In other threads I asked two questions which I think need to be answered for traditional natural rights theories to be tenable:
Moreover, an individual is a member of a great number of classes. Why should his selfless allegiance be to any one in particular? If his membership in a class imposes some magical "ought" upon him, why wouldn't he be just as much bound to act in a manner which promotes the fulfillment of the nature of a broader class like "primate", or a narrower class, like "welfare recipient"?
No doubt there are consequentialist arguments for natural rights. However, when a consequentialist takes up the natural rights for the sake of establishing general rules [ also know as rule utilitarianism ] then they stop being consequentialists. They had consequentialists reasons for accepting natural rights but once these rights are respected for their own sake then they are natural rights theorists.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
Thanks AC. But do you mind if we talk about the consequentialism question on the is/ought thread? I'd like to focus on the man/mankind problem here.
Lilburne: Thanks AC. But do you mind if we talk about the consequentialism question on the is/ought thread? I'd like to focus on the man/mankind problem here.
I apologize, I thought this was a broader topic concerning both.
Lilburne: Even if one discovered the optimal consequences to be aimed at for mankind, what is it in natural rights theories that binds the individual man to act toward those consequences, especially when an opposite course might be more beneficial to the individual man?
Isn't the former utilitarianism and the latter consequentialism? Utilitarianism, being for all people - being "greatest good for greatest number" - has been the justification for many Statist atrocities, so it seems out of place in libertarian thought. It sounds like collectivism. I think you're familiar with this, but just in case, and for other readers, I recommend G. Edward Griffin's excellent presentations on this subject.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W-Dhv59JYpA&feature=related
Why anarchy fails
AJ:Isn't the former utilitarianism and the latter consequentialism? Utilitarianism, being for all people - being "greatest good for greatest number" - has been the justification for many Statist atrocities, so it seems out of place in libertarian thought. It sounds like collectivism. I think you're familiar with this, but just in case, and for other readers, I recommend G. Edward Griffin's excellent presentations on this subject.
I'm definitely not in favor of utilitarianism. I'm not sure if natural rights theories qualify as utilitarianism either. "Mankind" in the man/mankind problem found in Rothbard's writings involves mankind as a class, not any given number of men as a collective.
Interesting question. I feel like we are finally getting to the bottom of the frenzied natural rights debate that has been taking place on this forum recently.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Lilburne: "Mankind" in the man/mankind problem found in Rothbard's writings involves mankind as a class, not any given number of men as a collective.
Do you mean Rothbard is only a collectivist as regards all humankind? Doesn't this:
Lilburne:Moreover, an individual is a member of a great number of classes. Why should his selfless allegiance be to any one in particular?
imply that an individual would be devoting his selfless allegiance to a group, hence greatest-good-for-greatest-number collectivism? If Rothbard was wrong, we should expect that deducing from his mistaken premises can lead to any number of fallacious results, such as collectivism and other Statist fallacies.
AJ:imply that an individual would be devoting his selfless allegiance to a group, hence greatest-good-for-greatest-number collectivism? If Rothbard was wrong, we should expect that deducing from his mistaken premises can lead to any number of fallacious results, such as collectivism and other Statist fallacies.
AJ, you may very well be right about what you say above regarding Rothbard's theory. However, I do think there is an important distinction between a class and a collective. "Mankind" I think of as a class. "All the individual humans currently living" or "those particular 48 humans" I think of as collectives.
zefreak: Interesting question. I feel like we are finally getting to the bottom of the frenzied natural rights debate that has been taking place on this forum recently.
I'm so glad you feel that way, zefreak. I really felt that to avoid everybody talking past each other, as has largely been happening regarding natural rights, there needed to be some targeted threads that go straight to the cruces of the matter.
Lilburne:"Mankind" I think of as a class. "All the individual humans currently living" or "those particular 48 humans" I think of as collectives.
I am not sure I disagree, and I have not read TEOL, but can you articulate the difference? On the face of it, "mankind" seems to be a collective.
In tEoL, Rothbard wrote:
The natural law, then, elucidates what is best for man—what ends man should pursue that are most harmonious with, and best tend to fulfill, his nature. In a significant sense, then, natural law provides man with a “science of happiness,” with the paths which will lead to his real happiness.
This use of "man" seems to use the meaning "mankind", "human beings in general", or "the human race". "The human race" is not a delimited concrete set or collective of humans (not even one that contains all humans presently living); it's a class, a purely abstract category. So Rothbard is speaking on a very abstract level. He's saying, "man-as-a-class should pursue ends which are most harmonious with the nature of man-as-a-class".
It's hard to understand how that has any bearing on an individual man-in-particular.
Thank you, Lilburne.
Well, I agree nothing in that passage sounds collectivist. I don't see why he phrases things like that, but then I often think that of Rothbard.
Unrelatedly, I'd really like to know how he sees natural law as any kind of "science." Even if it's backed by scientific findings, such as those you mentioned in your blog article, the natural law itself wouldn't be a science. It would still just be a persuasion method, since he seems to deny consequentialism. Or is he refering to praxeology? (doubt it)