How are Austrian-leaning libertarians different from Objectivists in philosophical terms?
The background of the question is that a friend recently brought up concerns over the Objectivist view of pure rationality. After some time I began discussing my albeit limited understanding of Mises & human action as a counter to the Objectivist argument. Then I was asked whether the Austrian view was limited to economics, as opposed to Objectivism being both a philosophy and able to subsume such teachings. After a few foggy recallections of how Kant played a role in seperating the two points, I have to admit my understanding broke down rather quickly.
In fact the Austrian view is limited to economics. The connection to objectivism is rather loose, yet it is there because both derive their ideas from the axiom that "man acts" and are therefor individualist in perspective. This is the reason why so much, almost all in fact, libertarians and objectivists embrace Austran economics.
In the begining there was nothing, and it exploded.
Terry Pratchett (on the big bang theory)
What "pure rationality"? Objectivists dislike the epistemological framework Mises uses, but their own system is one of moderate rationalism too, much like Locke's, even if they call it "empirical", as they allow for various truths that are what one would call synthetic a priori. Anyway, Objectivism can be used as a foundational structure for Austrian econ and some have made efforts to do so (Younkins, Plauche &c.) Here's a piece by Younkins, and here's a more comprehensive one. He has more on that site, so be sure to look them up. And here is Geoffrey's excellent paper.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Jon Irenicus: What "pure rationality"? Objectivists dislike the epistemological framework Mises uses, but their own system is one of moderate rationalism too, much like Locke's, even if they call it "empirical", as they allow for various truths that are what one would call synthetic a priori. Anyway, Objectivism can be used as a foundational structure for Austrian econ and some have made efforts to do so (Younkins, Plauche &c.) Here's a piece by Younkins, and here's a more comprehensive one. He has more on that site, so be sure to look them up. And here is Geoffrey's excellent paper.
Ohh, yes Younkins has had some very interesting things to say about these matters.
Thank you all for your input.
Jon as for what you may think of as a priori statements such as the three basic 'rules' of metaphysics (identity, causality, non-contradiction), the reason why Objectivists (such as myself) don't see a clear distinction between synthetic versus analytic knowledge sets is the fact that one depends on the other. For example, how can one known about identity without finding some things to perceive as individual units distinct from each other (say a pebble that's red and a pebble that's blue)? That's the problem with the synthetic/analytic distinction/dichotomy/whatever, is that it really depends on the idea that somewhere some of the ideas in our head came into existence without any external frame of reference. In some ways, it's sorta like a logical system that cannot validate its core premises can exist as such without an external frame of reference (a la Godel's Incompleteness Theorem). Meaning, that in reality all analytic statements or units of knowledge always depend upon there being something 'synthetic' or external in its frame of reference. Which is why Objectivism claims the term empiricism as the basis for its epistemology.
Or in simpler terms: you have to perceive before you could conceive it.
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
ladyattis:you have to perceive before you could conceive it.
Thats like saying you can throw all the indexes in a card catalouge onto the floor, and then the cards can rearrange themselves back into a meaningful system for understanding something greater than their individual parts. I simply can't buy the idea that we are bombarded by our senses, then our perceptions arrange themselves independent of a prior logical mind- into knowledge and concepts.
'Perceptions without conceptions are blind'
do we get free cheezeburger in socielism?
fezwhatley: 'Perceptions without conceptions are blind'
And conceptions without perceptions are empty. I think that Rand did something rather more profound than merely being an empiricist; she bridged the empiricist-rationalist gap.
Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.
I agree, I think the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is baseless nonsense grounded in linguistics. However, I'm trying to parse it so most here can comprehend it. Aprioricity concerns how a certain truth is justified, not how it is known (which is always mediately, through the senses.) Any system that incorporates it is a moderate form of rationalism, so long as it does not reduce it to so-called analytic truths. So on the whole, I think the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is nonsense, but for exegetic purposes i continue to use it.
Hayek was a critical rationalist. Check out The Fatal Conceit. He cites Karl Popper regularly; when discussing 'constructivist rationality', he also references William Bartley, editor of the The Fatal Conceit and student of Popper. He states that all knowledge is unjustifiable, echoing the thesis of Retreat to Commitment, where Bartley presents his improvement to Popper's philosophy--pancritical rationalism. Although it is almost imperceptible for those who do not know what to look for, Hayek's thought is suffused with critical rationalist philosophy.
The presuppositions of Hayek's philosophy were profoundly different to Misesian a priorism or Randian objectivism. And it is with Hayek I am in agreement.
Jon Irenicus:Any system that incorporates it is a moderate form of rationalism, so long as it does not reduce it to so-called analytic truths.
The reason why I see a distinction between Rand's point of view and that of the traditional rationalist point of view is one that depends on something that existed prior to Rand: Locke's nominal essences. This case, I'll abridge the explanation of nominal essences for sake of everyone, basically a nominal essence is something your senses can work upon (as opposed to true essences which are beyond the power of senses to capture (Plato's ideal forms and etc...)). They form from the basis of 'true' essences and possibly other factors. In many ways, this is much like Rand's epistemological essences, which are simply essences dependent on the property of entities that exist. So, one can say in simpler terms both Locke and Rand hit or repeat the same idea, but that Rand reduces it further down from the Aristotelian view of essences as opposed to Locke who keeps ahold of the older idea of some true essence which makes things the way they are.
The difference is important because it suggests that in some ways metaphysics is influenced by epistemology even though epistemology is built up from metaphysics or at least more complex propositions of epistemology are built up from metaphysics. Rand also makes this more clear when she stated that the study of Cosmology is not a study that should be in the field of philosophy, but rather one in the field of the sciences. This particular distinction, too, hammers home the point that you have to start from particular knowledge ('empirical' knowledge) before you can compose unparticular knowledge (what could be called 'rational' knowledge).
ladyattis:Or in simpler terms: you have to perceive before you could conceive it.
Well isn't this pretty much what Kant argues when he says using reason without applying it to experience will only lead to illusions, while experience will be purely subjective without first being subsumed under pure reason?