Doing community service with autistic kids I would not say that they have a lack of empathy, but they sometimes dont understand what they are doing. Once they understand what they did was wrong they can feel bad for it.
Daniel J. Sanchez: Juan:Humans are not really moral agents. Rather they are chemical machines which avoid certain pre-programmed emotions... How does being the latter preclude being the former?
Juan:Humans are not really moral agents. Rather they are chemical machines which avoid certain pre-programmed emotions...
How does being the latter preclude being the former?
Juan was being facetious.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Sphairon:Well, it has quite a number of interesting implications if you ask me. Lack of "free will" would be among them;
Of course the will is not free, if you mean "free from causation." Yes our choices are caused; that does not mean they are not choices, within the framework in which our minds operate. There is a "selector" in our minds that chooses between options. The fact that there ARE options makes the will free on the level that is meaningful to us, even though the operations of the selector itself has causes.
Sphairon:it also confirms what Vichy said about Asperger's patients being unable to feel empathy and thus, having a necessarily different approach towards morality than non-Aspergers.
That's true as far as it goes, keeping in mind that the existence of Aspberger's sufferers does not necessitate an egoist ethical stance among the rest of us, anymore than the existence of a computer does.
Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle in 9 steps (Soliciting comments)
Jon Irenicus: If you want an exposition of a type of free will from a thoroughgoing naturalist, look up Daniel Dennett's On Giving Libertarians what they say they want. Then again I am not the kind of person who is inclined to eliminate something because modern science is alleged to have a difficulty explaining it.
If you want an exposition of a type of free will from a thoroughgoing naturalist, look up Daniel Dennett's On Giving Libertarians what they say they want. Then again I am not the kind of person who is inclined to eliminate something because modern science is alleged to have a difficulty explaining it.
That looked interesting on first glance. I'll look into it, thanks!
wilderness: Pure Poetry! Excellent... very well written. Much of what you stated in this thread of the same, simply beautiful!
Pure Poetry!
Excellent... very well written. Much of what you stated in this thread of the same, simply beautiful!
Thank you for saying that, wilderness; it is much appreciated.
I'm still about mixed up about how to interpret his position, but the article (or at least its approach) is novel and interesting.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Dennett is hella smart.
While it is debatable whether liberterianism causes crankiness, side effects of anarchno-capitalism include short attention span and threadjacking and arguing!
Schools are labour camps.
With regards to the article, I don't think libertarianism makes people stupid; either they are or aren't. Plenty of libertarians are stupid, sure; and on the other hand, libertarianism in many cases seems to be able to make smart people say stupid things. The deification of the NAP is responsible for much of this though not all.
Regarding whether libertarians are cranky-- I'll point out that in this thread as in many others you see libertarians dismissing their opponents with one liner, "not even worth considering-- stupid," type comments. Of course, there are certain criticisms that are better off ignored, but libertarians take it too far. I think this type of discourse is quintessential crankyness, and you see it all over libertarianism, whether on this board or others. Libertarians often simply talk past their opponents and speak to them as savage unbelievers, whether it's to non-libertarians or infighting about "purity."
Sphairon:I know we had this debate before, but I feel compelled to rake it up one more time: Humans are life forms made up of particles. Some of these particles constitute admirable structures which are capable of things we call "reasoning" or "morality".
Daniel J. Sanchez:I believe Hume was right when he said that the ultimate spring of morality is the passions. I discuss Rothbard's critique of Hume's position here.
Daniel J. Sanchez: Juan: Humans are not really moral agents. Rather they are chemical machines which avoid certain pre-programmed emotions... How does being the latter preclude being the former?
Juan: Humans are not really moral agents. Rather they are chemical machines which avoid certain pre-programmed emotions...
Of course the will is not free, if you mean "free from causation." Yes our choices are caused; that does not mean they are not choices, within the framework in which our minds operate.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Vichy: Libertarians tend to be stupid because it's attractive to cranky dolts. That being said:
Libertarians tend to be stupid because it's attractive to cranky dolts. That being said:
Why say anything else though? You could just as easily have said:
"People who go to Libraries tend to be stupid because Libraries are attractive to cranky dolts."
It's no surprise to me that this thread is five pages long.
I was very pleased with your eloquent defense of moral nihilism. Have you ever looked into emergence? If yes, what do you think of it? And what's your take on free markets? I haven't been able to make that out as of yet
If you mean 'emergence' in terms of consciousness I reject it as a 'levels' theory of reality. I think everything in reality which exists/happens is solely the result of the interaction of the basic components (though we need not call them electrons, quarks etc. - mere). As this regards human beings, of course we have perspectives and values but there is neither a central 'identity' for us nor any existential freedom. We are teleologic (goal based) entities, we pursue our goals and we have no choice - we only lack the capacity to infer what actions we will actually pursue. Computational limitations and whatnot.
I think Austrian economics is more or less solid except when it tries to disprove all welfare or government activity. It's just not justified on the basis of Austrian econ - you have to make empirical arguments with reference to certain consequences. To assert that anything the market does is more argument-by-definition. That being said, it's not as though I think the statists have any particularly good points - and they are often quite oblivious to the drawbacks and difficulties of using a state to do, well, anything.
Doing community service with autistic kids I would not say that they have a lack of empathy, but they sometimes dont understand what they are doing.
The autistic are still marginally social, but they have a great deal of problem with effective (direct-feeling) empathy. Whether or not they can be convinced to 'feel bad' is just a matter of how you can manipulate their ideas and impulses. It just happens that a lack of empathy is a big barrier to this.
Egoism in the continental sense (existentially internal valuation and decision making) is a fact of reality, it's incoherent to deny it - teleological actors act themselves on their particular values. Voluntary (or philosophical) egoism is the conscious acceptance of this. So you may continue to believe a fictional moralistic paradigm, but the paradigm remains false. And, I would say that reducing morality to saying, "This is how I feel about it" undercuts exactly what people want morality for - to be able to tell other people what they should/should not do. It's a biology of social control - or, as Nietzsche said, "morality is herd instinct in the individual."
Yeah, witness this thread among many on Mises. A bunch of libertarians here decided to crankily dismiss everything they disagreed with without actually engaging it; especially the notion that libertarianism might be heavily crank-laden.
"Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned." - Avicenna
majevska: With regards to the article, I don't think libertarianism makes people stupid; either they are or aren't. Plenty of libertarians are stupid, sure; and on the other hand, libertarianism in many cases seems to be able to make smart people say stupid things. The deification of the NAP is responsible for much of this though not all. Regarding whether libertarians are cranky-- I'll point out that in this thread as in many others you see libertarians dismissing their opponents with one liner, "not even worth considering-- stupid," type comments. Of course, there are certain criticisms that are better off ignored, but libertarians take it too far. I think this type of discourse is quintessential crankyness, and you see it all over libertarianism, whether on this board or others. Libertarians often simply talk past their opponents and speak to them as savage unbelievers, whether it's to non-libertarians or infighting about "purity."
I think an outsider looking in might have this perspective about arguments over purity. I can see how it might seem cranky. And I also think I've come to realize this at times as well when I watch the back and forth. But I also take note that individuals will find disagreement. That's the beauty of diversity. Of course it depends on to what degree has the turf war over purity been extended. There is a too far sometimes, but there is a too little also no doubt.
"A is C."
"No it's not."
"Yes it is if the derivative of zy is calculated using the m-cost of Event WX... It is C."
And it does tend to seem more conflict oriented at times, but there are also some basic human relations that would help if mediated in preparedness by a circle of neighbors in whichever community, even an on-line one. Such as I won't coerce you, if you don't me. Then we can go on and argue if mental telepathy exists or not if the mood strikes us. Of course I wouldn't want to be in that debate at this time. No offense, but I just don't know.
Vichy:Yeah, witness this thread among many on Mises. A bunch of libertarians here decided to crankily dismiss everything they disagreed with without actually engaging it; especially the notion that libertarianism might be heavily crank-laden.
According to Scott Althaus' book Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics, the more knowledgeable one is the more libertarian one becomes, Althaus not being a libertarian sypathist by any means, makes this quite interesting.
Angurse: According to Scott Althaus' book Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics, the more knowledgeable one is the more libertarian one becomes, Althaus not being a libertarian sypathist by any means, makes this quite interesting.
'Knowledgeable' in what, exactly? College professors are (supposed to be) knowledgeable, yet a huge percentage in the US are marxist or marxist leaning.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Vichy:Yeah, witness this thread among many on Mises. A bunch of libertarians here decided to crankily dismiss everything they disagreed with without actually engaging it; especially the notion that libertarianism might be heavily crank-laden.After careful consideration, I've dismissed you as a crank and a poseur. And that's not a very good thing for your stay here--understand?
With all due respect, friend, do you think that's fair? Perhaps she has a point (about libertarians not engaging other ideas enough). Looking back at my own record, I see I've done that quite a few times myself...
"Anticapitalist theories share in common an inability to take human nature as it is. Rather than analyzing man as a complex creature, anticapitalist theories tend to focus on what the theorist wishes man to be." - Isaac Morehouse
Freiheit: With all due respect, friend, do you think that's fair? Perhaps she has a point (about libertarians not engaging other ideas enough). Looking back at my own record, I see I've done that quite a few times myself...
You know, it's almost like some of the posters are trying to prove my point about crankyness.
Vichy: Freiheit: With all due respect, friend, do you think that's fair? Perhaps she has a point (about libertarians not engaging other ideas enough). Looking back at my own record, I see I've done that quite a few times myself... You know, it's almost like some of the posters are trying to prove my point about crankyness.
So, permit me to properly engage your ideas. I admit I'm not very familiar with Steiner/Nietzsche. Can you give me a summarized version of your thoughts on ethics and why there are none?
Well, there is a lot to the answer of that question - which is to say, I think morality fails or invites strong skepticism from multiple angles. But the most basic one would be this:
The only 'morality' I consider relevant are those which make claims about what acts a person should or should not engage in/what things should or should not be like, as a function of morality. If one does not attempt to make the claim 'you should be moral' or 'morality is intrinsically valuable', it is not for this purpose 'morality'. The problems with virtue ethics, moral naturalism and moral fictionalism are different and I will not deal with them here.
The only thing that counts as a reason to do anything is a reason that could potentially motivate action. The only things that can potentially motivate action are those which refer to actual values the person has. Since all values are held by, and only by, specific individuals there is an incommensureability of interpersonal values. Therefor to tell someone 'they should not have done that', or to say someone's activities were 'objectively wrong' is pure nonsense. Because nothing is valuable unless someone values it, and the only real values are values actually instantiated in specific individuals.
Now some people might go this far with me, but this is the point I want to make clear: That even if you resign to a fictionalist/Humean paradigm, this simply does not line up with moral psychology and practice. People make judgements about other people's actions that they expect 'reasonable people' to accept. But what is reasonable is a matter of what sort of behaviour you approve of, and in any case the person you are judging is - if they disagree with your moral views, or do not care what you think is 'moral' - completely immune to claims or criticisms of this matter. Likewise, there is nothing one 'must' consider moral, and no 'overarching' goal that applies to all humans except for the immemorially vague 'satisfaction'. Human beings are distinct physical operators, and to criticize them for having values they have is like criticizing water for being wet. That's what they are, that's what they do.
I think to talk about psychological appeals (such as moral fictionalism) as being 'morality' is simply misleading in the real sense in which most moral statements are intended, and I think many moralists of this sort do a 'double-think' and forget these facts. Thus, in practice, most morality is error, nonsense, propaganda and sophistry.
Vichy: The only 'morality' I consider relevant are those which make claims about what acts a person should or should not engage in/what things should or should not be like, as a function of morality.
The only 'morality' I consider relevant are those which make claims about what acts a person should or should not engage in/what things should or should not be like, as a function of morality.
Could you elaborate on this for me, please? By "relevant," do you mean "relevant to human action" or merely "relevant to this discussion"?
Freiheit:With all due respect, friend, do you think that's fair?
I know energy creatures, and Vichy is one.
Vichy:You know, it's almost like some of the posters are trying to prove my point about crankyness.
You're not helping yourself any.
Freiheit: Vichy: Freiheit: With all due respect, friend, do you think that's fair? Perhaps she has a point (about libertarians not engaging other ideas enough). Looking back at my own record, I see I've done that quite a few times myself... You know, it's almost like some of the posters are trying to prove my point about crankyness. So, permit me to properly engage your ideas. I admit I'm not very familiar with Steiner/Nietzsche. Can you give me a summarized version of your thoughts on ethics and why there are none?
http://www.nonserviam.com/egoistarchive/stirner/bookhtml/The_Ego.html
That is an online link to the full text of "The Ego and It's Own", well worth the read.
Freiheit: Could you elaborate on this for me, please? By "relevant," do you mean "relevant to human action" or merely "relevant to this discussion"?
I mean, 'relevant for the purpose of this criticism'. As I said, there are other things people might call 'ethics' or morality, but I consider this to be the quintessential proposition and psychology of moralism. Without the notion that one ought to obey the dictates of morality contra practical motivations, I don't think it's accurate terminology to call it 'morality'.
My basic view of why this is would be that what people actually call morality is just a tendency to feel that things are 'acceptable', 'right' or 'wrong'; and to feel indignation and guilt if the moral views are driven against. People tend to believe these things are true of the world, or the actions they refer to (That was wrong, he is evil) rather than true of their own psychology. It's a fictional narrative of reality, and to quote Nietzsche again, "There are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena."
Dondoolee: http://www.nonserviam.com/egoistarchive/stirner/bookhtml/The_Ego.html That is an online link to the full text of "The Ego and It's Own", well worth the read.
Thank you for the link. I will absolutely give it a look.
Vichy: Freiheit: Could you elaborate on this for me, please? By "relevant," do you mean "relevant to human action" or merely "relevant to this discussion"? I mean, 'relevant for the purpose of this criticism'. As I said, there are other things people might call 'ethics' or morality, but I consider this to be the quintessential proposition and psychology of moralism. Without the notion that one ought to obey the dictates of morality contra practical motivations, I don't think it's accurate terminology to call it 'morality'. My basic view of why this is would be that what people actually call morality is just a tendency to feel that things are 'acceptable', 'right' or 'wrong'; and to feel indignation and guilt if the moral views are driven against. People tend to believe these things are true of the world, or the actions they refer to (That was wrong, he is evil) rather than true of their own psychology. It's a fictional narrative of reality, and to quote Nietzsche again, "There are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena."
So, with this in mind, what is your view on praxeology? Do you think there is any sort of logic to human action?
Vichy: Without the notion that one ought to obey the dictates of morality contra practical motivations, I don't think it's accurate terminology to call it 'morality'. It's a fictional narrative of reality, and to quote Nietzsche again, "There are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena."
Without the notion that one ought to obey the dictates of morality contra practical motivations, I don't think it's accurate terminology to call it 'morality'.
It's a fictional narrative of reality, and to quote Nietzsche again, "There are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretations of phenomena."
So what you said is 'with the notion that one ought to obey the dictates of morality contra practical motivations', then it is morality. I differ. I perceive morality also being practical.
Those moral interpretations of phenomena therefore make the phenomena moral. This is a statement rearranged to fit my perspective. So, I differ with yours.
Like I said, that just seems to be misleading terminology. Since that is certainly not what most people mean, and does not enable people to make the sorts of statements most of them would consider necessary to be called 'morality'. The fact that it totally ceases to be interpersonal is also a problem for most people.
The furthe problem is that, factually, morality is nothing but values you have. To talk about 'moral' values as if they had some extrensic worth is nonsense.
Likewise, moral arguments often refer to non-properties and thus don't really mean anything. So acting upon moral values is, more or less, arbitrary. It's not even internally consistent as an idea of 'justice', since what you think 'liberty' implies in practice can not be restricted in a non-arbitrary manner.
Does it really matter if you call it "morality" or not? I think it's a big who cares. Couldn't it be right and wrong because some actions just don't get rewarded? For example as a player of Euchre and Pinochle (two card games) they have "no cheating" rules. They also have customs where the winner of the game takes the money, and this all goes on in illegal gambling so there is no law to enforce it. The people/ places get weeded out on things most people would consider "bad" behavior.
The same easily goes from me (and most other bar owners I know of) owning a rough bar, where you actually run across very violent people who have nothing to lose and no care in the world. These are very scary people to deal with, but after the initial shock of dealing with them, they get weeded out too. Many of these degenrates from my experience (6 yrs owning the place) end up dead , in jail, or ostracized completley from the groups they were initially with. They certainly were not welcomed with any bars I was familiar with in the area. Call it what you want but undesirable people/ traits get weeded out. And the more undesired (example, people who murder) the more likely they are not to last.
Vichy: Like I said, that just seems to be misleading terminology. Since that is certainly not what most people mean, and does not enable people to make the sorts of statements most of them would consider necessary to be called 'morality'. The fact that it totally ceases to be interpersonal is also a problem for most people.
A) sentence one: misleading to you
B) sentence two: generalizing
C) sentence three: opinion not validated by my experience
Vichy: The furthe problem is that, factually, morality is nothing but values you have.
The furthe problem is that, factually, morality is nothing but values you have.
We've had this conversation before. I said I'm a moral artist. So you're saying nothing new here.
Vichy: To talk about 'moral' values as if they had some extrensic worth is nonsense.
To talk about 'moral' values as if they had some extrensic worth is nonsense.
A) opinion not validated by my experience
Vichy: Likewise, moral arguments often refer to non-properties and thus don't really mean anything.
Likewise, moral arguments often refer to non-properties and thus don't really mean anything.
My moral argument refers to properties.
Vichy: So acting upon moral values is, more or less, arbitrary.
So acting upon moral values is, more or less, arbitrary.
yeap arbitrary, free choice...
Vichy: It's not even internally consistent as an idea of 'justice', since what you think 'liberty' implies in practice can not be restricted in a non-arbitrary manner.
It's not even internally consistent as an idea of 'justice', since what you think 'liberty' implies in practice can not be restricted in a non-arbitrary manner.
don't coerce me, and I won't need to defend myself... simple.
Dear Vichy,
What is wrong with you
do we get free cheezeburger in socielism?
Vichy:People make judgements about other people's actions that they expect 'reasonable people' to accept.
People use words like "reasonable" when the are making judgments of virtue and vice, which are generally matters of character, not morality. Matters of morality (and especially those we've been discussing) generally concern questions of justice and crime (in the broader, non-state sense).
Vichy:Human beings are distinct physical operators, and to criticize them for having values they have is like criticizing water for being wet.
This reminds me of the cultural relativist Greek sophists and modern anthropologists who criticize the western culture of criticizing other cultures, because, according to their culture, cultures are not to be criticized.
Vichy, do you honestly believe the statement, "you shouldn't have murdered my son, damn you" is a ridiculous statement, akin to "water, thou shouldst not be wet."?
Absolutely - because there are no reasons other than practical reasons, if something does not motivate someone to act it is literally irrelevant. All you are doing is stating your preference which, if the person in question agreed with you, he would not have killed your son. By the way, the term 'murder' is in itself begging the question.
Vichy: Vichy, do you honestly believe the statement, "you shouldn't have murdered my son, damn you" is a ridiculous statement, akin to "water, thou shouldst not be wet."? Absolutely - because there are no reasons other than practical reasons, if something does not motivate someone to act it is literally irrelevant. All you are doing is stating your preference which, if the person in question agreed with you, he would not have killed your son. By the way, the term 'murder' is in itself begging the question.
Vichy,
Would you agree with the statement that, given any desired end, there are necessarily some means that are more appropriate to employ and some that are less appropriate to employ, in the pursuit of that desired end?
But end variance is vast, and only meaningful in the context of a given specific individual and the circumstances he actually resides in. Furthermore, you are attempting morality-by-redefinition. Read my post here about the problems with that.
Vichy: Would you agree with the statement that, given any desired end, there are necessarily some means that are more appropriate to employ and some that are less appropriate to employ, in the pursuit of that desired end? But end variance is vast, and only meaningful in the context of a given specific individual and the circumstances he actually resides in. Furthermore, you are attempting morality-by-redefinition. Read my post here about the problems with that.
What if there were to be a singular desired end that is pursued by all acting humans at all times?
Then we'd live in a fantasy land. And how would you possibly prove this? It is CLEARLY an empirical question, and I doubt you much know what your nearest relatives 'aims' are, much less the planet's.
Furthermore, even individual human beings do not have unified 'ends' - we're a complex pattern of conscious and unconscious motivations, frequently at odds and contorted in relations with eachother so complex they're almost impossible to sort out. There is no 'single-end' for one reason because there is no unified 'self' which can sort amongst them, the self is a congruence of various disparate and incommensearable ends which basically strain for control and satisfaction. And there is no way to sort between these various ends, since that would presume an extra-personal ability to judge between values which is pure nonsense.
Vichy: What if there were to be a singular desired end that is pursued by all acting humans at all times? Then we'd live in a fantasy land. And how would you possibly prove this? It is CLEARLY an empirical question, and I doubt you much know what your nearest relatives 'aims' are, much less the planet's. Furthermore, even individual human beings do not have unified 'ends' - we're a complex pattern of conscious and unconscious motivations, frequently at odds and contorted in relations with eachother so complex they're almost impossible to sort out. There is no 'single-end' for one reason because there is no unified 'self' which can sort amongst them, the self is a congruence of various disparate and incommensearable ends which basically strain for control and satisfaction. And there is no way to sort between these various ends, since that would presume an extra-personal ability to judge between values which is pure nonsense.
Do you agree with Ludwig von Mises that the purpose of human action is always to substitute a more satisfactory state of affairs for a less satisfactory state of affairs?
Vichy: Vichy, do you honestly believe the statement, "you shouldn't have murdered my son, damn you" is a ridiculous statement, akin to "water, thou shouldst not be wet."? Absolutely
Absolutely
Alright then, I'm not going to convince you, given that you seem to be enamored with this line of thought. I'm satisfied that with the above exchange, to anyone you might have tempted toward philosophical amoralism, it is now sufficiently evident how unhinged your position is.
That said, I enjoyed debating you (it helped me crystallize some of my ideas), and I sincerely hope you don't get banned, as I feel that would be grossly unfair.
Yes, but what is 'satisfactory' is not any specific emotional state, nor some specific end sought after, it is tautological - the satisfaction of a particular end that is actually held by a particular person at a particular time in particular circumstances. It is impermissible to try to fight amongst the ends an individual has at one time or another, or to claim as invalid whatever ends he actually holds. This is as fallacious as comparing my utility to yours.
I'm satisfied that with the above exchange, to anyone you might have tempted toward philosophical amoralism, it is now sufficiently evident how unhinged your position is.
That's exactly what amoralism implies. It's only 'unhinged' because your psychological machinery has a hell of a time believing that 'morality' is literally false, just as most people can't believe that well-intentioned policy could possibly result in mass slaughter. You can not criticize the accuracy of a belief by attacking its consequences, these two parts are strictly irrelevant to one another.