From another thread...
Laughing Man:Ah yes but to use an example of Long. Let us theorize that you have ends for both Ice cream and fame and you are confronted with a choice between the two. You can either choose fame or choose ice cream. There must be a third 'aim' that allows you to rationalize which end to choose. That is the eudiamonia that Long speaks of, the overarching third party that rationalizes constituent means to overall ends.
There is no third aim. There are two aims, one of which is valued more. One could say it is valued more because it furthers the well-being (eudaimonia) of the agent more. But "regarded as furthering one's well being" and "valued" are synonyms. So the magical third aim of "eudaimonia" is nothing but a redundancy. The statement, "I value A over B, because A furthers my well-being more" says the same thing as the statement "I value A over B, because I value A over B".
Yes we have one "overarching end" in that we all want what we want. But sound ethical theory is not to be built on such an unenlightening pleonasm.
delete
Lilburne: From another thread... Laughing Man:Ah yes but to use an example of Long. Let us theorize that you have ends for both Ice cream and fame and you are confronted with a choice between the two. You can either choose fame or choose ice cream. There must be a third 'aim' that allows you to rationalize which end to choose. That is the eudiamonia that Long speaks of, the overarching third party that rationalizes constituent means to overall ends.
It's unclear to me how eudaimonia (or flourishing) is different from happiness (satisfaction, removing uneasiness, etc...), which is the ultimate end in Mises's analytic method.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
wilderness,
I was being facetious when I called wanting what we want an overarching end. Yes, A does = A. But, redundancy does not = profundity.
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Lilburne:There is no third aim. There are two aims, one of which is valued more.
I stated that there is a third party to which rationalizes whether ice cream or fame is better for the individual.
Ice cream is valuable
Fame is valuable
There must be a way to decide which is more valuable
Lilburne:Yes we have one "overarching end" in that we all want what we want.
Well now you are contradicting yourself. First you say there is only A or B, now you say there is an overall end which we all have which would imply that there is more then simply A or B.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
Laughing Man: Ice cream is valuable Fame is valuable There must be a way to decide which is more valuable
And what is this way exactly?
Laughing Man:Well now you are contradicting yourself. First you say there is only A or B, now you say there is an overall end which we all have which would imply that there is more then simply A or B.
As I told wilderness, "I was being facetious when I called wanting what we want an overarching end. Yes, A does = A. But, redundancy does not = profundity."
Laughing Man:There must be a way to decide which is more valuable
That is subjective preference.
Lilburne:And what is this way exactly?
And overall ultimate end, something you agreed existed.
Lilburne: But, redundancy does not = profundity."
So you are mad because you think we are acting profund by stating something so basic?
liberty student:That is subjective preference.
Subjective preference as to which goal will bring the individual closer to eudiamonia.
Laughing Man:And overall ultimate end.
And what is this end exactly?
Laughing Man:So you are mad because you think we are acting profund by stating something so basic?
What would make you think I'm mad?
Basic truths are useful. Redundant truths are not.
Lilburne:And what is this end exactly?
It depends on the individual.
Lilburne:Basic truths are useful. Redundant truths are not.
What makes eudiamonism a redundant truth?
Laughing Man:Subjective preference as to which goal will bring the individual closer to eudiamonia.
Is eudiamonia subjectively defined by each individual?
Laughing Man:It depends on the individual.
Okay, what is a possible ultimate end, say for someone deciding between ice cream and fame?
Laughing Man:What makes eudiamonism a redundant truth?
The OP is rather short; do I really need to quote it?
liberty student:Is eudiamonia subjectively defined by each individual?
Eudaimonia is supposed to refer to an objectively desirable life (featuring a guardian spirit!) while happiness is a subjective assessment of one's life. The terms are used almost interchangably by some though.
Actually virtue ethics, as it has been foreward by people like Plauche, contains both a "particular" and "general" element in which a certain sense of pluralism is synthesized with a certain sense of universalism, which leaves room for people to pursue mutually held goals in different ways. It does not imply that there is a rigidly singular way to live life - the notion that there are multiple ways in which people can "flourish" is fully granted by the eudaimonists.
Brainpolice:Actually virtue ethics, as it has been foreward by people like Plauche, contains both a "particular" and "general" element in which a certain sense of pluralism is synthesized with a certain sense of universalism, which leaves room for people to pursue mutually held goals in different ways. It does not imply that there is a rigidly singular way to live life - the notion that there are multiple ways in which people can "flourish" is fully granted by the eudaimonists.
I didn't mean to imply that there is a rigidily singular way to live in order for one to be eudaimon, just that Eudaimonia is broader notion than happiness, and it acribes features that are more objective. Basically the "general" elements.
I wish anyone trying to synthesize pluralism and universalism the very best of luck.
Lilburne: Laughing Man:It depends on the individual. Okay, what is a possible ultimate end, say for someone deciding between ice cream and fame?
I noticed Laughing Man bailed after a very simple question and that somebody gave this thread a one-star rating right before he logged off.
I hope eudaimonists can be more forthright about taking a hard look at their apparently unenlightening "man values what he values" tautology than the objective-natural-rights folk were about their is-ought hybrid syllogisms.
Brainpolice: Actually virtue ethics, as it has been foreward by people like Plauche, contains both a "particular" and "general" element in which a certain sense of pluralism is synthesized with a certain sense of universalism, which leaves room for people to pursue mutually held goals in different ways. It does not imply that there is a rigidly singular way to live life - the notion that there are multiple ways in which people can "flourish" is fully granted by the eudaimonists.
Brainpolice:
Here's the part I don't understand about Eudaimonia or virtue ethics.
For the sake of discussion, let's say there are 6 or 7 primary virtues, and one them is "giving the other person his due."
Then I happen to have a dealing with a virtue ethicist who didn't give me my due. I approach him about it, and he is quite honest, and admits that he didn't give me my due as virtue ethics requires. So I say to him: "You are a virtue ethicist, why didn't you give me my due?"
To this he replies: "I chose to diminish my virtue (or Eudaimonia, or flourishing) in this case."
My understanding is that the reason some give for pursuing this type of ethics, is because utilitarianism or instrumentalism can allow or "license" immoral outcomes. To me this means, that if we were to construct a theoretical system that showed "instrumentally" which ethical acts lead to a person's happiness, and which lead to his unhappiness, this would still be unacceptable, because then the person could make a calculated choice to still engage in immoral conduct, as long as he was willing to suffer the unhappiness that the theory demonstrated would occur.
But as my example shows, at least to the extent I understand eudaimonia or virtue ethics, a person is still going to be able to act against what is best for his flourishing, based on his subjective choice. He will still be able to choose, "instrumentally," to diminish his flourishing, in order to avoid giving a person his due, if and when he subjectively chooses to do so.
A while back, I was corresponding with a defender of eudaimonia ethics, and he seemed to indicate that if a eudaimonia ethicist did as my example illustrates, then "he would not really be a eudaimonia ethicist" (here I'm paraphrasing). In other words, it was the opinion of this person that, a priori, a person acting against the eudaimonia virtues, would automatically become a member of another philosophical school (utilitarian, I suppose). And that was his proposed solution to the problem. A person acting contrary to the primary or objective virtues, a priori is a member of an inferior ethical school of thought. This struck me as perhaps wonderfully convenient for his theory, but problematic if every ethical school decided to do the same thing. (define all immoral acts of their adherents, as acts that by definition could only be committed by members of the adversarial school of thought)
My main point is that I don't understand how virtue or eudaimonia or flourishing ethics, constrains the behavior of the individual more than an ethics theory that would demonstrate "instrumentally" how certain acts lead to the happiness or unhappiness of an individual.
Once we define what constitutes eudaimonia, won't the individual have the choice to diminish his own eudaimonia in order to commit an immoral act should he choose to do so?
Won't this be a "license" to engage in immoral conduct, as long as one is willing to suffer a diminishment in his own eudaimonia?
Adam Knott: For the sake of discussion, let's say there are 6 or 7 primary virtues, and one them is "giving the other person his due." Then I happen to have a dealing with a virtue ethicist who didn't give me my due. I approach him about it, and he is quite honest, and admits that he didn't give me my due as virtue ethics requires. So I say to him: "You are a virtue ethicist, why didn't you give me my due?" To this he replies: "I chose to diminish my virtue (or Eudaimonia, or flourishing) in this case."
Then he isn't eudaimon in this particular case. Choosing to lessen one's flourishing is a perversion of practical reason.
Adam Knott: A while back, I was corresponding with a defender of eudaimonia ethics, and he seemed to indicate that if a eudaimonia ethicist did as my example illustrates, then "he would not really be a eudaimonia ethicist" (here I'm paraphrasing). In other words, it was the opinion of this person that, a priori, a person acting against the eudaimonia virtues, would automatically become a member of another philosophical school (utilitarian, I suppose). And that was his proposed solution to the problem. A person acting contrary to the primary or objective virtues, a priori is a member of an inferior ethical school of thought. This struck me as perhaps wonderfully convenient for his theory, but problematic if every ethical school decided to do the same thing. (define all immoral acts of their adherents, as acts that by definition could only be committed by members of the adversarial school of thought)
I think what he was trying to say is that he was confused as to the implications of what he was saying (either this, or the person in question is just plain wrong).
Adam Knott: Once we define what constitutes eudaimonia, won't the individual have the choice to diminish his own eudaimonia in order to commit an immoral act should he choose to do so? Won't this be a "license" to engage in immoral conduct, as long as one is willing to suffer a diminishment in his own eudaimonia?
They could indeed choose to do so, but they would not be flourishing. They would be hypocritical, supposedly holding that one course of action is right while pursuing another.
Market anarchist, Linux geek, aspiring Perl hacker, and student of the neo-Aristotelians, the classical individualist anarchists, and the Austrian school.
wombatron, what's your take on the OP?
Lilburne: wombatron, what's your take on the OP?
I think the portrayal of the facts is correct, but I disagree with your evaluation of them. Saying that you value A over B is indeed the same thing as saying that you value A as a means to your well-being (or flourishing), but I don't think that it is trivial. Long would argue (and I would agree) that action demonstrates the actor has an ultimate end.
Is there a need for 10+ threads on the same bloody topic? Please keep this to as few topics as possible, it is getting tedious.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Well essentially yes. Flourishing could be applied to any manner. You could have your eudiamonia as being a billionaire while I could have my eudiamonia as being as intellectual as Rothbard. The objectivity of eudiamoina comes from the premise that we all have an ultimate end in life.
Lilburne: Okay, what is a possible ultimate end, say for someone deciding between ice cream and fame?
The maximization of social preference.
Lilburne:The OP is rather short; do I really need to quote it?
Well I rechecked the definition of redundant to ensure that I am intrepretating you correctly, it left me wondering what you meant by it.
Lilburne: I noticed Laughing Man bailed after a very simple question and that somebody gave this thread a one-star rating right before he logged off.
I work the night shift Lilburne and I always respond to points brought to my attention. Nor did I give this topic one star.
Lilburne:I hope eudaimonists can be more forthright about taking a hard look at their apparently unenlightening "man values what he values" tautology than the objective-natural-rights folk were about their is-ought hybrid syllogisms.
Honestly, that is just petty. I am here for a great deal of time but I don't live here. I have my ultimate ends to pursue.
If anyone is interested in learning more about the topic before further discussion then I present Dr. Long's lecture on the topic at hand. Very informative.
"The Praxeological Case for Ultimate Ends"
http://mises.org/multimedia/mp3/Long/Long-2.mp3
wombatron:I think the portrayal of the facts is correct, but I disagree with your evaluation of them. Saying that you value A over B is indeed the same thing as saying that you value A as a means to your well-being (or flourishing), but I don't think that it is trivial. Long would argue (and I would agree) that action demonstrates the actor has an ultimate end.
If the tautology is non-trivial, what non-trivial conclusions are derived from it?
Jon Irenicus: Is there a need for 10+ threads on the same bloody topic? Please keep this to as few topics as possible, it is getting tedious.
Jon,
What topic do you mean? Criticisms of various ethical theories?
I explained why I post focused questions and propositions in responding to Juan elsewhere (please note that the barbed comments below were directed at Juan, and are in no way directed at you)...
Lilburne: Juan:lol. there are four threads dealing basically with the same semantic trolling that your 'philosophy' boils down toHow do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?Valid Casuistry: Deriving Ought from OughtActual Logical Proof of Natural LawCan You Define Natural Rights as a Meaningful Concept?Not sure why you whine about confusion since you are a promoter of it. Again you exhibit a deficient subtlety of mind. Each of those threads encompasses a separate issue which, if one is interested in the careful consideration of ideas, and not the reactive grunts you contribute, can be the object of lengthy, focused, and productive discussion. What is confusing, in my opinion, is the way ethics conversations used to evolve here. Someone would make an all-purpose natural rights thread and, since there was no focus in the topic, people would talk past each other for 60 pages. A couple weeks would pass, someone else would make another all-purpose natural rights thread, and the whole thing would start all over again. Perhaps you liked the fuzziness of that approach, because it obscured the flaws of your position. Perhaps the direct, focused questions of the new approach make you uncomfortable, which is why you try to reinsert chaos into the discussion by blurting out random comments and insisting on a reply. Or perhaps I give you too much credit, and you're just a troll who types out the first reaction that comes to mind when he reads something he doesn't like.
Juan:lol. there are four threads dealing basically with the same semantic trolling that your 'philosophy' boils down toHow do natural rights theories cross the is/ought divide?Valid Casuistry: Deriving Ought from OughtActual Logical Proof of Natural LawCan You Define Natural Rights as a Meaningful Concept?Not sure why you whine about confusion since you are a promoter of it.
Again you exhibit a deficient subtlety of mind. Each of those threads encompasses a separate issue which, if one is interested in the careful consideration of ideas, and not the reactive grunts you contribute, can be the object of lengthy, focused, and productive discussion.
What is confusing, in my opinion, is the way ethics conversations used to evolve here. Someone would make an all-purpose natural rights thread and, since there was no focus in the topic, people would talk past each other for 60 pages. A couple weeks would pass, someone else would make another all-purpose natural rights thread, and the whole thing would start all over again.
Perhaps you liked the fuzziness of that approach, because it obscured the flaws of your position. Perhaps the direct, focused questions of the new approach make you uncomfortable, which is why you try to reinsert chaos into the discussion by blurting out random comments and insisting on a reply. Or perhaps I give you too much credit, and you're just a troll who types out the first reaction that comes to mind when he reads something he doesn't like.
Laughing Man: Lilburne: Okay, what is a possible ultimate end, say for someone deciding between ice cream and fame? The maximization of social preference.
Is that the only possible ultimate end? If not, what is another?
Laughing Man:Well I rechecked the definition of redundant to ensure that I am intrepretating you correctly, it left me wondering what you meant by it.
What is it about the definition that you think is inapplicable?
Laughing Man: Lilburne: I noticed Laughing Man bailed after a very simple question and that somebody gave this thread a one-star rating right before he logged off. I work the night shift Lilburne and I always respond to points brought to my attention. Nor did I give this topic one star. Lilburne:I hope eudaimonists can be more forthright about taking a hard look at their apparently unenlightening "man values what he values" tautology than the objective-natural-rights folk were about their is-ought hybrid syllogisms. Honestly, that is just petty. I am here for a great deal of time but I don't live here. I have my ultimate ends to pursue.
My apologies. That was uncharitable of me.
Fine, it's just that I see a large number of topics devoted to the issue going on concurrently and wonder if they're not just different avenues for expressing the same arguments. If they're not just carry on.
Thank you Jon,
I'll try to keep any overlap of arguments to a minimum.
Lilburne: Laughing Man: Lilburne: Okay, what is a possible ultimate end, say for someone deciding between ice cream and fame? The maximization of social preference. Is that the only possible ultimate end? If not, what is another?
Biology is another end aside from social preference, methinks. Despite the social preferences of an individual, their biology may dictate and/or motivate them to certain behavior they would otherwise feel obligated to avoid (such as having children at a young age, etc.). This doesn't make every young person incapable of escaping biological urges to reproduce, but it yields an influence.Would the maximization of social preference be favorable at the expense of other's social preferences and/or at the expense of the physical universe (or i suppose, reality) ? This is partially why the concept of eudaimonia, to me, seems to fairly vague & susceptible to manipulation. For instance, many who support the state view that the state maximizes their social preference of a comfortable & familiar living, which many equate to "freedom", which is another concept that is manipulated politically. I mean, of course you could just argue "well, just appeal to them that the state doesn't maximize their social preference or happiness or whatever" (I assume this is the case with libertarians supporting eudaimonia & using it in their arguments and what not), but then you're just right back where you started in trying to changes someone's mind with a different argument.
"Look at me, I'm quoting another user to show how wrong I think they are, out of arrogance of my own position. Wait, this is my own quote, oh shi-" ~ Nitroadict
Lilburne:Is that the only possible ultimate end? If not, what is another?
That is a broad end in which subjective desires could fit under.
Lilburne:What is it about the definition that you think is inapplicable?
Redundant is characterized as being excessive, which lead me to wonder if you are just vexed by how many people are talking about it? Or what?
Laughing Man: Lilburne:Is that the only possible ultimate end? If not, what is another? That is a broad end in which subjective desires could fit under.
Yes, it is a hugely broad end. Are there any possible others? I ask, because if not, that contradicts what you said earlier about the ultimate end depending on the individual.
Laughing Man:Redundant is characterized as being excessive, which lead me to wonder if you are just vexed by how many people are talking about it? Or what?
I don't mean "redundant" as in people are repetitively talking about it in different situations: that would be a misuse of the word. I mean that Long's position is basically saying, "Man values what he values", which, by its redundancy, provides no insight and, moreover, no new information at all. What meaningful conclusions regarding morality could one possibly derive from such a unedifying tautology?
Lilburne: Yes, it is a hugely broad end. Are there any possible others? I ask, because if not, that contradicts what you said earlier about the ultimate end depending on the individual.
It is broad because subjective desires are supposed to be applicable to it.
Lilburne:"Man values what he values", which, by its redundancy, provides no insight and, moreover, no new information at all. What meaningful conclusions regarding morality could one possibly derive from such a unedifying tautology?
It is not merely that man values what he values, but in a way why they value what they value and what they hope to achieve in a manner of speaking.
Laughing Man:It is broad because subjective desires are supposed to be applicable to it.
I hope you don't mind that I ask for the third time, are there any possible others? If so, what is one possible example?
Laughing Man:It is not merely that man values what he values, but in a way why they value what they value and what they hope to achieve in a manner of speaking.
Okay, what does Long's "third aim" position say about "why they value what they value, etc..."?
Lilburne:I hope you don't mind that I ask for the third time, are there any possible others? If so, what is one possible example?
I would ask what more there is other then the maximization of social preference, perhaps you have something in mind?
Lilburne: Okay, what does Long's "third aim" position say about "why they value what they value, etc..."?
Laughing Man: "The Praxeological Case for Ultimate Ends" http://mises.org/multimedia/mp3/Long/Long-2.mp3
Laughing Man:I would ask what more there is other then the maximization of social preference, perhaps you have something in mind?
You asserted that every individual has an overall ultimate end. I asked you what this overall ultimate end was. You said...
Laughing Man: It depends on the individual.
Laughing Man:The maximization of social preference.
And now you seem to be characterizing that as a universal overall ultimate end, which therefore does NOT depend on the individual, contradicting your earlier "it depends on the individual" answer.
So which is it? Does it depend on the individual or not?
Laughing Man: Lilburne: Okay, what does Long's "third aim" position say about "why they value what they value, etc..."? Laughing Man: "The Praxeological Case for Ultimate Ends" http://mises.org/multimedia/mp3/Long/Long-2.mp3
Laughing Man, If you understand Long's position well enough to be ardently promoting it, you should be able to provide a rough, distilled answer to such a basic question yourself.
It seems in every other thread, you, or wombatron, or anarchist cain, or some other person (or account) is pointing new members to Long's articles and lectures; it's very cadre-like. I'm concerned that young, impressionable libertarians are getting caught up with Long's eloquence, erudition, and "progressive" sympathies, but too few are taking a hard look at the real-world truth-value, logical soundness, and meaningfulness of his eudaimonist doctrines.