If yes, what if someone hypnotizes me and I'm basically in a state of mind that doesn't allow for making decisions on my own?Or, on a more futuristic note, what if someone somehow wires my brain and remote-controls me?Do I still own myself, then?
If someone violates your rights, does that mean you don't have rights? Same question, really.
Also, see Rothbard "The Ethics of Liberty" pages 45 and 46 or the first two pages of chapter 8.
Sphairon:If yes, what if someone hypnotizes me and I'm basically in a state of mind that doesn't allow for making decisions on my own?Or, on a more futuristic note, what if someone somehow wires my brain and remote-controls me?Do I still own myself, then?
If someone urinates on your lawn, do you still have ownership rights over your lawn? Sure. You still have the right to it if someone violates that right. That's undeniable.
To channel Hoppe*, what's the point in arguing about something like this if you don't own you and I don't owe me? If we don't own ourselves and have a sense of self it is very hard to understand how any being could be rational. By assuming that we are all rational enough to answer your question, aren't you assuming we own ourselves? If we didn't own ourselves logic and discourse would be absolutely impossible.
*I hope my understanding of argumentation ethics was too crude.
Sphairon: If yes, what if someone hypnotizes me and I'm basically in a state of mind that doesn't allow for making decisions on my own?Or, on a more futuristic note, what if someone somehow wires my brain and remote-controls me?Do I still own myself, then?
I think the more relevant question is: is self-ownership valid as a dualistic concept? Do you really own yourself, or would it be more appropriate to say that you are yourself and hence you are responsible for yourself? It's certainly not 100% identical to how a property right over an external object works, because you are yourself. So I think that the basic idea that people cannot legitimately be owned and infringed upon is a better way of putting it. It is misleading to act as if the mind "owns" the body, which seems like a bad analogy. This absolute mind/body dichotomy isn't valid, as there is overlap and a coherant whole.
Self-ownership is often used as a hodge-podge of different yet related concepts such as conciousness, free will and personal responsibility. Self-ownership is also treated as a metaphysical given sometimes, but it isn't a metaphysical given. In line with the is/ought dichotomy, there is a distinction to made between the right of personal sovereignty (an ethical concept) and the mere fact that one has conciousness or free will. It is of course true that conciousness and free will (metaphysical and epistemic concepts) are necessary for there to be personal sovereignty, but the existance of a capacity and an ethical proposition is not the same thing as the reality of the world. The fact that I have conciousness and free will in and of itself is not a valid argument for the ethical right of personal sovereignty, there must be something more to it than that.
In this regaurd, the performative contradiction argument fails. People's right to personal sovereignty is not always excersized or respected and the mere fact that someone expresses action or decision-making, through argumentation or otherwise, does not prove a particular ethical theory as to the justification for action or decision-making power in and of itself. All it proves is that they currently control something, and the ethical right of decision-making power is not the same thing as the mere fact that one does have decision-making power. It makes no sense to make an argument that implies the reductio of "you inherently are free, therefore you ought to be free". It isn't a metaphysical given that one's rights will be respected or excersized, hence the establishment of goals and hence the establishment of ethics. There would be no purpose to form ethics to begin with if they were all a metaphysical given and hence inherently followed absolutely.
Surely, when a libertarian uses the term self-ownership, they are refering to an ethical right to independance and decision-making power, not whatever happens to currently be controlled by anyone. The purposeful excersize of action with one's body at the biological level by itself is not what self-ownership is, it's only a prerequisite for it. Hence, argueing against self-ownership does not prove self-ownership (an ethical right defining the critieria and boundaries of the exercise of decision-making power relative to the individual), it only proves that you have willpower and engage in purposeful action. At best, argueing against self-ownership can be hypocritical to the extent that one's behavior in their personal life tends to respect and excercise it as an ethical right.
Thanks for all your answers, especially Brainpolice's was pretty enlightening. One thing remains questionable, however:It is of course true that conciousness and free will (metaphysical and epistemic concepts) are necessary for there to be personal sovereigntyWhat exactly do you mean by free will? The ability to freely decide what you want, or the ability to do what you want?