well, thats why i disagree with Ryan, since he wants to have morality without all the messy morality stuff messing it up.
morality is distincitve, it is peculiur in that way. the mistake is to assume that its oughts are want orientated as other more common oughts are .the oughts are not want orientated they are morally orientated. im arguing in a circle similar to how i would argue that tic tac toe is a game played over 9 spaces filled in turn by distinctive marks with the winner making a line of 3.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Lilburne: ladyattis:For me, is and ought are categorically distinct. [...] The so-called divide for me is illusionary and ignorant, simply put. They are categorically distinct, yet their division is illusory and ignorant? Can you explain this Heraclitean puzzle for me?
ladyattis:For me, is and ought are categorically distinct. [...] The so-called divide for me is illusionary and ignorant, simply put.
They are categorically distinct, yet their division is illusory and ignorant? Can you explain this Heraclitean puzzle for me?
It's illusionary in the manner that neither really have anything to do with each other. And neither function the same way. It's like have two parts from the same machine, which don't directly influence or alter the other's functionality, but that both are essential to the operation of that machine. It's ignorant to say because these parts not influencing each other that the machine can operate one without the other, and it's illusionary to say that neither influence the successful operation of that machine. You need both parts, period and end of story, to have the machine work. You need ought to direct actions in moral considerations, as you need is to connect these actions to the moral considerations so you can form logical arguments about them (as to optimize future moral judgments). Neither alters the function of the other, neither bridges to the other, but both are part of the same human "ethical engine."
"The power of liberty going forward is in decentralization. Not in leaders, but in decentralized activism. In a market process." -- liberty student
Lilburne: Actually, I have defined it in this thread: Lilburne: In plain language, morality has never been about general optimization in action. People don't say it is immoral to go skydiving without a helmet or to have an un-diversified stock portfolio. What sets moral choices apart from other choices is that the former involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being: risking one's life to save another, abstaining from a tempting crime which would likely go unpunished, etc. Those choices are a distinctive part of human action. That part ought to have a name. It's traditional name is morality. It makes no sense to extend that name to all human action.
Actually, I have defined it in this thread:
Lilburne: In plain language, morality has never been about general optimization in action. People don't say it is immoral to go skydiving without a helmet or to have an un-diversified stock portfolio. What sets moral choices apart from other choices is that the former involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being: risking one's life to save another, abstaining from a tempting crime which would likely go unpunished, etc. Those choices are a distinctive part of human action. That part ought to have a name. It's traditional name is morality. It makes no sense to extend that name to all human action.
In plain language, morality has never been about general optimization in action. People don't say it is immoral to go skydiving without a helmet or to have an un-diversified stock portfolio. What sets moral choices apart from other choices is that the former involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being: risking one's life to save another, abstaining from a tempting crime which would likely go unpunished, etc. Those choices are a distinctive part of human action. That part ought to have a name. It's traditional name is morality. It makes no sense to extend that name to all human action.
That definition is absolutely inadequate. If I were to use that definition, then starving myself would be a moral action merely because it "involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being".
Or, did you mean to imply that such an action must benefit an other person? In that case: If you want to claim that altruism exists and forms the basis of morality, then you will have to form an evolutionary argument that proves that altruism exists or your argument will remain unconvincing.
Lilburne: Regarding evolution, I have always claimed that the subjective evaluations of morality arise out of nature, which is why certain moral impulses are preponderant. But it is two different things (a) for morality to arise out of natural laws and (b) for those natural laws to be considered to make up morality.
Regarding evolution, I have always claimed that the subjective evaluations of morality arise out of nature, which is why certain moral impulses are preponderant. But it is two different things (a) for morality to arise out of natural laws and (b) for those natural laws to be considered to make up morality.
I do not recognize a difference between those two things. The necessary deductions of an axiomatic system (such as a possible set of "natural laws") are the foundation and the foundation is the necessary deductions. The only reason that they seem separate to us is because our mind is imperfect.
As Mises said:
"Logic and mathematics deal with an ideal system of thought. The relations and implications of their system are coexistent and interdependent. We may say as well that they are synchronous or that they are out of time. A perfect mind could grasp them all in one thought. Man's inability to accomplish this makes thinking itself an action, proceeding step by step from the less satisfactory state of insufficient cognition to the more satisfactory state of better insight. But the temporal order in which knowledge is acquired must not be confused with the logical simultaneity of all parts of an aprioristic deductive system. Within such a system the notions of anteriority and consequence are metaphorical only."["Human Action"; p. 99 of the Scholar's Edition; emphasis mine]
Lilburne: To me such "explicitization" is basically a futile attempt to become a deus ex machina. Our moral urges may be a result of the "natural social engineering" of Darwinian forces; that doesn't mean it makes sense to internalize that engineering project, any more than it makes sense for a couple to eschew romance since "it's all ultimately about the propagation of the species".
To me such "explicitization" is basically a futile attempt to become a deus ex machina. Our moral urges may be a result of the "natural social engineering" of Darwinian forces; that doesn't mean it makes sense to internalize that engineering project, any more than it makes sense for a couple to eschew romance since "it's all ultimately about the propagation of the species".
I do not believe that if one understands the evolution of "romance" and "love", one must "eschew" it because of such knowledge. And, similarly, I do not believe that if one understands the evolution of "morality", one must "eschew" it because of such knowledge.
And, if you want to claim that such explicitization lies outside the ability of the human mind, then you will need to substantiate that claim.
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
pairunoyd: This doesn't really contribute much, if anything, but I thought I add some of my thoughts. I think the ought-ness of a thing has to correspond with it's nature and it's purpose. Like I said earlier about how the wall ought to slow my car down. Yes, I'm using ought as an expectation, but why would I expect the wall to slow my car? Assuming the wall that looks like brick is indeed brick, then we know certain things about the nature of brick. We know about it's hardness and it's weight. We know with what general purpose man manufactured it and placed it. Knowing these things about bricks and brick walls, we can then expect it to respond a certain way. If I drove my car into the wall and the wall responded by actually speeding the car up, continuing it along it's current trajectory, that would be unexpected. The wall would not be acting according to it's nature nor fulfilling the purpose with which man has manufactured and placed it. If objects don't react the way we expect them to, we attribute this not to these objects "acting" outside their nature or outside the laws of nature, but we attribute it to an error in our judgment, evaluation or expectation. Objects don't choose to act however they please, they're compelled. Therefore, objects have no duty or ought-ness in the sense that an uncompelled man may have. Yes, we're still subject to laws of nature, based on things like our strength, our chemical makeup, etc., but we can also make choices. I can choose to finish typing this sentence or I can choose to delete it. I think the oughtness of man is based in part upon his adherence to his nature and upon his adherence to the purpose for which he was manufactured. Man can also create his own purposes, but if those purposes, which bring along with them, "oughts", are in discord with his nature (e.g., i must eat to live) or in discord with the purpose for which he was made, then the degree to which we err will be the degree to which we suffer.
This doesn't really contribute much, if anything, but I thought I add some of my thoughts.
I think the ought-ness of a thing has to correspond with it's nature and it's purpose. Like I said earlier about how the wall ought to slow my car down. Yes, I'm using ought as an expectation, but why would I expect the wall to slow my car? Assuming the wall that looks like brick is indeed brick, then we know certain things about the nature of brick. We know about it's hardness and it's weight. We know with what general purpose man manufactured it and placed it. Knowing these things about bricks and brick walls, we can then expect it to respond a certain way. If I drove my car into the wall and the wall responded by actually speeding the car up, continuing it along it's current trajectory, that would be unexpected. The wall would not be acting according to it's nature nor fulfilling the purpose with which man has manufactured and placed it.
If objects don't react the way we expect them to, we attribute this not to these objects "acting" outside their nature or outside the laws of nature, but we attribute it to an error in our judgment, evaluation or expectation. Objects don't choose to act however they please, they're compelled. Therefore, objects have no duty or ought-ness in the sense that an uncompelled man may have. Yes, we're still subject to laws of nature, based on things like our strength, our chemical makeup, etc., but we can also make choices. I can choose to finish typing this sentence or I can choose to delete it.
I think the oughtness of man is based in part upon his adherence to his nature and upon his adherence to the purpose for which he was manufactured. Man can also create his own purposes, but if those purposes, which bring along with them, "oughts", are in discord with his nature (e.g., i must eat to live) or in discord with the purpose for which he was made, then the degree to which we err will be the degree to which we suffer.
That is interesting.
I. Ryan: pairunoyd: This doesn't really contribute much, if anything, but I thought I add some of my thoughts. I think the ought-ness of a thing has to correspond with it's nature and it's purpose. Like I said earlier about how the wall ought to slow my car down. Yes, I'm using ought as an expectation, but why would I expect the wall to slow my car? Assuming the wall that looks like brick is indeed brick, then we know certain things about the nature of brick. We know about it's hardness and it's weight. We know with what general purpose man manufactured it and placed it. Knowing these things about bricks and brick walls, we can then expect it to respond a certain way. If I drove my car into the wall and the wall responded by actually speeding the car up, continuing it along it's current trajectory, that would be unexpected. The wall would not be acting according to it's nature nor fulfilling the purpose with which man has manufactured and placed it. If objects don't react the way we expect them to, we attribute this not to these objects "acting" outside their nature or outside the laws of nature, but we attribute it to an error in our judgment, evaluation or expectation. Objects don't choose to act however they please, they're compelled. Therefore, objects have no duty or ought-ness in the sense that an uncompelled man may have. Yes, we're still subject to laws of nature, based on things like our strength, our chemical makeup, etc., but we can also make choices. I can choose to finish typing this sentence or I can choose to delete it. I think the oughtness of man is based in part upon his adherence to his nature and upon his adherence to the purpose for which he was manufactured. Man can also create his own purposes, but if those purposes, which bring along with them, "oughts", are in discord with his nature (e.g., i must eat to live) or in discord with the purpose for which he was made, then the degree to which we err will be the degree to which we suffer. That is interesting.
Not really. Just another example of a naturalistic fallacy, with God-given purpose as an attempted justification.
As per the rest of the discussion, it seems to once again be straying off topic.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
zefreak: Not really. Just another example of a naturalistic fallacy, with God-given purpose as an attempted justification. As per the rest of the discussion, it seems to once again be straying off topic.
Who mentioned God?
I. Ryan: zefreak: Not really. Just another example of a naturalistic fallacy, with God-given purpose as an attempted justification. As per the rest of the discussion, it seems to once again be straying off topic. Who mentioned God?
Universal or "objective" ethics requires, according to whoever it was I quoted, a universal purpose. From whence does this purpose come, if not from the supernatural? To say that man's purpose is to fulfill his nature is an unfounded assertion that cannot be deduced from observation.
pairunoyd:I think the oughtness of man is based in part upon his adherence to his nature and upon his adherence to the purpose for which he was manufactured. Man can also create his own purposes, but if those purposes, which bring along with them, "oughts", are in discord with his nature (e.g., i must eat to live) or in discord with the purpose for which he was made, then the degree to which we err will be the degree to which we suffer.
I can do a simple slippery slope argument against this.
If one refuses to eat, he will decrease his lifespan. If one refuses to exercise, he will decrease his lifespan. All those actions listed above can increase one's lifespan, but it comes at an expense of his or her other priorities in life. What delineates acting within one's 'nature' with mere action itself?
I will do a separate argument below:
Suppose that we believe in the proposition "living beings must behave within his or her 'nature'" is true. However, that does not in any way imply that the living being must act to maximize his lifespan. As long as he stays alive, he will not contradict himself if behaves within his 'nature'. That does not depend on how long or short he lives, as long as he is currently living and able to make decisions. Therefore, increasing the being's lifespan is unnecessary to stay consistent with 'natural law'.
Remember when we deduced 'natural law' as a package deal with unnecessary values shoved down our throats? We will now classify the "maximization of lifespan" as an 'unnecessary value'. One can choose to die early and have a short life—without contradicting the third proposition—in that argument.
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
I. Ryan:It (morality) does not require a creator. If no creator exists, then the self-evidence of morality and rights can be attributed to the evolutionary process. If it were "fun" to murder people, then do you believe that people would exist? No; we would have become extinct.
The evolutionary process cannot explain morality. It can't explain the existence or intricate arrangement of matter, let alone that of personality and that it that entails (like genuine choices, undetermined by biochemical make-ups). Mud doesn't start suddenly "wanting" any more than does a rock. (Then there's that pesky little "law" called entropy.)
If we're talking is/ought and morality, we at least must have the possiblity of choosing between options. A Darwinian naturalism only gives you bio-chemically controlled determinism. You cannot eat your cake (have free choice, and morality) and have it too (claim an impersonal, naturalistic origin of the universe). "Water cannot rise above its source."
True that the majority of people don't think it's "fun" to murder people (though some, like the Darwinian Hitler, did). But the evolutionary process simply cannot account for that; there's no directing 'mind' or 'will' in the naturalistic worldview.
I. Ryan: That definition is absolutely inadequate. If I were to use that definition, then starving myself would be a moral action merely because it "involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being".
Starving oneself can very well be a moral act, just as monastic asceticism often is.
ladyattis:Arong, then what if there's no God?
Then knowledge isn't possible, neither is science or logic. There is no basis for predication, and we have no basis for the uniformity of nature (see David Hume). Is an ought are distinct, but they involve each other and cannot be divorced. And ought is something different than a "preferred course of action." Ought, in the moral sphere, means the "good" "right" or "virtuous" course of action. And that can only be "set" by an authority who is above all of us and can communicate it effectively.
And, after reading your last sentence I'm not sure what you're objecting to - the division or the non-division of the "is" and the "ought".
I. Ryan:Any disconnect between "ought" and "want" implies coercion and then eventually totalitarianism.
...and if I really want to kill my neighbor and steal his speedboat? Is it "totalitarian" for the policeman to stop me -- or for my neighbor to? Is the system of courts and prisons to incarcerate criminals "totalitarian"?
Law itself is "totalitarian"?
arongahagan:Then knowledge isn't possible, neither is science or logic. There is no basis for predication, and we have no basis for the uniformity of nature (see David Hume).
That is ridiculously asinine.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
arongahagan:The evolutionary process cannot explain morality.
arongahagan:It can't explain the existence or intricate arrangement of matter, let alone that of personality and that it that entails (like genuine choices, undetermined by biochemical make-ups). Mud doesn't start suddenly "wanting" any more than does a rock. (Then there's that pesky little "law" called entropy.)
arongahagan:If we're talking is/ought and morality, we at least must have the possiblity of choosing between options. A Darwinian naturalism only gives you bio-chemically controlled determinism.
arongahagan:True that the majority of people don't think it's "fun" to murder people (though some, like the Darwinian Hitler, did).
So, since you're just wrong about the whole thing--why not actually try learning about that which you're discussing. Might make you not look so stupid.
Lilburne: I. Ryan: That definition is absolutely inadequate. If I were to use that definition, then starving myself would be a moral action merely because it "involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being". Starving oneself can very well be a moral act, just as monastic asceticism often is.
Furthermore, starving oneself would only be a moral act if it is for the sake of someone (a fellow castaway or an imagined god) or something (an indoctrinated ideal) else, as opposed to starving oneself in order to avoid living for years in agony or dying an even more painful death. The latter two scenarios would involve, not morality, but a peculiar kind of self-promotion that can occur in situations of extremity. I did forget to include this reference to this particular kind of selflessness in my definition, which I usually include, as I did elsewhere in this thread...
Lilburne:Moral urges are the kind that impel us toward action that is most certain to be to our own material detriment relative to other actions and is usually for the sake of others.
Lilburne, then how do you propose to avoid turning morality/ethics into Grand Central Station that's full of people who are blindfolded without hope of knowing who they'll bump into next?
arongahagan: Is an ought are distinct, but they involve each other and cannot be divorced.
Is an ought are distinct, but they involve each other and cannot be divorced.
I'm going to ignore the rest of your rediculous assertions and merely ask you to clarify this. How are "is" reliant on "ought"? "Ought implies valuation, either of the ends or the means, whereas "is" is what exists, free of value.
This is not the first time such an assertion was made in this thread. Can you explain in what way and to what extent "is" is dependant on "ought"?
Anarchist Cain:That is ridiculously asinine.
No, it isn't. May I attempt to explain why?
First, knowledge wouldn't be possible because we could only know something certainly if we had experienced it universally. Otherwise we might one day encounter a fact that alters (or even reverses) everything we've believed up to that point. We would be continually searching, never truly knowing. We just simply don't know enough nor have we experienced enough on our own, as finite, historical, mortal beings, to make universal truth claims. In a universe "governed" (for lack of a better word) by chaos, nothing is permanent - not nature, not even our own selves.
Second, science wouldn't be possible because there would be no reason to believe the universe would continue to behave in the future as it has in the past. Science is based on probability, and probability has no place in a universe of chaos. Logic is the same way - there is no basis for rationality if the universe is ultimately impersonal and irrational (chaos again). The very law of contradiction cannot be accounted for if chaos is ultimate; logic is only possible if the universe is ultimately rational.
The topic of this thread is "how do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?" This question involves metaphysics (is), and ethics (ought). it also includes epistemology - and I would submit that the only valid epistemology is a revelational epistemology. That is, true knowledge is only possible if the absolute personal God reveals it to us. I know most won't like this answer, and I'm sure I haven't shared it as eloquently or clearly as it could be shared. Nevertheless, I have offered an example of how the is/ought divide is crossed in the Christian-theistic version of the natural rights discussion.
Respectfully,
Lilburne: Lilburne: I. Ryan: That definition is absolutely inadequate. If I were to use that definition, then starving myself would be a moral action merely because it "involves possible choices which might be selected with full knowledge that it is likely to be to the detriment of the moral actor's material well-being". Starving oneself can very well be a moral act, just as monastic asceticism often is. Furthermore, starving oneself would only be a moral act if it is for the sake of someone (a fellow castaway or an imagined god) or something (an indoctrinated ideal) else, as opposed to starving oneself in order to avoid living for years in agony or dying an even more painful death. The latter two scenarios would involve, not morality, but a peculiar kind of self-promotion that can occur in situations of extremity. I did forget to include this reference to this particular kind of selflessness in my definition, which I usually include, as I did elsewhere in this thread... Lilburne:Moral urges are the kind that impel us toward action that is most certain to be to our own material detriment relative to other actions and is usually for the sake of others.
I'm not sure I agree here, unless you are simply describing common themes that can be found in commonsense "morality". What are the implications of egoism or the position (that I won't get into here) that altruism is nonsensical and that seemingly altruistic actions are merely satisfying more roundabout or immaterial desires?
ladyattis: Lilburne, then how do you propose to avoid turning morality/ethics into Grand Central Station that's full of people who are blindfolded without hope of knowing who they'll bump into next?
That is a very colorful metaphor, ladyattis: perhaps too colorful, because I can't figure out for certain what it's supposed to mean.
Knight_of_BAAWA:It's not supposed to.
No, Darwin even said he can't account for instinct or morality. But I was responding to another commenter above who said that the evolutionary process could explain morality.
Knight_of_BAAWA:Which you completely fail at understanding.
How so? I've always thought that Darwin's theory was dependant on the idea that "complex organs" "...are formed by numerous, successive, slight" and obviously, beneficial "modifications"? Given that his attempt was to find a naturalistic explanation for the origin of species, man included, wouldn't the advent of personality have to arrive on the scene after one of these non-deleterious mutations? Like I said, mud doesn't spring a personality from nowhere. (See Chapter 6 of Darwin's The Origin of Species.)
Knight_of_BAAWA:...that old lie about Hitler being Darwinian.
Have you never read Mein Kampf?
Knight_of_BAAWA:So, since you're just wrong about the whole thing--why not actually try learning about that which you're discussing. Might make you not look so stupid.
I really do forgive you. Perhaps you could offer some honest arguments instead of bald denials and insults...none of which I take personally.
arongahagan: No, it isn't. May I attempt to explain why? First, knowledge wouldn't be possible because we could only know something certainly if we had experienced it universally. Otherwise we might one day encounter a fact that alters (or even reverses) everything we've believed up to that point. We would be continually searching, never truly knowing. We just simply don't know enough nor have we experienced enough on our own, as finite, historical, mortal beings, to make universal truth claims. In a universe "governed" (for lack of a better word) by chaos, nothing is permanent - not nature, not even our own selves. Second, science wouldn't be possible because there would be no reason to believe the universe would continue to behave in the future as it has in the past. Science is based on probability, and probability has no place in a universe of chaos. Logic is the same way - there is no basis for rationality if the universe is ultimately impersonal and irrational (chaos again). The very law of contradiction cannot be accounted for if chaos is ultimate; logic is only possible if the universe is ultimately rational. The topic of this thread is "how do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?" This question involves metaphysics (is), and ethics (ought). it also includes epistemology - and I would submit that the only valid epistemology is a revelational epistemology. That is, true knowledge is only possible if the absolute personal God reveals it to us. I know most won't like this answer, and I'm sure I haven't shared it as eloquently or clearly as it could be shared. Nevertheless, I have offered an example of how the is/ought divide is crossed in the Christian-theistic version of the natural rights discussion. Respectfully,
Chaos is not irrational. You brought up entropy earlier, do you understand what it means? God is not a prerequisite for a deterministic universe. What you say about absolute knowledge is ultimately true, hence why there are normative rules of thumb such as Occam's Razor which people use to discern most likely explanations, requiring the least number of assumptions.
arongahagan:No, Darwin even said he can't account for instinct or morality. But I was responding to another commenter above who said that the evolutionary process could explain morality.
arongahagan:How so?
arongahagan:Have you never read Mein Kampf?
zefreak:I'm not sure I agree here, unless you are simply describing common themes that can be found in commonsense "morality". What are the implications of egoism or the position (that I won't get into here) that altruism is nonsensical and that seemingly altruistic actions are merely satisfying more roundabout or immaterial desires?
It is true that "altruistic" acts are, in a manner of speaking, not selfless, because all urges that impel action come from the self. Also, I believe many people are often guilty of moral vanity, which is not true morality (for example charitable actions which are only done to raise one's standing in society). But what I think deserves special study, and a special category, is a certain distinct class of action. Like all actions, these actions are for the sake of relieving some felt uneasiness (see Mises); and the satisfaction of that uneasiness is, in a manner of speaking, selfish. But the felt uneasiness itself is related to some other being that is perceived to be outside of the self (whether real or imagined): a child, a drowning man, a god, etc. This is what I mean when I say "selfless". And this kind of uneasiness is what I mean when I say "moral urge".
zefreak:How are "is" reliant on "ought"?
and
zefreak:Can you explain in what way and to what extent "is" is dependant on "ought"?
Let's say I write a poem. I am its author, I therefore have authority over its meaning; it means what I say it means. If someone else says it means something other than that, that person is wrong. Or, let's say I'm an inventor and I make a tool; I say what it is designed for, I define its purpose for being. If someone else comes along and says "the proper use of that item is X", and it's not what I designed it for, then he is wrong. If I exist as the author of the poem, then its meaning depends upon me - I have authority over it. If I exist as the inventor of a tool, then its proper use depends on my purpose. If I mean the poem a certain way, then it ought to be read that way, or it is misread. If I purpose the tool for a certain use, then it ought to be used in that way, or it is misused. "Ought" is dependant on "is".
If there is no author, there is no authority, the poem doesn't just mean anything, it means nothing. Only persons mean something. If there is no creator of an object, there is no purpose for it, because only persons purpose. Is is not dependant on ought, but involves an ought. (If I wrote it unclearly above, this is what I meant, sorry.) This is also why there can only be meaning and purpose to life if there is an absolute and personal Creator. If we are the result of something impersonal, then not only are we not personal, we have no purpose, and no meaning.
So, to perhaps more directly answer your question. "ought" is determined by our Creator who is there, and is not silent. He is the ultimate "is" and communicates the ultimate "oughts" to us. Without him as the ultimate "is", there is no ultimate "ought."
Knight_of_BAAWA:Because you don't grasp that the 2LoT is a statistical rule SOLELY about usable energy in a closed system, i.e. the total amount of usable energy in a closed system will always decrease. That's all. Period. Should you disagree, I can point you to numerous high school and college level physics texts to disabuse you of your erroneous notion. Please do not bring such humiliation upon yourself.
And without usable energy, what happens? The system degrades. The universe is a system of systems, and they are all subject to this law, therefore they all -- even human reproduction --- tend toward degradation. Try as you might, you can't get Darwin's theory to play nice with the 2Lot.
Knight_of_BAAWA:So you're still going to lie. Fine. Do recall that nowhere in Mein Kampf does Hitler mention Darwin, evolution-as-explained-by-Darwin, or natual selection.
I forgive you for accusing me of lying, rather than for simply assuming I was misinformed (though I wasn't). Can't we be a bit more charitable here, though we disagree?
arongahagan:And without usable energy, what happens?
arongahagan:I forgive you for accusing me of lying
Hint: if you don't want to be accused of lying, don't try to sound like you know what you're talking about. It will get you into a load of trouble with someone who DOES know what he's talking about.
Are we clear?
Lilburne:That is a very colorful metaphor, ladyattis: perhaps too colorful, because I can't figure out for certain what it's supposed to mean.
Perhaps, but let me unpack it for you since I think quite literally in terms of what certain ideas can lead. Imagine the fact that moral subjectivity prevents a person to bridge the standards by which one and other(s) forms their values upon. The difference between any given pair of people in terms of morality would be so broad that to say there's any commonality wouldn't be possible. In essence, it is like blinding everyone that happens to be in Grand Central Station then asking them walk to their destination with ease. The absence of any measure of objectivity that defines the human condition with regard to morality, there can be no prescription that is shared (other than those by pure chance) among anyone. Objectivity here need not mean sameness in content of morality, it merely means one can point out reasons (even emotional ones) that are shared universally among all possible human beings (and maybe even non-humans that are roughly similar in nature). You bridge it with Evolution. I bridge it with rationality (which includes emotion in the Randian sense). Our difference may be of degree rather than kind in this debate, but I think the difference is enough to raise it.
But I will state that this does not change the nature of is/ought. I think we're in agreement there so far. Perhaps there should be another thread discussion the framework of ethics that can be raised in absence of [traditional] natural rights?
Knight_of_BAAWA:...a red herring
I have to say I think you're being rather uncharitable with my non-technical language. Can we agree that the universe tends toward disorder? That's what I mean by the term 'entropy' though I didn't technically use it correctly. I do think I would've been understood by most other non-specialist common-folk. I also think you knew what I was aiming at, but hey, I'm willing to give you the benefit of the doubt.
Knight_of_BAAWA:You are.
Now hold on; I never claimed to have read the book from cover to cover, but I have read excerpts and have read articles by those who have studied his books and diaries, etc. (Did you discover entropy personally, or did you read about it from what you deem as reliable sources?) I think anyone familiar with the basics of Darwin's theory would recognize his ideas -- in Hitler's writings. <a href="http://www.crusader.net/texts/mk/mkv1ch11.html">Vol 1, Chapter 9 "On Nation and Race"</a>, might provide an example. I suppose I could've asked, "Have you never read [portions of] Mein Kampf?" If you knew the general them of Paradise Lost (which I'm sure you do) and you'd read a few relevant passages (as I'm sure you have), would you really consider yourself lying if, when someone claimed that Milton was a satanist, you asked, "haven't you read Paradise Lost, his definitive work?"
I may still be uninformed, or simply remain unconvinced. But lying? Surely you're better than that. (Do all newbies get the "Are we clear?" flexing around here? Seriously, that's awesome.)
Ok, well I've offered my answer to the thread topic. Thanks for the dialogue, everyone.
arongahagan:I have to say I think you're being rather uncharitable with my non-technical language.
arongahagan:Can we agree that the universe tends toward disorder? That's what I mean by the term 'entropy' though I didn't technically use it correctly.
arongahagan:Now hold on
arongahagan:even human reproduction --- tend toward degradation.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
arongahagan: Can we agree that the universe tends toward disorder?
Can we agree that the universe tends toward disorder?
If you think entropy implies disorder in the sense of indeterminism then you are sorely mistaken.
arongahagan: I. Ryan:It (morality) does not require a creator. If no creator exists, then the self-evidence of morality and rights can be attributed to the evolutionary process. If it were "fun" to murder people, then do you believe that people would exist? No; we would have become extinct. The evolutionary process cannot explain morality. It can't explain the existence or intricate arrangement of matter, let alone that of personality and that it that entails (like genuine choices, undetermined by biochemical make-ups). Mud doesn't start suddenly "wanting" any more than does a rock. (Then there's that pesky little "law" called entropy.) If we're talking is/ought and morality, we at least must have the possiblity of choosing between options. A Darwinian naturalism only gives you bio-chemically controlled determinism. You cannot eat your cake (have free choice, and morality) and have it too (claim an impersonal, naturalistic origin of the universe). "Water cannot rise above its source." True that the majority of people don't think it's "fun" to murder people (though some, like the Darwinian Hitler, did). But the evolutionary process simply cannot account for that; there's no directing 'mind' or 'will' in the naturalistic worldview.
Someone at somepoint obviously convinced you that to be religious means you must be anti-science. They have done you a great disservice, and you are vastly intellectually poorer for it.
You're the type of person who would be surprised to learn that for centuries many lead scientists were clergy.
Peace
JonBostwick: arongahagan: I. Ryan:It (morality) does not require a creator. If no creator exists, then the self-evidence of morality and rights can be attributed to the evolutionary process. If it were "fun" to murder people, then do you believe that people would exist? No; we would have become extinct. The evolutionary process cannot explain morality. It can't explain the existence or intricate arrangement of matter, let alone that of personality and that it that entails (like genuine choices, undetermined by biochemical make-ups). Mud doesn't start suddenly "wanting" any more than does a rock. (Then there's that pesky little "law" called entropy.) If we're talking is/ought and morality, we at least must have the possiblity of choosing between options. A Darwinian naturalism only gives you bio-chemically controlled determinism. You cannot eat your cake (have free choice, and morality) and have it too (claim an impersonal, naturalistic origin of the universe). "Water cannot rise above its source." True that the majority of people don't think it's "fun" to murder people (though some, like the Darwinian Hitler, did). But the evolutionary process simply cannot account for that; there's no directing 'mind' or 'will' in the naturalistic worldview. Someone at somepoint obviously convinced you that to be religious means you must be anti-science. They have done you a great disservice, and you are vastly intellectually poorer for it. You're the type of person who would be surprised to learn that for centuries many lead scientists were clergy.
Sorry to wade in here but Jon you've made one of the most blatant category errors I've seen: what does the advancement of empirical science have to do with morality? That deals with is statements rather than ought ones (quite apt for this thread). Now even if you explain the origin of someone's moral beliefs, via evolution for example, that doesn't justify the truth value of such a belief.
The atoms tell the atoms so, for I never was or will but atoms forevermore be.
Yours sincerely,
Physiocrat
arongahagan: zefreak:Can you explain in what way and to what extent "is" is dependant on "ought"? Let's say I write a poem. I am its author, I therefore have authority over its meaning; it means what I say it means. If someone else says it means something other than that, that person is wrong. Or, let's say I'm an inventor and I make a tool; I say what it is designed for, I define its purpose for being. If someone else comes along and says "the proper use of that item is X", and it's not what I designed it for, then he is wrong. If I exist as the author of the poem, then its meaning depends upon me - I have authority over it. If I exist as the inventor of a tool, then its proper use depends on my purpose. If I mean the poem a certain way, then it ought to be read that way, or it is misread. If I purpose the tool for a certain use, then it ought to be used in that way, or it is misused. "Ought" is dependant on "is". If there is no author, there is no authority, the poem doesn't just mean anything, it means nothing. Only persons mean something. If there is no creator of an object, there is no purpose for it, because only persons purpose. Is is not dependant on ought, but involves an ought. (If I wrote it unclearly above, this is what I meant, sorry.) This is also why there can only be meaning and purpose to life if there is an absolute and personal Creator. If we are the result of something impersonal, then not only are we not personal, we have no purpose, and no meaning. So, to perhaps more directly answer your question. "ought" is determined by our Creator who is there, and is not silent. He is the ultimate "is" and communicates the ultimate "oughts" to us. Without him as the ultimate "is", there is no ultimate "ought."
Nice.
Physiocrat: AJ: Physiocrat: AJ: Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good Not logically defensible. Please tell me why this is not logically defensible rather than just stating it? Because it's just persuasion: "Hey guys, c'mon, don't you see how good nature is?" If you meant it to be interpreted any other way, why didn't you give your own definition of "good"? 1. God is good.
AJ: Physiocrat: AJ: Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good Not logically defensible. Please tell me why this is not logically defensible rather than just stating it? Because it's just persuasion: "Hey guys, c'mon, don't you see how good nature is?" If you meant it to be interpreted any other way, why didn't you give your own definition of "good"?
Physiocrat: AJ: Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good Not logically defensible. Please tell me why this is not logically defensible rather than just stating it?
AJ: Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good Not logically defensible.
Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good
1. Nature is good
Not logically defensible.
Please tell me why this is not logically defensible rather than just stating it?
Because it's just persuasion: "Hey guys, c'mon, don't you see how good nature is?" If you meant it to be interpreted any other way, why didn't you give your own definition of "good"?
1. God is good.
You forgot "0. God exists." As I implied earlier, the statement, "nature is good," may be defensible in terms of religion (for believers). However, those that believe in God (Christian God at least) do not need to cross the is/ought divide. It's still not logically defensible from first principles (no problem for a religious person, but problematic for others), and anyway you still didn't define what you mean by "good." Logical deduction can't work in any case unless all the terms are clearly defined.
Why anarchy fails
Brainpolice:When I make specific arguments for normative ethical premises, I am not merely communicating that I feel a certain way, I am giving reasons.
For example?
arongahagan:"We hold these truths to be self-evident..."
This is a purely persuasive appeal, so the following is also:
arongahagan:Again, the answer is above: part of that "is" is the self-evident knowledge of our Creator, under whose authority we live and move and have our being. As his “creation,” we are metaphysically and epistemologically dependent upon him, the absolute person, and are therefore ethically obliged to live according to his design. We all know this as soon as we know anything at all – though we normally refuse to admit and embrace it, just as we normally “go ahead and do it anyway” when our conscience objects. Neither natural rights nor our absed consciences are something we can deduce; they're the self-evident consequence of being a creature always before his Creator.
nirgrahamUK:2) you ought do it because to do otherwise would be wrong, regardless of your personal subjective goals. even if your goal is to be wrong, you 'should' frustrate your goal and not be wrong. (this is peculiar, but it captures the distinctive sense of what morality is)
What's your definition of "wrong"?
Lilburne:But what I think deserves special study, and a special category, is a certain distinct class of action. Like all actions, these actions are for the sake of relieving some felt uneasiness (see Mises); and the satisfaction of that uneasiness is, in a manner of speaking, selfish. But the felt uneasiness itself is related to some other being that is perceived to be outside of the self (whether real or imagined): a child, a drowning man, a god, etc. This is what I mean when I say "selfless". And this kind of uneasiness is what I mean when I say "moral urge".
Certainly a worthy field of study, but I think more the purview of psychology or biology than philosophy.