I ought to take an aspirin as this thread is killing my brain.
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
Romantivist: Man ought not to frustrate another man because in so doing he indirectly frustrates himself. By violating the rights of others a man negates his own claim to the same rights and opens himself to just retaliation.
Man ought not to frustrate another man because in so doing he indirectly frustrates himself. By violating the rights of others a man negates his own claim to the same rights and opens himself to just retaliation.
You suppose that it is self-evident that a man ought be free of frustration. That man should act in his self-interest or utility maximization may be a workable first-principle, but it isn't self evident and cannot be derived from factual statements.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
ladyattis:I ought to take an aspirin as this thread is killing my brain.
and
Romantivist:Man ought not to frustrate another man because in so doing he indirectly frustrates himself.
Yes, these are both consequentialism, the only meaningful way to cross the is/ought gap (meaning we allow for ought to mean simply "ought...in order to achieve X"). All other ways are mere persuasive techniques, which are perfectly valid in their own right, but have no place in academic discourse. I welcome any reader or scholar to attempt to demonstrate otherwise.
Why anarchy fails
Romantivist:Man ought not to frustrate another man because in so doing he indirectly frustrates himself. By violating the rights of others a man negates his own claim to the same rights and opens himself to just retaliation.
This begs the question, because his having such a claim in the first place and the notion of retaliation being "just" also presupposes other "oughts".
And if this is merely a consequetialist argument, then it is false too, because such a man may be quite confident that no such retaliation, just or not, will ever result (as in Plato's Ring of Gyges scenario). Of course this last is more of a matter for the "Man/Mankind" problem in another thread.
zefreak: Still waiting on an adequate derivation of an ought from an is..
Still waiting on an adequate derivation of an ought from an is..
I already gave you one, at the top of the post.
Man is a living thing, and therefore he ought to go on living.
This statement is axiomatic.
Any argument to the contrary negates itself, because those doing the arguing have already agreed to the truth of this statement continuing to live.
If you hold that men ought not to go on living, and you believe this to be rational, then please, demonstrate.
If you post again, it will necessarily mean one of two things:
1. You are irrational, and therefore have entered this rational discourse under false pretenses (I believe that's what's called a 'troll')
or
2. You concede the point: Man is a living thing, therefore he ought to go on living.
"We must not let our rulers load us with perpetual debt. We must make our election between economy and liberty or profusion and servitude." - Thomas Jefferson
Lilburne:This begs the question, because his having such a claim in the first place and the notion of retaliation being "just" also presupposes other "oughts".
Yes, when we are not on the same page metaphysically and epistomologically, it does beg the question. We have, I think we can all agree, started in the middle of philosophy and not at the beginning.
I can assure you that it does not beg the question, so long as you understand the philosophical foundation of the statement, but you'll have to take my word for it...unless you want to start from the beginning, philosophically.
Wrong, confused and/or dishonest.
Romantivist: Man is a living thing, and therefore he ought to go on living.
This is not self-evident.
Romantivist: Any argument to the contrary negates itself, because those doing the arguing have already agreed to the truth of this statement continuing to live.
As I said elsewhere, any action taken to extend life is not an admission of life as a first principle, categorical imperative, what have you. My life may be value-neutral except to the extent it satisfies some unobserved value.
Your argument, that because a man lives is an admission that he "ought" to live, is untenable.
Romantivist: If you hold that men ought not to go on living, and you believe this to be rational, then please, demonstrate.
False dichotomy. To reject the proposition that man ought to live does not assert the proposition that man ought not to live.
Romantivist: If you post again, it will necessarily mean one of two things: 1. You are irrational, and therefore have entered this rational discourse under false pretenses (I believe that's what's called a 'troll') or 2. You concede the point: Man is a living thing, therefore he ought to go on living.
You fail logic.
Romantivist: zefreak: Still waiting on an adequate derivation of an ought from an is.. I already gave you one, at the top of the post. Man is a living thing, and therefore he ought to go on living.
Ought to go on living in order to achieve what consequences? If not to achieve any consequences, then please explain precisely what you mean by "ought to go on living," because your meaning is not obvious unless you mean to refer to consequences. Alternatively, if you mean in order to achieve consequences, the statement is consequentialist. I agree the is/ought gap can be bridged through consequentialism, but it is trivial to do so as I showed here. So I think Lilburne is looking for a non-consequentialist way to cross the is/ought divide.
zefreak:My life may be value-neutral except to the extent it satisfies some unobserved value.
This statement represents a default on rational discourse. How can we have a discussion if we assert things like "unobserved values" which hold sway over the discussion?
I may as well say "You're wrong because The Voice Of God spoke to me and told me so." It has as much verifiability as your statement.
And anyway, a thing can't serve as a means to a valuable end and remain value-neutral, especially not a thing so important as one's own life. To assert that it can, with no foundation or defense, is simply to argue arbitrarily, IE irrationally. The burden of proof lies on you. If you want to include the concept of "unobservable ends" in the conversation then you'd better supply some foundation for it.
zefreak:False dichotomy. To reject the proposition that man ought to live does not assert the proposition that man ought not to live.
A "false dichotomy" only exists when there are many choices and only two are presented. However, between the choice to live and the choice to not live, there aren't a spectrum of possiblities. One either lives or dies, one doesn't "sort-of die" or "kind-of live, sometimes."
So, in fact, rejecting the proposition that you ought to go on living does assert the proposition that you ought not to live.
This is what I believe is called a "true dichotomy."
Anyway, it matters not, because so long as you go on referring to "unobservable values" to bolster your argument, I must conclude that you're irrational, and not interested in real debate.
All "ought" statements do not imply a purpose. Life is an end unto itself.
For Romantivist, even Rand would never assume that because someone is alive that they ought to continue to live. Rand, and a few other consequentialists, recognized living for living's sake isn't always the best option. Should someone knowing they're going to be tortured for the entire length of their natural life continue to wish to live, when death may give them the means to escape? Should someone that is going to suffer a similar circumstance due to an incurable disease want to live too?
Should I avoid all risks in life just to stay alive? No, avoiding death doesn't ensure a life in terms of one's values. If one values their life, they'll make the best of it, but that's the kicker, it's their life without a theoretical framework to tie it to that of others. We're all heavily into individualism in the argument so far, but no one else has really brought it to the fore the importance of a meta-ethical framework that connects the personal values of individuals to a larger whole that composes society. I'm not necessarily arguing for a greater good, or commonweal, but I am arguing there's something that is operating between human beings other than blind chance in terms of avoiding ruinous conflicts.
One of my professors at my university, who taught my moral philosophy class, suggested a similar "patch work theory" as I'm suggesting too, but I think I make a distinction from him in that it's not a mere patch work, but rather a system of open ended actions (and equally open ended value systems) by which a meta-ethical framework can be constructed. Now, what does this mean for the is-ought divide? Not much, other than the ought of personal values can lead to an *is* in terms of what *is* true for being a human being in a society. Whether the particular values that evolve are alien from what we're accustomed to in our age may not be important (beyond some bare minimum of a non-heuristic set of truisms), or whether they retain the same sense of ethos as we do today, the fact will remain that the same structure in the personal individual ethical concerns and the impersonal 'collective' ethical concerns will be maintained by the same frameworks.
For me, ought still stands as a signal for alternate actions that one may or may not instantiate in terms of one's values. The term *is* is simply a statement of fact (past or present), thus to attempt to make an object the values that each person carries with them is nonsense not from the standpoint that these are indiscrete or arbitrary, but that these depend on the context and choices of each person. So, the *is* can only signal that a person *is* following a set of values, the *ought* is the signal of the choices s/he can make in terms of those values (even in terms of dispensing of one set of values for that of another).
those concerned with the ought/is gap suppose that
a) morality can be reduced down to non-moral facts, in which case they will destroy morality by eliminating that which is special/peculiar about it. squeezing ethics -> physics is to say that everything is physics and there is no ethics (not vice versa)
b) that if morality cant be reduced down to non-moral facts, there cant be moral facts, because they suppose that only non-moral facts can be facts.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Lilburne: A natural rights theory based on that conception is basically no different from the crude amoralism of Jacob Bloom, because it makes right-and-wrong into a matter of smart-and-stupid.
A natural rights theory based on that conception is basically no different from the crude amoralism of Jacob Bloom, because it makes right-and-wrong into a matter of smart-and-stupid.
That does not refute my argument because my argument does indeed show that moral correctness is the same as any other correctness. The simple truth is that all "ought" statements imply a specific "want". As an Austrian economist, if you wanted to make nonexistent the human race, then you would preach extreme statist and totalitarian ideology. However, if you wanted to be successful, then you would have to pretend that the instillation of such ideology will cause all to prosper because that is, generally, the "want" of humans.
Any disconnect between "ought" and "want" implies totalitarianism and collectivism.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
nirgrahamUK: those concerned with the ought/is gap suppose that a) morality can be reduced down to non-moral facts, in which case they will destroy morality by eliminating that which is special/peculiar about it. squeezing ethics -> physics is to say that everything is physics and there is no ethics (not vice versa) b) that if morality cant be reduced down to non-moral facts, there cant be moral facts, because they suppose that only non-moral facts can be facts.
Bingo. Ethics != Cosmology.
AJ:I agree the is/ought gap can be bridged through consequentialism, but it is trivial to do so as I showed here. So I think Lilburne is looking for a non-consequentialist way to cross the is/ought divide.
Indeed. The only way for morality to be objective is if it bridges the is/ought gap with consequentialism. I don't think consequentialism is properly called morality, because then it is simply a technical matter of optimizing human action (right/wrong as smart/stupid). Outside of utilitarianism, morality could not be consequentialist and universal at the same time, because likely consequences will differ for different people according to different situations (the man/mankind problem). And nothing in utilitarian theory has convinced me why I as an individual ought to strive for the greatest utility for the greatest number, or force anyone else to.
Casting all these academic contrivances aside, all that is left is the preponderant, inherent decency of the human heart. I just don't see what's so scary about that.
zefreak: Ought is simply a statement about a preferred state of affairs, as opposed to what "is". It is the presumption of value in a state of affairs, while morality is a system of ought statements whos purpose are to attain said valuable state of affairs. I hold that value is subjective, hence morality is subjective.
Ought is simply a statement about a preferred state of affairs, as opposed to what "is". It is the presumption of value in a state of affairs, while morality is a system of ought statements whos purpose are to attain said valuable state of affairs.
I hold that value is subjective, hence morality is subjective.
The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves.
AJ: Romantivist: zefreak: Still waiting on an adequate derivation of an ought from an is.. I already gave you one, at the top of the post. Man is a living thing, and therefore he ought to go on living. Ought to go on living in order to achieve what consequences? If not to achieve any consequences, then please explain precisely what you mean by "ought to go on living," because your meaning is not obvious unless you mean to refer to consequences. Alternatively, if you mean in order to achieve consequences, the statement is consequentialist. I agree the is/ought gap can be bridged through consequentialism, but it is trivial to do so as I showed here. So I think Lilburne is looking for a non-consequentialist way to cross the is/ought divide.
Strictly speaking, nothing can cross the is-ought divide. Introducing purpose is basically introducing an ought proposition into the equation. As I elaborated earlier:
Proposition 1 (is): A wants B
Proposition 2 (is): A can attain B through C
Conclusion 1 (ought): A should use C to attain B
This is not valid reasoning without introducing
Proposition 3 (ought): A ought to attain his wants
This is often hidden by the if-then form consequentialists use in their reasoning. Its simply sloppy semantics.
Instead of saying "If A wants B he should do C", it would be proper to say "If A should attain B, he should do C".
nirgrahamUK:a) morality can be reduced down to non-moral facts, in which case they will destroy morality by eliminating that which is special/peculiar about it. squeezing ethics -> physics is to say that everything is physics and there is no ethics (not vice versa)
Just to note we can indeed reduce 'morality' into 'non-moral' 'facts' in a sense. For example, we can reduce the human's 'moral' 'preference' to not harm others to the genes that force people to feel empathy and guilt. The 'existence' of those genes 'are' not 'preferences', but 'objective facts' about the world. I believe Anarchist Cain and wilderness has defended 'objective morality' in this sense.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
Lilburne:Indeed. The only way for morality to be objective is if it bridges the is/ought gap with consequentialism.
When you propose this, you demonstrate that you believe we ought to accept it as true. Even in denying that the is/ought gap is bridgeable, you affirm that it, in fact, is bridgeable.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:Just to note we can indeed reduce 'morality' into 'non-moral' 'facts' in a sense. For example, we can reduce the human's moral preference to not harm others to the genes that causes people to feel empathy and guilt. I believe Anarchist Cain and wilderness has defended 'objective morality' in this sense.
i believe that a rational animal that did not have empathy or guilt 'emotions' but could reflect on interpersonal action, freedom etc. could derive libertarian ethics. i dont know how id prove that, or how you would prove the opposite. but i thought i should at least indicate a counter position without letting yours be the only one people read .
Romantivist:Life is an end unto itself.
Can you articulate what this means?
Lilburne:Casting all these academic contrivances aside, all that is left is the preponderant, inherent decency of the human heart. I just don't see what's so scary about that.
I never see any problem with asserting that morality has a sense to it that cannot be reduced to sylogisms, but the point that is always true in most moral considerations is that you can at least put most of it in terms of logic as to frame the argument. This is probably the most important part of ethics for human beings that it is partly emotional and logical in nature. It's this melding of earlier pre-human and human adaptations that allows us to survive in small bands or huge concrete jungles together. Or even to act alone with some measure of self-respect. To deny the logic of ethics is to give in to those that wish reality to be whatever conceived of or wished. To deny the emotion of ethics is to give in to those that want to make man another machine that can be engineered. Neither exclusive position is tenable for a human being as both lead to some kind of tyranny.
Stephen Forde: The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves.
I value logic, consistency, and truth. Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't.
AJ: Romantivist:Life is an end unto itself. Can you articulate what this means?
He may mean Life qua Life. Which I don't see how that's defensible...
Romantivist: A "false dichotomy" only exists when there are many choices and only two are presented. However, between the choice to live and the choice to not live, there aren't a spectrum of possiblities. One either lives or dies, one doesn't "sort-of die" or "kind-of live, sometimes." So, in fact, rejecting the proposition that you ought to go on living does assert the proposition that you ought not to live. This is what I believe is called a "true dichotomy." Anyway, it matters not, because so long as you go on referring to "unobservable values" to bolster your argument, I must conclude that you're irrational, and not interested in real debate.
Dishonest. There is of course a true dichotomy regarding dying and not dying, but this is not what you or I are talking about.
Also, you misunderstood my meaning with regards to "unobservable values" (I said unobserved, not unobservable, implying that you do not know why I choose to sustain my life. I will not respond to dishonest strawmen in the future)
With regards to ought statements, there are 2. But that precludes the possibility of the third, which denies the existence of an ought.
1. Man ought to live2. Man ought not to live2. There is no ought with regards to living or not living
He means that because we are choosing to live, it is inherently valuable.
ladyattis: Rand would never assume that because someone is alive that they ought to continue to live.
Rand makes a distinction between "remaining alive" and "living." This is a valid distinction, and above it can be assumed, now that you've brought up the distinction, that I refer to "living" as opposed to "remaining alive." A good reference for this distinction is in Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand where suicide is discussed.
zefreak:Strictly speaking, nothing can cross the is-ought divide.
I think I agree. Consequentialism (toward others) is really just advice, however correct that advice might be: "You ought to do X in order to achieve Y." The underlying assumption that the listener wants to achieve Y is obvious. So yes, in that sense nothing can cross the is-ought divide. An "ought" spoken to another person is simply a "word to the wise," advice, or persuasion. It's, "Hey you don't really want to do that, do you?" By the definition you're implying, the word "ought" has no place in any formal statement in academic discourse.
AJ: zefreak:Strictly speaking, nothing can cross the is-ought divide. I think I agree. Consequentialism (toward others) is really just advice, however correct that advice might be: "You ought to do X in order to achieve Y." The underlying assumption that the listener wants to achieve Y is obvious. So yes, in that sense nothing can cross the is-ought divide. An "ought" spoken to another person is simply a "word to the wise," advice, or persuasion. It's, "Hey you don't really want to do that, do you?" By the definition you're implying, the word "ought" has no place in any formal statement in academic discourse.
Exactly.
edit: It seems really minor, but I don't want anyone to be confused. This level of abstraction requires precision. To imply that consequentialism crosses the is-ought divide is potentially confusing.
are there facts about what has place in formal academic discourse?
zefreak: AJ: Romantivist:Life is an end unto itself. Can you articulate what this means? He means that because we are choosing to live, it is inherently valuable.
That would mean living has value, which implies a purpose to be had in keeping that value. But he said that not all 'ought' statements imply a purpose, and apparently intended to demonstrate that by saying, "Life is an end unto itself."
nirgrahamUK: Anarcho-Mercantilist:Just to note we can indeed reduce 'morality' into 'non-moral' 'facts' in a sense. For example, we can reduce the human's moral preference to not harm others to the genes that causes people to feel empathy and guilt. I believe Anarchist Cain and wilderness has defended 'objective morality' in this sense. i believe that a rational animal that did not have empathy or guilt 'emotions' but could reflect on interpersonal action, freedom etc. could derive libertarian ethics. i dont know how id prove that, or how you would prove the opposite. but i thought i should at least indicate a counter position without letting yours be the only one people read .
Correct in a sense. A person who lacks empathy or guilt can logically libertarian ethics. He can do that by first assuming the maximization the freedom and prosperity of humanity as an 'ought'. He will then develop Austrian economics which will provide maximum freedom and property.
However, that person will lack the motivation to promote and spread libertarianism.
zefreak: Exactly. edit: It seems really minor, but I don't want anyone to be confused. This level of abstraction requires precision. To imply that consequentialism crosses the is-ought divide is potentially confusing.
I ought've brought my number 2 pencil to class.
zefreak:Still waiting on an adequate derivation of an ought from an is..
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Anarcho-Mercantilist:However, that person will lack the motivation to promote and spread libertarianism.
being libertarian would be enough, promoting libertarianism is a bonus
Juan: zefreak:Still waiting on an adequate derivation of an ought from an is.. Still waiting for a refutation of moral realism. As noted this "ought-is" stuff is just a strawman. And a dogma in hume's church.
There is as much evidence of moral realism as there is of the supernatural. You cannot disprove either. If an objective moral standard exists, it cannot be derived from observation. I would argue the same holds in relation to God, invisible robots, supernatural spirits, and an infinite number of possibilities that explain observable phenomena.
You are strikingly similar to a theist in that regard. (should rile him up)
zefreak:Ought is simply a statement about a preferred state of affairs,
nirgrahamUK: Anarcho-Mercantilist:However, that person will lack the motivation to promote and spread libertarianism. being libertarian would be enough, promoting libertarianism is a bonus
True in a sense. A perfectly unempathetic individual will feel no obligation to pay any taxes or believe in statist authority. He will also murder, rape, and steal if he believes he will not get caught.
However, he will probably not study nor research about libertarianism in the first place, unless he gets paid for doing that. Because of his lack of empathy, he has no motivation in eliminating statist aggression against innocents (unless he gets paid for it).
Anarcho-Mercantilist:He will also murder, rape, and steal if he believes he will not get caught.
unless, maybe he doesnt want to do those things, and perhaps he doesnt want to do them if he thinks they are 'wrong' things to do. he has access to such knowledge through the reflections that you granted. if he raped and murder etc he would hardly be the libertarian we were discussing, he would be a moral nihilist in action.
Juan: zefreak:Ought is simply a statement about a preferred state of affairs, Wrong. Please take a look at the dictionary. ought : 1. (used to express duty or moral obligation) 2 (used to express justice, moral rightness, or the like) Of course, your 'argument' is just to assert your premise. Since morals are subjective, it follows that oughts are subjective. But you don't have an argument proving that morality is 'subjective'.
That's not a very meaningful definition. How does that cover statements like "you ought to do your homework"?
By the way, merriam webster disagrees..
used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advisability <ought to take care of yourself>, natural expectation <ought to be here by now>, or logical consequence <the result ought to be infinity>
four different meanings, the first and second of which are relevant to the discussion.