So I'm trying to understand the Objectivist POV on sense perception, but I'm having some trouble here. I was reading Leonard Peikoff's book about Objectivism, and in it, he stated that our sense perceptions are correct as an axiom.
How can this be? If humans can have dreams and hallucinations where they can see, touch, and even smell and taste figments, how can we know for sure that the "physical" world around us is actually physical and not just a kind of dream or hallucination?
Isn't it possible that we're just a bunch of brain cells in a petri dish somewhere? I'm not saying that that's necessarily true, but that it is impossible to prove beyond doubt the existence of the world and the universe as we know it.
As for Objectivist ethics, I don't quite understand why we should follow our own "rational self interest." As I understand it, Rand's argument was that since survival/life is a universal value, we should follow it as well, which leads us to rational self interest as the primary ethical goal. However, isn't this just a naturalistic fallacy? Only because all organisms try to survive, does that mean we should do the same?
I understand that it is rational to act in your own self interest, but I don't understand how it is ethical. In other words, it makes sense that one should improve oneself, but it doesn't make sense why not doing so would be unethical.
Furthermore, doesn't Rand's ethics depend on her epistemology/metaphysics? If one cannot prove that the physical world, and therefore the organisms within it, exist, can one really say that we should follow our own self interest because it is, in a sense, a universal value?
So wouldn't a more rational approach to ethics try to determine if there is some basis for ethics a priori instead of a posteriori?
Please correct me if I'm wrong in anything I've written, and please help me understand the Objectivist view on senses. Thanks. :)
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Sure, but what I meant is one isn't restricted to merely what one perceives. One can infer from known premises, conjecture &c. and nothing in the Objectivist epistemology says otherwise. But otherwise yes, agreed.
-Jon
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Geoffrey:The eye can be improved upon? So what.
We see what is out there according to the nature of the object, the laws of reality and the natures of our sense organs and brain processes.
So? None of this means that the realistic position needs to be proven against some idealist or solipsist default.
That sounds like the fantasist Kantian position that results in the absurdity that because we have eyes, we are blind,
Could we really be in the Matrix. Yes, that's not beyond the realm of possibility.
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Jon Irenicus: Why is this repeated as if it's actually correct? You can't prove a negative? I can't prove that I don't have green hair or that --p = p (this is a basic logical transformation)? No, the burden of proof is on anyone making an assertion, negative or positive in nature - all the more so in the case of incredible arguments (e.g. we're all brains in vats, solipsism &c.) As for Peikoff's argument, I'd need to see it fully elaborated to see whether I agree with it or not. -Jon
Why is this repeated as if it's actually correct? You can't prove a negative? I can't prove that I don't have green hair or that --p = p (this is a basic logical transformation)? No, the burden of proof is on anyone making an assertion, negative or positive in nature - all the more so in the case of incredible arguments (e.g. we're all brains in vats, solipsism &c.)
As for Peikoff's argument, I'd need to see it fully elaborated to see whether I agree with it or not.
The problem here is that I'm not making a claim. I'm arguing that Objectivists are making an erroneous, unbacked claim when they state that our senses are correct axiomatically. I am asking for evidence that proves that our senses are valid, nobody has yet provided that.
Erroneous? No, that remains to be established. I still want you to provide Peikoff's argument, otherwise there's no point in discussing this any further. I think Geoffrey's pretty much cleared this up by bringing in the distinction between cognition and sense-perception.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:I didn't say anything about axioms.
I'm referring to Peikoff's argument.
And yes the burden of proof does fall on you because you would be the one challenging the commonsense view of reality, the view of it that all reason and evidence supports.
My entire point is that nobody has ever provided me, nor have I ever found any evidence or "reason" that supports the "common sense" view of reality. You're just committing an argumentum ad populum here, only because something is "common sense" doesn't mean that it is necessarily true.
Nobody here in this thread has so far provided any evidence to support the validity of our senses. The question asked in this thread was whether or not anyone here could provide that evidence.
God and the Flying Spaghetti Monster are of course different than the question of reality/existence. It is ridiculous to lump the former in with the latter.
God and FSM are relevant when discussing the validity of our senses, because
Our senses show us the world as it is.
So what about dreams? Or are those cognitive errors (below) as well?
It is when cognition enters the picture that the possibility of error enters the picture. Thus, when our senses present us with the image of the bent stick half-submerged in water, our eyes are presenting with facts of reality - the water bends the light and so we see a bent stick - if we then conclude that the stick really is bent that is not an error of our senses but a cognitive error.
Arguably there are a lot of people in insane asylums who have a completely different view of reality, and it would be safe to say that that is due to "cognitive errors." The question is: how do you know we're not experiencing a similar series of cognitive errors?
Read Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith "Against Idealism: Johannes Daubert vs. Husserl's Ideas I" and my "Against Idealism: Rand and Daubert vs. Husserl's Ideas I."
I'll read those today.
Jon:I think Geoffrey's pretty much cleared this up by bringing in the distinction between cognition and sense-perception.
Ipse dixit.
krazy kaju: My entire point is that nobody has ever provided me, nor have I ever found any evidence or "reason" that supports the "common sense" view of reality. You're just committing an argumentum ad populum here, only because something is "common sense" doesn't mean that it is necessarily true. Nobody here in this thread has so far provided any evidence to support the validity of our senses. The question asked in this thread was whether or not anyone here could provide that evidence.
There's no shortage of evidence, and the burden is still on you to present a case for the contrary position.
krazy kaju:So what about dreams? Or are those cognitive errors (below) as well?
? Dreams are internal. They say nothing for or against the validity of the senses.
krazy kaju:Arguably there are a lot of people in insane asylums who have a completely different view of reality, and it would be safe to say that that is due to "cognitive errors." The question is: how do you know we're not experiencing a similar series of cognitive errors?
Again, the burden of proof is on you. That abnormal people have biological and/or psychological disorders does not speak against the general validity of the senses.
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Juan:I explained why - but maybe you didn't bother reading it. You can't consider sense-perception by itself without taking into account what Geoffrey called 'processing'. The system works as a whole.
YOu're getting all the distinctions confused. I distinguished raw sensory data picked up by the senses, from sense-perception which includes the automatic processing (which again is distinct from conceptual interpretation). These are not arbitrary distinctions.
Because all distinctions imply dichotomies, no? It's pretty much distinguishing the inputs (raw data) from the processing (sense-perception).
I distinguished raw sensory data picked up by the senses, from sense-perception which includes the automatic processing (which again is distinct from conceptual interpretation).
krazy kaju: Nobody here in this thread has so far provided any evidence to support the validity of our senses. The question asked in this thread was whether or not anyone here could provide that evidence.
I'm not sure there is any such evidence to support the validity of our senses. However, if you reject your sense data, then you have no data at all of an external reality. None, zip nada. We have to rely on our sense data because that's all we have. Even if our sense data is flawed in some way, there's no way to show otherwise, there is no other data we can gather and compare with our sense data, except for more sense data. All testing, all verification, all justification is based upon sense data. Therefore, sense data is axiomatic because you have no other options for a source of data. All that we think, all that we know, all that we think we know, even all that we believe, is ultimately based upon our sense data.
macsnafu:I'm not sure there is any such evidence to support the validity of our senses. However, if you reject your sense data, then you have no data at all of an external reality. None, zip nada. We have to rely on our sense data because that's all we have.
That's called faith. Although I agree that for practical reasons we must use our sense data, if you're trying to formulate an ethical theory, it would make more sense to do so on an a priori basis.
As for data "of an external reality," I suppose you've never heard of the debate over analytic a priori, logic, and mathematics?
Even if our sense data is flawed in some way, there's no way to show otherwise, there is no other data we can gather and compare with our sense data, except for more sense data.
That is almost a kind of argument from ignorance.
All testing, all verification, all justification is based upon sense data. Therefore, sense data is axiomatic because you have no other options for a source of data. All that we think, all that we know, all that we think we know, even all that we believe, is ultimately based upon our sense data.
That doesn't make sense data axiomatic. An axiom is something that can be proven true by default, e.g. human action. You can't prove that human action is false because in doing so you are acting. Sensory data is not the same.
Geoffrey Allan Plauche:There's no shortage of evidence, and the burden is still on you to present a case for the contrary position.
If there's no shortage of evidence, why don't you provide some of it here?
So how do you know that the senses aren't some kind of internal experience or cognitive mistake?
Again, the burden of proof is on you.
I'm not arguing for solipsism, I'm asking for evidence of the validity of our senses. So far, nobody has provided any of that evidence.
That abnormal people have biological and/or psychological disorders does not speak against the general validity of the senses.
It does show that humans are capable of sensing one thing but seeing something else. The broader question here is whether or not our senses are real or if they're simply some kind of internal mechanism. If you believe in objective science, you would have to take a neutral position on the topic until some evidence has been presented for either side. This is what I'm doing. I'm asking for evidence to be presented but nobody is presenting any evidence which is my problem here.