Vichy: The difference between a flashlight and a laser is, more or less, energy concentration. They both act in essentially the same way - sending that obnoxious light, heating up the air and walls, doing minor (but detectable) damage to the wood on my front door! Aggression! Your arbitrary limits are all based on rationalizing proportionality or denying restitution like Lefevre. Because that would work out GREAT! Steal, nothing happens to you!
The difference between a flashlight and a laser is, more or less, energy concentration. They both act in essentially the same way - sending that obnoxious light, heating up the air and walls, doing minor (but detectable) damage to the wood on my front door! Aggression!
Your arbitrary limits are all based on rationalizing proportionality or denying restitution like Lefevre. Because that would work out GREAT! Steal, nothing happens to you!
How is that an arbitrary limit? If you can prove that my light damaged your door, you certainly have a case against me.
liberty student: I think here, we don't have cranks, as much as we have a few very cranky people. But then I suppose crankery is all relative.
I think here, we don't have cranks, as much as we have a few very cranky people.
But then I suppose crankery is all relative.
I make a habit of not sharing my telephone number online. Seeing some of the discussions on mises.org have made me vow I never will!
"As long as there are sovereign nations possessing great power, war is inevitable."
Who in your opinion is *not* a crank?
Ludwig von Mises, Edmund Burke, Jeffrey Friedman, Anthony de Jasay; the egoist influenced branch of libertarian-leanings (James L. Walker, LA Rollins). Some more liberal writers who would qualify as broadly libertarian. The 'libertarians' who engage mainly in real research, rather than dreaming up the Ten Commandments, are pretty interesting. This is especially true of 18-19th century authors, who forged the liberal movement - libertarians have inhereted the conclusions but seperated it from the chain of reasoning that led there. Property is 'a priori'. Property IS liberty? Why? Because Herbert Spencer said so!
And most libertarians have never read Herbert Spencer. Their views are just unjustified, far too strong in proportion to what they actually could justify. Which is a serious problem with ethics in general - very few people can offer a coherent justification, yet they are demanding not only belief but positive action from other people on the basis of moral beliefs. Most people can't even define what a moral judgement is supposed to constitute!
"Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned." - Avicenna
Vichy:I do not deny that there are cranks who aren't libertarians - Paul Krugman is a crank, and an idiot. But that doesn't somehow negate libertarian crankishness.
Then your crank label is meaningless. Many ______ are cranks. I could fill in the blank a thousand times.
Vichy: I can't help but wonder what is really wrong with Vichy. She's seems to be kinda pissed off by libertarians? When all else fails, resort to psychologizing!I'm not 'pissed off' by Libertarians, I think libertarianism, liberalism and humanism are literally false doctrines. I think many libertarians are cranks, and not infrequently stupid cranks.
I can't help but wonder what is really wrong with Vichy. She's seems to be kinda pissed off by libertarians?
When all else fails, resort to psychologizing!I'm not 'pissed off' by Libertarians, I think libertarianism, liberalism and humanism are literally false doctrines. I think many libertarians are cranks, and not infrequently stupid cranks.
You think Libertarianism is a false doctrine. But You think Bob Barr is a libertarian, so I might agree with you.
What's for dinner?
Many people are cranks. What makes them cranks are that they have far-out doctrines which they can't coherently justify, and their refusal to even understand criticism.
Vichy:Many people are cranks. What makes them cranks are that they have far-out doctrines which they can't coherently justify, and their refusal to even understand criticism.
I partly agree, except I don't think a far-out doctrine has to be involved. Take Modern Democracy for example. I wouldn't call it a far-out doctrine, yet most of its adocates refuse to understand any criticism at all.
Eric: Vichy:Many people are cranks. What makes them cranks are that they have far-out doctrines which they can't coherently justify, and their refusal to even understand criticism. I partly agree, except I don't think a far-out doctrine has to be involved. Take Modern Democracy for example. I wouldn't call it a far-out doctrine, yet most of its adocates refuse to understand any criticism at all.
That's not cranky, that's pig-headed. Cranks are specifically obscurantist or outside the norm, quacks in other words. A crackpot is an extreme crank.
So, a democratist who literally believed in 'the general will' would be a crank, but somone who believed in the democratic process would just be ignorant.
Vichy:That's not cranky, that's pig-headed. Cranks are specifically obscurantist or outside the norm, quacks in other words. A crackpot is an extreme crank.
I'll buy that, although I suspect you might also suffer from this malady, and thus be susceptible to confirmation crank bias.
Does Vichy like anything? Or is everything wrong? :D
Vichy: Eric: Vichy:Many people are cranks. What makes them cranks are that they have far-out doctrines which they can't coherently justify, and their refusal to even understand criticism. I partly agree, except I don't think a far-out doctrine has to be involved. Take Modern Democracy for example. I wouldn't call it a far-out doctrine, yet most of its adocates refuse to understand any criticism at all. That's not cranky, that's pig-headed. Cranks are specifically obscurantist or outside the norm, quacks in other words. A crackpot is an extreme crank. So, a democratist who literally believed in 'the general will' would be a crank, but somone who believed in the democratic process would just be ignorant.
While I hate quibbiling over minor points, crank and quack are not the same. That being said is "crank" the not so secret word of the day? Here a crank, there a crank, everywhere a crank.
I'm proud to be a crank. Hell, I love John C Dvorak's articles, so I have to be one. >_>
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
Vichy: Their views are just unjustified, far too strong in proportion to what they actually could justify. Which is a serious problem with ethics in general - very few people can offer a coherent justification, yet they are demanding not only belief but positive action from other people on the basis of moral beliefs. Most people can't even define what a moral judgement is supposed to constitute!
Their views are just unjustified, far too strong in proportion to what they actually could justify. Which is a serious problem with ethics in general - very few people can offer a coherent justification, yet they are demanding not only belief but positive action from other people on the basis of moral beliefs. Most people can't even define what a moral judgement is supposed to constitute!
Here's my thoughts on ethics that I copied and pasted from another thread. It's basically my attempt to explain libertarian ethics in 3 minutes. Mind taking a look and seeing if there's any problems in my reasoning? (I'm actually asking for your honest opinion, not trying to sound snotty):
As Ludwig von Mises pointed out, every action is undertaken to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory state of affairs. And, as Henry Hazlitt extrapolated, this implies that the singular, ultimate desired end of all acting humans is the long-run maximization of personal satisfaction.
Ethics is a system of recommendations for action (oughts) that apply to all acting humans. However, oughts merely connect desired ends with the means most appropriate to achieve them. I.e. "If you desire to bake a cake (desired end), you ought to buy some flour (means most appropriate)"
Thus, in order for there to be "oughts" that apply to all acting humans, all acting humans must share one universal desired end in common, which they do: long-run maximization of personal satisfaction.
However, as Hazlitt also pointed out, actors cannot judge all the infinite and unforseeable effects of any given action considered in isolation, and thus cannot know whether any particular action will actually lend itself to a net maximization of long-run personal satisfaction or not. But, we can follow the logic of human action and recognize correct general rules for action.
The first ethical issue one must resolve is, how ought individuals act in regard to selves? A general rule needs to be recognized regarding selves A). because your self is scarce and thus conflict is possible between you and another person over it, and B). because if, as a general rule, you ought not be allowed ultimate jurisdiction over your self (i.e. ownership over your self), then you have no basis to undertake any further action using your self.
As Rothbard pointed out, there are only three possible options. Either:
A). You own your self.B). Some other person or group of people other than you, owns you.C). Everyone has an equal share of co-ownership in everyone else.
Option B fails straightaway, simply because it is not a general rule applicable to all acting humans, but is rather a specific rule, arbitrarily applicable in one way to some humans, and in another way to other hunmans.
Option C would necessitate that in order for you to undertake any action with your self, you would have to obtain the consent of all other co-owners of your self. But the action of seeking their consent would itself need their consent. Thus Option C would ethically paralyze all further action. Option C is not a functional ethic.
Only Option A (you are your own property) is a functional ethic. The Principle of Self-Ownership is the most appropriate general rule/ethic (means) to employ to obtain long-run maximization of individual satisfaction (desired end).
If you own your self, you necessarily own your actions. If you own your actions, you necessarily own your labor (the fusing of your active efforts with untapped natural resources). And if you own your labor, you necessarily own the fruit of your labor (the property you come to acquire).
The fact that the system of private property is the most appropriate ethic to employ in regards to scarce resources in this world can be proved by examining all the alternatives. Here, again, there's only 3 options:
A). The first person to appropriate and use a resource is its rightful owner.B). One person or group of people owns all resources, and others don't.C). All users of a resource (which would mean users past, present, and future) equally co-own all resources.
As before, Option B fails straightaway as it is not actually a general rule.
Option C fails because you would somehow have to get the consent of future users of the resource (late-comers) before you could use any given resource. It would basically ethically paralyze all action with any resource other than your self. Option C is not a functional ethic. It is a grossly inappropriate general rule to employ as a means in the pursuit of the ultimate desired end.
Only Option A (that the first person to appropriate and use a scarce resource becomes its owner) is a functional/appropriate ethic.
If you are the owner of some thing, it may be said that you have a just claim to that thing. A metaphorical concept to describe a "just claim" to something, is a "title." Using the word "title" simply makes it easier to conceptualize ownership.
If you have an ownership title in something, then you may, of course, dispose of it or transfer it as you will, so long as you do not violate the physical integrity of anyone else's property. There is certain property, however, that you cannot possibly dispose of or transfer, such as your self or your will. You may pretend to transfer the title to your self to someone else, but in actuality, you necessarily always remain in [both physical and ethical] ultimate jurisdiction (ownership) over it. Thus, for example, libertarians generally see slavery as an illegitimate and ethically unenforceable faux contract.
The Non-Aggression Axiom is basically a nice, neat name to describe the fact that no one may violate (i.e. aggress against) any one else's property. Person A may not act toward Person B's property in a physical way in which Person A implicitly presumes a higher authority over Person B's property than Person B has himself. If you own something, then what happens to that something ought to be subject to your ultimate decision-making, overriding the decision of everyone else concerning that something. If anyone acts in violation of this ethic, they are committing "aggression." "Illegitimate" merely means that something goes against what is "ethical," and of course what is "ethical" merely means action that is line with the general rules that are the most appropriate means to employ in pursuit of long-run maximization of personal satisfaction, given the fact that scarcity exists and thus interpersonal conflict is possible.
"Anticapitalist theories share in common an inability to take human nature as it is. Rather than analyzing man as a complex creature, anticapitalist theories tend to focus on what the theorist wishes man to be." - Isaac Morehouse
Vichy: the egoist influenced branch of libertarian-leanings
Vichy,
Regarding amoral egoism and natural property rights...
Let us say you witness a little girl being brutalized in a dark alley. Something within you would cry out that that is wrong. You wouldn't deduce from premises that it is wrong. You would just feel it. An urge would well up inside you to do something about it, even if such action would considerably risk your life and limb. For example, you might feel a powerful urge to call for help, even though this might raise a small chance that the brutalizer would hear you and try to violently silence you. That urge is not rationally egoistic. Helping the little girl would not "serve you"; it would endanger you. Yet the urge to do so would be there, nonetheless. That is morality. What aspect of the brutalizer's assault would engender such a potentially self-sacrificing urge? It is not that in a society in which such violence is done with impunity, you yourself or someone who benefits you might end up being harmed. It is a primary urge that cries out, without any argumentative grounding, "it is wrong for him to do that to her body." That natural, internal moral imperative is what I call a property right: the inherent "ought" that lies with all of us regarding what, for example, a little girl can do with her body, and what other people can't.
Of course, like you've said, property rights don't exist as ghostly connections between a human and an object. They are not "natural" in the sense that they are a material body or force. They are natural in that they are not artificial or customary. The same basic principle goes for property outside of one's body.
Were you to watch a sculptor, who saved up and bought his own materials, painstaking make a beautiful bust of an Olympian god over the course of several days, and then see another man come up, shove the sculptor aside, and run off with the bust, something inside you would say, "that was FUCKED up." You would feel a strong desire to see the bust returned to the sculptor. In that urge is implied the notion that the sculptor was the bust's rightful owner. Again, the property right resides within your psyche, as it would within most anyone who witnessed such an act.
SIDE NOTE: Now obviously these moral urges would not be as strong, if existent at all, within the brutalizer and the thief. They either ignore or sufficiently quiet those moral urges (in which case they are immoral, compared to the general tendency of mankind), are overwhelmed by countervailing passions (in which case they are disturbed, compared to the general tendency of mankind), or are pathologically devoid of empathy (in which case they are amoral and psychotic, compared to the general tendency of mankind).
All such instances (and any honest reflection on what one's own feelings would be in such situations) offer a surfeit of evidence of a moral code written in our nature. And like I've written elsewhere...
This natural moral code is only shoved aside when we enter conditions of extremity (aka "lifeboat situations), in which circumstances have forced the human community to devolve into a war of all against all. In those cases, we instinctively cast aside our communal moral feelings for the sake of extreme short-term selfishness. We morally allow ourselves “necessary evils”.The state has deceived the bulk of humanity into believing that society is inherently in perpetual extremity (an ever-present "lifeboat situation"), and that its own acts of murder, plunder, and enslavement are necessary evils. This is a lie. Society does not require for its survival, or even for its flowering, that certain men be above natural morality. Far from it; the murderers, plunderers, enslavers, and liars who comprise the state are simply parasites who cripple society and threaten to destroy it
A man doesn’t need to understand the politics of war to know that murder is wrong; neither need he understand how markets work to know that stealing is wrong. If it weren’t for state propaganda, there would be no need for libertarian intellectualism. Unfortunately the state, through its false economics and false political philosophy, has convinced mankind that the world is in a constant state of extremity, such that, without some men being given the power to murder, steal, and enslave with impunity, civilization will descend into chaos. False theory can only be fought effectively with true theory. The role of a libertarian intellectual therefore is not to weave intricate theories to justify justice itself (there is no need for that); rather it is to UNWEAVE the tangled fabric of state lies. That is why we need economics and political philosophy: to show exactly how the state’s purported necessary evils are simply evils, and thereby reveal to people their inner libertarian.
Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle in 9 steps (Soliciting comments)
Let us say you witness a little girl being brutalized in a dark alley. Something within you would cry out that that is wrong. You wouldn't deduce from premises that it is wrong. You would just feel it. An urge would well up inside you to do something about it, even if such action would considerably risk your life and limb.
I can tell you this is descriptively false. It may be true in your case - in most cases. But not in my case. And even if it were, it would prove nothing but that people have a psychological tendency to moralize and have ideas about social norms. I never denied this. I just denied that such norms were objectively 'true' or 'binding'. I do not feel idigntation, and I do not feel the need to pass 'moral' judgement on - anything.
I do not know how much you know about Aspberger's syndrome, but one of the key features is a lack of effective empathy. So this - basically an appeal to emotions - is looking for a target that doesn't exist.
Read Danny Shahar's blogpost to get a summary of his views.
I do not know how much you know about Aspberger's syndrome, but one of the key features is a lack of effective empathy.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
So we came to the conclusion that Vichy is either autist or psychopathic?
Juan:So we came to the conclusion that Vichy is either autist or psychopathic? No. Apparently she says she is autistic, but that's not an argument, that's psychologizing, something she has objected to...
My humble impression is that she is trying to go all Nieztsche on us with all this ammorality, but even Nietzsche had a clear notion of something being lame or stupid (like nationalism). Oh well, Nieztsche himself was quite a cranky
Vichy:prove nothing but that people have a psychological tendency to moralize
That these moral urges are the results of an inherent tendency is what makes them natural in the Aristotelean sense. Therefore, the rights conferred in response to these urges in the minds of the people who feel these urges are natural rights.
Vichy:objectively 'true' or 'binding'.
It is "binding" to those who heed the natural moral urges. It is not effectively binding to those who do not. When A says B ought not to brutalize C, of course it's a subjective statement. Morality, like all values, arises subjectively, but can be objectively observed. The statement, "B is evil" of course is not true on a universal materialist level. He is not "evil" to a banana slug or to a lump of coal or to you. Natural rights are indeed subjective; that does not make them unnatural, non-rights, or unreal.
Vichy:I do not feel idigntation, and I do not feel the need to pass 'moral' judgement on - anything.
So, if you saw a man brutalizing a young girl in an alley, you would not think that was wrong?
Vichy:I do not know how much you know about Aspberger's syndrome, but one of the key features is a lack of effective empathy.
Okay, then, go promote your egoist libertarianism among the Aspberger's set, and stop claiming that the rest of us are irrational for having natural moral urges.
Vichy:So this - basically an appeal to emotions - is looking for a target that doesn't exist.
...among Aspberger's sufferers. I am completely aware and completely comfortable with my grounding morality in the emotions. David Hume, to my mind, proved that morality can only have its ultimate source in primary passions, and not in reason...
“This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but `tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.”
That morality is grounded in emotion does not make it any less important, real, or natural. That is because we humans have an inborn tendency toward certain common moral urges. So I with my natural moral urges can talk meaningfully to another human who, by virtue of being human (and not having Aspberger's), has similar urges. That is what people without neurological disorders do when they talk to each other about natural rights.
No, whether I object to it or not would be entirely a matter of personal motivation. I don't think it's too implausible, for example, that defending my friends could be an entirely egoistic behaviour. But there is no value in 'persons in themselves'.
I don't promote 'egoist libertarianism', I accept and choose to argue egoism as a fact and I happen to agree with libertarians on a number of consequentialist points. To point out one example, I do not think that the State is evil, but I do think that no one actually has any reason to 'obey' the state.
Having a 'moral' sense - a sense that certain things are socially/interpersonally acceptable - is not 'irrational'. It seems to be a fact of biology. But the sorts of statements these feelings motivate people to make - saying, for example, "You should not do that" are literally false. And you can not find coherent fault with someone for rejecting the values which underly the judgement. Morality literally has no claim on anyone who disagrees with you - and since categorical imperatives are fundamentally impossible, all morality (libertarian or otherwise) at best amounts to fiction or propaganda.
That's wonderful for you, but many libertarians think morality is objective, imperative and beyond questions of actual motivation.The final point I would make, which dovetails with the rest, is that even though moral feelings are real, they are intrinsically personal feelings among specific people. And it is simply not plausible to state that all people having a moral feeling must share the same basic principles or conclusions. Not on sheer logic, and certainly not empirically. Which means that whatever is wrong with communists consequentially, their moral theory is not any more or less 'true' than the libertarian one. Nor is it - in fact - any less egoistic. It simply inclines people to feel that it is not egoistic. But all action is, by simple fact of individual existence, egoistic in the broad sense.
Vichy:Morality literally has no claim on anyone who disagrees with you - and since categorical imperatives are fundamentally impossible, all morality (libertarian or otherwise) at best amounts to fiction or propaganda.
Juan:Somehow you feel the need to keep on babbling your stupid stirnerite propaganda ? Why ?
While I may not be sure that Vichy is who she claims to be, she has answered questions put to her without being insulting or evasive. If you have a problem with something she has said, surely you are capable of more than demeaning her replies as babbling, and her ideas as stupid.
Enough with the Ad Homs.
without being insulting or evasive.
Juan:I don't think it's an 'ad-hominem' at all.
I didn't ask you what you thought.
Stop being insulting. It's not a request.
Vichy:Having a 'moral' sense - a sense that certain things are socially/interpersonally acceptable - is not 'irrational'. It seems to be a fact of biology. But the sorts of statements these feelings motivate people to make - saying, for example, "You should not do that" are literally false. And you can not find coherent fault with someone for rejecting the values which underly the judgement. Morality literally has no claim on anyone who disagrees with you - and since categorical imperatives are fundamentally impossible, all morality (libertarian or otherwise) at best amounts to fiction or propaganda.
That such statements are subjective does not make them false: in fact it is not even appropriate to ask whether they are true or false, anymore than asking if, "that puppy is cuter than the other one" is objectively true or false. When most people say, "you should not do that", they basically mean, "I feel that what you're doing is wrong," not "that action is objectively, and somehow cosmically, wrong". Yes, a good number of libertarians try to make out natural rights to be Kantian categorical imperatives; and I agree with you that they are incorrect in that. But to dismiss all moral judgments as based on Kantian nonsense is ridiculous.
Vichy:And it is simply not plausible to state that all people having a moral feeling must share the same basic principles or conclusions.
Almost everybody feels that murder, rape, plunder, and enslavement are wrong: that much is empirically clear. And each one of those mental concepts entails a sense of property rights. Those who participate in or support murder, rape, plunder, and enslavement either are abnormal or bury those feelings for the sake of their own aggrandizement. Communists fit the latter category.
Indeed, it is literally true, for example, that "Chocolate ice cream is better than vanilla," insofar as we remember this is 'true of my preferences'. But it is important to realise that all values actually exist on in specific individuals - so to say, "That goes against my sense of morals," might be coherent but to conclude, "Therefor you should not have done that" is not. You can not tell a person what they should or should not have done except as a hypothetical imperative. And this is the sense that I used the distinction of the 'categorical' imperative - not in a strictly Kantian manner, but in the sense of, "you should/should not have acted as you did", since the person was obviously in a literal sense acting on their actual values - in the only manner really available to them, in fact.
Most humans have some sense that certain activites are outside the bounds of acceptability, or at least reprobate. They also have a sense that people should respect certain spheres of autonomy, entailing of course control over physical resources. But it is simply false to say they believe this absolutely - they don't - or to say they are inconsistent for failing to do so. Values entailing some sense of liberty, property, equality, fairness are basically normal among human beings, but their proportions and entailments vary greatly. And you can not rationally call this 'wrong' - a freakish idolatry of property or equality is not implied by having an intrinsic sense that these values are valuable.
Vichy:"you should/should not have acted as you did", since the person was obviously in a literal sense acting on their actual values - in the only manner really available to them, in fact.
People who say "you should not have acted as you did" don't generally mean that the action was inconsistent with the actor's own values. They mean that the action was inconsistent with their own (that is, the speaker's) values.
Vichy:their proportions and entailments vary greatly.
They vary greatly precisely because they, again, are quieted by many for the sake of aggrandizement.
Vichy:And you can not rationally call this 'wrong'
Yes, I can, because "wrong" is subjective. I am sincerely and spontaneously outraged when I think about seizures of property. Therefore, I say that it is wrong. A communist may say the same about me holding private property. But I strongly suspect he would be posturing when doing so. Revulsion toward plunder is natural and near-universal. Revulsion toward private property is neither, and is generally only to be found among the theory class who would personally benefit from their theories taking hold.
Daniel J. Sanchez:Almost everybody feels that murder, rape, plunder, and enslavement are wrong:
Yes, a good number of libertarians try to make out natural rights to be Kantian categorical imperatives; and I agree with you that they are incorrect in that.
But to dismiss all moral judgments as based on Kantian nonsense is ridiculous.
Juan: Also, notice that almost everybody feels that murder in the name of 'your country' is thoroughly legitimate...so maybe it is ?
Don't humans renounce this action during some late point in life, usually? I'm translating "murder" as in an assasin of the state.
Vichy: That such statements are subjective does not make them false Indeed, it is literally true, for example, that "Chocolate ice cream is better than vanilla," insofar as we remember this is 'true of my preferences'. But it is important to realise that all values actually exist on in specific individuals - so to say, "That goes against my sense of morals," might be coherent but to conclude, "Therefor you should not have done that" is not. You can not tell a person what they should or should not have done except as a hypothetical imperative. And this is the sense that I used the distinction of the 'categorical' imperative - not in a strictly Kantian manner, but in the sense of, "you should/should not have acted as you did", since the person was obviously in a literal sense acting on their actual values - in the only manner really available to them, in fact. Almost everybody feels that murder, rape, plunder, and enslavement are wrong: that much is empirically clear. And each one of those mental concepts entails a sense of property rights. Most humans have some sense that certain activites are outside the bounds of acceptability, or at least reprobate. They also have a sense that people should respect certain spheres of autonomy, entailing of course control over physical resources. But it is simply false to say they believe this absolutely - they don't - or to say they are inconsistent for failing to do so. Values entailing some sense of liberty, property, equality, fairness are basically normal among human beings, but their proportions and entailments vary greatly. And you can not rationally call this 'wrong' - a freakish idolatry of property or equality is not implied by having an intrinsic sense that these values are valuable.
Isn't the very definition of words such as murder, rape, theft, etc wrong to at least the victim? Or am I missing your entire point?
Juan:What is kantian nonsense ?
I was referring to what Vichy might think of as Kantian nonsense. I actually have deep respect for Kant as a thinker. However, I do think he erred when he tried to establish morality as based on reason alone with his notion of the categorical imperative. I also believe that Rothbard (although he is my favorite human who ever lived) was incorrect in similarly basing property rights on reason alone. Like I said before, I believe Hume was right when he said that the ultimate spring of morality is the passions. I discuss Rothbard's critique of Hume's position here.
Juan:Also, notice that almost everybody feels that murder in the name of 'your country' is thoroughly legitimate...so maybe it is ?
Like I said, humans shove aside their moral code when in situations of extremity ("lifeboat situations"): this is not proof that the moral code does not exist, only that people will act immorally (commit "necessary evils") in conditions of extremity.
And almost everybody feels killing innocents in war is a necessary evil. This is one of the innumerable examples of the state having convinced most of humanity (through public school and mainstream media indoctrination) that society is in a perpetual "lifeboat situation" in which a great many "necessary evils" must be committed by the state, else the "lifeboat" of society will keel over and everybody will drown. Again, this is a lie. More consistent adherence to morality would emerge should this lie be exposed.
Juan:Humans are not really moral agents. Rather they are chemical machines which avoid certain pre-programmed emotions...
I know we had this debate before, but I feel compelled to rake it up one more time:Humans are life forms made up of particles. Some of these particles constitute admirable structures which are capable of things we call "reasoning" or "morality". Still, the human body is bound by its biological origin; in all likelihood, there was no magic touch that enabled us to step out of line. In that sense, humans are indeed masterpieces of chemistry.Sarcastically denying it won't make it wrong.Vichy,I was very pleased with your eloquent defense of moral nihilism. Have you ever looked into emergence? If yes, what do you think of it? And what's your take on free markets? I haven't been able to make that out as of yet.
I am increasingly getting the feeling that someone is a crank according to whether they agree with your own prejudices or not, i.e. the typical way this label is used, e.g. Mark Blaug dismissing Mises as a "crank" because of his methodological inclinations. I think I am just going to go directly to the thinkers you rely on, if I want their arguments, because this is becoming dull. Yes, "real" thinkers like Friedman.
Then from Sphairon...
Humans are life forms made up of particles. Some of these particles constitute admirable structures which are capable of things we call "reasoning" or "morality". Still, the human body is bound by its biological origin; in all likelihood, there was no magic touch that enabled us to step out of line. In that sense, humans are indeed masterpieces of chemistry.
And? Is this meant to be surprising/illuminating/interesting, as opposed to trivial and trite?
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Daniel J. Sanchez: And almost everybody feels killing innocents in war is a necessary evil. This is one of the innumerable examples of the state having convinced most of humanity (through public school and mainstream media indoctrination) that society is in a perpetual "lifeboat situation" in which a great many "necessary evils" must be committed by the state, else the "lifeboat" of society will keel over and everybody will drown. Again, this is a lie. More consistent adherence to morality would emerge should this lie be exposed.
Pure Poetry!
Excellent... very well written. Much of what you stated in this thread of the same, simply beautiful!
Jon Irenicus: And? Is this meant to be surprising/illuminating/interesting, as opposed to trivial and trite?
Well, it has quite a number of interesting implications if you ask me. Lack of "free will" would be among them; it also confirms what Vichy said about Asperger's patients being unable to feel empathy and thus, having a necessarily different approach towards morality than non-Aspergers.And I know, this has all been said before and it's not really shocking. But there seems to be this nagging rejection of the purely chemical/biological/physical nature of man that incentivizes me to repeat the state of affairs every now and then.
If you want an exposition of a type of free will from a thoroughgoing naturalist, look up Daniel Dennett's On Giving Libertarians what they say they want. Then again I am not the kind of person who is inclined to eliminate something because modern science is alleged to have a difficulty explaining it.
How does being the latter preclude being the former?