This post is in response to a request that I give an explanation of my views on the derivation and nature of rights. I think that it will help in some of the recent discussion topics to give at least an outline of the neo-Aristotelian libertarian theory of rights.
First of all, my approach is based in a broader theory of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. The key concept is that of eudaimonia, which best translates as happiness, flourishing, the "examined life", and well-being. It is the natural end of each and every human being; that is, it is the good at which all human actions implicity aim. A person's flourishing is valuable and choice-worthy in itself. It is, as often said, both a way of living and a way of living.
Principles that guide a person in acting towards their natural end are known as virtues; these include rationality (the prime virtue, of which the others are derivatives), practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom (the intellectual virtues), pride, productivity, benevolence, justice, prudence, temperence (a sampling of the moral virtues), etc. The virtues are both means to the greater end of flourishing, and ends in themselves, as they are constitutive of flourishing (that is, they are an essential part of being a flourishing person). Various external goods, including but not limited to wealth, health, honor, friendship, and justice, are also consititutive of flourishing. The balancing of all these goods and virtues is the role of practical wisdom, which is practical reason properly applied. Only an individual, through the self-directed use of their practical reason, can know and thus act towards their natural end.
Rights can then be approached from 2 different levels, the structural and the personal (some familiarity with the Aristotelian dialectics of Chris Sciabarra is helpful here). At the structural level, which can be thought of as the "demand-side" account, rights are meta-normative principles that are designed to protect self-direction, a necessary constituent of flourishing. The most fundamental right is the right to liberty; that is, the right to be free from the initiation of force or the threat of force against one's person or property. The non-aggression principle is a corollary (in this case, a positive re-statement) of the right to liberty.
From the personal level (the "supply-side", rights are interpersonal normative principles that guide one's actions in interacting with others. Rights-respecting behavior is also constitutive of flourishing; it is part of the virtue of justice. Because we are humans, we are rational and social animals, capable of communicating and co-operating with others. The life of such an animal will thus involve actualizing that potentiality, in refraining from initiating force against others.
(For those who are interested in learning more, I recommend the works of Ayn Rand, Henry Veatch, Douglas B. Rasmussen, Douglas J. Den Uyl, Chris M. Sciabarra, Fred D. Miller, Tibor R. Machan, Roderick T. Long, and Geoffrey Allan Plauche.)
Obviously, this is just an outline; questions regarding more in-depth explanation are appreciated
Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.
I don't mean to challenge you, I'm genuinely curious, but why is flourishing valuable in itself?
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
I have a big knowledge deficit when it comes to this stuff.
Yes, likewise.
GilesStratton: I don't mean to challenge you, I'm genuinely curious, but why is flourishing valuable in itself?
Because it is the good for human beings, at which all human actions at least implicitly aim. I think Rasmussen and Den Uyl say it best:
R&DU:The person who asks why he should live in accordance with the requirements of his nature has a value he is trying to attain. He wants an answer to his question; he is seeking a value. Yet wants or values are not metaphysically primary. Having an answer to a question is a value only to a being for whom knowledge is a value and for whom possessing knowledge as opposed to not possessing knowledge could make a difference in its existence or functioning. Otherwise, there would be no ultimate difference between possessing knowledge or not possessing knowledge and thus no basis for knowledge being an object of pursuit for this being.
This is fleshed out by the neo-Aristotelian view of human nature, in which actualizing the potentialities specific to humans (rationality and sociality) is the definition of the good of a human being, just as (to borrow Henry Veatch's example) an acorn actualizing its potential of being an oak tree is the good of the acorn.