For me, the answer to this question is no, and that is one of my chief problems with most natural rights theories, and which is why I'm trying to construct my own. Are people who are incapable of proper syllogisms incapable of knowing right from wrong?
Could a Rothbardian natural rights proponent please enlighten me on this?
Are people who are incapable of proper syllogisms incapable of knowing right from wrong?
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Juan:As to your question, it's true that there are people who have an intuitive understanding of right and wrong (aka moral sense) - that doesn't mean that more rationalistic justifications can't be advanced as we
It just seems like such artful "advancings" of justifications are (1) academic thought-games, (2) attempts at elegant solutions to social engineering problems, or some combination of both. To pin the name "morality" on such things doesn't seem sound.
Juan:Shouldn't you prove Hume's musings on the so called 'ought is' problem ?
I'm not sure the burden of proof would be on Hume with this, but I am trying to address this issue in another thread I just started.
yes. it makes sense,however its not necessary to do the deduction oneself though. if one is handed the correct conclusions by a good deducer then one is capable of knowing right from wrong.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Lilburne:which is why I'm trying to construct my own.
Nice article. If I may summarize my understanding of your points, "natural law" is most correctly understood as a system of legal precepts based on those inborn moral urges of human beings that are preponderantly universal. It is useful to libertarians because of its preponderant universality, and is therefore likely to be adopted in an anarchic free market in law (or should be upheld by a minarchist government if it wants to retain legitimacy in the eyes of the governed). Natural law is of course adopted for consequentialist reasons, if it's correctly adopted for any logical reasons at all. (Nothing necessarily wrong with a person adopting it individually for non-logical reasons, such as moral urges.)Since the final end is happiness, which despite some universality is highly personal, ends cannot be determined logically or universally. Insofar as they are advocated to individuals, moral precepts that ignore consequences cannot be derived logically, and any attempt such as Rothbard's must necessarily fail. The urge to derive non-consequentialist moral precepts logically is based on a misunderstanding of what such moral notions are: simply Hume's "passions." In other words, it's silly to try to derive logically that X action is morally wrong, when such is tantamount to trying to derive logically something like, "X action makes YOU feel bad inside."
Of course, we can argue that people are evolutionarily inclined to feel bad inside if they perform such an action, but that is a scientific and not a logical argument. In other words, science may be able to demonstrate a (preponderantly universal) natural inborn sense of moral aversion to an act, so in some sense non-consequentialist moral precepts can be derived if we define them in that scientific sense (and each person would only do that if they were moved by that argument - after all, someone could easily argue that just because it's in our instinctive nature that is no LOGICAL reason to adhere to it; it is merely a persuasive argument).Am I reading you correctly?
Why anarchy fails
And yet to understand moral urges a person has to use their intellect. People reason - it is an "is". People can't stop reasoning. And thus people will reason and come to conclusions whether one admits it or not. So I'm all for a sound intellect to even know what moral urges are. The only way a person will know and use their reason correctly is to feed the intellect and provide reason with good knowledge, even if such knowledge is based on moral urges. Either way the intellect is to be cultivated cause it's going to provide reason and free-choice with guidance and so it might as well be sound guidance. The only way around the intellect is to avoid the intellect cause it's not going away - we are human. And the only way to even know moral urges is via intellect. Of course there is an appetitive knowing, but there is an intellect knowing too. And to ignore and abandon the intellect that will know is to not understand the role that intellect plays in each persons life. This ignoring of the reflexive act of intellect seems like an attempt to ignore what provides the light and thus knowing of the decisions of reason that provide judgement with a sound understanding that informs a person's free-will that is demonstrated with the rest of the world. It is to think people are billiard balls based on some newtonian instinct, mechanical game, but that's to ignore that human's have free-will. I'd rather intellect be informed in unison with moral urges, than to ignore what informs a person's good judgement, the intellect, and thus to let ones reasoning not know how to perform these moral urges rightly. If reason doesn't understand these moral urges, then reason will decide upon them in erratic ways for reason will decide upon moral urges - that can't be changed. So an informed reason is better than an ill-informed reason.
It is a matter of impositionism vs. reflectionism. You are to believe that logic imposeses itself on the reality around us and therefore logic is only in our mind and nature when not viewed through our logic can perhaps be chaotic [ A Kantian argument ]. However, as reflectionists, reality imposes itself on the minds of individuals. Thus logic is out there and we can deduce how it operates. Natural law is outside of the human consciousness. Reflecting upon it gives us truths of the world.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
I agree AC. The intellect finds truths of the world - induction - and then informs reason pertaining to if any judgements are to be poor or sound as we thereby in turn demonstrate what we have learned and thus apply with the world each moment. Induction leads to deduction. Without induction there is no deduction. And without deduction there is no reasonable assertion of the world and our judgement will be poor on how we act with our moral urges and the world around us.
The act of intellect to apprehend is reflectionism and as a person naturally imposes him or her self upon the world simply by being present to find truths of this world to act in accord with what is (being) a unison in action with what is, is an open-ended journey and along the way certain truths are gathered to allow such an imposition to be either good or bad. To go with the grain and not against the grain of the truths of this world that is the quest, at least for me.
nirgrahamUK: yes. it makes sense,however its not necessary to do the deduction oneself though. if one is handed the correct conclusions by a good deducer then one is capable of knowing right from wrong.
How can that be personal morality if one is merely following the pronouncements of another?
Lilburne:How can that be personal morality if one is merely following the pronouncements of another?
By consenting to follow it.
Hi AJ,
AJ:"natural law" is most correctly understood as a system of legal precepts based on those inborn moral urges of human beings that are preponderantly universal.
As I've been using it, "natural law" is descriptive, not prescriptive. It simply describes the moral behaviors people will tend to exhibit outside of lifeboat scenarios. I haven't yet considered the matter of codifying those behaviors into precepts.
AJ:It is useful to libertarians because of its preponderant universality, and is therefore likely to be adopted in an anarchic free market in law
Yes, quite correct.
AJ:Natural law is of course adopted for consequentialist reasons
Again, my conception of natural law isn't a set of precepts to be adopted.
AJ:Since the final end is happiness, which despite some universality is highly personal, ends cannot be determined logically or universally.
I agree with the last part, but not the first, as I don't subscribe to eudaimonism.
And I am pretty much in agreement with the rest of what you wrote.
I greatly appreciate your giving my article a careful reading!
Anarchist Cain: Lilburne:How can that be personal morality if one is merely following the pronouncements of another? By consenting to follow it.
That person doesn't personally know right from wrong; he's just assuming the other guy does.
Lilburne: That person doesn't personally know right from wrong; he's just assuming the other guy does.
How do you know that they don't know what is right from wrong? Perhaps they joined this ideology because it is right. Case in point: How do you know that Hume is right about the passions instead of reason?
No, I don't think it does. Negative demonstrations are about as far as it goes, i.e. epistemological arguments, IMO. I'd recommend you read Rasmussen's and den Uyl's work on natural rights if you want a nuanced perspective on them that clarifies a lot of misunderstandings on the topic. I'm still a bit ambivalent on it, but it's the best attempt I've seen so far to structure a moral system, if one draws a bit from Anthony de Jasay in addition (still need to read more of him.)
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Anarchist Cain:Perhaps they joined this ideology because it is right.
But in the hypothetical presented by Nir, the person doesn't even do the reasoning himself, so he can't even be said to understand the ideology.
Anarchist Cain:How do you know that Hume is right about the passions instead of reason?
My sense of right and wrong comes from within; it doesn't come from a "Humean ideology". Where Hume's theory comes in is in explaining, as an ethicist, and not as a moral agent, how morality works.
Lilburne:My sense of right and wrong comes from within
Could not someone who joined this ideology feel the same?
Lilburne:Where Hume's theory comes in is in explaining, as an ethicist, and not as a moral agent, how morality works.
I'm confused these. Ethics is the study of morality.
Lilburne:But in the hypothetical presented by Nir, the person doesn't even do the reasoning himself, so he can't even be said to understand the ideology.
Im sorry i answered the question you originally asked," Are people who are incapable of proper syllogisms incapable of knowing right from wrong?"
well, people who are incapable of providing mathematical proofs can accept and use math formulas provided for them. just as this is enough for them to solve those particular math probs, wouldnt accepting a true statement of rightness and wrongness empower the accepter to act consistent with it, whatever it was...
perhaps they dont know 'everything about rightness and wrongess' but if they know what is and what isnt wrong. thats something. if they just believed it that would be enough for the peace.
people who are incapable of describing evolutionary theory, and citing proper methodology of biology, and the history of categorisation in biologoy (zooology i guess.) can still know a cat from a dog....
wilderness:And yet to understand moral urges a person has to use their intellect.
One need not "understand" moral urges to be impelled by them; one need only have them.
Anarchist Cain:Could not someone who joined this ideology feel the same?
Yes, but that would run counter to the traditional "morality-via-reason" natural rights conception.
Anarchist Cain:I'm confused these. Ethics is the study of morality.
But moral behavior doesn't necessarily arise out of an ethical theory, just as economic behavior doesn't necessarily arise out of an economic theory.
Anarchist Cain: It is a matter of impositionism vs. reflectionism. You are to believe that logic imposeses itself on the reality around us and therefore logic is only in our mind and nature when not viewed through our logic can perhaps be chaotic [ A Kantian argument ]. However, as reflectionists, reality imposes itself on the minds of individuals. Thus logic is out there and we can deduce how it operates. Natural law is outside of the human consciousness. Reflecting upon it gives us truths of the world.
Actually...
Roderick T. Long: Wittgenstein’s considered position, however, is pretty clearly an attempt to transcend the reflectionist/impositionist dichotomy entirely. On this view, impositionism is rejected because it pictures logic as a constraint imposed by us on the world, while reflectionism is rejected because it pictures logic as a constraint imposed by the world on us. To think of logic as constraining something is to imagine, or try to imagine, how things would be without the constraint. Since neither talk of an illogical world nor talk of illogical thought can be made sense of, the whole question cannot be meaningfully asked and so may be dismissed in good conscience.
Wittgenstein’s considered position, however, is pretty clearly an attempt to transcend the reflectionist/impositionist dichotomy entirely. On this view, impositionism is rejected because it pictures logic as a constraint imposed by us on the world, while reflectionism is rejected because it pictures logic as a constraint imposed by the world on us. To think of logic as constraining something is to imagine, or try to imagine, how things would be without the constraint. Since neither talk of an illogical world nor talk of illogical thought can be made sense of, the whole question cannot be meaningfully asked and so may be dismissed in good conscience.
(from Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action)
Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.
wombatron: Actually... Roderick T. Long: Wittgenstein’s considered position, however, is pretty clearly an attempt to transcend the reflectionist/impositionist dichotomy entirely. On this view, impositionism is rejected because it pictures logic as a constraint imposed by us on the world, while reflectionism is rejected because it pictures logic as a constraint imposed by the world on us. To think of logic as constraining something is to imagine, or try to imagine, how things would be without the constraint. Since neither talk of an illogical world nor talk of illogical thought can be made sense of, the whole question cannot be meaningfully asked and so may be dismissed in good conscience. (from Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action)
Shhhh I wanted to lead them into a trap! See if anyone was capable of deducing what Long stated.
Lilburne, thanks for your reply - everything made sense and I basically agree, so I have nothing to directly respond to.
However, if you agree that morality for others is essentially a persuasion technique (unless it is purely consequentialist), don't most of the points being debated here regarding logic become moot?
AJ: Lilburne, thanks for your reply - everything made sense and I basically agree, so I have nothing to directly respond to. However, if you agree that morality for others is essentially a persuasion technique (unless it is purely consequentialist), don't most of the points being debated here regarding logic become moot?
Yes.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Juan: Lilburne:Are people who are incapable of proper syllogisms incapable of knowing right from wrong? No they aren't.
Lilburne:Are people who are incapable of proper syllogisms incapable of knowing right from wrong?
Juan, in another thread, you just had this exchange with Spidey.
Juan: Spideynw:Parents should be able to legally torture their children. Why ?
Spideynw:Parents should be able to legally torture their children.
Why challenge it, Juan? Does the notion disgust you? But morality has nothing to do with an inner sense of right and wrong, right? If that's the conclusion the moral syllogism arrives at, you're bound to it, aren't you?
Lilburne:Why challenge it, Juan?
Does the notion disgust you ?
But morality has nothing to do with an inner sense of right and wrong, right?
If that's the conclusion the moral syllogism arrives at, you're bound to it, aren't you ?
Wow, you actually tried to meaningfully address my points; I must have struck a chord. Since you posted a bit more like me, I'll respond "Juan-style"...
Juan:I'm not only challenging him. I'm challenging him by rational means.
How can you challenge rationally when you're rationally challenged ? ...
Juan:I think torture is wrong ... both intuition and reason tell me so.
Maybe you should admit your hybrid moral philosophy is self contradictory trash ?
Juan: Not quite right. I never dismissed moral sense completely. I pointed out its limitations - limitations which you seem to be ignoring.
Your nonsense it is boring ...
Juan:'m bound by logic, yes. But notice that I already said that there's no way to logically prove that A has authority over B, which in this case translates to "parents have no authority to torture 'their' children".
Sorry I don't understand ? Maybe because you don't make sense ?
Let's see: flip answers, thoughtless insults, oddly placed spacing and punctuation, bizarre phrasing, declarative statements with question marks... Did I miss anything?
Hans-Hermann Hoppe: While such recognition of the praxeological constraints on the structure of knowledge might not immediately strike one as in itself of great significance, it does have some highly important implications. For one thing, in light of this insight one recurring difficulty of rationalist philosophy finds its answer. It has been a common quarrel with rationalism in the Leibniz-Kant tradition that it seemed to imply some sort of idealism. Realizing that a priori true propositions could not possibly be derived from observations, rationalism answered the question how a priori knowledge could then be possible by adopting the model of an active mind, as opposed to the empiricist model of a passive, mirror-like mind in the tradition of Locke and Hume. According to rationalist philosophy, a priori true propositions had their foundation in the operation of principles of thinking which one could not possibly conceive of as operating otherwise; they were grounded in categories of an active mind. Now, as empiricists were only too eager to point out, the obvious critique of such a position is, that if this were indeed the case, it could not be explained why such mental categories should fit reality. Rather, one would be forced to accept the absurd idealistic assumption that reality would have to be conceived of as a creation of the mind, in order to claim that a priori knowledge could incorporate any information about the structure of reality. And clearly, such an assertion seemed to be justified when faced with programmatic statements of rationalist philosophers such as the following by Kant: "So far it has been assumed that our knowledge had to conform to reality," instead it should be assumed "that observational reality should conform to our mind." Recognizing knowledge as being structurally constrained by its role in the framework of action categories provides the solution to such a complaint. For as soon as this is realized, all idealistic suggestions of rationalist philosophy disappear, and an epistemology claiming that a priori true propositions exist becomes a realistic epistemology instead. Understood as constrained by action categories, the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the mental on the one hand and the real, outside physical world on the other is bridged. So constrained, a priori knowledge must be as much a mental thing as a reflection of the structure of reality, since it is only through actions that the mind comes into contact with reality, so to speak. Acting is a cognitively guided adjustment of a physical body in physical reality. And thus, there can be no doubt that a priori knowledge, conceived of as an insight into the structural constraints imposed on knowledge qua knowledge of actors, must indeed correspond to the nature of things. The realistic character of such knowledge would manifest itself not only in the fact that one could not think it to be otherwise, but in the fact that one could not undo its truth.
While such recognition of the praxeological constraints on the structure of knowledge might not immediately strike one as in itself of great significance, it does have some highly important implications. For one thing, in light of this insight one recurring difficulty of rationalist philosophy finds its answer. It has been a common quarrel with rationalism in the Leibniz-Kant tradition that it seemed to imply some sort of idealism. Realizing that a priori true propositions could not possibly be derived from observations, rationalism answered the question how a priori knowledge could then be possible by adopting the model of an active mind, as opposed to the empiricist model of a passive, mirror-like mind in the tradition of Locke and Hume. According to rationalist philosophy, a priori true propositions had their foundation in the operation of principles of thinking which one could not possibly conceive of as operating otherwise; they were grounded in categories of an active mind. Now, as empiricists were only too eager to point out, the obvious critique of such a position is, that if this were indeed the case, it could not be explained why such mental categories should fit reality. Rather, one would be forced to accept the absurd idealistic assumption that reality would have to be conceived of as a creation of the mind, in order to claim that a priori knowledge could incorporate any information about the structure of reality. And clearly, such an assertion seemed to be justified when faced with programmatic statements of rationalist philosophers such as the following by Kant: "So far it has been assumed that our knowledge had to conform to reality," instead it should be assumed "that observational reality should conform to our mind."
Recognizing knowledge as being structurally constrained by its role in the framework of action categories provides the solution to such a complaint. For as soon as this is realized, all idealistic suggestions of rationalist philosophy disappear, and an epistemology claiming that a priori true propositions exist becomes a realistic epistemology instead. Understood as constrained by action categories, the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the mental on the one hand and the real, outside physical world on the other is bridged. So constrained, a priori knowledge must be as much a mental thing as a reflection of the structure of reality, since it is only through actions that the mind comes into contact with reality, so to speak. Acting is a cognitively guided adjustment of a physical body in physical reality. And thus, there can be no doubt that a priori knowledge, conceived of as an insight into the structural constraints imposed on knowledge qua knowledge of actors, must indeed correspond to the nature of things. The realistic character of such knowledge would manifest itself not only in the fact that one could not think it to be otherwise, but in the fact that one could not undo its truth.
He has you exact, Juan.
wilderness:Without induction there is no deduction.
Can you explain this? I'm pretty sure it's possible to derive specific cases from general cases without deriving general cases from specific cases.
Juan:I don't think so Stephen.
I think you forgot to put the question mark at the end of your sentence?
Lilburne: For me, the answer to this question is no, and that is one of my chief problems with most natural rights theories, and which is why I'm trying to construct my own. Are people who are incapable of proper syllogisms incapable of knowing right from wrong? Could a Rothbardian natural rights proponent please enlighten me on this?
Hans-Hermann Hoppe: From the undeniable acceptance – the axiomatic status – of this a priori of argumentation in turn two equally necessary conclusions follow. The first follows from the a priori of argumentation when there is no rational solution to the problem of conflict arising from the existence of scarcity. Suppose in my earlier scenario of Crusoe and Friday, that Friday was not the name of a man but of a gorilla. Obviously, just as Crusoe can run into conflict regarding his body and its standing room with Friday the man, so he might do so with Friday the gorilla. The gorilla might want to occupy the same space that Crusoe is already occupying. In this case, at least if the gorilla is the sort of entity that we know gorillas to be, there is in fact no rational solution to their conflict. Either the gorilla wins, and devours, crushes, or pushes Crusoe aside – that is the gorilla’s solution to the problem – or Crusoe wins, and kills, beats, chases away, or tames the gorilla – that is Crusoe’s solution. In this situation, one may indeed speak of moral relativism. With Alasdair MacIntyre, a prominent philosopher of the relativist persuasion, one may concur asking as the title of one of his books, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? – Crusoe’s or the gorilla’s. Depending on whose side one chooses, the answer will be different. However, it is more appropriate to refer to this situation as one where the question of justice and rationality simply does not arise: that is, as an extra-moral situation. The existence of Friday the gorilla poses for Crusoe merely a technical problem, not a moral one. Crusoe has no other choice but to learn how to successfully manage and control the movements of the gorilla just as he must learn to manage and control the inanimate objects of his environment.By implication, only if both parties to a conflict are capable of engaging in argumentation with one another, can one speak of a moral problem and is the question of whether or not there exists a solution meaningful. Only if Friday, regardless of his physical appearance (i.e., whether he looks like a man or like a gorilla), is capable of argumentation (even if he has shown himself to be so capable only once), can he be deemed rational and does the question whether or not a correct solution to the problem of social order exists make sense. No one can be expected to give an answer – indeed: any answer – to someone who has never raised a question or, more to the point, who has never stated his own relativistic viewpoint in the form of an argument. In that case, this "other" cannot but be regarded and treated like an animal or plant, i.e., as an extra-moral entity. Only if this other entity can in principle pause in his activity, whatever it might be, step back so to speak, and say "yes" or "no" to something one has said, do we owe this entity an answer and, accordingly, can we possibly claim that our answer is the correct one for both parties involved in a conflict.
From the undeniable acceptance – the axiomatic status – of this a priori of argumentation in turn two equally necessary conclusions follow. The first follows from the a priori of argumentation when there is no rational solution to the problem of conflict arising from the existence of scarcity. Suppose in my earlier scenario of Crusoe and Friday, that Friday was not the name of a man but of a gorilla. Obviously, just as Crusoe can run into conflict regarding his body and its standing room with Friday the man, so he might do so with Friday the gorilla. The gorilla might want to occupy the same space that Crusoe is already occupying. In this case, at least if the gorilla is the sort of entity that we know gorillas to be, there is in fact no rational solution to their conflict. Either the gorilla wins, and devours, crushes, or pushes Crusoe aside – that is the gorilla’s solution to the problem – or Crusoe wins, and kills, beats, chases away, or tames the gorilla – that is Crusoe’s solution. In this situation, one may indeed speak of moral relativism. With Alasdair MacIntyre, a prominent philosopher of the relativist persuasion, one may concur asking as the title of one of his books, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? – Crusoe’s or the gorilla’s. Depending on whose side one chooses, the answer will be different. However, it is more appropriate to refer to this situation as one where the question of justice and rationality simply does not arise: that is, as an extra-moral situation. The existence of Friday the gorilla poses for Crusoe merely a technical problem, not a moral one. Crusoe has no other choice but to learn how to successfully manage and control the movements of the gorilla just as he must learn to manage and control the inanimate objects of his environment.By implication, only if both parties to a conflict are capable of engaging in argumentation with one another, can one speak of a moral problem and is the question of whether or not there exists a solution meaningful. Only if Friday, regardless of his physical appearance (i.e., whether he looks like a man or like a gorilla), is capable of argumentation (even if he has shown himself to be so capable only once), can he be deemed rational and does the question whether or not a correct solution to the problem of social order exists make sense. No one can be expected to give an answer – indeed: any answer – to someone who has never raised a question or, more to the point, who has never stated his own relativistic viewpoint in the form of an argument. In that case, this "other" cannot but be regarded and treated like an animal or plant, i.e., as an extra-moral entity. Only if this other entity can in principle pause in his activity, whatever it might be, step back so to speak, and say "yes" or "no" to something one has said, do we owe this entity an answer and, accordingly, can we possibly claim that our answer is the correct one for both parties involved in a conflict.
Does that answer the question? I'm not sure if this is a direct enough explaination. Only rational agents are able to argue over moral propositions. And only rational agents capable of forming proper syllogisms. So while there is a connection between the two, it is not necessary to be able to form proper syllogisms to be moral and not necessary to be moral to be able to form proper syllogisms.
The Hoppeinamtor:Recognizing knowledge as being structurally constrained by its role in the framework of action categories provides the solution to such a complaint. For as soon as this is realized, all idealistic suggestions of rationalist philosophy disappear, and an epistemology claiming that a priori true propositions exist becomes a realistic epistemology instead. Understood as constrained by action categories, the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the mental on the one hand and the real, outside physical world on the other is bridged. So constrained, a priori knowledge must be as much a mental thing as a reflection of the structure of reality, since it is only through actions that the mind comes into contact with reality, so to speak. Acting is a cognitively guided adjustment of a physical body in physical reality. And thus, there can be no doubt that a priori knowledge, conceived of as an insight into the structural constraints imposed on knowledge qua knowledge of actors, must indeed correspond to the nature of things. The realistic character of such knowledge would manifest itself not only in the fact that one could not think it to be otherwise, but in the fact that one could not undo its truth.
To: Stephen Forde
http://mises.org/journals/scholar/long.pdf
I'm glad that Womb posted this link.
Here is a shorter article:
http://praxeology.net/antipsych.pdf
Anarchist Cain: http://mises.org/journals/scholar/long.pdf I'm glad that Womb posted this link. Here is a shorter article: http://praxeology.net/antipsych.pdf
Thanx, I will read this and get back to you. Probably not until later on though as I have many things to do today, and only the short article. In the meantime, could you edit your post so that the quote is from professor Hoppe instead of me? Or perhaps at least double quote so that it is me quoting Hoppe?
Deduction is inferential. Without premises from which conclusions are to be inferred, it doesn't factor in. Premises are inductively formed. Classical induction is what you have in mind here.
Stephen Forde:Only rational agents are able to argue over moral propositions. And only rational agents capable of forming proper syllogisms.
But implicit in Hoppe's argumentation ethics is the notion that being fully moral involves abiding by the conclusions of argumentation ethics which are reached by deduction. If people don't perform Hoppe's deductions, but act in accord with Hoppe's conclusions anyway, then they would only be acting morally by accident. Again, in Hoppe's system as well as in Rothbard's, it seems that to be a fully moral being necessarily involves rigorous deduction. And such a formulation of morality just seems to be a contrived product of wordplay.
I feel Hoppe's argumentation ethics also fails to derive "ought" from "is", but that matter is for another thread.
Jon Irenicus: Can you explain this? I'm pretty sure it's possible to derive specific cases from general cases without deriving general cases from specific cases. Deduction is inferential. Without premises from which conclusions are to be inferred, it doesn't factor in. Premises are inductively formed. Classical induction is what you have in mind here.
What about premises that are negatively demonstrable? They are not inductively (I'm not sure if we mean the same thing by inductively) formed. Also, empirical induction can only provide hypothetical truths, not necessary truths.
Also, I was more interested in a response from wilderness, since he thinks I don't know anything about epistemology and accused me of 'fronting'.