personal preferences of oneself (or to another according to his preferences) is to misuse the word.
The need? No, there is no "need" per se. There's just the inescapable fact of it. It amuses me, immensely, when nihilists rally against morality, and then expect to be taken seriously when they think arguments appealing to self-interest (namely, economic ones) cannot be brushed off with similar ease. That is the real con game going on here. What hindered me from converting to anarcho-capitalism, initially, were precisely moral objections, as I was convinced on the economics of it all.
R.J. Moore II: These are essentially straw man arguments. Irrelevant with regard to Aristotelians since we hold nothing resembling either view. It does when you consider that no matter what you think you have proven to be universally true as moral still has absolutely no meaning to any individuals actual utility scales and rational choices except insofar as he is concerned with air castles and susceptable to nonsensical arguments. No one can ever have any reason to do anything except their own. Insofar as whatever you may call 'justice' contradicts with their ends, they would be behaving foolishly to be stopped by it.
It does when you consider that no matter what you think you have proven to be universally true as moral still has absolutely no meaning to any individuals actual utility scales and rational choices except insofar as he is concerned with air castles and susceptable to nonsensical arguments. No one can ever have any reason to do anything except their own. Insofar as whatever you may call 'justice' contradicts with their ends, they would be behaving foolishly to be stopped by it.
I don't see how this is a compelling objection, insofar as I don't see any real understanding of Aristotelian virtue ethics in it. This is all question-begging assertion.
R.J. Moore II:Furthermore, no one has to justify their actions. The need for justification is circular reasoning since it presumes the existence of morality. The attempt at 'justifying' actions according to ends or standards outside the personal preferences of oneself (or to another according to his preferences) is to misuse the word.
You miss the point. People justify their actions. It's unavoidable.
R.J. Moore II:Well, none of its defenders have any sensical arguments, they typically don't even acknowledge what it actually is. I am fond of civilization and many of the things that come with it, therefor I dislike the state; a stateless society would be superior to one with a state for myself and for most things that I would want to be around.
That won't get you very far in convincing others.
R.J. Moore II:It's true that I can't make absolute claims that somehow 'command' other people to prefer libertarianism. But, from my perspective, neither can you.
Unsupported assertion. And what do you mean "command"? Sounds like another straw man.
R.J. Moore II: It just renders one toothless against a State, or its minions, because conversely, they do not have to justify their actions either. Rollins made a response precisely to the point, that rights do not protect you from the state. Only actual positively enforced 'rights' will protect you, the only thing that can make you safe is to have more power than your adversary (which includes the ability to avoid, circumvent, deceive etc). Of course ideas are very important and powerful in human society, but the standards of society at large are objective and positive facts which will protect you, all the theoretical rights in the world will not.
You keep citing this argument by Rollins as if Roderick hasn't already refuted it thoroughly.
Wow. Here I thought the freethinking well had dried up on this forum.
I too have long since been disenchanted with the concept of "natural rights." I was a rank-and-file Natural Rightsist (not a proper term, I know) for a while, mostly until I saw one of Len Budney's posts on the old Austrian Forum, paraphrasing, "and I think man 'discovering' a rights-based ethical system in nature to be not much more than a philosophical pipe dream." (Those last three words are verbatim.) That one simple post sent me on a torrent of exploration. And now, I agree.
Much to everyone's irritation, I'm sure, I won't go into why I think this is so. Suffice it to say that I've read lots of natural rights-based ebooks, articles, whatever, and also read Rollins' The Myth of Natural Rights several months ago. I compared the ideas of both with the ideas I'd already held from the Christian religion, which I considered myself a part of at the time but subsequently rejected (yet I've still found no reason to reject Jesus...odd), and concluded that natural rights were an inordinately silly concept. I apologize if that offends some people.
One of the keys to my denial of natural rights was found in a book called Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics, which I've brought up here on this forum before, much to the sound of crickets and heavy sighs. In it, the author suggests a denial of the "law" of identity, which, however it may sound, is not itself meant to be a denial of logic as such (non-contradiction and excluded middle are maintained). It holds instead that this law of identity itself is illogical in application.
I felt so strongly about this book's conclusions that I typed out the first few chapters in PDF form so that others could read it. And though the small introduction almost certainly won't convince everyone by itself (I expect it to be misinterpreted, as I misinterpreted the thesis several times myself even after reading nearly the whole book and sitting on it for a few months), if it piques anyone's interest, I'd recommend buying the book.
Once again, I offer no further explanation for my views than already given, as I've now moved so far out into left field that I expect to make no progress at all on "interweb arguments yay," even with intelligent people like you fine folks.
If mentioning all this leads some, as it led me, toward some revving of the curiosity engine, then I'm satisfied with that.
Science and Sanity - Book I, Part I:http://www.mediafire.com/?jmnjmummi1e
"Melody is a form of remembrance. It must have a quality of inevitability in our ears." - Gian Carlo Menotti
Dynamix:In it, the author suggests a denial of the "law" of identity, which, however it may sound, is not itself meant to be a denial of logic as such
If it quacks like a duck...
Dynamix:(non-contradiction and excluded middle are maintained).
These are dependent upon the Law of Identity. All of logic depends upon it, and therefore all of thought too.
Dynamix:It holds instead that this law of identity itself is illogical in application.
Only if you don't know what you're doing.
I was a natural rights guy for a while but now I'm starting to question their existence and move toward amoralism.
Let's get one thing clear though, the burden of proof is on the moralist. Even when I was a natural rights kinda guy I never thought it was anything but a human construct but I used it because I thought it was an advantageous human construct. Now I'm starting to think that morality as a whole is a damaging construct, close to as damaging, disgusting, and ridiculous as the constructs of race, the state, god, etc.
I think people act because of their own egoistic reasons no matter what moral reasons they give. Furthermore, I think it is psychologically unhealthy to tell yourself that you are doing something for any reason than an egoistic one. I've personally felt better since giving up morality and acting purely by my ego (and I haven't had the desire to go out and kill people or do anything that would violate the imaginary human construct of natural rights).
I think there is room to talk about justice, fairness etc. without bringing morality in the picture; and I think things will be better if people stop kidding about why they do things by saying it's for "morality."
I'll admit that I'm not nearly as well versed in philosophy as many of you. But what I don't even understand what it could possibly mean that "natural rights," "exist." I can't reach out and touch them.
majevska:I think there is room to talk about justice, fairness etc. without bringing morality in the picture; and I think things will be better if people stop kidding about why they do things by saying it's for "morality."
This makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. Justice and fairness are moral concepts.
majevska:I'll admit that I'm not nearly as well versed in philosophy as many of you. But what I don't even understand what it could possibly mean that "natural rights," "exist." I can't reach out and touch them.
This is a straw man objection. Nobody would argue rights are some material thing out there that can be touched. That's just silly. And only a modern day Platonist would even say they are "out there" at all. They are normative principles grounded in human nature. There's nothing mystical about it. It's a naturalist ethics. See here for starters.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche: majevska:I think there is room to talk about justice, fairness etc. without bringing morality in the picture; and I think things will be better if people stop kidding about why they do things by saying it's for "morality." This makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. Justice and fairness are moral concepts. majevska:I'll admit that I'm not nearly as well versed in philosophy as many of you. But what I don't even understand what it could possibly mean that "natural rights," "exist." I can't reach out and touch them. This is a straw man objection. Nobody would argue rights are some material thing out there that can be touched. That's just silly. And only a modern day Platonist would even say they are "out there" at all. They are normative principles grounded in human nature. There's nothing mystical about it. It's a naturalist ethics. See here for starters.
Justice and fairness have multiple definitions. In my dictionary, one of the definitions for fairness is "free from favoritism or bias; impartial" (this says nothing about the morality of fairness or impartiality); another one says, "consistent with rules, logic, or ethics," (I would throw out the part about ethics in this instance). Justice also doesn't necessarily refer to morality. Perhaps we could throw out the words "fairness" and "justice" what I mean is dispute resolution in a manner that would be beneficial to me and others.
My supposed straw man was actually supposed to be a question: "in what sense do natural rights exist." I know you don't believe that they're corporeal.
I read most of the piece you sent and have some objections but am too lazy to type them now. It's almost 2am and I need to get up early. gnite
majevska:Justice and fairness have multiple definitions. In my dictionary, one of the definitions for fairness is "free from favoritism or bias; impartial" (this says nothing about the morality of fairness or impartiality); another one says, "consistent with rules, logic, or ethics," (I would throw out the part about ethics in this instance). Justice also doesn't necessarily refer to morality. Perhaps we could throw out the words "fairness" and "justice" what I mean is dispute resolution in a manner that would be beneficial to me and others.
Justice is a moral and legal concept. Necessarily so.
As for fairness, it may mean other things in other contexts, like rules or logic but you can't just arbitrarily throw out ethics. The way you used it and will inevitably use it when discussing social, political and legal matters will involve morality.
Even with the question of what would be beneficial to you or others, you can't escape morality. Read the Veatch excerpts I posted earlier.
Now I'm starting to think that morality as a whole is a damaging construct, close to as damaging, disgusting, and ridiculous as the constructs of race, the state, god, etc.
You act as though it abused your fragile little psyche... apart from assertions that morality is a human construct, I see little of substance. Justice &c. are moral concepts. They make no sense apart from it.
As for denying the law of identity, that'd mean any argument denying it isn't an argument denying it, as something now isn't something that it is, and vice versa. Wow, profound.
If rights exist it would be impossible to "violate" them.
The fact that I can infringe on someone's "natural rights" negates them. It would be UN-natural to violate these rights, and if I can, am I not natural. So if I am unnatural, what am I, a ghost. Using such terms as unnatural and natural leads to circular logic. Hence to make it easier, I would say "rights" don't exist.
Jon Irenicus: You act as though it abused your fragile little psyche... apart from assertions that morality is a human construct, I see little of substance. Justice &c. are moral concepts. They make no sense apart from it. -Jon
And that moral concept of "justice" has been used for otherwise immoral actions such as for the white race to pursue "justice" for itself, by killing Jews, which poisoned the white race. When's the last time a horrific event was started by an appeal to relative immorality on behalf of those who started it?
Andrew: If rights exist it would be impossible to "violate" them. The fact that I can infringe on someone's "natural rights" negates them. It would be UN-natural to violate these rights, and if I can, am I not natural. So if I am unnatural, what am I, a ghost. Using such terms as unnatural and natural leads to circular logic. Hence to make it easier, I would say "rights" don't exist.
Amateur mistake. You're confusing normative principles with the laws of physics.