nirgrahamUK: Adam Knott:Please provide the passages in Hoppe's argumentation ethics where he refers to the concept of "falsehoods." do you deny that his argumentation ethics involves understanding that some set of propositions are false , and knowing this by recognising the performative contradiction involved in the stating of them. ? if you dont deny it, then dont be petulant. if you do deny it I will ask you how you manage that....
Adam Knott:Please provide the passages in Hoppe's argumentation ethics where he refers to the concept of "falsehoods."
do you deny that his argumentation ethics involves understanding that some set of propositions are false , and knowing this by recognising the performative contradiction involved in the stating of them. ?
if you dont deny it, then dont be petulant. if you do deny it I will ask you how you manage that....
I fully affirm what are *real* examples of performative contradictions, such as if I shout in your ear that "sound doesn't exist". Assuming that you're not deaf, my statement self-detonates because it is empirically falsified on impact.
The problem is that this does not work outside of such a context. If I say "the initiation of aggression is morally justified", this statement does not inherently self-detonate simply because I don't bludgeon you with an axe. It is not empirically falseified on impact, because the mere fact that I don't bludgeon you with an axe is not in and of itself a proof of the NAP.
Brainpolice:If I say "the initiation of aggression is morally justified", this statement does not inherently self-detonate simply because I don't bludgeon you with an axe.
you arent going to say if arguing presupposes any interpersonal norms are you....
you make debate panda sad
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
Brainpolice:That's precisely my point - the attempt to act as if anyone argueing against the *ethic* of "self-ownership" is denying the *fact* of physiological autonomy or intentionality is a conflation between normative ethics and physical or metaphysical facts.
nirgrahamUK: Brainpolice:The question "am I just a wall?" misses the point, which is that interpersonal norms are not proven or disproven by how people behave in debates. what (if any) interpersonal norms do you think are implicit in argumentation?
Brainpolice:The question "am I just a wall?" misses the point, which is that interpersonal norms are not proven or disproven by how people behave in debates.
what (if any) interpersonal norms do you think are implicit in argumentation?
None. I don't believe that the very act of argumentation proves or disproves any perscriptive premises. Only the actual content of a given argument can do that, not anything that is inherent in argumentation itself.
So Brainpolice believes that argumentation happens in a vacuum. That there's not even any relation to language and grammar and syntax and all that. Some idealized Platonic form.
How idiotic.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Brainpolice:That's precisely my point - the attempt to act as if anyone argueing against the *ethic* of "self-ownership" is denying the *fact* of physiological autonomy or intentionality is a conflation between normative ethics and physical or metaphysical facts.No, it is not. But thanks for whining about it in your response. Which, invariably, you will do. Because you still don't grasp what Hoppe is saying. Which isn't my problem.
Yes, that is a conflation: the right to not have one's person interfered with by an external authrority is not the same thing as the fact that one has physiological control of one's body. One can have physiological control of one's body while one's person is interfered with by an external authority, and one can lack physiological control of one's body while one's peson is not interfered with by an external authority. They are not the same thing.
It isn't me that isn't grasping what Hoppe is saying, it's you that isn't grasping the inherent flaw in what he's saying.
Knight_of_BAAWA: So Brainpolice believes that argumentation happens in a vacuum. That there's not even any relation to language and grammar and syntax and all that. Some idealized Platonic form. How idiotic.
No, I do not believe that argumentation happens in a vacuum, I believe that the act of argumentation does not inherently prove or disprove ethical premises: that depends on the actual *substance* of the arguments, not the form of argumentation itself.
I reject platonism.
ha, keep strawmanning for the win!
Brainpolice:Yes, that is a conflation
Knight_of_BAAWA: Brainpolice:Yes, that is a conflationNo, it isn't. Learn what Hoppe is saying. Stop strawmanning. It's annoying. And learn what a transcendental argument is. Are you seriously this ill-informed?
There is no strawman. I'm responding to precisely what the claim is at face value, and you're denying that something is a conflation when it has been explained in detail why it is a conflation.
Brainpolice:No, I do not believe that argumention happens in a vacuum
Brainpolice:There is no strawman.
Brainpolice: "Instead, it is a proof that it is impossible to propositionally justify non-libertarian principles without falling into contradictions."(underline added) By making the statement "there is no right to self-ownership", I am not contradicting the fact that I have physiological control of my body, because I'm not denying that I have physiological control of my body. There is no contradiction, hence the misleading nature of the argument.
"Instead, it is a proof that it is impossible to propositionally justify non-libertarian principles without falling into contradictions."(underline added)
By making the statement "there is no right to self-ownership", I am not contradicting the fact that I have physiological control of my body, because I'm not denying that I have physiological control of my body. There is no contradiction, hence the misleading nature of the argument.
I believe I could say the same thing somewhat differently: If I make the statement "I deny that I have physiological control of my body," this does not contradict the fact that I'm walking around, because physical facts cannot contradict one another (at least as we typically conceive things). Thus, my physical utterance cannot be said to "contradict" a separate physical movement of mine.
To find a performative contradiction then, we have to look not to two separate sets of physical facts (in which case there will be no contradiction), but to the relation of a physical fact or set of facts to an intention.
But then another problem arises:
The physical utterances a person may make are consistent with an innumerable number of intentions that person may have. Conversely, the intention held by an actor is consistent with an innumerable number of utterances he may make.
Someone may exclaim: "Socialism is great !" This physical utterance is perfectly consistent with any number of intentions a person may have. He may be at a gathering of libertarians, and saying this mockingly. There is obviously no contradiction.
Conversely, someone may exclaim: "Lockean private property is the only argumentatively justifiable social order!" This person may be a socialist at a socialist gathering, and saying this to mock libertarians. There is obviously no contradiction.
(the relevant works on these ideas are: Hayek's essay "The facts of the social sciences," and Searle's book Minds, Brains and Science)
For Hoppe's theory to become rigorous, he may then have to address intentions, and this will likely begin to get complicated.
There is the possibility of establishing a pure logical contradiction, as opposed to a performative contradiction. But my current understanding is that Hoppe's theory does not seek to establish a pure logical contradiction.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Liar. You believe that argumentation is not between humans, but some ideals which can never be realized. You believe that argumentation does not require anything for humans, such as language, acceptance of the other person having an opinion, and acceptance of the other person being able to understand you and accept what you're saying.
Sorry, but *that* is a strawman. You cannot reasonably tell me what my position is for me. I never claimed anything of the sort along the lines of "ideal forms" or argumentation not taking place between humans. Neither have I denied that argumentation requires a means of communication, which requires the capacity to understand what others are saying. What I deny is the non-sequitor of "argumentation ethics" - that normative ethics, let alone a particular normative ethic, somehow inherently follows from any of this. It doesn't. It's a lame attempt to take Habermas's ideas out of context and give libertarian norms a metaphysical weight that they simply do not have. Libertarian norms (or Hoppe's specific formulation of them, for that matter) are not inherently derived from argumentation itself. This is pure sophistry.
Adam Knott:I believe I could say the same thing somewhat differently: If I make the statement "I deny that I have physiological control of my body," this does not contradict the fact that I'm walking around
Brainpolice:Sorry, but *that* is a strawman.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Brainpolice:Sorry, but *that* is a strawman.Nope. You've made it quite clear that you deny that argumention has any requirements whatsoever. So now you've taken to lying about your own position. That's not good. I suggest that you refrain from discussing this.
No, I have not. I have denied the non-sequitor that *libertarian* norms are a requirement for argumentation, or that *libertarian norms* are inherently proven by the very act of argumentation. You have failed to grasp what the problem is, not me.
Brainpolice:No, I have not.
tell me, are rational argument and violence against innocents mutually compatible?
I mean to ask, does violence disrupt discource, or not?
Adam Knott: Brainpolice: "Instead, it is a proof that it is impossible to propositionally justify non-libertarian principles without falling into contradictions."(underline added) By making the statement "there is no right to self-ownership", I am not contradicting the fact that I have physiological control of my body, because I'm not denying that I have physiological control of my body. There is no contradiction, hence the misleading nature of the argument. I believe I could say the same thing somewhat differently: If I make the statement "I deny that I have physiological control of my body," this does not contradict the fact that I'm walking around, because physical facts cannot contradict one another (at least as we typically conceive things). Thus, my physical utterance cannot be said to "contradict" a separate physical movement of mine. To find a performative contradiction then, we have to look not to two separate sets of physical facts (in which case there will be no contradiction), but to the relation of a physical fact or set of facts to an intention. But then another problem arises: The physical utterances a person may make are consistent with an innumerable number of intentions that person may have. Conversely, the intention held by an actor is consistent with an innumerable number of utterances he may make. Someone may exclaim: "Socialism is great !" This physical utterance is perfectly consistent with any number of intentions a person may have. He may be at a gathering of libertarians, and saying this mockingly. There is obviously no contradiction. Conversely, someone may exclaim: "Lockean private property is the only argumentatively justifiable social order!" This person may be a socialist at a socialist gathering, and saying this to mock libertarians. There is obviously no contradiction. (the relevant works on these ideas are: Hayek's essay "The facts of the social sciences," and Searle's book Minds, Brains and Science) For Hoppe's theory to become rigorous, he may then have to address intentions, and this will likely begin to get complicated. There is the possibility of establishing a pure logical contradiction, as opposed to a performative contradiction. But my current understanding is that Hoppe's theory does not seek to establish a pure logical contradiction.
I think you bring up an important additional point with respect to intentions, I.E. what people actually mean by the terms in such statements. For example: "private property rights", by itself, can be quite vague - which specific theory of private property rights? There are many. Once we get into specifics, an extended discourse is required, which cannot be so simply summed up by "argumentation ethics" - which seems to take one's own specific meanings for granted in discourse.
nirgrahamUK: tell me, are rational argument and violence against innocents mutually compatible? I mean to ask, does violence disrupt discource, or not?
It doesn't matter: you need an actual substantive argument for non-aggression. Appealing to the fact that someone is debating you peacefully rather than bludgeoning you over the head with an axe is not a substantive argument for non-aggression.
Someone could concivably engage in "rational argumentation" in favor of violence against innocents. In order to prove them wrong, you need a substantive argument of your own, not an appeal to the fact that they aren't currently aggressing.
I think it does matter. rather a lot whether rational argument and violence against innocents can or cannot co-exist simultaneously.
the substantive argument for non-aggression is that it cant be argued for without contradicting the presuppostions of argument. of course these are presuppositions you are ignorant of.... as KoB said, your problem....
Brainpolice:It doesn't matter: you need an actual substantive argument for non-aggression.
Brainpolice: I think you bring up an important additional point with respect to intentions, I.E. what people actually mean by the terms in such statements. For example: "private property rights", by itself, can be quite vague - which specific theory of private property rights? There are many. Once we get into specifics, an extended discourse is required, which cannot be so simply summed up by "argumentation ethics" - which seems to take one's own specific meanings for granted in discourse.
To prove his theory, Hoppe may have to address intentions, because in observable physical reality there are no contradictions as we typically conceive things. As Hoppe has written elsewhere: "...there are only bodily movements to be observed but no such thing as actions.."
(Economic Science and the Austrian Method, p.22)
This is an acknowledgment that what constitute one's actions are one's intentions, and the intentions/actions are not observed.
There is no contradiction between the observed person's vocal utterances and his other physical movements. A performative contradiction would seem to refer to what the observed person means, as compared to "the words that are coming out of his mouth." Then Hoppe would be saying something like:
When actor A means "xyz," but the words that are coming out of his mouth are "abc," then.....
But a problem will be that the words coming out of A's mouth will have to be given a meaning by someone, otherwise they are brute physical facts.
If the meaning is supplied by observing person B, then there is no contradiction as envisioned by the AE, since the AE refers to a contradiction occurring for A, not a contradiction between the divergent views of A and B.
If the meaning of A's words are supplied by A, then we have a contradiction of meanings, and maybe here, a logical contradiction. But this is no longer a performative contradiction, but a contradiction between two meanings; is something like a contradiction between ideas; is something like a standard logical contradiction. But now, the standard for establishing a logical contradiction is fairly rigorous. There is less wiggle room here than with the ambiguous concept of performative contradiction....
If we're to go with Searle's distinction between "brute facts" and "insitutional facts", it seems quite obvious that the meaning of terms are "institutional facts". While words can contextually be used to refer to "brute facts", words do not have intrinsic meanings. The meaning of words are contextual to what has been agreed upon by people. In either case, it seems to me that it is not sensible to tell someone "this is what you really mean by your terms". Only they can tell you want they mean by their terms, and hopefully through the course of discourse you can come to a better understanding of eachother's position by clarifying one's terms. But I'm having trouble seeing how this linguistic issue connects to the "argumentation ethics" proof of libertarianism.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Brainpolice:It doesn't matter: you need an actual substantive argument for non-aggression.Wrong. The person needs a substantive argument for aggression. Otherwise the person will (most likely) special plead. And you DO know what special pleading is, RIGHT? RIGHT?
Anyone, making any argument (for aggression, against aggression, for reptilian jewish bankers from outerspace, whatever it may be) has to have a substantive case for their position. You aren't inherently correct in a debate simply because you're a libertarian; libertarianism, like everything else, has to be argued for with a subtantive argument. It cannot just be assumed to be true and then we simply dismiss people who disagree with us without any regard for the substance of their arguments.
That is the sense in which I consider "argumentation ethics" to be sophistry, since it functions to give libertarians an excuse to avoid having to actually make any sort of positive case for libertarianism, while they can dismiss their opponent's arguments out of hand without addressing their content. Ironically, it's actually me putting foreward the more rigorous standards for argumentation here: the shocking notion that you have to have a positive, substantive argument for your position.
Brainpolice: But I'm having trouble seeing how this linguistic issue connects to the "argumentation ethics" proof of libertarianism.
But I'm having trouble seeing how this linguistic issue connects to the "argumentation ethics" proof of libertarianism.
Brainpolice:
I didn't intend my argument to be linguistic. The idea is to locate the precise contradiction that the AE claims exists. My point was that the contradiction can't be found in physics. As actor A observes the things around him, the observable movements, sounds, smells, and tactile experiences do not contradict one another. These things obey the law of conservation and the other physical laws. This fact is not changed by assuming that some of the things A observes moving about and making sounds include person B.
Thus, the contradiction the AE refers to must lie elsewhere than between the various phisical movements and sounds of the arguor.
If what the arguor is saying (the physical word sounds) is part of his contradiction, then the thing that his sounds contradict seems to be his intended meaning.
To me this isn't a linguistic issue. It simply means that actor A is claiming that actor B is contradicting himself. It isn't a "physical" contradiction, and it isn't a purely logical contradiction. Here, I'm assuming we are in agreement.
Then it must be some other sort of contradiction; a performative contradiction. This seems to mean a contradiction between B's physical movements, sounds, etc.., and his intentions. That is my main point, and I don't believe it is a linguistic one.
Adam
Brainpolice:Anyone, making any argument
And you've yet to address the fact of the special plead. Do address it, for I grow weary of your sophistry.
I'm interested, what are these interpersonal norms that are demonstrated by the mere act of argumentation?
Can the performative contradiction of rejecting the right of self ownership be put into the form of a syllogism?
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Knight_of_BAAWA: Brainpolice:Anyone, making any argumentNope. Only the positive claimant/the one adding more than is justified. And you've yet to address the fact of the special plead. Do address it, for I grow weary of your sophistry.
The non-aggression principle, self-ownership and neo-lockean private property rights are all positive claims - all "ought" statements are positive claims. In either case, all claims have to actually be justified with subtance. The idea that you don't have to substantively justify your claims, which effectively means that they can just be assumed to be true, is what is true sophistry. Your correctness is not a metaphysical given, and such an approach to debate is pompous idiocy.
zefreak: I'm interested, what are these interpersonal norms that are demonstrated by the mere act of argumentation? Can the performative contradiction of rejecting the right of self ownership be put into the form of a syllogism?
The argument tends to go (roughly) something like this: "you must make use of your body in order to argue against self-ownership, therefore you implicitly prove it in the attempt to argue against it". Of course, I've already explained ad nauseum that this is dependant on a conflation between "the right of self-ownership" and "the fact of physiological control". The fact that someone has physiological control of their body is not a proof of "the right of self-ownership". I painstakingly tried to point this out to Stefan Molyneux in a voice debate to no avail, since he insists on using "self-ownership" to refer to physiological control (a fact that hardly anyone who argues against "self-ownership" actually denies).
Brainpolice:The non-aggression principle, self-ownership and neo-lockean private property rights are all positive claims
Brainpolice:The argument tends to go (roughly) something like this: "you must make use of your body in order to argue against self-ownership, therefore you implicitly prove it in the attempt to argue against it".
I wonder, though: if physiological control of your body doesn't show self-ownership--by what authority are you even engaging in this debate? OOOOOPS! That requires some backstory and prerequisites, whcih you deny. Looks like you do believe that argumentation exists in a vacuum, little sophist.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Juan:What's your justification for non-aggression Brainpolice ?
A consequentialist appeal to self-interest, grounded in a humanistic respect for individuals, grounded in a realist epistemology. Most certainly *not* an attempt to argue that it is a metaphysical given or to treat it as a contextless axoim.
And yet you treat argumentation in a vacuum. How....hypocritical of you.
Knight_of_BAAWA: Initiating force is a positive claim. Having someone refrain from initiating force isn't. Enough of your sophistry and pompous idiocy.
Brainpolice:A consequentialist appeal to self-interest, grounded in a humanistic respect for individuals, grounded in a realist epistemology.
zefreak:This is false. Both the initiation of force and the obligation to refrain from initiating force are positive claims, and both must be justified.
zefreak:This is false. Both the initiation of force and the obligation to refrain from initiating force are positive claims