Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this. Right, I hold certain values and would like other to hold similar values. Certain values are preferable to me. I have never denied this; such an admission does not prove what you think it does. In my statement that you quoted, I said "keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values" and before that, "Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't." (in the off chance that, sharing those values, you adopt similar conclusions) There is no contradiction here. You are grasping at straws. I'm not sure what you think an "ought" is. I'm pretty sure it's just an expression of valuing one action over another, in which case, I'm right. Also, I think you are assuming that it is only the content of your arguments that is under dispute. It is actually what is implied by the fact that you are arguing that makes the difference.
zefreak: Stephen Forde: The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this. Right, I hold certain values and would like other to hold similar values. Certain values are preferable to me. I have never denied this; such an admission does not prove what you think it does. In my statement that you quoted, I said "keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values" and before that, "Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't." (in the off chance that, sharing those values, you adopt similar conclusions) There is no contradiction here. You are grasping at straws.
Stephen Forde: The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this.
The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this.
Right, I hold certain values and would like other to hold similar values. Certain values are preferable to me. I have never denied this; such an admission does not prove what you think it does. In my statement that you quoted, I said
"keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values"
and before that,
"Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't." (in the off chance that, sharing those values, you adopt similar conclusions)
There is no contradiction here. You are grasping at straws.
I'm not sure what you think an "ought" is. I'm pretty sure it's just an expression of valuing one action over another, in which case, I'm right. Also, I think you are assuming that it is only the content of your arguments that is under dispute. It is actually what is implied by the fact that you are arguing that makes the difference.
As per my previous post..
—used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advisability <ought to take care of yourself>, natural expectation <ought to be here by now>, or logical consequence <the result ought to be infinity>
The first one is the one relevant to the discussion. This is a topic regarding morality, after all. The second one is what you are referring to, and, as advice or opinion, does not require bridging the is-ought gap.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
zefreak: used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advisability <ought to take care of yourself>, natural expectation <ought to be here by now>, or logical consequence <the result ought to be infinity> The first one is the one relevant to the discussion. This is a topic regarding morality, after all. The second one is what you are referring to, and, as advice or opinion, does not require bridging the is-ought gap.
used to express obligation <ought to pay our debts>, advisability <ought to take care of yourself>, natural expectation <ought to be here by now>, or logical consequence <the result ought to be infinity>
Excellent clarification.
Physiocrat: Lilburne, Do you fancy commenting on my attempted defence of natural rigths based on the argument that nature is good I posted a page or so back? I'll reply to AM response to my criticism of emotivisim when I've got sufficient time.
Lilburne,
Do you fancy commenting on my attempted defence of natural rigths based on the argument that nature is good I posted a page or so back?
I'll reply to AM response to my criticism of emotivisim when I've got sufficient time.
Do you mean this one?
Physiocrat: 1. God is good. 2. God created nature. 3. Therefore nature was created good. Now the question here revolves around....
1. God is good.
2. God created nature.
3. Therefore nature was created good.
Now the question here revolves around....
I very much agree with AM's two responses to it, and I'm not sure I would add too much to them. I don't think you've established that god exists, that goodness is objective, or that to harmonize with nature is objectively good.
I. Ryan: Lilburne, It seems that you missed this response:
It seems that you missed this response:
Thank you for reminding me.
I. Ryan:That does not refute my argument because my argument does indeed show that moral correctness is the same as any other correctness.
It does show that this conception of morality is basically consequentialism. And like I said before, I don't think consequentialism is properly called morality, because then it is simply a technical matter of optimization. What then would distinguish "moral action" from "action in general"?
I. Ryan:The simple truth is that all "ought" statements imply a specific "want". As an Austrian economist, if you wanted to make nonexistent the human race, then you would preach extreme statist and totalitarian ideology. However, if you wanted to be successful, then you would have to pretend that the instillation of such ideology will cause all to prosper because that is, generally, the "want" of humans.
I contend that statements like "one ought to not commit aggression" as a moral statement is an issue of inherent revulsion against aggression and not a utilitarian "for the good of humanity in general" position. The latter such position is not an instance of true morality, but is instead an attempt at an elegent solution to the problems of social engineering. People are not moral agents to the extent that they are social engineers. Social engineering is not fundamental to the human psyche; it is relatively new project of the philosophical set.
Lilburne: And like I said before, I don't think consequentialism is properly called morality, because then it is simply a technical matter of optimization. What then would distinguish "moral action" from "action in general"?
And how exactly is this problem? You and others haven't clarified the real implications of said conclusion about consequentialism.
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
ladyattis: Lilburne: And like I said before, I don't think consequentialism is properly called morality, because then it is simply a technical matter of optimization. What then would distinguish "moral action" from "action in general"? And how exactly is this problem? You and others haven't clarified the real implications of said conclusion about consequentialism.
Actually, I have...
Lilburne:Outside of utilitarianism, morality could not be consequentialist and universal at the same time, because likely consequences will differ for different people according to different situations (the man/mankind problem). And nothing in utilitarian theory has convinced me why I as an individual ought to strive for the greatest utility for the greatest number, or force anyone else to.
Also, it would seem like a highly unuseful redefinition of a word. When people talk about morality, they don't mean matters of technical optimization like using the appropriate screwdriver or making the best move in chess. If there were no difference between "moral action" and "action" then people should stop using the word "morality" altogether, and just talk about action. But there is a set of motivations which is fundamentally different from the basic motivations of self-preservation and self-promotion. Those are the motivations that most people talk about when they use the word "morality". I don't think it makes sense to remove from that word its useful delimiting function and redefine it as a superfluous synonym of action.
Lilburne:Also, it would seem like a highly unuseful redefinition of a word. When people talk about morality, they don't mean matters of technical optimization like using the appropriate screwdriver or making the best move in chess. If there were no difference between "moral action" and "action" then people should stop using the word "morality" altogether, and just talk about action. But there is a set of motivations which is fundamentally different from the basic motivations of self-preservation and self-promotion. Those are the motivations that most people talk about when they use the word "morality". I don't think it makes sense to remove from that word its useful delimiting function and redefine it as a superfluous synonym of action.
Well put, this is my biggest problem with natural law philosophy. It seems to hinge on an unusual definition of the word "ought". I mean, if natural law philosophy is indeed correct then people ought to live in a certain way, there's no reason for that "ought" to be moral.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
First, consequentialism *is not* utilitarianism. So stop equivocating the two. It's like what some Randroids do with Rationalism (by equivocating everything Kant wrote with that of every other Rationalist before and after him), it's dirty pool, friend. I don't play it. I expect you not to do the same.
Second, it's a given fact that each intent does not always entail the same end. One may intend to save a person's life in the act of being a doctor, but the end may be that his patient may die anyways. Intent may be a good measure of a moral proposition's general aim (of moral or immoral), but it is *not* a sound measure of its functionality in terms of actual ends. To divorce ends from moral propositions (or moral intents) is to invite an anti-causalist approach to all other human affairs (including those of the purely observational/empirical). So, either you include consequence as *part* of the moral debate or you come up with a theory of moral intents, where it's proven ends are overshadowed by intents in a consistent manner.
Lilburne:When people talk about morality, they don't mean matters of technical optimization like using the appropriate screwdriver or making the best move in chess. If there were no difference between "moral action" and "action" then people should stop using the word "morality" altogether, and just talk about action.
You're the one that's conflating the purpose of consequence in moral considerations. I'm simply stating that at the end of a moral consideration (post-intent analysis) that consequences are weighed to see if the ends match up with the intents and vice versa. If this some how an evil optmization process, guess what? Everything in terms of human action does include the pursuit of the optimal. The optimal need not be merely cardinal in quality, it's often ordinal. It's something we measure not in terms of summation, but how it stands as part of a system of values, as a whole. Thus, you're confusing the pursuit of the optimal in human affairs with the pursuit of the optimal in the inanimate world (that of reaching equilibrium). Both may deal with systems, but now each deals with the function of systems is entirely different.
ladyattis:First, consequentialism *is not* utilitarianism. So stop equivocating the two. It's like what some Randroids do with Rationalism (by equivocating everything Kant wrote with that of every other Rationalist before and after him), it's dirty pool, friend. I don't play it. I expect you not to do the same.
I'm not playing dirty pool. I didn't equivocate the two. I characterized utilitarianism as a variant of consequentialism, not as a synonym. That is how I honestly conceive of utilitarianism. If I'm incorrect, feel free to correct me without assuming ill intent.
ladyattis:Second, it's a given fact that each intent does not always entail the same end. One may intend to save a person's life in the act of being a doctor, but the end may be that his patient may die anyways.
Your use of the word "end" here is confusing. Usually, in questions of human action, the word "end" is defined as what you are calling "intent", not as what you are calling "consequence".
I contend that intention is everything, and actual consequences are immaterial, when discussing morality. The morality of a surgery is dependent on whether the doctor had consent to operate and whether he intended to help or harm: not on the ultimate success. I don't know what school of ethics argues otherwise or how this pertains to the "is/ought" question.
ladyattis:Thus, you're confusing the pursuit of the optimal in human affairs with the pursuit of the optimal in the inanimate world (that of reaching equilibrium). Both may deal with systems, but now each deals with the function of systems is entirely different.
So are you saying what distinguishes "moral action" from "action in general" is whether it involves human affairs?
Lilburne:Your use of the word "end" here is confusing. Usually, in questions of human action, the word "end" is defined as what you are calling "intent", not as what you are calling "consequence".
End for me means the end of a set of actions based on a set of intents.
Lilburne:I contend that intention is everything, and actual consequences are immaterial, when discussing morality.
So if a mother saws off her first born's arms, which results in bleeding, because she thought it would be good for her child, then it's good? The same for honor killings/suicides (like those practiced in India), are they good because the intent was to do good? Oops, so much for intent, when the consequences can lead to shitty ends.
All that that seems to matter for your theoretical framework is what is conceived as 'good' intent, and then by what standard is the intent is 'measured' (not cardinally, mind you or as some cognitive psychological theories would suppose)?
Lilburne:So are you saying what distinguishes "moral action" from "action in general" is whether it involves human affairs?
More or less, basically, if humans didn't direct it, then it has its own operational parameters that are separate (not necessarily exclusive) from that of human affairs. An example would be the random fluke of a meteor striking someone on the head, or a support beam in a building breaking due to random percularities of the composition (that couldn't have been known to the makers). Or some such events.
For me, intent guides or drives to ends (results), thus the pursuit of optimality is part of the pursuit of intent in morality. They're reflective to one and other.
consequentialism is moral theory that is obsessed with consequences, and other moral theories stake their claim by distancing themselves from it. but its a question of emhpasis or degree, every moral theory has an eye on 'consequence' broadly speaking. even supposing your intentionalism you must concede that if your intentions never caused or informed your actions and did not lead to led judgeable outcomes they would hardly be worth discussing. indeed, the kind of intentions you have in mind are consequence orientated. the doctor who intends helpful surgery, intends so with the consequences of such an intention in mind, i.e. he has the intention to bring about the consequence of healing, (whhether or not that is what is obtained by his acting)
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Let me put it another way, if I intend for X, then how by Y is the factor that defines the 'consequence.' Therefore, if my intention to do good by a finite means to achieve it (the how) I must consider each means own end in respect to the intent (and the end in respect to the intent). Whether there's any metaphysical basis for tying one end to one intent is beside the point, it's a matter of whether one is trying to make their ethical or moral judgments sound. As the old saying goes, "The road to Hell is paved with Good Intentions."
.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
I. Ryan: .
WAT
ladyattis:End for me means the end of a set of actions based on a set of intents.
That usage is likely to lead to a lot of confusion in discussion with other Misesians... (emphasis added)
The result sought by an action is called its end, goal, or aim. One uses these terms in ordinary speech also to signify intermediate ends, goals, or aims; these are points which acting man wants to attain only because he believes that he will reach his ultimate end, goal or aim in passing beyond them. Strictly speaking the end, goal, or aim of any action is always the relief from a felt uneasiness. -Human Action, Chapter 4
The result sought by an action is called its end, goal, or aim. One uses these terms in ordinary speech also to signify intermediate ends, goals, or aims; these are points which acting man wants to attain only because he believes that he will reach his ultimate end, goal or aim in passing beyond them. Strictly speaking the end, goal, or aim of any action is always the relief from a felt uneasiness.
-Human Action, Chapter 4
ladyattis:So if a mother saws off her first born's arms, which results in bleeding, because she thought it would be good for her child, then it's good?
I am a subjectivist, in economics as well as ethics. So to me the question is "good according to whom"? The arm-sawing is not good according to me, or according to the preponderance of humanity. If the woman is mad, however, it may very well be good according to her.
ladyattis: More or less, basically, if humans didn't direct it, then it has its own operational parameters that are separate (not necessarily exclusive) from that of human affairs. An example would be the random fluke of a meteor striking someone on the head, or a support beam in a building breaking due to random percularities of the composition (that couldn't have been known to the makers). Or some such events.
No, what I mean is: Do you distinguish moral human action from human action in general according to whether it involves other humans or whether it involves inanimate objects?
Lilburne:I am a subjectivist, in economics as well as ethics. So to me the question is "good according to whom"? The arm-sawing is not good according to me, or according to the preponderance of humanity. If the woman is mad, however, it may very well be good according to her.
Subjectivity always is yielded by the decoupling of goal and action (of end and mean [as you prefer to use the terms]). If you deny that means can indeed alter the end, or the end can alter the means, then you deny all causality at some level. That even physics is merely a 'metanarrative' or some such construct. Turtles all the way down, yet again.
Lilburne:No, what I mean is: Do you distinguish moral human action from human action in general according to whether it involves other humans or whether it involves inanimate objects?
The categories means and ends are analogous to the categories causes and effects. Therefore, the "end" of an action is the effect of that action. And, therefore, in order to describe the intended effect of an action, one may say the "intended end".
I think that that removes any possible ambiguity. Also, I think that, in that quote, Mises erred because he did indeed, at some point, say that the categories means and ends are analagous to the categories causes and effects.
Pretty much this video sums up my views on this thread entirely... For now.
ladyattis: Pretty much this video sums up my views on this thread entirely... For now.
Huh?
ladyattis: Let me put it another way, if I intend for X, then how by Y is the factor that defines the 'consequence.' Therefore, if my intention to do good by a finite means to achieve it (the how) I must consider each means own end in respect to the intent (and the end in respect to the intent). Whether there's any metaphysical basis for tying one end to one intent is beside the point, it's a matter of whether one is trying to make their ethical or moral judgments sound. As the old saying goes, "The road to Hell is paved with Good Intentions."
The road to misery is often paved with good intentions, but not necessarily the road to culpability. Anyway, I still don't know what this has to do with the is/ought divide.
I. Ryan: ladyattis: Pretty much this video sums up my views on this thread entirely... For now. Huh?
Exactly.
Lilburne:The road to misery is often paved with good intentions, but not necessarily the road to culpability. Anyway, I still don't know what this has to do with the is/ought divide.
It has more to do with your overemphasis on intentionality.
[In response to the original post:]
You seem to be assuming that there couldn’t be an “ought” embedded in the very nature of what “is”.
I think our founding fathers answered this question rather beautifully: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” (emphasis mine)
A justification for natural rights doesn’t need to be deduced, because this moral knowledge is self-evident (call it an extension of our conscience). You wrote candidly below [above] about how we “just know” or “feel” when something is morally wrong (even when we “go ahead and do it anyway”). Each of us has experienced that entire all-too-familiar range of sensations from temptation (a want coupled with a feeling that it "ought not" be done), to the fleeting sweetness of doing it anyway (because "why not?"), and the resulting feeling of guilt that almost immediately follows (as if “someone saw”). So, I think the question becomes, Why? Whence this innate and nagging sense of "ought" and "ought not"?
Again, the answer is above: part of that "is" is the self-evident knowledge of our Creator, under whose authority we live and move and have our being. As his “creation,” we are metaphysically and epistemologically dependent upon him, the absolute person, and are therefore ethically obliged to live according to his design. We all know this as soon as we know anything at all – though we normally refuse to admit and embrace it, just as we normally “go ahead and do it anyway” when our conscience objects. Neither natural rights nor our absed consciences are something we can deduce; they're the self-evident consequence of being a creature always before his Creator.
ladyattis: Exactly.
Ha!
Sorry, new here and didn't quote properly. The above was in response to the original post, since I wasn't sure at which point to jump in, though I've skimmed through a few pages of the conversation.
arongahagan: You seem to be assuming that there couldn’t be an “ought” embedded in the very nature of what “is”. I think our founding fathers answered this question rather beautifully: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” (emphasis mine) A justification for natural rights doesn’t need to be deduced, because this moral knowledge is self-evident (call it an extension of our conscience). You wrote candidly below about how we “just know” or “feel” when something is morally wrong (even when we “go ahead and do it anyway”). Each of us has experienced that entire all-too-familiar range of sensations from temptation (a want coupled with a feeling that it "ought not" be done), to the fleeting sweetness of doing it anyway (because "why not?"), and the resulting feeling of guilt that almost immediately follows (as if “someone saw”). So, I think the question becomes, Why? Whence this innate and nagging sense of "ought" and "ought not"? Again, the answer is above: part of that "is" is the self-evident knowledge of our Creator, under whose authority we live and move and have our being. As his “creation,” we are metaphysically and epistemologically dependent upon him, the absolute person, and are therefore ethically obliged to live according to his design. We all know this as soon as we know anything at all – though we normally refuse to admit and embrace it, just as we normally “go ahead and do it anyway” when our conscience objects. Neither natural rights nor our absed consciences are something we can deduce; they're the self-evident consequence of being a creature always before his Creator.
A justification for natural rights doesn’t need to be deduced, because this moral knowledge is self-evident (call it an extension of our conscience). You wrote candidly below about how we “just know” or “feel” when something is morally wrong (even when we “go ahead and do it anyway”). Each of us has experienced that entire all-too-familiar range of sensations from temptation (a want coupled with a feeling that it "ought not" be done), to the fleeting sweetness of doing it anyway (because "why not?"), and the resulting feeling of guilt that almost immediately follows (as if “someone saw”). So, I think the question becomes, Why? Whence this innate and nagging sense of "ought" and "ought not"?
It (morality) does not require a creator. If no creator exists, then the self-evidence of morality and rights can be attributed to the evolutionary process. If it were "fun" to murder people, then do you believe that people would exist? No; we would have become extinct.
Arong, then what if there's no God? Then the nature of is implying ought leads nowhere? For me, is and ought are categorically distinct. Is merely means that which is a fact (It's 95F in Wichita, KS in my neighborhood...). Ought means a prefered course of action (based on one's own intention) (I ought to turn on the damn AC if I don't want to cook in my house...). The so-called divide for me is illusionary and ignorant, simply put.
ladyattis: Arong, then what if there's no God? Then the nature of is implying ought leads nowhere? For me, is and ought are categorically distinct. Is merely means that which is a fact (It's 95F in Wichita, KS in my neighborhood...). Ought means a prefered course of action (based on one's own intention) (I ought to turn on the damn AC if I don't want to cook in my house...). The so-called divide for me is illusionary and ignorant, simply put.
Excellent. As always, an "ought" implies a "want". And, analogously, a universal "ought" (i.e., human rights theories) imply a universal "want".
Bingo. Ought is the method of connecting a prefered end to some set of actions that can fulfill it.
I. Ryan: ladyattis: Arong, then what if there's no God? Then the nature of is implying ought leads nowhere? For me, is and ought are categorically distinct. Is merely means that which is a fact (It's 95F in Wichita, KS in my neighborhood...). Ought means a prefered course of action (based on one's own intention) (I ought to turn on the damn AC if I don't want to cook in my house...). The so-called divide for me is illusionary and ignorant, simply put. Excellent. As always, an "ought" implies a "want". And, analogously, a universal "ought" (i.e., human rights theories) imply a universal "want".
There exists an implicit 'ought': One 'ought' to satisfy his or her wants.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
in my op, you are taking all the morality out of it.
can we not disciminate between two kinds of 'oughts' ?
1)you ought do this if such and such is your goal. because it is a suitable means (maybe the best?) to your goal.
which is different from the moral ought, which stubbornly suggests
2) you ought do it because to do otherwise would be wrong, regardless of your personal subjective goals. even if your goal is to be wrong, you 'should' frustrate your goal and not be wrong. (this is peculiar, but it captures the distinctive sense of what morality is)
I. Ryan:If you believe that the category of "moral action" is a subcategory of "action", then, in order to understand moral action, you must ascertain and then explicitly state the differentia. If you continue to employ the term "moral" or "morality" without explicitly defining such a term via an explicit statement of the differentia, then your arguments will remain incomplete and unconvincing.
Actually, I have defined it in this thread:
Lilburne:In plain language, morality has never been about general optimization in action. People don't say it is immoral to go skydiving without a helmet or to have an un-diversified stock portfolio. What sets moral choices apart from other choices is that the former involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being: risking one's life to save another, abstaining from a tempting crime which would likely go unpunished, etc. Those choices are a distinctive part of human action. That part ought to have a name. It's traditional name is morality. It makes no sense to extend that name to all human action.
Regarding evolution, I have always claimed that the subjective evaluations of morality arise out of nature, which is why certain moral impulses are preponderant. But it is two different things (a) for morality to arise out of natural laws and (b) for those natural laws to be considered to make up morality.
I. Ryan:Although, as you correctly indicated, the so-called science of "social engineering" is a relatively new scientific demarcation, it is merely an explicitization of the nature of a certain demarcation of human action
To me such "explicitization" is basically a futile attempt to become a deus ex machina. Our moral urges may be a result of the "natural social engineering" of Darwinian forces; that doesn't mean it makes sense to internalize that engineering project, any more than it makes sense for a couple to eschew romance since "it's all ultimately about the propagation of the species".
I. Ryan:Do you believe that praxeology "is not fundamental to the human psyche" because "it is [a ] relatively new project of the philosophical set"?
The science of praxeology is not fundamental to the human psyche, but that which it studies is.
nirgrahamUK: in my op, you are taking all the morality out of it. can we not disciminate between two kinds of 'oughts' ? 1)you ought do this if such and such is your goal. because it is a suitable means (maybe the best?) to your goal. which is different from the moral ought, which stubbornly suggests 2) you ought do it because to do otherwise would be wrong, regardless of your personal subjective goals. even if your goal is to be wrong, you 'should' frustrate your goal and not be wrong. (this is peculiar, but it captures the distinctive sense of what morality is)
No. Any disconnect between "ought" and "want" implies coercion and then eventually totalitarianism.
im not sure how you derive that. it seems non-sequitor-ish but perhaps you have reasons....
if you object to 2, does your understanding of morality mean that people with personal goals to do harm to other innocents are not per se being wrong, and ought not avoid doing wrong ? isnt that absurd?
ladyattis:For me, is and ought are categorically distinct. [...] The so-called divide for me is illusionary and ignorant, simply put.
They are categorically distinct, yet their division is illusory and ignorant? Can you explain this Heraclitean puzzle for me?
nirgrahamUK:even if your goal is to be wrong, you 'should' frustrate your goal and not be wrong.
If, as Ryan says, an "ought" implies a "want", then whose "want" is implied by "you ought to frustrate your goal"?
Lilburne: Lilburne:In plain language, morality has never been about general optimization in action. People don't say it is immoral to go skydiving without a helmet or to have an un-diversified stock portfolio. What sets moral choices apart from other choices is that the former involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being: risking one's life to save another, abstaining from a tempting crime which would likely go unpunished, etc. Those choices are a distinctive part of human action. That part ought to have a name. It's traditional name is morality. It makes no sense to extend that name to all human action. Regarding evolution, I have always claimed that the subjective evaluations of morality arise out of nature, which is why certain moral impulses are preponderant. But it is two different things (a) for morality to arise out of natural laws and (b) for those natural laws to be considered to make up morality.
The words 'subjective' and 'objective' can have entirely different meanings depending on context and perspective.
Morality can be 'objective' in this sense: Humans have evolved certain 'moral' impulses such as cooperation and generosity. Genes encode those 'moral' impulses. Those genes 'objectively' exist in reality. Therefore, 'morality' is 'objective' in the sense that genes encode the hardwired 'moral' impulses.
Morality can be 'objective' in another sense. Objectivists, Post-Objectivists, and Molyneuvians define 'objectivity' as the methodology of constructing moral prescriptions from science, reason, and consistent logic—without any biases, logical contradictions, or distortions from short-term gut-feelings. XOmniverse from YouTube defined 'objective morality' in this way.
I agree with 'moral objectivism' in those two above senses. I have continually advised the different meanings of 'subjective' and 'objective', which can lead to terminological confusion and equivocation.
This doesn't really contribute much, if anything, but I thought I add some of my thoughts.
I think the ought-ness of a thing has to correspond with it's nature and it's purpose. Like I said earlier about how the wall ought to slow my car down. Yes, I'm using ought as an expectation, but why would I expect the wall to slow my car? Assuming the wall that looks like brick is indeed brick, then we know certain things about the nature of brick. We know about it's hardness and it's weight. We know with what general purpose man manufactured it and placed it. Knowing these things about bricks and brick walls, we can then expect it to respond a certain way. If I drove my car into the wall and the wall responded by actually speeding the car up, continuing it along it's current trajectory, that would be unexpected. The wall would not be acting according to it's nature nor fulfilling the purpose with which man has manufactured and placed it.
If objects don't react the way we expect them to, we attribute this not to these objects "acting" outside their nature or outside the laws of nature, but we attribute it to an error in our judgment, evaluation or expectation. Objects don't choose to act however they please, they're compelled. Therefore, objects have no duty or ought-ness in the sense that an uncompelled man may have. Yes, we're still subject to laws of nature, based on things like our strength, our chemical makeup, etc., but we can also make choices. I can choose to finish typing this sentence or I can choose to delete it.
I think the oughtness of man is based in part upon his adherence to his nature and upon his adherence to the purpose for which he was manufactured. Man can also create his own purposes, but if those purposes, which bring along with them, "oughts", are in discord with his nature (e.g., i must eat to live) or in discord with the purpose for which he was made, then the degree to which we err will be the degree to which we suffer.
"The best way to bail out the economy is with liberty, not with federal reserve notes." - pairunoyd
"The vision of the Austrian must be greater than the blindness of the sheeple." - pairunoyd