Lilburne:As a moral agent, I proclaim that Bush DID murder over one million Iraqis, because the killing is disgusting to my sense of right and wrong.
I think if most Americans were disabused of the notion that it was necessary for their personal safety, they would feel the same way about it too.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Lilburne, I agree that Bush has murdered over one million Iraqis. I gave a bad example.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
Juan: Lilburne:There are no cosmically/objectively "right" or "wrong" moral urges. That's kind of obscure but it seems to mean that there are no right or wrong actions. You are an amoralist afert all eh ? And this certainly doesn't make sense. Some moral urges concern what is traditionally known as property rights: the urge not to aggress against others Moral urges are the kind that impel us toward action that is most certain to be to our own material detriment You really sound as if saying that stealing is bad for you - that you would be better off being a thief.
Lilburne:There are no cosmically/objectively "right" or "wrong" moral urges.
Some moral urges concern what is traditionally known as property rights: the urge not to aggress against others
Moral urges are the kind that impel us toward action that is most certain to be to our own material detriment
Juan,
I've been quite clear in my explanations. Your complete misinterpretation of what I wrote stems from lazy reading. I will not explain myself to you further, because you have no interest in understanding the true meaning of my arguments. Like I said, I don't mind your knee-jerk snarky comments, but I do mind you twisting my words around, potentially confusing future readers. I believe such willful obfuscation constitutes trolling. If you persist in that, I'll (of course non-bindingly, as I'm not a moderator) ask you politely to stop posting in my thread altogether.
I've been quite clear in my explanations. Your complete misinterpretation of what I wrote stems from lazy reading. I will not explain myself to you further, because you have no interest in understanding the true meaning of my arguments.
Like I said, I don't mind your knee-jerk snarky comments, but I do mind you twisting my words around, potentially confusing future readers. I believe such willful obfuscation constitutes trolling.
If you persist in that, I'll (of course non-bindingly, as I'm not a moderator) ask you politely to stop posting in my thread altogether.
Lilburne: Juan:Well, if you don't believe in the agent-independent value of freedom, why are you here ? Presumably, because he has a high agent-dependent valuation of freedom, and he would like to converse with others who do too: perhaps in order to make the world a more free place, pursuant to his agent-dependent valuation of freedom.
Juan:Well, if you don't believe in the agent-independent value of freedom, why are you here ?
Presumably, because he has a high agent-dependent valuation of freedom, and he would like to converse with others who do too: perhaps in order to make the world a more free place, pursuant to his agent-dependent valuation of freedom.
What do you two mean by agent-dependent/independent?
Why anarchy fails
AJ:What do you two mean by agent-dependent/independent?
Basically subjective vs. objective morality.
AJ: Lilburne: Juan:Well, if you don't believe in the agent-independent value of freedom, why are you here ? Presumably, because he has a high agent-dependent valuation of freedom, and he would like to converse with others who do too: perhaps in order to make the world a more free place, pursuant to his agent-dependent valuation of freedom. What do you two mean by agent-dependent/independent?
Well, I define agent-dependent valuation as the 'grounding' of 'ought' statements to the individual's empathy. See Danny's post for more details.
I will avoid using the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' to define the above terms because I discovered about ten different definitions for each term. I do not want people to equivocate the multiple meanings of 'subjective' and 'objective'.
So his question was, "Do you believe in the objective value of freedom?" If so, he would appear to be under the impression that placing two words side-by-side automatically creates a meaningful term.
Edit: And thanks, AM, but I think this is derailing the thread, so I'm willing to leave it as it is.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Great post. I personally take this further by avoiding the words such as 'legitimate', 'freedom', and 'liberty'.
Thank you. I do agree that such words are imprecise, but that was not the full gist of my post. I don't necessarily reject the use of such words altogether, but ask that in each context they be meaningfully defined - and that means not referring to some equally ill-defined word.
On the topic of definitions, which I believe are the source of 99% of the confusion on all issues here, I always wished more people would respond to this post I made a while ago on redefining terms. If you wish to continue discussing word usage as a subject, which I highly welcome especially given your unique view of semantics, let's do it there or a new topic so as not to derail this important thread.
Lilburne: ladyattis:I think one possible solution is the fact that morality is something learned over time, not merely builtin or held as absolute. Thus, the ought in all moral statements become a mechanism to signal a point by which an individual can seek to judge one's values, finding that which fits best with their own epistemology. Some ought conditions can lead to death, but that by itself doesn't mean the ought swings to is or that is can conversely swing to ought. As zefreak has been suggesting is that oughts are not evaluations onto themselves. They merely signal a means by which a human being can evaluate the choices that can be taken (regardless of perfect knowledge). Ladyattis, I must say this whole line of thinking is a wrong turn in moral theory. In plain language, morality has never been about general optimization in action. People don't say it is immoral to go skydiving without a helmet or to have an un-diversified stock portfolio. What sets moral choices apart from other choices is that the former involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being: risking one's life to save another, abstaining from a tempting crime which would likely go unpunished, etc. Those choices are a distinctive part of human action. That part ought to have a name. It's traditional name is morality. It makes no sense to extend that name to all human action.
ladyattis:I think one possible solution is the fact that morality is something learned over time, not merely builtin or held as absolute. Thus, the ought in all moral statements become a mechanism to signal a point by which an individual can seek to judge one's values, finding that which fits best with their own epistemology. Some ought conditions can lead to death, but that by itself doesn't mean the ought swings to is or that is can conversely swing to ought. As zefreak has been suggesting is that oughts are not evaluations onto themselves. They merely signal a means by which a human being can evaluate the choices that can be taken (regardless of perfect knowledge).
Ladyattis, I must say this whole line of thinking is a wrong turn in moral theory. In plain language, morality has never been about general optimization in action. People don't say it is immoral to go skydiving without a helmet or to have an un-diversified stock portfolio. What sets moral choices apart from other choices is that the former involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being: risking one's life to save another, abstaining from a tempting crime which would likely go unpunished, etc. Those choices are a distinctive part of human action. That part ought to have a name. It's traditional name is morality. It makes no sense to extend that name to all human action.
First, I never stated in clear terms that all morality was mere optimization. So, I suggest you keep your psychologizing to yourself, unless I paid you to do that (to which then I must ask you not to bring my mom or dad into it either... ;) ). Anyways, aside from my poor attempt at humor, there's a grain of truth in my words, in that I never clearly made it the case that it's solely optimization that's at the heart of morality. Rather, my case is simpler: optmization is the side effect that all moral conditions are a series of ought statements. In fact, many non-moral statements are merely ought statements, in which a person must choose from their own scale of values that which they think is good and choose to fight that which they think is evil. To ignore causality when facing moral considerations is to be at best a fool and at worse suicidal as some moralities call for the entire death of families to "save face" or some other arbitrary sense of honor or collective "soulfulness". And then what is the purpose of a morality that in contrary manner destroys its adherents? What realm do they go to in annihilation? So, I can't say doing good for so-called goodness sake is indeed good at least for me.
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
@ the OP
Ultimately, values and norms are action produced phenomenon. They are demonstrated through action. While values themselves are not a part of physical reality and thus cannot be considered true or false themselves, whether or not individuals hold them is a part of physical reality and is provable.
I don't know if you would consider that to be a natural rights expalination, but there is an epistemological solution to the problem you posed.
nirgrahamUK: the question implicitly assumes that 'oughts' 'arent'. and as such, wont be found amongst the things that are , all the 'is's. but if oughts 'are' then there will be some is's that are "ought-is's". another possibility. theres not a very good way to pluralise 'is' is there ?
the question implicitly assumes that 'oughts' 'arent'. and as such, wont be found amongst the things that are , all the 'is's.
but if oughts 'are' then there will be some is's that are "ought-is's".
another possibility.
theres not a very good way to pluralise 'is' is there ?
If 'ought' 'is', how would we know? Either way, the burden of proof lies on the one asserting the existance of an 'ought' that 'is'.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Lilburne: I don't know how any deductive natural rights theory could follow anything other than the following formula: __ is __, therefore __ is __, therefore __ is __, [...] therefore __ should __. But how can any deductive argument like this derive a "should" from an "is"? For any given natural right, can anyone fill in the blanks of the above formula, and explain to me how it makes sense? Or if a natural rights theory rests on another kind of model, can someone explain to me how it is formed?
I don't know how any deductive natural rights theory could follow anything other than the following formula:
__ is __, therefore __ is __, therefore __ is __, [...] therefore __ should __.
But how can any deductive argument like this derive a "should" from an "is"?
For any given natural right, can anyone fill in the blanks of the above formula, and explain to me how it makes sense?
Or if a natural rights theory rests on another kind of model, can someone explain to me how it is formed?
The way out I see is thus:
1. Nature is good
2. Natural law is derived from nature
3. Natural law is good
4. One ought to follow the good.
5. Thus one ought to follow natural law.
Of the two premises 1 and 4, 4 is uncontroversial however 1 is not. It is though defensible: the most robust defence would rest on nature being created by a good God. If this were the case then the above argument would be sound.
The atoms tell the atoms so, for I never was or will but atoms forevermore be.
Yours sincerely,
Physiocrat
"Rothbard's actual argument is much more subtle and complex than the sketch embedded in my mind. He relies heavily in his defense of self-ownership on a point of fact. Everyone in reality is in control of his own will. If I obey another, I must always make the decision to do as he wishes; and the threat of violence on his part should I follow my own course leaves the situation unchanged. I must decide whether to accede to the threat.
"So what," you may say. "Even if Rothbard is right that you cannot, in some sense, alienate your will, how does he get to the conclusion he wants? From the fact that you control your own will, how does the ethical judgment follow that you ought not to threaten violence against another self-owner? Isn't Rothbard guilty of that dread fallacy, the derivation of an ought from an is?"
To our imagined objector, Rothbard would demur. He does indeed derive an ought from an is, but he denies that he is guilty of fallacy. Instead, he maintains that ethical principles follow from the nature of man. Because man has free will, it does indeed follow that he ought not to be coerced by others. (Unless of course he initiates violence: then, Rothbard holds, one may respond with all necessary force. "Tolstoyan" is not, in our author's vocabulary, a word of praise.)
Is Rothbard right? If he is, he has overthrown the dominant way of doing moral philosophy today. In making his case, Rothbard displays his remarkable scholarly ability to extract just what he needs from a vast array of sources. The works of little-known Aristotelian philosophers, e.g., John Wild and John Toohey, S.J., figure to great effect as Rothbard builds his argument. (In conversation, Murray often spoke of his admiration for Toohey's work.)
Rothbard bases his system on self-ownership and defends that principle through an ethics of natural law. But it is not only in the foundation and consistent elaboration of his system that he displays his dialectical skill. I was again and again amazed, as I went through the book, how often Rothbard anticipates the objections of critics."
~ David Gordon
Lilburne: Wilmot of Rochester:It is a fine distinction that often gets muddled between the lines of someone questioning the concepts of morality and someone who rejects it all together, but it does exist, Juan. What baffles me about people like Juan is that it's actually a pretty clear-cut distinction. Believing in individual subjective morality is not the same thing as believing in no morality; it's that simple. That he can characterize someone who forthrightly hates state aggression from the bottom of his heart as "close to amoralism" just shows how besotted with the "Ethics of Liberty" Kool-Aid he is. Rothbard himself said he hates the state "deep in his belly". It's a shame he felt the need to convolute that sentiment with extreme moral rationalism.
Wilmot of Rochester:It is a fine distinction that often gets muddled between the lines of someone questioning the concepts of morality and someone who rejects it all together, but it does exist, Juan.
What baffles me about people like Juan is that it's actually a pretty clear-cut distinction. Believing in individual subjective morality is not the same thing as believing in no morality; it's that simple. That he can characterize someone who forthrightly hates state aggression from the bottom of his heart as "close to amoralism" just shows how besotted with the "Ethics of Liberty" Kool-Aid he is.
Rothbard himself said he hates the state "deep in his belly". It's a shame he felt the need to convolute that sentiment with extreme moral rationalism.
Yes, well. It's the same debate time and time again here.
Sometimes I like to be reminded of why I hold the position I do and see what new challenges the opposition has designed, but without anything new to add, it gets boring quick.
existence is elsewhere
Conza88:[Rothbard] does indeed derive an ought from an is, but he denies that he is guilty of fallacy. Instead, he maintains that ethical principles follow from the nature of man. Because man has free will, it does indeed follow that he ought not to be coerced by others.
Even though man has 'free will', why we 'ought' to not 'coerce' others? Rothbard denied 'slavery' because he wanted to not violate the 'free will' of humans. Kant made a similar mistake of rejecting treating humans as a 'means'. However, he has define 'slavery' in TEoL arbitrarily, just like how Kant has defined which scenarios constitute as treating humans as a mere 'means' arbitrarily. For example, Rothbard categorized contracts on promises, parental obligation, and anti-abortion laws as forms of 'slavery'.
We see those examples as arbitrary because we can categorize about any action as slavery. For example, anti-murder laws enslaves the would-be murderer in a sense because it forces the murderer to restrain himself from acting out his desire to murder someone. Blocking sunlight from a farm enslaves the farmer in a sense because it forces the farmer to buy artificial lighting for his crops. Marriage contracts enslave the wife in a sense because it prevents her from cheating on her husband. (Similar to how anti-abortion contracts enslaves the woman in a sense because it prevents her from aborting her child.)
Restricting would-be murderer to act out his desire to murder constitutes an 'inaction' for the murderer. However, Mises classified all forms of 'inaction' as 'action'. Therefore, restricting the would-be murderer to act out his desire also constitutes an 'action' against the murderer. Therefore, all laws enslave one party at the expense of another. For example, prohibiting pedophiles to have sex with prepubescents restrains their freedom, thus constitutes as a form of slavery against the pedophile. Contrastingly, if we allow pedophiles to have sex with prepubescents, then it constitutes as a different form of slavery, a form of slavery against the prepubescent. So all laws function like a 'zero-sum' game. On one side, there exists the 'slaveowner', on the other side, there exists the 'slave'. The would-be murderer is a 'slave' to the would-be victim of murder. The wife is a 'slave' to the would-be cuckold. The would-be pedophile is a 'slave' to the prepubescent. If murder, adultery, and pedophilia were legalized, the reverse would be true: the victim of murder is a 'slave' to the murderer; the cuckold is a 'slave' to his wife; the prepubescent is a 'slave' to the pedophile.
Rothbard labeled anti-abortion laws as 'slavery' while he has denied anti-murder laws as also slavery. This shows Rothbard's arbitrariness in classifying whether an action constitutes 'slavery' or not.
This also sounds circular. Rothbard did not want anyone to 'coerce' anyone, without defining what 'coercion' means. He has defined 'slavery' as a form of 'coercion', but we showed that he has defined 'slavery' arbitrarily. The word 'coerce' also has disputes. Some will label emitting one billion tons of carbon dioxide into the air as 'coercion' and some will not. Proudhon might label the private ownership of capital and land as 'coercive' while Rothbard might not. No one can label if an action constitutes as a form of 'coercion' unless he gave specific examples of situations that he has defined as 'coercive'. However, Rothbard treats the word 'coercive' as if the word itself can derive whether these specific scenarios violate the word.
On chapter 28 of TEoL, even though he has noted the problems with the word 'coercion', the same arguments apply with the definition of 'violence', which libertarians define as 'the violation of property rights'. See my above post of how it is still arbitrary to classify whether if an action falls under 'the violation of property rights'. All of the arguments above applies to 'violence' as it applies to 'coercion'.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: For example, anti-murder laws enslaves the would-be murderer in a sense because it forces the murderer to restrain himself from acting out his desire to murder someone.
Laws against murder is making murderers not murder? Clearly Thoreau's statement: 'Law never made men a whit more just' does not sway you.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Rothbard labeled anti-abortion laws as 'slavery' while he has denied anti-murder laws as also slavery. This shows Rothbard's arbitrariness in classifying whether an action constitutes 'slavery' or not.
You are clearly lacking in understanding of Rothbard's work. The law is not about punishment or preventing individuals from doing things. We have free-will therefore I can go on a murdering rampage tomorrow, law or no law regardless. What law does is establish reparations for the violations of rights. On the issue of abortion, the rights of a fetus do not supercede the rights of a mother on her property [ her body ] therefore the mother can evict the fetus from her property. To coerce the mother into keeping the child is akin to involuntary servitude to the fetus itself.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Rothbard did not want anyone to 'coerce' anyone, without defining what 'coercion' means. He has defined 'slavery' as a form of 'coercion', but we showed that he has defined 'slavery' arbitrarily.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:On chapter 28 of TEoL, even though he has noted the problems with the word 'coercion', the same arguments apply with the definition of 'violence', which libertarians define as 'the violation of property rights'.
A clear contradiction of yourself. If you had actually read the 28th chapter of Ethics of Liberty, the very first paragraph in fact, you would of see this statement.
Murray Rothbard in Ethics of Liberty: Chapter 28 Paragraph One: For instead of defining coercion as is done in the present volume, as the invasive use of physical violence or the threat thereof against someone else’s person or (just) property, Hayek defines coercion far more fuzzily and inchoately:
For instead of defining coercion as is done in the present volume, as the invasive use of physical violence or the threat thereof against someone else’s person or (just) property, Hayek defines coercion far more fuzzily and inchoately:
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
Conza88:He does indeed derive an ought from an is, but he denies that he is guilty of fallacy. Instead, he maintains that ethical principles follow from the nature of man. Because man has free will, it does indeed follow that he ought not to be coerced by others. ~ David Gordon
See, this just doesn't make sense to me. Basically what's being said here is...
"A man's nature is to excercise free will. Therefore another man ought not to violate a man's free will." Within that argument is a hidden assumption that "a man ought not to frustrate the nature of another man". So then we have the syllogism...
"(A) A man's nature is to excercise free will. (B) Another man ought not to frustrate the nature of a man. (C) Therefore another man ought not to violate a man's free will."
...the premise (A) is fair enough, but the premise (B) is totally unfounded, so the conclusion (C) simply does not follow.
I think in Rothbard's formulation it only seems to make sense prima facie because he conflates the individual man with mankind (see the Man/Mankind thread). But if you express what he's saying with methodological individualism (which is the only method that make sense when you're trying to proclaim what individuals ought to do) as I do in the above syllogism, it's evident that it frankly makes no sense. And Dr. Gordon (whom, as well as Rothbard, I greatly respect) pointing to all the scholars Rothbard cites, all the counterarguments Rothbard attempts to address, and Rothbard's dialectical skill does nothing to change that fact.
Still waiting on an adequate derivation of an ought from an is..
lets try to agree on what the oughts are first..., and then look to see if they need "is's" to justify them , which they would need if they 'weren't', or whether they just 'are' themselves
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Ought is simply a statement about a preferred state of affairs, as opposed to what "is". It is the presumption of value in a state of affairs, while morality is a system of ought statements whos purpose are to attain said valuable state of affairs.
I hold that value is subjective, hence morality is subjective.
properly speaking the only 'ought' is the 'ought to be moral', and the content is negatively defined by all the ought-nots....
the concept of property aggression is not wholly subjective....
The concept property presupposes a value statement. Property is legitimate exclusivity, legitimate meaning constrained to a certain moral code.
Property is subjective. A given moral system can constrain exclusivity to a certain class, while another value system would result in different property rights.
To be more precise, the content of a property right is subjective.
Ought to be moral seems redundant. I ought to ought not kill?
To me "you ought to be moral" is saying "you ought to behave as you ought", which, as a meaningful statement, is unsatisfying to say the least.
whenever some kid writes x1 next to their equation in math class, sure its redundant, but its also correct and truth preserving.
people say bland things all the time, so what?
zefreak: The concept property presupposes a value statement. Property is legitimate exclusivity, legitimate meaning constrained to a certain moral code.Property is subjective. A given moral system can constrain exclusivity to a certain class, while another value system would result in different property rights.To be more precise, the content of a property right is subjective.
The concept property presupposes a value statement. Property is legitimate exclusivity, legitimate meaning constrained to a certain moral code.Property is subjective. A given moral system can constrain exclusivity to a certain class, while another value system would result in different property rights.To be more precise, the content of a property right is subjective.
paradoxes abound. words themselves are subjective and objective.
nirgrahamUK: zefreak: The concept property presupposes a value statement. Property is legitimate exclusivity, legitimate meaning constrained to a certain moral code.Property is subjective. A given moral system can constrain exclusivity to a certain class, while another value system would result in different property rights.To be more precise, the content of a property right is subjective. paradoxes abound. words themselves are subjective and objective.
Maybe you misunderstood me. Property is legitimate exclusive use, implying a moral code by which it is constrained. The content of that code determines the conditions of the property right. I do not understand how your response was appropriate.
naturally, if you are skeptic of moral codes, and they are subjective, then other things which you tie to that will seem similarly subjective. like your position on property rights.
if you are a moral realist and posit objectivity to morality, then your property theory will be firmed up.
in my previous post i was making a more general point that meta-ethics is notoriously tortourous whatever ones stake, and there are such things as the limit of language,...
nirgrahamUK: naturally, if you are skeptic of moral codes, and they are subjective, then other things which you tie to that will seem similarly subjective. like your position on property rights. if you are a moral realist and posit objectivity to morality, then your property theory will be firmed up. in my previous post i was making a more general point that meta-ethics is notoriously tortourous whatever ones stake, and there are such things as the limit of language,...
So what are the 'oughts' that exist? In what way do they exist, and how do you discern them? You know my position, now I want to know yours.
Can't get rid of this double post
haha, do i have to do it in public or can i do it in private
i think i would take up pages and pages. but my gist is that moral talk is not gibberish, there are common elements, they point in common directions, they might be said to have a common telos or reason. so i reflect as analytically as i can about what morality purports to be and what properties it should have in order to be what is claimed for it. and by such analysis i whittled down candidate moralities to the true morality of libertarianism. and satisfied myself that, the morality is 'inforce' for all moral agents capable of similiar analysis.
this begs lots of questions of course but i dont get paid to type by the paragraph (or at all!)
Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good 2. Natural law is derived from nature 3. Natural law is good 4. One ought to follow the good. 5. Thus one ought to follow natural law. Of the two premises 1 and 4, 4 is uncontroversial however 1 is not. It is though defensible: the most robust defence would rest on nature being created by a good God.
Of the two premises 1 and 4, 4 is uncontroversial however 1 is not. It is though defensible: the most robust defence would rest on nature being created by a good God.
Not logically defensible.
Anyway, a religious person relying on God for their morality doesn't need to cross the is/ought gap: if their god declares that something ought not be done, that is the end of the discussion. And of course pointing out God's views is also an effective persuasion method for all his fellow believers.
Lilburne:There are no cosmically/objectively "right" or "wrong" moral urges. Moral urges are the kind that impel us toward action that is most certain to be to our own material detriment relative to other actions and is usually for the sake of others. Some moral urges concern what is traditionally known as property rights: the urge not to aggress against others and to retaliate against aggression. Of course there are the great many non-moral urges which are not selfless in this way: the basic urges of personal survival and personal promotion. When a basic urge overwhelms a property-relative urge and we thus aggress against someone, our property-relative urges will often engender feelings of guilt. In hindsight a repentant person will feel that the basic urge that impelled him to aggress was "wrong" in that it was excessive. This kind of thing can happen in foresight too. We've all been at a point where we're about to do something that we feel is wrong, but we go ahead and set out to do it anyway. In those cases, our self-promotion urges are overwhelming our moral urges, but the latter are still there engendering feelings of "pre-guilt" and causing us to reflect upon the self-promotion urges as "bad", even though the latter continues to impel us on anyway. If such guilty feelings become strong enough, they will tip the scale and we will act morally.
This is really good.
Conza88:Because man has free will, it does indeed follow that he ought not to be coerced by others.
"Ought not" in order to bring about what consequences? Only three types of answers are possible:
1. Ought not, only in order to achieve certain consequences.
2. Ought not, for reasons purely unrelated to consequences.
3. Ought not, in order to achieve some consequences and also for reasons purely unrelated to consequences.
If Case 1, the statement is purely consequentialist.
If Case 2, the onus immediately falls on Rothbard to explain precisely what he means by "ought not" (for reasons purely unrelated to consequences) in precise, unambiguous terms - if he did not soon do so, we must reject his whole notion as nothing more than non-logical persuasion and wholly inappropriate for academic discourse.
If Case 3, the statement is partly consequentialist, and the remainder is merely non-logical persuasion if he does not immediately clear up exactly what he means by "ought not" (for reasons purely unrelated to consequences).
Hence until someone can explain how "ought not for reasons purely unrelated to consequences" can make sense in rigorous, precisely-defined, unambiguous language without reference to similarly ill-defined terms, Rothbard's statement must be either
1. Purely consequentialist
2. Pure non-logical persuasion
3. Partly consequentialist and partly non-logical persuasion
Man ought not to frustrate another man because in so doing he indirectly frustrates himself. By violating the rights of others a man negates his own claim to the same rights and opens himself to just retaliation.
To argue that men don't have the foresight to realize this is to argue that men are not rational.
"We must not let our rulers load us with perpetual debt. We must make our election between economy and liberty or profusion and servitude." - Thomas Jefferson