Again, I contend that it may in fact be ethical to violate someone's self-ownership, but that will only occur when there is a telelogical suspension of the ethical. When that telelogical suspenion occurs is unknowable to us though and regardless of whether or not it is ethical, violation of self-ownership creates a material deficiency with the one violated and that violation should be repayed.
Agreed.
-Jon
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Trianglechoke7: Take donny's example. How could you not steal the boat from the man in order to save the child? Not only would I steal it, but if I had to go to court over it I would argue that he should not be compensated in any way, and I should not be punished in any way. That is my intuition.
Take donny's example. How could you not steal the boat from the man in order to save the child? Not only would I steal it, but if I had to go to court over it I would argue that he should not be compensated in any way, and I should not be punished in any way. That is my intuition.
And the jury would mostly likely agree with you. Good reason to have jury nullification, I suppose.
Suppose there was a world where noone would have to act to survive, everything is just available at the blink of an eye, so how many socialists, capitalists, environmentalists, bees, flies, humans, would engage in barter?
In short, the whole thought experiment is a fallacy. If you suppose something that is not existent -like the famous teacan that orbits around the sun- you can not prove anything. It is just absurd. Exaggeration does not change the basic principles at all.
The non-aggression principle holds as long as there is no paradies and if there is one it becomes obsolet.
Does that make sense?
In the begining there was nothing, and it exploded.
Terry Pratchett (on the big bang theory)
Would you kill the holder if necessary?
nhaag: Suppose there was a world where noone would have to act to survive, everything is just available at the blink of an eye, so how many socialists, capitalists, environmentalists, bees, flies, humans, would engage in barter? In short, the whole thought experiment is a fallacy. If you suppose something that is not existent -like the famous teacan that orbits around the sun- you can not prove anything. It is just absurd. Exaggeration does not change the basic principles at all. The non-aggression principle holds as long as there is no paradies and if there is one it becomes obsolet. Does that make sense?
No. More realistic examples have been given such as the boat example. It's not hard to come up with them. Hiding from them doesn't solve anything.
In order for the NAP to be some absolute universal truth, you would have to take the position that it would be wrong to save the guy's life. If you are not willing to take that position, then you must admit that the NAP is not an absolute. You cannot say that it is right to save the guy's life and that NAP is an absolute. That would be a contradiction because NAP says it's wrong to save the guy's life. It doesn't get any more basic than this. So far, I have not seen this refuted. I've seen avoidance and obfuscation but I have not seen this refuted.
NAP is defeated as an absolute until someone takes the position that it is wrong to save the guy's life and can defend that position. If there are no takers then, NAP remains defeated as an absolute. It doesn't mean NAP is a bad thing or shouldn't be used, it just means it's not an absolute and really I thought that was always common sense.
The boat example? Well Rothbard, I think it was him... yes he was, explained the libertarian view on that pretty clear, so please look it up.
gigaplex:NAP is defeated as an absolute until someone takes the position that it is wrong to save the guy's life and can defend that position. If there are no takers then, NAP remains defeated as an absolute. It doesn't mean NAP is a bad thing or shouldn't be used, it just means it's not an absolute and really I thought that was always common sense.
The problem is, giga, that intellectuals, such as those found here, are actually more comfortable being hypocrites in the system they espouse than they are having a less settled and simplistic system. Being a bunch of talkers who like to give snappy answers on forums and such, the response, "I don't know, I'd have to think about it" is just unacceptable to them. They want to appear knowledgeable and principled, the things they, as intellectuals, value in people.
But seriously, I love you guys. I dis on you a lot, but I hang around because the level of discussion really is high. I'm just saying, on this one, you're full of it. I did a thread just like this one awhile ago, and it pretty much came back to the same thing: everyone believes in the NAP, but noone would follow it in a situation where it was truly tested.
Giles, the problem of resistance to punishment is not isolated to this example; it is involved in any view which acknowledges that force may be used in some instances in order to enforce justice.
Niccolo, would you mind directing me to Kierkegaard's discussion of the suspension of the ethical? I'm not sure that this example strikes me as such a situation, but I'd want to read exactly what Kierkegaard has to say about this sort of thing, since I've only heard about the idea from other people.
Nhaag, could you also direct me to the passage you're talking about? I made up the boat example myself, so it would be pretty interesting to discover that Rothbard had already written about it!
Folsom, as one of those intellectuals, I take offense to that! Actually, I don't think the problem you've cited is endemic to moral or political philosophers so much as people who aren't actually moral or political philosophers, but who have read certain works in those disciplines and believe that they therefore know the Truth of the matter. Within the community of intellectuals who actually deal with these sorts of questions, you'll find a whole lot less certainty than you tend to on these message boards, and for good reason: these questions aren't simple! What this example illustrates is a scenario in which two of our deepest-held values are in direct conflict with each other. On one hand, the boat owner is acting despicably, and the consequence of that action, if force is not used, will be the death of a child, which would be extremely regrettable. So we feel a very strong desire to do something to save the child, and we are mortified by the boat-owner's callousness. But on the other hand, we are faced with a situation where saving the child would require us to infringe upon the self-determination and property claims of the boat-owner, both of which he most certainly has a right to. Accordingly, we should feel conflicted. Does the significance of the negative consequences of inaction constitute a morally weighty enough reason to infringe on the rights of the boat owner? Some people would say yes, and others would say no. But I would argue that we don't have a very good way to determine which of these is correct, since libertarian philosophy has no solid theory which deals with this question (implausible "you can never do anything like that ever!" and "you can do whatever you want as long as you compensate the victims" theories aside).
Donny, I actually don't think the boat example is that controvertial. I think a vast majority of people would, if it were the only factor restraining them, violate the man's property rights to save the boy. The actual expressed morality of humans (one might even say, the inherent [!] morality) seems to be unambiguously in that direction. Words are nice, but actions speak louder.
JCFolsom: The problem is, giga, that intellectuals, such as those found here, are actually more comfortable being hypocrites in the system they espouse than they are having a less settled and simplistic system. Being a bunch of talkers who like to give snappy answers on forums and such, the response, "I don't know, I'd have to think about it" is just unacceptable to them. They want to appear knowledgeable and principled, the things they, as intellectuals, value in people.
Well, certainly not all intellectuals, but yeah, I've seen the type. So apparently, the fear of not having an answer outweighs the fear of being a hypocrite for them. Unfortunately, it does not result in the person looking intelligent or knowledgeable and makes anarchism less convincing since you see a clear hypocricy and have to assume there may be other hypocricies if this one is allowed.Maybe what the NAP absoluters are missing is that you don't really lose anything when you admit the NAP is not absolute. Few ever believed it was anyway. It only made ancap harder to accept since everyone intuitively knew that it was not an absolute. People aren't usually convinced of ancap by moral argument alone, anyway, as Donny likes to remind us. They need the practical side. Once they get the practical side, it seems like the rest almost falls into place automatically.So really, NAP absoluters, you just need to let go.
Trianglechoke7:I do not understand kingmonkey's criticism that all I have shown is that it is not impossible to act against the NAP. Obviously it is not impossible, physically or logically, to act against the principle. What I am trying to show is that there are situations in which initiating force is not morally wrong, and therefore, NAP, which states, "it is NEVER ok to use force except in self-defense," is false.
There are NO situations -- zero, zip, zlitch, nada, bupkis -- were you will ever find it morally right to violate the rights and property of another UNLESS it is for self-defense against an AGGRESSOR. The man dying on a mountain is a sad situation indeed but that does not give his friends the right to steal something from someone else that might save his life. It is no more morally right to steal from the owner of the transporter than it is to let the man die. Only the property owner has the right to decide how their property is going to be used even in life boat situations where lives are at stake.
As asked by others how far are you willing to go to save this mans life? Theft? Assault? Murder? Fine. Go ahead and take the transporter. But when you steal that transporter from its owner, assault him and/or possibly murder him you could and should be held liable for your actions. If in the course of stealing that mans property you end up pushing him off the mountain then you and everyone responsible should be tried for murder, convicted, and executed for justice to be served.
The non-aggression principle is absolute, it is definite, it is unbendable. You do NOT, under ANY circumstance, have the right to violate another persons rights or property, UNLESS and this is the only exception, it is for SELF-DEFENSE against an AGGRESSOR.
If you try to steal that transporter from its owner he has the right to pull out a pistol and shoot you dead to protect his property and his life. The would be thieves are the aggressors not the man who refuses to allow them to use his transporter.
I know people want to use the emotional argument that "oh, but this man would have DIED if we didn't knock that guy out and take his transporter!" but that does not prove that the NAP is false. All it proves is that you are a criminal and should be punished for your crimes.
"It does not require a majority to prevail, but rather an irate, tireless minority keen to set brush fires in people's minds. " -- Samuel Adams.
gigaplex:In order for the NAP to be some absolute universal truth, you would have to take the position that it would be wrong to save the guy's life. If you are not willing to take that position, then you must admit that the NAP is not an absolute. You cannot say that it is right to save the guy's life and that NAP is an absolute. That would be a contradiction because NAP says it's wrong to save the guy's life. It doesn't get any more basic than this. So far, I have not seen this refuted. I've seen avoidance and obfuscation but I have not seen this refuted.
Bad argument. It can be right to try to save someone's life but wrong to aggress against anyone in the process. As Socrates would say, it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it.
Yours in liberty,Geoffrey Allan Plauché, Ph.D.Adjunct Instructor, Buena Vista UniversityWebmaster, LibertarianStandard.comFounder / Executive Editor, Prometheusreview.com
I'm not an intellectual by any means but anarcho-capitalism is very simple and easy to understand. It all rest on property and the non-aggression principle.
1) My property is my property and I alone have the right to decide how it is used.
2) You do not have the right to violate my property, no matter the situation or the excuse, and if you do I have the right to protect my property with violence if need be.
That's not very difficult to understand.
Your argument based off of emotions does nothing to disprove the NAP as being absolute. All it shows is that there are situation were you are willing to violate the rights and property of another. But justice demands that when you violate another's property, even for a good and noble reason, you ought to be punished for your crime. Unless, of course, the person whose rights you violated decides to forgive your transgression, which is totally and completely their right.
There is no hypocracy there. It's very consistent. Very absolute.
So, monkey, are you saying then that you would not take the transporter? Because, you are in the vast minority, if that is so. Also, you would be in the vast minority of people who would convict someone for doing so. And, I wonder, what is the value of a morality that almost no one will follow? Seems kinda silly to me.
The non-aggression principle does not argue that it is wrong to save the mans life. It argues that it is wrong to violate the property of the owner of that transporter. No one would say that when given the chance to save a life it would be wrong to do so. But if in the course of saving that persons life you aggressed against another person you MUST be held accountable for your actions. That is what the NAP is dealing with -- aggression. You aggressed against his property, even if it was for a just and noble reason. You are a criminal, even though you saved the mans life. You must be held accountable for your crime.
To declare that there are situations where aggression against an innocent person is justifiable for good and noble reason opens the world up for any number of tyrannies. If we "absoluters" conceed that the NAP is not absolute then we must also agree that at times conscription, theft, enslavement, murder, assault, spying, etc., etc. all have excusable reasons for their existing. If the NAP is not absolute then the government stealing from me in the form of taxes, then conscripting me into military service and shipping me to some region of the world were people are being butchered by their own government is justifiable. We must also conceed then, that the state has the right to spy on me, assault me and jail me indefinitely if I should actively campaign agaisnt their war to stop, say, the government of the Congo from murdering its people. In essence, if the NAP is NOT absolute then the existence of the state is justifiable and you actually have no rights except those the state allows you to have.
JCFolsom:I think a case-by-case basis is exactly how it should be considered, and to wish to do otherwise is mere intellectual laziness.
Life as we know it would come to a standstill if we have to re-think every issue every time we take an action. Consider it a limitation of being imperfect humans. Do you have to think who's in the wrong if you see a man pointing a gun at a convenience store clerk? Even if you think there's the slight possibility that he's engaged in self-defense or is otherwise in the right, the chances are very good that he's an aggressor/robber.
Of course, it's possible that you might have a secondary rule or principle that says it would be better to disarm him and avoid anybody getting shot until more information can be discovered to consider the issue in greater detail. Naturally, this is a dramatic, less common example, and considering it after the fact could well guide you in future similar events.
More common examples are the very things we don't think about very much. Do you have to worry about being an initiator of force every time you buy a newspaper or magazine? Do you worry about violating the NAP when you play a rough sport like football? Do you worry about what harm you may be causing every time you eat fried chicken?
This is not to say that we should never reconsider our principles, only that we don't need to reconsider them all the time. We need a reason, such as an uncommon event, or a persuasive argument, to make us think twice about them.
JCFolsom: So, monkey, are you saying then that you would not take the transporter? Because, you are in the vast minority, if that is so. Also, you would be in the vast minority of people who would convict someone for doing so. And, I wonder, what is the value of a morality that almost no one will follow? Seems kinda silly to me.
Well, yes of course I would take the transporter. And yes, if I was in a jury I would convict someone for doing so. So I suppose I would be in the minority there. Just because the "majority" would do it doesn't make it right. That's like saying if the "majority" thought it was ok to burn Jews at the stake then it would be ok. I mean, what is the value of a morality that almost no one will follow, right?
kingmonkey: JCFolsom: So, monkey, are you saying then that you would not take the transporter? Because, you are in the vast minority, if that is so. Also, you would be in the vast minority of people who would convict someone for doing so. And, I wonder, what is the value of a morality that almost no one will follow? Seems kinda silly to me. Well, yes of course I would take the transporter. And yes, if I was in a jury I would convict someone for doing so. So I suppose I would be in the minority there. Just because the "majority" would do it doesn't make it right. That's like saying if the "majority" thought it was ok to burn Jews at the stake then it would be ok. I mean, what is the value of a morality that almost no one will follow, right?
Not that this justifies aggression, but the aggressor in this case probably wouldn't be looking at anything more than having to pay a little restitution. We're not talking about long prison terms or harsh retributive punishment here. Meanwhile, the reputation of the transporter/boat owner will probably suffer and this could have major effects on his daily life, business/empoyment, etc.
macsnafu:Life as we know it would come to a standstill if we have to re-think every issue every time we take an action. Consider it a limitation of being imperfect humans.
Nonsense. Life would not come to a standstill. Honestly, how often are we really faced with terrible moral dillemas? I know I don't deal with them that often. Again I say, only large institutions need to work by principles and rules, because they are inefficient and removed from the actual situation. I am actually fortunate enough to never have had to take something by force to help another, but if such a situation were to occur, I would have to make a decision based on the best information I had at the time.
kingmonkey:Well, yes of course I would take the transporter. And yes, if I was in a jury I would convict someone for doing so.
See, I don't get that. I think it makes you a bad, hypocritical, and self-righteous *** if you punish someone for doing something you yourself would do. It's just ridiculous. Your head has apparently clamped down so tightly on this NAP idea that you've squeezed your brain out your ears. It doesn't make sense, it borders on madness. Do as I say, not as I do, or I'll send you to prison. What a load of crap!
JCFolsom: macsnafu:Life as we know it would come to a standstill if we have to re-think every issue every time we take an action. Consider it a limitation of being imperfect humans. Nonsense. Life would not come to a standstill. Honestly, how often are we really faced with terrible moral dillemas? I know I don't deal with them that often. Again I say, only large institutions need to work by principles and rules, because they are inefficient and removed from the actual situation. I am actually fortunate enough to never have had to take something by force to help another, but if such a situation were to occur, I would have to make a decision based on the best information I had at the time.
Agreed. Moreover, we're constantly judging how to apply general moral principles to particular circumstances every day. Moral principles, including rights, are not some exhaustive rationalist list of rules that can be applied the same way in every situation by anyone regardless of context.
JCFolsom: kingmonkey:Well, yes of course I would take the transporter. And yes, if I was in a jury I would convict someone for doing so. See, I don't get that. I think it makes you a bad, hypocritical, and self-righteous *** if you punish someone for doing something you yourself would do. It's just ridiculous. Your head has apparently clamped down so tightly on this NAP idea that you've squeezed your brain out your ears. It doesn't make sense, it borders on madness. Do as I say, not as I do, or I'll send you to prison. What a load of crap!
I think he's saying he would expect to be penalized too, if he did it, and would accept the penalty.
gigaplex: In order for the NAP to be some absolute universal truth, you would have to take the position that it would be wrong to save the guy's life. If you are not willing to take that position, then you must admit that the NAP is not an absolute. You cannot say that it is right to save the guy's life and that NAP is an absolute. That would be a contradiction because NAP says it's wrong to save the guy's life. It doesn't get any more basic than this. So far, I have not seen this refuted. I've seen avoidance and obfuscation but I have not seen this refuted. NAP is defeated as an absolute until someone takes the position that it is wrong to save the guy's life and can defend that position. If there are no takers then, NAP remains defeated as an absolute. It doesn't mean NAP is a bad thing or shouldn't be used, it just means it's not an absolute and really I thought that was always common sense.
Another fallacy. As always when morale and rights intermix. The NAP states that it is a crime to start aggression against another party. Now a crime is not a moral entity (what is good and what is bad), but it is a violation of anothers right and voilation of rights means the aggressed has the right to get compensation. So taking the position that NAP is an absolute right - which it is as it gives the aggressed the absolute right to have him replaced into the state he was before the aggression took place - does not a bit force me to say it is right or worng in a moral sense to save the guys life. It only means, that if i agress against the owner of your cool device,I am commiting a crime. Yet, remember, a crime in the libertarian sense does not have a moral dimension.
So yes, if i choose to act in that way, i have commited a crime against the guy with the gadget and he has a right to be compensated for my crime. Isn't that easy?
So NAP is an abslute right, but rights are not moral categories in any way. Something is not right or wrong, because I believe it to be ethical to act in a certain way.
Bottomline, if I have to commit a crime to survive, the buck stops here, and I might cmmit that crime, but it has consequences.
Again the fallacy is to intermix property rights with morality and ethics.
Does that make sense and refute the claim?
JCFolsom:Honestly, how often are we really faced with terrible moral dillemas? I know I don't deal with them that often.
That's exactly my point. We don't think about the morality of everyday occurrences every time they occur. It's only when we are faced with some kind of extreme situation that our ordinary rules and principles may not be enough to guide us.
nhaag:Now a crime is not a moral entity (what is good and what is bad),
I think that's debatable. If (real) crimes are not immoral and (just) laws don't have a moral basis, then what is the basis of law? Why should laws protect libertarian rights? Why should people respect rights? Is it not wrong/immoral to violate rights intentionally? Typically the stark separation of ethics and law that you propose is a mark of legal positivism, which is not conducive to libertarianism.
Well, if he thinks he did something wrong for which he would accept punishment, why would he do it in the first place? Clearly, because he did it, he thought it was the right thing to do. Since when should you be punished for doing the right thing?
macsnafu: JCFolsom:Honestly, how often are we really faced with terrible moral dillemas? I know I don't deal with them that often. That's exactly my point. We don't think about the morality of everyday occurrences every time they occur. It's only when we are faced with some kind of extreme situation that our ordinary rules and principles may not be enough to guide us.
While I disagree that we don't make contextual moral judgments everyday, there is something true here. Moral principles and even more so legal principles are not properly derived from extremely bizarre hypothetical emergency situations.
JCFolsom: Well, if he thinks he did something wrong for which he would accept punishment, why would he do it in the first place? Clearly, because he did it, he thought it was the right thing to do. Since when should you be punished for doing the right thing?
People who take this route probably think it is the right thing to do in a certain sense while recognizing that it is also wrong. It's something of a balancing act or utilitarian calculus: 1) aggressing against others is wrong, 2) letting X die would be more wrong, 3) there is no other option but (1) and (2), 4) therefore (1) is the lesser of two evils and is "the right thing to do" in this qualified sense. They don't believe it is the right thing to do in any unqualified sense.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:People who take this route probably think it is the right thing to do in a certain sense while recognizing that it is also wrong. It's something of a balancing act or utilitarian calculus: 1) aggressing against others is wrong, 2) letting X die would be more wrong, 3) there is no other option but (1) and (2), 4) therefore (1) is the lesser of two evils and is "the right thing to do" in this qualified sense. They don't believe it is the right thing to do in any unqualified sense.
That seems like a pretty contorted way of saying "It was the right thing to do in that circumstance", which still contains the phrase "It was the right thing to do", and, having done the right thing, he ought not be punished for it.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:While I disagree that we don't make contextual moral judgments everyday, there is something true here. Moral principles and even more so legal principles are not properly derived from extremely bizarre hypothetical emergency situations.
Okay. Building on this, here is something I don't think has been said yet: Even if the non-aggression principle is not absolutely absolute, this does not necessarily open the door for forcible government (i.e., the state). Why? Because even if the hypos put forth here can show that the non-aggression principle can be trumped by other moral principles in such extreme, rare emergency situations, it is not proper to generalize moral principles and laws from such situations. They are marginal cases. Rare exceptions to general rules, at best. And they can be dealt with in private courts.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:Even if the non-aggression principle is not absolutely absolute, this does not necessarily open the door for forcible government (i.e., the state). Why? Because even if the hypos put forth here can show that the non-aggression principle can be trumped by other moral principles in such extreme, rare emergency situations, it is not proper to generalize moral principles and laws from such situations. They are marginal cases. Rare exceptions to general rules, at best. And they can be dealt with in private courts.
Again, though, you are trying to establish a rule. I think it should be clear by now that morality does not operate by absolutes in terms of "x behavior is always wrong". Now, we can say "cruelty for sadistic pleasure" is always wrong, but again, this is not an actual action, but the characterization of one. I think, to be able to create a coherent and consistent morality, we need to be willing to approach actions a little less... empirically?
I fail to see why you think it's appropriate to insult me. If you disagree with me fine, but there is no excuse for insults.
As for your argument I would expect to be punished just like anyone else. I would know the risk of violating that persons rights and would expect punishment for doing it. Of course I'd throw myself on the mercy of man whose rights I just violated and asked for forgiveness and try to use reason to convince him that it was the just course to take. I don't see any hypocrisy in that. Everyone makes a choice to either violate or not violate another's rights. I would expect to be punished for my actions just as I would punish another in that same situation. Would it be excusable if I'm sitting on a jury and the case before me is just what we are talking about except that when one man tried to take the transporter he killed its owner? I would have taken the transporter but should I excuse this murder? According to you and your theory that the NAP is not absolute I should. I disagree.
Also, please provide me with proof that you are not a hypocrit? Because everyone is at some point in their life and on some occasion. Hypocrisy doesn't negate the fact that the NAP is absolute.
JCFolsom:I think it should be clear by now that morality does not operate by absolutes in terms of "x behavior is always wrong".
So your belief would mean that what the Nazi's did in WWII was right. If the NAP is not absolute, and the majority are the ones that decide what is right and wrong, then the murder of millions of Jews, homosexuals, political rivals, etc. by the Nazi's in WWII is just fine and dandy because the "majority" agreed with it. It's an extreme example but if your agrument can't survive extreme examples then it is not valid.
JCFolsom: Geoffrey Allan Plauche:People who take this route probably think it is the right thing to do in a certain sense while recognizing that it is also wrong. It's something of a balancing act or utilitarian calculus: 1) aggressing against others is wrong, 2) letting X die would be more wrong, 3) there is no other option but (1) and (2), 4) therefore (1) is the lesser of two evils and is "the right thing to do" in this qualified sense. They don't believe it is the right thing to do in any unqualified sense. That seems like a pretty contorted way of saying "It was the right thing to do in that circumstance", which still contains the phrase "It was the right thing to do", and, having done the right thing, he ought not be punished for it.
Well, some might lament the fact that life is more complicated than rationalist, deontological theories of ethics but that would be a waste of time and investment. The fact of the matter is, we are sometimes faced with moral dillemmas not under our control and not our fault. In fact, the state makes such events more common and pervasive. But I'm not saying I agree with choosing the lesser of two evils. I was just explaining the reasoning. The lesser of two evils for them is not an unqualified right. I think there is some confusion in the position. It compares an immoral action (aggression) with a tragic event/situation (someone dying due to another's inhuman inaction (but not rights-violation). Does the latter justify the former? I don't think so. You are not yourself killing the person. And it may seem a fine distinction but letting die and killing are two different things. Even the inhumane transporter/boat owner is not killing the person. He is not responsible for the person's situation which resulted in her dying. He is letting the person die, however, when he could do something to try to prevent it. In most circumstances this is probably morally reprehensible but it is not a rights violation. While I sympathize, I have a hard time finding it to justify committing injustice to rectify a tragic situation.
I have a question for those who think the non-aggression principle is overridden in these cases. Do you also think the non-aggression principle is overridden, say, if you have a daught who needs a heart transplant and you can't afford it and you can't find anyone to help pay for it or doctors who will do the transplant for free? Is it all right to stealt he money, steal a heart, and/or force some doctors to perform the operation?
JCFolsom:Again, though, you are trying to establish a rule.
Not a rule. A principle. There is a difference. Also, I'm not trying to establish a principle. I'm taking it for granted, as does the OP in his hypo. All he tried to do was show that the non-aggression principle is not absolute. That it didn't hold in every situation, i.e., that it had exceptions. At best, he's established that it can be overriden in some extreme circumstances. Quite a bit more would be required to show that these exceptions are many, much less so common that they aren't really exceptions and so the principle is not valid. He also claimed that if the non-aggression principle is not absolute, the case for anarcho-capitalism is sunk. My claim is that a few exceptions in rare emergency situations is not enough to justify forcible government, so anarcho-capitalism is not undermined.
JCFolsom:I think it should be clear by now that morality does not operate by absolutes in terms of "x behavior is always wrong". Now, we can say "cruelty for sadistic pleasure" is always wrong, but again, this is not an actual action, but the characterization of one. I think, to be able to create a coherent and consistent morality, we need to be willing to approach actions a little less... empirically?
I think you mean a little less rationalistically. I agree, although I don't necessarily agree that we can never say "x behavior is always wrong." It depends on what x is and how the claim is formed.
JCFolsom:Now, we can say "cruelty for sadistic pleasure" is always wrong, but again, this is not an actual action, but the characterization of one.
Similarly, "aggression is always wrong" describes the characteristic of certain actions just as cruelty does. The trick is determining what counts as aggression.
Folsom, I'm glad you're seeing first-hand just how controversial the example is. I agree that it is perhaps more controversial than perhaps it should be; and we haven't even gotten to the really interesting variant, where we don't know how to drive the boat and are debating whether to point a gun at the boat-owner's head to make him rescue the child (let's not talk about that for now).
Gigaplex, glad to see I'm starting to make a dent! I'd contend further that the only really effective moral argument that weighs specifically in favor of anarcho-capitalism is one which addresses a position that very few people actually hold: that of minarchism. There's so much that needs to be established before that debate is even coherent that anarcho-capitalism is almost an irrelevant position outside of the world of academic political philosophy, where comprehensive paradigms can actually be discussed and understood.
To Geoffery, I agree that it's worse to act unjustly than to be the victim of injustice, but the question being debated is whether there's actually an injustice. Note that Socrates doesn't say that it's worse to use aggressive force than to be aggressed against.
Monkey, an important distinction needs to be made between punishment and restitution. A strict liability standard, which many libertarians accept as being more legitimate than the currently prevalent duty of care standard, would hold that a person is responsible for compensating another person for any damage done to them by the agent's actions, whether or not those actions were morally objectionable. So the idea, then, would be that we have the right not to have costs imposed on us by other people, such that imposing them upon us without restitution would be unjust (though I have discussed the possibility that there might be situations in which this standard might not apply). If we accept this doctrine, then a court would surely force me to compensate the boat owner for any damages he suffered as a result of my actions. But that would have nothing to do with whether or not I acted wrongly.
Courts only begin to play a role in dealing with morality and punishment under an alternative standard: the duty of care standard. According to this doctrine, people are only responsible for compensating victims if they acted wrongly in bringing about the damage in question. So under this standard, I would have to be acting wrongly if I was going to be expected to compensate the boat owner. But notice that according to this standard, what is cited as explaining my obligation to compensate the boat owner is the possibility that I had a moral duty not to do what I did. And according to this standard, it seems reasonable to think that the boat owner might be said to also have been violating a moral duty by not saving the child in the first place. It would seem somewhat odd to think that this person would think himself justified in objecting to my treating him as somehow less than human, given that his treatment of the child seems to belie that he held the same sort of attitude.
So my point would be that it's difficult to think of any standard which would command me to respect the boat owner which wouldn't also command the boat owner to save the child. And if the boat owner was in clear violation of his duties, it seems odd to think that I should not have some leeway to behave differently towards him than would be acceptable under normal circumstances in order to prevent the outcome that he had the duty to prevent.
Also, I'm really glad that Godwin's law has been validated yet again...
Donny with an A:To Geoffery, I agree that it's worse to act unjustly than to be the victim of injustice, but the question being debated is whether there's actually an injustice. Note that Socrates doesn't say that it's worse to use aggressive force than to be aggressed against.
Well, if there's not, then Socrates' principle doesn't apply. But then, we don't have a problem because the OP's argument is sunk.
If there is an injustice, then Socrates' principle applies.
Perhaps what you're saying is that there are injustices that trump the injustice of aggression. Legally speaking, I don't agree.
I assume you aren't saying that attacking the transporter/boat owner in this case and "borrowing" his property does not count as aggression but rather as self-defense (defense of others) because his inaction itself is aggression.
Donny with an A: Courts only begin to play a role in dealing with morality and punishment under an alternative standard: the duty of care standard. According to this doctrine, people are only responsible for compensating victims if they acted wrongly in bringing about the damage in question. So under this standard, I would have to be acting wrongly if I was going to be expected to compensate the boat owner. But notice that according to this standard, what is cited as explaining my obligation to compensate the boat owner is the possibility that I had a moral duty not to do what I did. And according to this standard, it seems reasonable to think that the boat owner might be said to also have been violating a moral duty by not saving the child in the first place. It would seem somewhat odd to think that this person would think himself justified in objecting to my treating him as somehow less than human, given that his treatment of the child seems to belie that he held the same sort of attitude. So my point would be that it's difficult to think of any standard which would command me to respect the boat owner which wouldn't also command the boat owner to save the child. And if the boat owner was in clear violation of his duties, it seems odd to think that I should not have some leeway to behave differently towards him than would be acceptable under normal circumstances in order to prevent the outcome that he had the duty to prevent.
Whoa. Maybe I was wrong. Seems like you're abandoning libertarian rights here. Or are you putting this forth as a reason to reject the idea that the boat owner has a legally enforceable obligation to save the child?
kingmonkey:So your belief would mean that what the Nazi's did in WWII was right. If the NAP is not absolute, and the majority are the ones that decide what is right and wrong, then the murder of millions of Jews, homosexuals, political rivals, etc. by the Nazi's in WWII is just fine and dandy because the "majority" agreed with it. It's an extreme example but if your agrument can't survive extreme examples then it is not valid.
Your argument is flawed in three ways. First, the majority of Germans did not know that people were going to be systematically killed, and unlike our boat example, moral considerations were far from the only disincentive to protest; you could easily end up on the train as well. Secondly, given what you quoted from me, actions which can be characterized as vicious, bigoted and murderous are wrong, even if sometimes killing can be justified. Finally, I did not say the majority's opinion is supreme. What I said, or what I thought I'd implied is, the VAST majority of people, across the VAST majority of time, would take the boat, and that includes you. What the did was done by a relative few people over a relatively short amount of time.
No, I'm saying that the right to self-determination is presumptive, and legitimately overrideable in certain situations. I think that self-defense is one kind of example in which it is permissible to infringe upon someone's right to self-determination, but I don't think it's the only kind of example (shoving an aimless drunk out of the way of an oncoming bus, for an uncontroversial example). It seems to me that the child's life provides us with a morally significant reason for infringing upon the boat owner's right to self-determination, and so it would not be unjust to do so.
I'm not saying that the boat owner has an enforceable obligation to save the child (I'm not sure that I completely accept the view that no such obligation exists, but that's not important for the example we're talking about). An enforceable obligation to save the child would mean that I would be justified in forcing the boat owner to save the child himself. That's not what I'm saying here. I'm saying that the boat owner would seem to need to call upon a standard of justice in order to complain about my infringing upon his rights which would almost certainly condemn his own actions. That's not to say that it follows that both parties aren't acting unjustly; maybe they are (two wrongs don't make a right). It's just an observation. It just seems to me that if you have a duty to do X, and wrongfully fail to do X, then I may be able to justify doing things which involve harm being done to you in order to bring about X.