What we need are institutions that are neither statist nor capitalist. Both of these involve hierarchy, subordination, and the centralization of power and decision-making authority in the hands of a small few; which is then wielded against the many.
We need institutions that are entirely 1) voluntary, 2) cooperative, and 3) participatory
The reason you cannot transfer title to your entire body is because the decision-making agent that transfers title would have to go with that body.
Which has nothing to do with changing you mind about a sale. You can change your mind about selling a car, that doesn't make eforcing your sale of a car "aggression". Rothbard confuses "is (or isn't [possible] in this case) with "ought" (or ought not to be done in this case), so do you in your description of what you call self-ownership. Get it? Description. Because your explanation is descriptive, not normative.
Abandoning the concept of self-ownership is a contradiction in fact. Self-ownership denotes control. If you do not self-own, you do not self-control.
Control doesn't imply property, being that it can be recognizes as just possession.
Papirius:The discussion has become basically irrelevant to me now, being that I am rejecting the notion of self-ownership. I had some discussion with some people who like rationality about a couple of points. First is about selfownership validate organ donation but not slavery. Being that I have a starting preference to liberty and not to property, I've used slavery as something of a lackmus test of ethical ideas, being that what Hoppe call "self-ownership" is so obvious, and it's self-refuting to try and justify people owning other people being it is an apriori of argumentation to accept the opposite, and something can be justified only by argumentation. Self-ownership is obvious when pointed to the question of whether someone has the right to take your organs without your permisson with the answer "Of course not, you own yourself". But if I can transfer the title (sell, give as a gift) to pieces of my body (implied to be the self) like blood, semen, eggs, organs, it is consistent with that that I can transfer the title to my entire body to someone and that contract to be eforceable. That kind of theory that justifies slavery hardly deserves a name connected to liberty.
What do you find so wrong, distasteful, etc. about a person transferring the title to his entire body to someone else?
Papirius:The point is in a second consideration about why is the apriori norm of argumentation of "respecting other people's exclusive use of their body" taken to imply property; which we discussed. In the light of some thoughts about homesteading principle being an unjustified addition to the labor theory of property (which I mentioned in the beggining of this post) recognising self-ownership of other people does not follow from the APoA of respecting their exclusive use of their bodies, recognising their "self-possession". This poses a question of whether if any property can be justified to exist, on which I have to ponder some more, and talk about with my friends..
Are you just redefining "ownership" to mean "possession"? Or what?
You stated earlier that you think people are entitled to the product of their labor. That implies to me that you think people have more than just the right to use themselves - logically you must think they also have the right to the fruit(s) of their self-use. So the only question remaining is whether you think people have the right to give up, or abandon, their rights to self-use and the fruit(s) of their self-use.
The keyboard is mightier than the gun.
Non parit potestas ipsius auctoritatem.
Voluntaryism Forum
You stated earlier that you think people are entitled to the product of their labor.
It is logical that if people own themeselves that they should own the products of their labor, but as I said, I've realized that self-ownership isn't justified, so I reject it, and now don't see how is property justified to come into being.
There's really only three options when it comes to self ownership.
1. Either everyone owns themselves 100%, or
2. Some people own parts of other people but are not themselves owned by those others, the sort of master/slave scenario, which we'd call unequal ownership of others, or
3. Everyone owns an equal share in everyone.
Point 2 is logically inconsistent, since we're looking for a universal principle. Point 3, which it seems you, Papirius, is leaning towards, would have disastrous outcomes if taken to its logical extremes. For, if everyone needed everyone's permission to do anything, that would be impossible to actually achieve and mankind would do nothing and soon perish.
Furthermore, if we then say that, by extension, everyone owns everything, including all the physical property in the universe, then what results in fact is point 2, because everyone cannot control everything, and so control is always eventually handed to a few 'political oligarchs' or the like, meaning a few people still end up acting as if they controlled something as an owner more than others, which is point 2. The left-socialists, in their continual misapprehension of the concept of property, are guilty of pushing point three and allowing it continually to devolve into point 2. But only point 1 can be achieved in reality.
Indeed, the only logical and factual scenario is point 1, everyone owns themselves completely and no one else, and taken to its ultimate extremes means pure libertarianism.
(There is a fourth possibility, though unachievable in fact, where we could say no one owns anything, but such would be a denial that any individual can even control themselves, and anyone attempting to put forth such a statement would disprove it by the very act of speaking.)
As a fact of reality, man controls himself and is thereby a self-owner completely. If humankind were a partial or shared owner in everyone, reality would've made humankind with something like a hive-mind that would reflect that reality. Resistance would be futile.
False trilemma, because it deals with only the concept of property. Argumentation ethics show that right to exclusive use of one's body is an axiom. But that doesn't imply ownership, it can imply possession. Right to possession is in most basic sense- right to exclusive use of something during that use.
where we could say no one owns anything, but such would be a denial that any individual can even control themselves
Non sequitur. You can have the right to exclusive use something without owning it- right to possession.
people own the product of what they own.
if people work with material that someone else owns, the owner owns the result and the worker gets paid compensation and both have agreed apon this deal.
Papirius:It is logical that if people own themeselves that they should own the products of their labor, but as I said, I've realized that self-ownership isn't justified, so I reject it, and now don't see how is property justified to come into being.
Let me ask you this - do you use the term "justified" as a synonym of "legitimate"? Or do you use it as a synonym of "logically valid"? Or both? Or neither?
I ask this because I don't think one has to engage in logical argumentation in order to consider something to be legitimate - but he does have to engage in logical argumentation in order to evaluate its logical validity.
Anyways, if you don't think any ownership is legitimate, then you logically wouldn't think that self-ownership is legitimate. So the question to me now is why you don't think any ownership is legitimate.
Thank you for that description of capitalism devoid of any argument for it's justficiation.
Let me ask you this - do you use the term "justified" as a synonym of "legitimate"? Or do you use it as a synonym of "logically valid"? Or both?
I'd here say that justified, legitimate and logically sound are synonyms.
if you don't think any ownership is legitimate, then you logically wouldn't think that self-ownership is legitimate.
As I said, I have rejected self-ownership, and with it the concept of ownership that was justified as something that follows from it. Why are you making me repeat myself? Your trolling / mental impairment is just shown on more examples not be a matter of my opinion but a fact.
So the question to me now is why you don't think any ownership is legitimate.
It's justifications have failed.
If ownership or property is always illegitimate, then do you believe the only legitimate society is one of anarchistic chaos? That is, anyone can take from others whenever they please?
The only one worth following is the one who leads... not the one who pulls; for it is not the direction that condemns the puller, it is the rope that he holds.
If ownership or property is always illegitimate
It is illegitimate in a state of nature, i.e. it is not shown to be an ethical fact. Maybe it is, I'd need to hear some arguments in favor that, but aren't seem to be any.
then do you believe the only legitimate society is one of anarchistic chaos? That is, anyone can take from others whenever they please?
It is legitimate for people to construct a stateless social contract where they agree to respect each other's property in whatever form they decide to define it (as long it doesn't conflict with [/allows violation of] right to possession, which is an ethical fact).
Ahh, I think I see what you're getting at. So essentially, you haven't been shown a satisfactory argument for property. While you find it legitimate for a stateless society to set up property rights (let's say defined as how Rothbard defines it, but it doesn't matter which definition is used, so long as the society voluntarily agrees to said definition) and essentially have anarcho-capitalism be the rule in such a society. Or it would be legitimate to have just anarchistic chaos, as it is in Nature? As in, you find it equally legitimate for people to "steal" or "murder" since self-ownership or property are not ethical facts? Am I right, in understanding you? If not, could you elaborate. If I am, tell me, which do you prefer?
So essentially, you haven't been shown a satisfactory argument for property.
Yes. Hoppe's argument, which I've accepted, has been shown to be invalid and thus unsound, being that self-ownership is a non-sequitur to the a priori of argumentation that states that people must respect other people's exclusive use of their bodies.
hile you find it legitimate for a stateless society to set up property rights (let's say defined as how Rothbard defines it, but it doesn't matter which definition is used, so long as the society voluntarily agrees to said definition) and essentially have anarcho-capitalism be the rule in such a society.
Yes, but that would be a preference. Not something you can argument as right, ethical, moral, but something you have to convice people around you that they should like it enough to insitite it instead of any other social contract.
r it would be legitimate to have just anarchistic chaos, as it is in Nature? As in, you find it equally legitimate for people to "steal" or "murder" since self-ownership or property are not ethical facts?
Self-possession invalidates mured or assault as well as theft (theft being taking of something that is used without the consent of the user), this an apriori fact of ethics as shown by argumentation ethics.
its justified because its consentual and voluntary.
The main problem with Papirius is that he has very little foundation in philosophy. In another thread, Papirius stated his belief that there are objective morals. Now, while this is sometimes a position held by some philosophers with an advanced understanding of philosophy, Papirius holds this belief without having any foundation in philosophy. This is clear because of his complete misunderstanding of various nihilist beliefs.
Furthermore, it is clear that Papirius does not understand the object and subject relationship. Subjects value things. Objects do not value things. While people can be treated as objects, they are also subjects. But morals are never subjects. Morals do not value things. Subjects are required for value to exist. Value exists in the mind of subjects. This is what subjective means.
Papirius is claiming that there are objective values. When examined closely, we see that this is a nonsensical statement. Sure, I can anthropomorphize various objects, but in reality these objects do not actually become subjects. The concept of killing being right or wrong requires subjects to value one way or the other. Objectively, all we can say is that A killed B or that C considers the killing of B to be wrong. But the value that A killing B is wrong requires a subject.
I'm just repeating myself at this point. But it is clear that Papirius is not familiar with the concepts of subject and object, at least not in a philosophical sense. Grammatically he seems to be fine.
Next, we have his absurd definitions of property and possession. Again, in the other thread (What is Property), Papirius makes a claim that property is a social convention but that his concept of possession right is not a social convention. Just to be clear, this is an exact quote:
Papirius: I don't see any rational defense of property as a fact of ethics, therefore in the state of nature, you have possessions only of the things you use. The moment you abandon them, you have waived your right to possession (/to exclusive use), and it can be then used by anyone else. Any other way of things to happen would have to be by a convention among people who would agree on a centain period of a possibility for you to continue to use something, or would agree to accept the concept of property and then respect each other's property.
I don't see any rational defense of property as a fact of ethics, therefore in the state of nature, you have possessions only of the things you use. The moment you abandon them, you have waived your right to possession (/to exclusive use), and it can be then used by anyone else. Any other way of things to happen would have to be by a convention among people who would agree on a centain period of a possibility for you to continue to use something, or would agree to accept the concept of property and then respect each other's property.
Somehow we are supposed to believe that rights are not social conventions. Again, this is a total misunderstanding of what rights are. Rights are about who is acting in the right in any given situation. Likewise, when someone does not have a right to do something, we can say that if he were to do that thing, he would be acting in the wrong. We also use the terms rightfully and wrongfully to describe these ideas.
Any right of any kind is either a social convention or an opinion as to what that convention ought to be. The only objective way to talk about rights is to describe the reality of what is going on. In America, you have a right to property (I jest, we know that this is only partially true). Someone like Papirius claims that you do not have a right to property. The second claim is categorically different from the first. The first claim is a description of reality. The second is Papirius' belief as to what ought to be the case.
What he does is try to claim that somehow his claim is objectively true. I direct everyone to the first half of my post where I discuss the difference between subject and object. Like objective morals, any claim about objective rights is nonsensical upon examination. "Acting rightfully" cannot value anything. The action "kill" does not value anything. People value actions one way or the other. Papirius believes that it is wrong to have a right of exclusion regarding an object that you are not personally using at that moment.
Read that sentence again.
Notice how that sentence only makes sense when we have a subject doing the believing. Now insert an object into that sentence. It can be any object, whether it is shoe or measure or property or possession. Possession believes that it is wrong to have a right of exclusion regarding an object that you are not personally using at that moment.
In logical or imaginary space, anthropomorphizing objects can be understood. I can understand a concept of death being a person with a scythe. But in physical space, these types of statements are nonsense.
The main problem with Papirius is that he has very little foundation in philosophy
You saying it doesn't make it so.
This is clear because of his complete misunderstanding of various nihilist beliefs.
"Moral nihilism (also known as ethical nihilism or amoralism) is the meta-ethical view that nothing is intrinsically moral or immoral. For example, a moral nihilist would say that killing someone, for whatever reason, is neither inherently right nor inherently wrong. Moral nihilists consider morality to be constructed, a complex set of rules and recommendations that may give a psychological, social, or economical advantage to its adherents, but is otherwise without universal or even relative truth in any sense."
Papirius is claiming that there are objective values.
Quote that statement of mine.
The concept of killing being right or wrong requires subjects to value one way or the other.
It doesn't. Neigher does the the concept of murder (which is somewhat a normative concept, whereas killing is descriptive).
in the other thread (What is Property), Papirius makes a claim that property is a social convention but that his concept of possession right is not a social convention.
Argumentation ethics show a priori, value-free, ethical axiom that consists in "respecting other people's exclusive use of their bodies", but Hoppe makes a non-sequitur in labeling that a right to property over oneself (/one's body), because it can simply be a right to possession. A question then arises of how property in external things can come into being. With accepting self-ownership it was property of self (/body) -> property of one's labor -> property over one's product of labor. But being that property of self goes out the window, how can possession of self produce property, and not just possessions in external things.