Juan: Brainpolice: I support the NAP. Why ? Is there anything else besides arbitrary personal preference and moral subjectivism ?
Brainpolice: I support the NAP.
I don't believe in moral subjectivism. I just reject deontology and deontological-like justifications for libertarianism.
Brainpolice:I just reject deontology and deontological-like justifications for libertarianism.
I'm curious to know how you support the NAP which is by it's nature, deontological.
Brainpolice,
I agree with you that AJ is right on the money, as usual.
But, what's wrong with moral subjectivism?
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
liberty student:I'm curious to know how you support the NAP which is by it's nature, deontological.
When it is considered as being a stand-alone axiom, or apart from the rest of ethics, yes. When it is thought of as being a constitutive part of eudaimonia, then no. Virtue ethics in general transcends the consequentialism-deontology dualism.
Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.
BP:I just reject deontology and deontological-like justifications for libertarianism.
wombatron: liberty student:I'm curious to know how you support the NAP which is by it's nature, deontological. When it is considered as being a stand-alone axiom, or apart from the rest of ethics, yes. When it is thought of as being a constitutive part of eudaimonia, then no. Virtue ethics in general transcends the consequentialism-deontology dualism.
This is why I had to take a break from this thread & got a little impatient (unfairly towards wilderness; I apologize) with the discussion when at some point I could no longer clearly decipher what's being said. Oh well, I suppose the Internet can wait :\
"Look at me, I'm quoting another user to show how wrong I think they are, out of arrogance of my own position. Wait, this is my own quote, oh shi-" ~ Nitroadict
wombatron:When it is considered as being a stand-alone axiom, or apart from the rest of ethics, yes. When it is thought of as being a constitutive part of eudaimonia, then no. Virtue ethics in general transcends the consequentialism-deontology dualism.
Isn't virtue ethics just the third leg of the normative theory tripod though (with the other two being deontology and consequentialism)?
Angurse:Isn't virtue ethics just the third leg of the normative theory tripod though (with the other two being deontology and consequentialism)?
I'm not familiar with the reference? Is this a classification system of different normative theories? In that case, yes, but it doesn't mean that the theories are "equal" in any sense. I'm arguing from the position of virtue ethics, so I see virtue ethics being the dialectical synthesis of deontology and consequentialism, an example of the Randian trichomoty; it takes the best of both positions and puts them in their proper context. Long's "Why Does Justice Have Good Consequences?" contains a more in-depth explanation of this position.
Yep. Virtue ethics rejects the hard divide between consequentialism and deontology, relegating it to a distinction at best.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
liberty student: Brainpolice: I support the NAP. Brainpolice:I just reject deontology and deontological-like justifications for libertarianism. I'm curious to know how you support the NAP which is by it's nature, deontological.
The NAP is not inherently deontological by its nature. Deontology would be only one approach to it.
Lilburne:But, what's wrong with moral subjectivism?
Morality defined as a way a man should act is not subjective. Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective. Where his goal choice is subjective or objective is kind of undecided, I think it has elements of both. I believe implicit goals due do the nature of man or reality are objective, and everything else is probably subjective. But the subjective goals to me are completely unimportant things like "should i have a tuna or salami sandwhich?"
twistedbydsign99: Morality defined as a way a man should act is not subjective. Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective. Where his goal choice is subjective or objective is kind of undecided, I think it has elements of both. I believe implicit goals due do the nature of man or reality are objective, and everything else is probably subjective. But the subjective goals to me are completely unimportant things like "should i have a tuna or salami sandwhich?"
Yeah and when he ends up choosing, his actions are objective and clear. He valued the tuna sandwhich more than the salami, or vice versa.
Conza88: twistedbydsign99: Lilburne:But, what's wrong with moral subjectivism? Morality defined as a way a man should act is not subjective. Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective. Where his goal choice is subjective or objective is kind of undecided, I think it has elements of both. I believe implicit goals due do the nature of man or reality are objective, and everything else is probably subjective. But the subjective goals to me are completely unimportant things like "should i have a tuna or salami sandwhich?" Yeah and when he ends up choosing, his actions are objective and clear. He valued the tuna sandwhich more than the salami, or vice versa.
twistedbydsign99: Lilburne:But, what's wrong with moral subjectivism? Morality defined as a way a man should act is not subjective. Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective. Where his goal choice is subjective or objective is kind of undecided, I think it has elements of both. I believe implicit goals due do the nature of man or reality are objective, and everything else is probably subjective. But the subjective goals to me are completely unimportant things like "should i have a tuna or salami sandwhich?"
Seems you two are saying the same thing as Lilburne.
Under the consequentialist moral framework implied by Twisted's "Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective," there seems to be no difference between moral individualism and moral subjectivism, nor between moral universalism and moral objectivism.
In other words, in that consequentialist moral framework, the way each man should act is in theory objectively ascertainable (given his goals), and I don't think Lilburne would dispute that (please correct me if I'm wrong). However, in the sense that the way a man should act may differ from person to person (due to their divergent goals) we may call it a "subjective" choice - perhaps less ambiguous to call it an individual choice (Lilburne: do you have a reason for using the word subjectivism instead of individualism?).
To recap, the consequentialist ought is "objective" in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, but "subjective" in the sense that each man's goals (and hence ways of achieving them) are his own. So why not replace subjective with individual for clarity?
Why anarchy fails
twistedbydsign99:Morality defined as a way a man should act is not subjective. Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective.
But the subjective goals to me are completely unimportant things like "should i have a tuna or salami sandwhich?"
Agent-relative is a term I like in relation to this.
Jon Irenicus: To recap, the consequentialist ought is "objective" in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, but "subjective" in the sense that each man's goals (and hence ways of achieving them) are his own. So why not replace subjective with individual for clarity? Agent-relative is a term I like in relation to this.
That does seem a lot clearer than "subjective."
AJ: To recap, the consequentialist ought is "objective" in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, but "subjective" in the sense that each man's goals (and hence ways of achieving them) are his own. So why not replace subjective with individual for clarity?
Jason:
I'm not entirely clear on the above. When we say that the ought is objective in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, I assume we do not mean, merely objectively ascertainable by the actor himself.
If this is right, then objectively ascertainable means something like "publicly" ascertainable; ascertainable by a number of others besides the actor himself.
Then, when we say that this goal is objectively ascertainable by a group of people besides the actor himself, does this mean "perceptible" by them?
What constitutes a goal of an individual actor that is objectively ascertainable by a group of other people? Does this mean they must all be able to perceive this goal? Or what is the definition or conception of this type of objectivity?
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
Adam Knott: AJ: To recap, the consequentialist ought is "objective" in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, but "subjective" in the sense that each man's goals (and hence ways of achieving them) are his own. So why not replace subjective with individual for clarity? Jason: I'm not entirely clear on the above. When we say that the ought is objective in the sense that the goal is deemed objectively ascertainable, I assume we do not mean, merely objectively ascertainable by the actor himself. If this is right, then objectively ascertainable means something like "publicly" ascertainable; ascertainable by a number of others besides the actor himself. Then, when we say that this goal is objectively ascertainable by a group of people besides the actor himself, does this mean "perceptible" by them? What constitutes a goal of an individual actor that is objectively ascertainable by a group of other people? Does this mean they must all be able to perceive this goal? Or what is the definition or conception of this type of objectivity?
Adam, the above was intended only as my interpretation of Lilburne and other's positions, so I would turn your questions over to them. I was trying to demonstrate that a charitable interpretation of both sides (in those particular posts) would not necessarily result in any disagreement.
To give my own take, the consequentialist ought, being a mere prescription to "do X if you want Y results," can in theory be logically and/or scientifically demonstrated (praxeology?). If I were stating my own position, I wouldn't want to bring in a word like objective, which I feel is ambiguous exactly where precision is needed. My point above was simply that posters using the words objective and subjective could actually be in agreement, because the definitions of those two words are so malleable that one can nearly mean the other. The part you quoted was meant to show a way to resolve the disagreement (or encourage clarification from the other parties).
AJ: My point above was simply that posters using the words objective and subjective could actually be in agreement, because the definitions of those two words are so malleable that one can nearly mean the other.
My point above was simply that posters using the words objective and subjective could actually be in agreement, because the definitions of those two words are so malleable that one can nearly mean the other.
Oh. Sorry. I didn't catch that. I interpreted it as implying that the meaning of the term objective was clearly understood by all concerned.
That's OK. I think some of the issues you raised are why I find objective a problematic term in talking about morality. To give more of an idea why, here are a few possible interpretations that spring to mind:
1. Objective moral truth: A valid syllogism of the form "is -> ought" (individual consequentialism) or "ought -> ought" (persuasion to a person) for a given person/agent under discussion.
2. Objective moral truth: A valid syllogism of the form "is -> ought" (universal consequentialism) or "ought -> ought" (persuasion to a group), valid for all people.
3. Objective moral truth: An empirically established fact that provides insights into the consequences of human actions regardless of agent.
4. Objective moral truth: Something regarded as a situational "moral truth" by the majority, or everyone, or a certain class or group of people, possibly "authorities."
5. Objective moral truth: Something regarded as a universal "moral truth" by the majority, or everyone, or a certain class or group of people, possibly "authorities."
6. Objective moral truth: Something nonsensical, that people insist on calling "objective moral truth" while refusing to define which of the previous five interpretations - or another interpretation - they really mean. This one has the effect of making any statement about such an "objective moral truth" very hard to refute, because any and all refutations can be labeled strawmans.
There is of course some overlap, which makes things even messier, not to even mention that people mean different things by their oughts.
Juan:That's not morality.
At that point you usually give a more accurate definition, so give it. My definition is morality is the way a man should act. So elaborate.
Juan:Actually, the only important problem is whether 'subjective' ends, such as butchering your neighbor if you feel like it, are morally justified or not. Morality as far as I can tell is not concerned with food tastes or cooking, cooking being a metaphor for the utilitarian formula
Morality is not conerned with, but applies to cooking given my definition which I'm assuming you are going to refine. Notice that given my definition of morality it actually applies to itself. The selection of an end is an action. There is a manner we should select our goals, and murdering for fun should not be chosen. Of course the murder would believe he is acting morally, but he would be mistaken.
AJ: That's OK. I think some of the issues you raised are why I find objective a problematic term in talking about morality. To give more of an idea why, here are a few possible interpretations that spring to mind:
When I use objective, I mean true now and forever for all people independant of anyones opinion on the subject. I guess that is 2.
twistedbydsign99:Notice that given my definition of morality it actually applies to itself. The selection of an end is an action. There is a manner we should select our goals, and murdering for fun should not be chosen.
Given a man and his goals the way he should act is completely objective.
twistedbydsign99:When I use objective, I mean true now and forever for all people independant of anyones opinion on the subject.
Under that definition, do you believe in "objective values"? And if so, would that mean something other than "things that everyone deems important now and forever"?
AJ:Under that definition, do you believe in "objective values"? And if so, would that mean something other than "things that everyone deems important now and forever"?
So the answer to the second question is it wouldn't mean anything different. The first question, is there an objective set of goals all of humanity has that constrains them in some way, something like honesty, or preferring life over death. In an absolute sense no, but on average yes. The laws of nature and what it means to suceed in this world does give us on average a set of things we all believe. Logic over illogic, argument over physical fight, life over death, cooperation over isolation. Any man can choose to disobey any of these, which is why I said there is no absolute set, but he disobeys at his own peril, which is why on average we obey. The limit as time goes to infinity of the goals mankind will hold, includes these things :)
twistedbydsign99: AJ:Under that definition, do you believe in "objective values"? And if so, would that mean something other than "things that everyone deems important now and forever"? So the answer to the second question is it wouldn't mean anything different. The first question, is there an objective set of goals all of humanity has that constrains them in some way, something like honesty, or preferring life over death. In an absolute sense no, but on average yes. The laws of nature and what it means to suceed in this world does give us on average a set of things we all believe. Logic over illogic, argument over physical fight, life over death, cooperation over isolation. Any man can choose to disobey any of these, which is why I said there is no absolute set, but he disobeys at his own peril, which is why on average we obey. The limit as time goes to infinity of the goals mankind will hold, includes these things :)
twistedbydsign99:
Regarding your passage above, here is your starting point:
Part 1:
So the answer to the second question is it wouldn't mean anything different. The first question, is there an objective set of goals all of humanity has that constrains them in some way, something like honesty, or preferring life over death. In an absolute sense no,.....
Logic over illogic, argument over physical fight, life over death, cooperation over isolation. Any man can choose to disobey any of these, which is why I said there is no absolute set,...
Here is your theory of ethics, or theory of human ethical action:
Part 2:
The laws of nature and what it means to suceed in this world does give us on average a set of things we all believe....
there is no absolute set, but he disobeys at his own peril, which is why on average we obey. The limit as time goes to infinity of the goals mankind will hold, includes these things :)
Part 2 constitutes your thesis or theory. That is the part that I would want to see elaborated or explained further and rigorously in essay or book form.
Adam
Yea I am in the process of trying to get this morass of thoughts into something that resembles a straight line of thought haha. I have two sticking points right now, first parasitism could be considered a success if success is defined as merely propogating dna so its something I'm trying to refine, and second even if I was to have something that resembles a proof of some objective set of values that is "preferred" it doesn't answer the question that matters to me, of why. Long ellaborated on this, but the evolutionary answer is just kind of hollow, but it is an answer.
twistedbydsign99:The laws of nature and what it means to suceed in this world does give us on average a set of things we all believe. Logic over illogic, argument over physical fight, life over death, cooperation over isolation. Any man can choose to disobey any of these, which is why I said there is no absolute set, but he disobeys at his own peril, which is why on average we obey.
Thanks for the clarification. Would you object at this being called a type of consequentialism?
AJ:Thanks for the clarification. Would you object at this being called a type of consequentialism?
No I wouldnt't object, I would say I believe that good consequences specified over a long enough span of time come from acting properly and the converse is true as well. But there are sticking points for me in that parasites enjoy good consequences and is it true that planning longer term versus shorter term is actually rewarded more. And there is the deeper question of why is this the case.