Harry Felker: wilderness: Yet, it's also obvious that some are fearful of justice and liberty - I have no idea why, so, they try to find a way around it. Fear of responsibility for their actions...
wilderness: Yet, it's also obvious that some are fearful of justice and liberty - I have no idea why, so, they try to find a way around it.
Fear of responsibility for their actions...
I completely agree!!!
Anarcho-Mercantilist: One way to refute Rothbardian natural law is to refute ethical apriorism. Because ethical apriorism is a broader category than Rothbardian natural law, refuting the former will consequentially refute the latter. How do we refute ethical apriorism then? I found three ways. The first way is to refute the proposition: "ethics only requires reason alone, with no grounding by emotions or passions." Lilburne already did that, and hence he has legitimately refuted Rothbardian natural law. A second way to refute ethical apriorism is to refute the legitimacy of the argument by performative contradiction. I have summarized my points against the performative contradiction argument in my blog and some forum posts here. A third way to refute ethical aprorism is to refute that we can derive normative ethical commands from descriptive statements, like refuting that we can derive an "ought" from an "is". Rothbardian natural law uses "nature" as an "is."
One way to refute Rothbardian natural law is to refute ethical apriorism. Because ethical apriorism is a broader category than Rothbardian natural law, refuting the former will consequentially refute the latter.
How do we refute ethical apriorism then? I found three ways. The first way is to refute the proposition: "ethics only requires reason alone, with no grounding by emotions or passions." Lilburne already did that, and hence he has legitimately refuted Rothbardian natural law.
A second way to refute ethical apriorism is to refute the legitimacy of the argument by performative contradiction. I have summarized my points against the performative contradiction argument in my blog and some forum posts here.
A third way to refute ethical aprorism is to refute that we can derive normative ethical commands from descriptive statements, like refuting that we can derive an "ought" from an "is". Rothbardian natural law uses "nature" as an "is."
Ethical apriorism is not broad at all. It is tiny. It is due to ignorance on your part in having a fetish with the terms "natural".
And no Lilburne and you are totally confused about human nature. Human nature is not devoid of passions and emotions and nobody but a logical positivist would say human nature is devoid of such. So your quarrel is with logical positivists. Read Aristotle's Ethics he goes on and on and on and on... if you know Aristotle, he goes on and on... about passions and emotions and happiness and how this is human nature along with rational principles. You are taking snap shots of life and forgetting the rest of life has already been described at length by people for thousands of years. You are not saying anything new at all.
As for the rest of what you said I'm thinking your tangents from all the posts you've had in this forum are coming to light. It's arrogance on your part more than anything. You think you discovered something, "Oh my I discovered humans have emotions." And then you think it's new. Wake up dude we've known humans have emotions and passions. It's not new. That's like the one poster in this thread thinking it's not human nature to have an involuntary heartbeat. Really. Take a step back. Think for a bit. Your saying stuff that is common sense and then coming up with unnecessary refutations about not a damn thing. I call it the arrogance of immaturity. So we'll blame it on youth.
Harry Felker:This is comparing apples and oranges, you are not a teddy bear, nor is a teddy bear a sentient creature, now lets say your wife, do you own your wife?
That is exactly my point-- yet it is you, not me who uses the same words and concepts to describe these "apples and oranges." I have distinguished between various forms of ownership: normative, de facto, de jure; yet you have failed to make any distinction and consistently use the empirical evidence of de facto ownership of ones body in support of normative ownership of everything from one's body to one's car.
De jure and de facto ownership are reasoned descriptive terms, why should it not be how one ought to live, would you rather be living outside of reason?
I haven't rejected "de jure" and "de facto" as reasoned descriptive terms, or as meaningful, coherent terms. What I have rejected is that de facto ownership is evidence of normative ownership. I also reject your insinuation that anyone who disobeys your particular normative beliefs, whether in thought or action, is "living outside of reason." You have still not proven that violation of your norms is disadvantageous to every individual (committing the violation) at every time.
The second statement quoted basically says self ownership is a matter of fact by way of evidence of Neurological connections, but somehow this cannot be translated into a "law", I am supposing because the poster is under some impression that humans should not be held accountable for their actions....
I never said neurological connections are not based on laws of physics, only that these laws of physics don't prescribe any normative ethics. As for "being held accountable for their actions," I do think there's strong evidence that in many situations this is a necessary ingredient of a successful social system-- but if a particular individual would prefer others not to hold him accountable, then from his perspective it would be preferable not to be held accountable.
majevska: but if a particular individual would prefer others not to hold him accountable, then from his perspective it would be preferable not to be held accountable.
but if a particular individual would prefer others not to hold him accountable, then from his perspective it would be preferable not to be held accountable.
So? It's not as if you state anything enlightening here.
wilderness: Anarcho-Mercantilist: We will define "ethical apriorism" as the methodology in which we could deduce moral codes from reason alone, without reference to subjective preferences, human passions, and human desires. For example, the subjective preference of "not being murdered" is irrelevant to the question "is murder moral?" Whether murder is moral or immoral can be determined by reason alone, without reference to human passions. Same with the question "is adultery moral?" or "is blackmail moral?" Human emotions are irrelevant in determining whether these are moral or not. Only reason and "logical consistency" can determine if they are moral or not. ok. Sound good. But that's what Natural Law is about and Natural law is much much more. You are merely providing a term about reasons own action in deducing moral codes. Whether that exists or not, such a term elsewhere, I don't know.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: We will define "ethical apriorism" as the methodology in which we could deduce moral codes from reason alone, without reference to subjective preferences, human passions, and human desires. For example, the subjective preference of "not being murdered" is irrelevant to the question "is murder moral?" Whether murder is moral or immoral can be determined by reason alone, without reference to human passions. Same with the question "is adultery moral?" or "is blackmail moral?" Human emotions are irrelevant in determining whether these are moral or not. Only reason and "logical consistency" can determine if they are moral or not.
We will define "ethical apriorism" as the methodology in which we could deduce moral codes from reason alone, without reference to subjective preferences, human passions, and human desires. For example, the subjective preference of "not being murdered" is irrelevant to the question "is murder moral?" Whether murder is moral or immoral can be determined by reason alone, without reference to human passions. Same with the question "is adultery moral?" or "is blackmail moral?" Human emotions are irrelevant in determining whether these are moral or not. Only reason and "logical consistency" can determine if they are moral or not.
ok. Sound good. But that's what Natural Law is about and Natural law is much much more. You are merely providing a term about reasons own action in deducing moral codes. Whether that exists or not, such a term elsewhere, I don't know.
Well. I found the concept already. Aristotle calls reasoning morals: practical wisdom. So you haven't said anything new. And ways of conceptualizing practical wisdom are "understanding", "judgement", and "intuitive reason".
Check Book 6 Chapter 12 for further reference, but this whole book of his Ethics discusses this further. It's not that Aristotle was all knowing, but it points out that somebody already thought about this stuff. I have no doubts others since him have written on this either. It's the way western civilization is with all it's desires of philosophy and such.
majevska:That is exactly my point-- yet it is you, not me who uses the same words and concepts to describe these "apples and oranges." I have distinguished between various forms of ownership: normative, de facto, de jure; yet you have failed to make any distinction and consistently use the empirical evidence of de facto ownership of ones body in support of normative ownership of everything from one's body to one's car.
Ok I will do this again....
You own you, as no one else does own you, this is a fact....
Since you own you, you are responsible for your actions, therefore since you are responsible for your actions they result in creating property that is yours, it is the act of acting, combining resource with effort, that creates property, when the effort comes from you it is yours...
majevska:You have still not proven that violation of your norms is disadvantageous to every individual (committing the violation) at every time.
I have no time or place for moral nihilism, I can simply reason it as such, people do not get very far violating others rights, eventually they run out of victims or they face retaliation, this is something people do understand on the individual level, it is the reason we are still here on earth, individuals cooperating provides more "flourishing" (as wilderness puts it), or profit (As I put it) with the least effort....
If you will continue along the line of "If I violate another person's rights and I am not caught it is fine" find someone else to point this argument at, as it is absurd...
I do not have to prove it is disadvantageous to every violator at all times, I have to prove it is more advantageous to not violate, which is simple, there is no risk of retaliation...
majevska: I never said neurological connections are not based on laws of physics, only that these laws of physics don't prescribe any normative ethics. As for "being held accountable for their actions," I do think there's strong evidence that in many situations this is a necessary ingredient of a successful social system-- but if a particular individual would prefer others not to hold him accountable, then from his perspective it would be preferable not to be held accountable.
The laws of physics produce your sentience do they not?
And a person that feels that way would prefer to live outside of a society, I would hpe that person can provide for all his needs on his own, because the first person he steals from, murders, rapes, etc will most likely be his last in a free society....
The fact is that you think because there are some individuals that would rather violate other people that it automatically disproves the rule, there is a reason this is an exception, not normative, to violate others.....
Normative ethics is not based on absolute adherence, but rather the norm, that is the most prevalent....
So please prove that it is most prevalent that violating others is more profitable to individual life....
It sounds like the ocean, smells like fresh mountain air, and tastes like the union of peanut butter and chocolate. ~Liberty Student
Anarcho-Mercantilist:A second way to refute ethical apriorism is to refute the legitimacy of the argument by performative contradiction. I have summarized my points against the performative contradiction argument in my blog and some forum posts here.
i find your distaste for arguments reliant on performative contradiction to be quite odd.
on the one hand you admit that it is not possible to criticise them. at the end of the day someone who tries will contradict themselves. and then you assert that because they rest on assumptions; you dont trust that they are sound. or in otherwords, you criticise them. so are they criticisable or not? it seems like your meta-criticism of perfomative contradiction leads you into contradiction? funny eh?
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Anarcho-Mercantilist: I believe that you have strawmanned the "moral subjectivists" and the "moral nihilists". There are multiple definitions of these two terms. So be sure to define what you mean by "moral subjectivists" or "moral nihilsts" before you critique them. Even though some "moral subjectivists" and "moral nihilists" denies rights (which has multiple definitions), they would actually oppose Hitler. Some are "subjectivists" or "nihilists" in the epistemological level only. The definition of "natural law" is ambiguous. For instance, Rothbard does not explicitly deny that natural law denies passions and emotions to ground it. Yet, in actual practice, Rothbard's "natural law" actually denies emotions and passions. Therefore, Rothbard's definition of "natural law" is incomplete. One could only get a complete definition of Rothbard's "natural law" by reading his whole book the Ethics of Liberty. Is "natural law" the same to my definition of "ethical aprorism"? Both Rothbard and Hoppe identify themselves as "natural law" theorists. In addition, my definition of "ethical apriorism" is in accord to the ethical methodology of both Rothbard and Hoppe. Therefore, I believe that my definition of "ethical apriorism" is the same as "natural law". I invented the term "ethical apriorism" as a replacement for "natural law" because of the ambiguity of the latter. I used "ethical apriorism" to avoid semantic confusion. My use of "ethical apriorism" is just a name only. Therefore, it does not necessarily imply that it is actually apriori. You can replace the term "ethical apriorism" to anything you like, such as "ethical Rothbardianism" or "hashem-ism". I believe that my definition of "ethical apriorism" is about the same as the definition of "natural law", but without the buzzwords such as "natural" or "human nature".
I believe that you have strawmanned the "moral subjectivists" and the "moral nihilists". There are multiple definitions of these two terms. So be sure to define what you mean by "moral subjectivists" or "moral nihilsts" before you critique them. Even though some "moral subjectivists" and "moral nihilists" denies rights (which has multiple definitions), they would actually oppose Hitler. Some are "subjectivists" or "nihilists" in the epistemological level only.
The definition of "natural law" is ambiguous. For instance, Rothbard does not explicitly deny that natural law denies passions and emotions to ground it. Yet, in actual practice, Rothbard's "natural law" actually denies emotions and passions. Therefore, Rothbard's definition of "natural law" is incomplete. One could only get a complete definition of Rothbard's "natural law" by reading his whole book the Ethics of Liberty.
Is "natural law" the same to my definition of "ethical aprorism"? Both Rothbard and Hoppe identify themselves as "natural law" theorists. In addition, my definition of "ethical apriorism" is in accord to the ethical methodology of both Rothbard and Hoppe. Therefore, I believe that my definition of "ethical apriorism" is the same as "natural law".
I invented the term "ethical apriorism" as a replacement for "natural law" because of the ambiguity of the latter. I used "ethical apriorism" to avoid semantic confusion. My use of "ethical apriorism" is just a name only. Therefore, it does not necessarily imply that it is actually apriori. You can replace the term "ethical apriorism" to anything you like, such as "ethical Rothbardianism" or "hashem-ism". I believe that my definition of "ethical apriorism" is about the same as the definition of "natural law", but without the buzzwords such as "natural" or "human nature".
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Anarcho Mercantilist:There is nothing self-contradictory of "descriptive moral subjectivism". Yet, as you have repeatively demonstrated, both literally and sarcastically, that "prescriptive moral subjectivism" is a self-refuting idea. "Presciptive moral subjectivism" is self-refuting because it prescribes a moral code which denies the moral code in itself.
But not so with "descriptive moral subjectivism." "Descriptive moral subjectivism" is an idea that "only human subjects prescribe morality. neither divine entities nor higher spirits prescribe morality."
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
hashem:It does nothing to refute empirical praxeological axioms. And I don't see it doing much to destroy natural laws. Humans do indeed act.
The action axiom is not empirical, it is a synthetic a priori judgment.
Abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be found.
- Edmund Burke
Juan: Anarcho Mercantilist:There is nothing self-contradictory of "descriptive moral subjectivism". Yet, as you have repeatively demonstrated, both literally and sarcastically, that "prescriptive moral subjectivism" is a self-refuting idea. "Presciptive moral subjectivism" is self-refuting because it prescribes a moral code which denies the moral code in itself. And what you call "descriptive moral subjectivism" is true at a basic level but mostly irrelevant...OR it leads to "prescriptive moral subjectivism". But not so with "descriptive moral subjectivism." "Descriptive moral subjectivism" is an idea that "only human subjects prescribe morality. neither divine entities nor higher spirits prescribe morality." I said nothing about divine entities... Now, depending on what you deduce starting off with "only human subjects prescribe morality" you will render the idea of morality meaningless. In this regard, the 'philosophers' a la Vichy are more consistent. They consider morality to be literal nonsense. That's more honest than saying that morality is 'just' subjective valuations.
A nihilist like Vichy still values such things as reason and consistency, as these are the criteria she holds natural rights or any prescriptive morality to. If she did not value either reason or consistency, she would have nothing to critique. So I think Vichy doesn't reject morality per se, as she holds herself to a set of values, namely those outlined above. She, like me, may hold morality based on categorical imperatives to be nonsense, but that does not reject ethics as a whole.
I suppose I should add as a qualifier to my posts "if you value consistency and reason", so that I am not misinterpreted.
values is a big word. dont confuse moral values with 'desire' values.
zefreak:A nihilist like Vichy still values such things as reason and consistency, as these are the criteria she holds natural rights or any prescriptive morality to. If she did not value either reason or consistency, she would have nothing to critique.
So I think Vichy doesn't reject morality per se,
She, like me, may hold morality based on categorical imperatives to be nonsense, but that does not reject ethics as a whole.
This is getting off topic, but materialism is both rational and consistent. That doesn't mean it is correct, but Cartesian duality is not necessary to explain the phenomena of consciousness.
This is getting off topic, but materialism is both rational and consistent.
What is its scope? Cartesian duality is not necessary to explain the phenomena of consciousness, so why is materialism as a unified theory wrong, or misapplied?
Juan:Is consciousness some sort of physical stuff ? Is it an element ? A chemical compound ? Are ideas, feelings, thoughts made of some sort of material ?
One theory stipulates that consciousness is an aggregation of neurons firing in the brain, given coherence through synchronicity of those neural networks (why weight, color, texture, smell etc are seen as attributes of a singular entity). Just as our perception is essentially a representational model of an external reality, so is, under the theory, conciousness. There is ample experimental data to suggest this. It gives a materialistic explanation for lucid dreaming, OBE's, phantom limb syndrome, etc.
Juan:I'm afraid you don't understand the problem. Or maybe you believe that, say, your video camera is an entity which sees things, not in a metaphorical sense but literally ? Is your video camera alive ? Does your mp3 player sing ?
A materialist would say that there is no fundamental difference between "living" entities and nonliving ones. Both are patterns and combinations of the same building blocks of matter, only a human is immeasurably more complicated than a video camera.
zefreak:A materialist would say that there is no fundamental difference between "living" entities and nonliving ones. Both are patterns and combinations of the same building blocks of matter, only a human is immeasurably more complicated than a video camera.
that begs the question of what is the difference. (non-fundamental of course)
fundamental doesnt equal good/right/true/the whole story.
only a human is immeasurably more complicated than a video camera.
Aristotle:
"Hence it is about the same objects as practical wisdom; but understanding and practical wisdom are not the same. For practical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done; but understanding only judges. Now understanding is neither the having nor the acquiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so 'understanding' is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging of what some one else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned -- and of judging soundly; for 'well' and 'soundly' are the same thing. And from this has come the use of the name 'understanding' in virtue of which men are said to be 'of good understanding', viz. from the application of the word to the grasping of scientific truth; for we often call such grasping understanding."
"(3) Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means."
It's the way the human brain works. it is how we act in the first place. This is morality. It is scientific cause it is demonstrated.
Juan:only a human is immeasurably more complicated than a video camera. Actually machines are way better than humans at tasks which are not obviously mechanical. That is, a video recorder is device which can 'see' and 'remember' more efficiently than a human brain.
Non Sequitur. Efficiancy is not directly related to complexity.
nirgrahamUK: zefreak:A materialist would say that there is no fundamental difference between "living" entities and nonliving ones. Both are patterns and combinations of the same building blocks of matter, only a human is immeasurably more complicated than a video camera. that begs the question of what is the difference. (non-fundamental of course) fundamental doesnt equal good/right/true/the whole story.
I asked him to clarify the difference. I do not think there is one. Regardless, the point is not to prove or disprove either monist or pluralist ontology, but to show that everything can be reduced to matter, including consciousness, without inconsistencies or contradictions.
Juan:only a human is immeasurably more complicated than a video camera. Actually machines are way better than humans at tasks which are not obviously mechanical. That is, a video recorder is a device which can 'see' and 'remember' more efficiently than a human brain.
Non Sequitur
im rather confident consciousness can be fully explained by the relationships obtaining between material objects. I dont see how this impugnes what juan has been saying. regardless one must agree that the 'relations' between atoms and molecules are not themselves atoms or molecules. do hardcore materialists other than myself acknowledge this?
but to show that everything can be reduced to matter, including consciousness, without inconsistencies or contradictions.
regardless one must agree that the 'relations' between atoms and molecules are not themselves atoms or molecules. do hardcore materialists other than myself acknowledge this?
spatial arrangements would be an example, there are others, im not a physicist though so I cant say too much on the subject. but all the laws of math for example cant be explained by reference to material objects.... though those objects exepmlify them. so materiality cant explain everything
nirgrahamUK: im rather confident consciousness can be fully explained by the relationships obtaining between material objects. I dont see how this impugnes what juan has been saying. regardless one must agree that the 'relations' between atoms and molecules are not themselves atoms or molecules. do hardcore materialists other than myself acknowledge this?
I acknowledge it, but don't see your point. Unless I misunderstand him, Juan has been saying that a purely reductionist/materialist view of the world is illogical or contradictory.
zefreak: nirgrahamUK: im rather confident consciousness can be fully explained by the relationships obtaining between material objects. I dont see how this impugnes what juan has been saying. regardless one must agree that the 'relations' between atoms and molecules are not themselves atoms or molecules. do hardcore materialists other than myself acknowledge this? I acknowledge it, but don't see your point. Unless I misunderstand him, Juan has been saying that a purely reductionist/materialist view of the world is illogical or contradictory.
The point that I see is what I related to you numerous times earlier. So we'll use the materialist view, since that's the current discussion. Since you are using that view deductively your explanations will be limited, thus, lacking explanatory power.
if you acknowledge it then you are acknowledge that reductionism is powerful even though not all explanations will boil into its terms (arguments over math etc). so why expect the same for moral arguments?
nirgrahamUK: spatial arrangements would be an example, there are others, im not a physicist though so I cant say too much on the subject. but all the laws of math for example cant be explained by reference to material objects.... though those objects exepmlify them. so materiality cant explain everything
Obviously. Materialism doesn't posit that ideas or relationships are actual material. I don't know where this misunderstanding came from.
I even stated that consciousness is a result of the aggregate firings of neurons in the brain and their relationships to one another.
From wiki: "mental event types (for example, pains) are identical, perhaps contingently, with specific physical event types in the brain (for example, C-fiber firings)"
Obviously there is no material for "pain".
so how would you describe your disagreement with juan?
nirgrahamUK: if you acknowledge it then you are acknowledge that reductionism is powerful even though not all explanations will boil into its terms (arguments over math etc). so why expect the same for moral arguments?
You are misrepresenting me. As I said at the beginning, this has nothing to do with the current discussion of morality. Juan stated that materialism leads to contradiction, bringing up Viche as an example. That is all I have been discussing.
Nir:spatial arrangements would be an example, there are others,
well, there is amibiguity in that word 'are' which is to say being. yes, only wave-parcticles exist and they explain what they explain, but does the law of non-contradiction exist or not? we must say that it exists but be using exist in a similar but slightly different way. its a horrendously subtle topic !