1. A discussion pointed a critical flaw in my understanding of the axiom "Humans Act". A person who is in a coma does not act, yet they are still a human. But if all humans act, this contradicts that statement. How do you explain this cognitive dissonance.
Schools are labour camps.
In my opinion, people concern themselves far too much with the action axiom. The whole of praxeology is hypothetical in any case, meaning, catallactics is hypothetical, it assumes that those who the analysis concerns are acting human beings. The whole point of the action axiom was to provide a solid basis from which economic analysis could proceed, and it acheived that. Even if one could find an obscure situation in which the action axiom did not apply, I daresay it would not have too much of an impact on the Austrian analysis of the economy. I've yet to see many economists devote huge amounts of time to the role of vegetables in the business cycle, so I don't see why Austrians should.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
Eliotn, one more point. In terms of pure economic theory, it isn't necessary to prove that all individuals in the economy are actors in the Misesian sense (that can never be proven in any case, even if you and I are debating all it proves is that we are acting, not any body else in the economy). All that is necessary is that we assume that everybody in an economy is an actor. In terms of empirical applications of Austrian theory, then we must assume that actors in the economy are indeed actors, in the Austrian usage of the word. All things given, it isn't such an unrealistic assumption, especially when compared with the mainstream defintions of economic man, who is a perfectly "rational" optimizing individual with perfect knowledge of his own value scales and perfect knowledge of all goods for sale.
BobT:Actually he says those who are unchangeably unfit for action. It is reasonable to assume that a person in a coma can recover and continue to act.
Yes, that's why I wrote, "at least one in a permanent coma".
Wilmot of Rochester:You addressed pre compa and post coma, but not the state of the coma itself.
People in a coma do not act, and so they are not pertinent to economic analysis.
The action axiom is the starting point. If we act, then such and such is logically consequent. And if you deny that we act, your denial is an action and you are in a performative contradiction. No one in a coma is going to deny that he acts.
Because people in a coma do not act, choices concerning them must be made by next-of-kin or by way of a written will.
The fallacies of intellectual communism, a compilation - On the nature of power
BobT: It does not say "Humans are always acting," it says that humans do act. A person who has acted before the coma and will act after is by definition a being who does act. He just does not happen to be acting at that exact moment. It is the same for a sleeping person.
It does not say "Humans are always acting," it says that humans do act. A person who has acted before the coma and will act after is by definition a being who does act. He just does not happen to be acting at that exact moment. It is the same for a sleeping person.
So a child born into a coma - something that occurs - and never acts or who never will act, is he a human being?I'm saying that there are serious flaws I can see and that having to rely on grammar to patch up the holes isn't going to work out too well in real debates.
existence is elsewhere
Knight_of_BAAWA: Wilmot of Rochester:You addressed pre compa and post coma, but not the state of the coma itself.Actually, I did. Re-read the part about DNA. Helps to read the whole post, y'know.
You mentioned DNA as an afterthought. Your previous argument didn't really concern it, but if you're now saying that DNA is the qualifier for being human, then that's pretty good. I agree that biology does tend to make a human being.
That said, however, I find that the definition of human is usually more about what others perceive than what actually is, seeing as the thing in itself is more or less unknowable - at least according to Kant.
Stranger: People in a coma do not act, and so they are not pertinent to economic analysis. The action axiom is the starting point. If we act, then such and such is logically consequent. And if you deny that we act, your denial is an action and you are in a performative contradiction. No one in a coma is going to deny that he acts. Because people in a coma do not act, choices concerning them must be made by next-of-kin or by way of a written will.
Is the idea of praxeology only applicable to economics? If so, fair enough.
To be perfectly honest, I don't really know the value in praxeology.
Stranger:People in a coma do not act, and so they are not pertinent to economic analysis.
"Look at me, I'm quoting another user to show how wrong I think they are, out of arrogance of my own position. Wait, this is my own quote, oh shi-" ~ Nitroadict
Wilmot of Rochester:You mentioned DNA as an afterthought.
Nitroadict: Maybe not for human action, but wouldn't the costs of maintaining living standards for the coma patients be pertinent to economic analysis? I'd imagine it would be very important given the possible effects of a given overall economy or healthcare system on the standards of maintience on coma patients, who cannot economically act for themselves.
As I said, this cannot be decided by the person in a coma, who cannot act. It can only be decided by acting people who will decide the fate of the comatose person.
Stranger: Nitroadict: Maybe not for human action, but wouldn't the costs of maintaining living standards for the coma patients be pertinent to economic analysis? I'd imagine it would be very important given the possible effects of a given overall economy or healthcare system on the standards of maintience on coma patients, who cannot economically act for themselves. As I said, this cannot be decided by the person in a coma, who cannot act. It can only be decided by acting people who will decide the fate of the comatose person.
Thanks everybody!