yessir:"so it is purely utilitarian?"
It is a matter of appealing to the ends of the person you are trying to convince: both their professed ends (for the sake of winning over your audience), and what you speculate are their real ends (for the sake of winning over those you are debating with).
As Mises pointed out, most of the time with regard to political affairs, people at least profess to have utilitarian ends (greater general prosperity). And economic science makes the case for capitalism invincible given utilitarian ends.
If you speculate that the real ends of your opponent are "cynical" (that it's at bottom just a matter of self-promotion), the scientific case for capitalism is still nigh invincible...
Grayson Lilburne: "The average American worker enjoys amenities for which Croesus, Crassus, the Medici, and Louis XIV would have envied him." (Mises, HA) Had Louis XIV established economic liberty at the beginning of his reign, capitalist France would have poured a greater cornucopia of goods and services upon his head than his crippling taxes ever did. VERY few (if any) people benefit from the interventionist state more than they would benefit from capitalism. Mises knew what he was talking about: there truly is a harmony of interests.
"The average American worker enjoys amenities for which Croesus, Crassus, the Medici, and Louis XIV would have envied him." (Mises, HA)
Had Louis XIV established economic liberty at the beginning of his reign, capitalist France would have poured a greater cornucopia of goods and services upon his head than his crippling taxes ever did. VERY few (if any) people benefit from the interventionist state more than they would benefit from capitalism. Mises knew what he was talking about: there truly is a harmony of interests.
Economics can be difficult to master (I certainly haven't yet). And it's tempting to instead embrace and rely on a philosophical argument for liberty that can be expressed in a handful of sentences. But oftentimes it only takes a surface understanding of free market economics to convince someone to become a libertarian. And going just a little bit deeper into Austrian Economics can often convince someone to become an anarchist. Both the level of learning and the level of teaching sufficient to change people's political positions can be more accessible than you might think.
In the post-Enlightenment world, spurious philosophical doctrines serving as a kind of quasi-religion will only ultimately crash upon the rocks of their own dubiousness. Only economic science and honest persuasion has any hope of establishing the contractual society.
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What if you run into this argument: sure we might lose a couple GDP growth points by having a state, but I rather have less income inequality? How do you deal with that if you don't believe in something along the lines of natural law and rights
Liberte:You are such a crack-head sometimes, Wilderness.
I have not been condescending in this forum just making it clear what my theory is and answering posts politely. Yet some people have delibertately been uncivil in saying I'm "confused" or "non-sensical", including this poster here and no moderators have addressed this.
I want to publicly thank those people that have privately messaged me and have publicly messaged me on this forum in letting me know they that understand me.
I am valuing life, liberty, and private property. That is my theory. That is my natural law doctrine. Again thanks to all that uphold the value of freedom. cheers!
wilderness: Liberte:You are such a crack-head sometimes, Wilderness. I have not been condescending in this forum just making it clear what my theory is and answering posts politely. Yet some people have delibertately been uncivil in saying I'm "confused" or "non-sensical", including this poster here and no moderators have addressed this. I want to publicly thank those people that have privately messaged me and have publicly messaged me on this forum in letting me know they that understand me. I am valuing life, liberty, and private property. That is my theory. That is my natural law doctrine. Again thanks to all that uphold the value of freedom. cheers!
I deleted Liberte's insult, but accidentally deleted its "children" as well, including the above-quoted post. Sorry I don't know how to undo it, but here it is above, quoted in full, anyway.
Grayson Lilburne: I deleted Liberte's insult, but accidentally deleted its "children" as well, including the above-quoted post. Sorry I don't know how to undo it, but here it is above, quoted in full, anyway.
"Look at me, I'm quoting another user to show how wrong I think they are, out of arrogance of my own position. Wait, this is my own quote, oh shi-" ~ Nitroadict
Liberté:Do you believe that it is possible for you to tell me a true statement that is inconsistent with a particular action of mine? I believe it is possible for you to take actions based on beliefs about means, and that these beliefs will be in some extent mistaken.
Do you believe that it is possible for you to tell me a true statement that is inconsistent with a particular action of mine?
I believe it is possible for you to take actions based on beliefs about means, and that these beliefs will be in some extent mistaken.
Is that "yes"?
If I want to avoid E, then it is inconsistent for me to do M and to believe that "M will achieve E." Is this what you're saying?
Yes, unfortunately there are no necessary efficient causes in synthetic statements; so this doesn't work at all for your 'highest good' or 'natural law' arguments.
“Socialism is a fraud, a comedy, a phantom, a blackmail.” - Benito Mussolini"Toute nation a le gouvernemente qu'il mérite." - Joseph de Maistre
Liberté:Yes, unfortunately there are no necessary efficient causes in synthetic statements; so this doesn't work at all for your 'highest good' or 'natural law' arguments.
I'm not trying to argue for a "highest good" or "natural law," so bear with me for a moment here.
Let's say I'm about to do M, and you make a statement S. I could reply by:
Suppose S were the statement "Eating candy leads to tooth decay, and you want to avoid tooth decay, so you want to avoid eating candy." Then these replies would be:
Now suppose I go ahead and eat the candy anyway. Reply #1 fails, because S is inconsistent with this action. Reply #2 fails, because eating candy does lead to tooth decay. However, Reply #3 succeeds, because it is in fact true - as you said in your blog post, there can be no critique of values.
If S were instead "The sky is blue," then #1 would succeed, because this has nothing to do with my eating candy; #2 would fail, because the sky is blue; and #3 would fail, because I cannot simply will the sky to not be blue.
Are you with me so far?
I think there is something important being overlooked in the systems of thought of Hume, Mises, and other important thinkers who tend to be disparaged by the the objectivist school (objectivist school here conceived broadly as the school of thought that makes a critique of theoretical subjectivism the basis or centerpiece of its theory of man, and even of nature).
When a proposition or assertion is formulated to the effect that "it is impossible to do X," it is easy to overlook the fact that a law (of action, or of nature) is being positively asserted.
We tend to look at assertions or propositions of this kind only with respect to their "prohibitionary" affront to our previously held belief(s) that doing X is or was, in principle, possible. When we are confronted with the proposition that doing X is, in principle, impossible, we are prone to consider it as an unjust restriction on our liberties, or as a moral proscription, rather than considering the possibility that what is asserted amounts to a positive law of action or nature.
This is how socialists reacted to the economist's assertions that socialism wouldn't work. They refused to see in this, reference to any law(s) of human action, but instead considered the economist's assertions as unjust restrictions on their plans for arranging society according to their hopes.
The general proposition that socialism is impossible can be reformulated as the positive assertion that, if socialism is tried, XYZ must necessarily happen. What is being asserted by the "prohibitionary" proposition, and what is interpreted by its opponents as an unjust restriction on their hopes and plans, is an assertion of a law of action or of nature.
And this is what is being overlooked in the objectivist's monolithic attempt to overcome the Humean and Misesian sytems of thought. What are being disparaged by objectivists as mean-spirited prohibitions and proscriptions, are the laws of action and of nature asserted by theoretical subjectivists.
Since Feynman's name has come up recently, I will use a passage from Feynman to illustrate. Writing about Heisenberg, Feynman phrased things in the following way:
"Heisenberg noticed, when he discovered the laws of quantum mechanics, that the new laws of nature that he had discovered could only be consistent if there were some basic limitation to our experimental abilities that had not been previously recognized......Heisenberg proposed his uncertainty principle which, stated.....'It is impossible to design any apparatus whatsoever to determine through which hole the electron passes that will not at the same time disturb the electron enough to destroy the interference pattern.' " (The Character of Physical Law, p.143)(emphasis added)
The key parts of this passage of Feynman are:
1. He states that Heisenberg discovered the laws of quantum mechanics.
2. As we see, Feynman states Heisenberg's discovered laws in terms of a "basic limitation" and an "impossibility." I.e., the law is described in terms of a limitation or "prohibition" on something that people previously believed, in principle, it was possible to do.
3. We can also see that the law Feynman is discussing can easily be formulated in terms of a positive assertion as opposed to a negative limitation or prohibition, such as: If an apparatus is built such that it is possible to determine through which hole the electron passes, then the interference pattern must necessarily be destroyed."
So here we have the three elements I was mentioning before in the context of Hume and Mises. We have, 1. the assertion of a law, 2. phrased in terms of a prohibition, restriction, or limitation on what was previously believed to be an achievable end, and 3. this law is also formulable in positive terms.
New laws of action or nature, when first discovered, imply that the plans, goals, or hopes of various individuals, are, in principle, unrealizable, or that the attempt to realize those plans will have different results than believed.
This is why Mises writes in the opening pages of Human Action:
"But all were fully convinced that there was in the course of social events no such regularity and invariance of phenomena as had already been found in the operation of human reasoning and in the sequence of natural phenomena. They did not search for the laws of social cooperation because they thought man could organize society as he pleased. If social conditions did not fulfill the wishes of the reformers, if their utopias proved unrealizable, the fault was seen in the moral failure of man. Social problems were considered ethical problems. What was needed in order to construct the ideal society, they thought, were good princes and virtuous citizens. With righteous men any utopia might be realized."
What Mises is saying in these opening pages of Human Action is that the discovery of necessary laws in the realm of societal organization implied a restriction, limitation, or "prohibition" on the plans and designs of some who believed that no laws of human action prevented their plans from being realized. The theoretical struggle over economics and praxeology is a struggle on the part of some to overcome the laws of action asserted by praxeology and economics. The laws of action, if valid, limit achievable ends, or, show how particular means cannot attain the posited ends. This constitutes to the opponents of such laws, an implied constraint on what they had previously believed was possible. It tells them that their plans are not realizable, or, the attempt to realize them won't bring about the desired result.
Regardless of the reasons why, it seems that both in the realm of nature and in the realm of human action, resistance to the constraining, confining, or limiting quality of laws of nature and of human action, comes to be identified as the approach of "objectivism."
This is the case with Heisenberg and quantum physics as it is with Hume and necessity and with Mises and socialism. As conveyed by Heisenberg:
"However, all the opponents of the Copenhagen interpretation do agree on one point. It would, in their view, be desirable to return to the reality concept of classical physics or, to use a more general philosophic term, to the ontology of materialism. They would prefer to come back to the idea of an objective real world whose smallest parts exist objectively in the same sense as stones or trees exist, independently of whether or not we observe them.....This, however, is impossible or at least not entirely possible because of the nature of the atomic phenomena, as has been discussed in some of the earlier chapters. It cannot be our task to formulate wishes as to how the atomic phenomena should be; our task can only be to understand them." (Physics and Philosophy, p.129)(emphasis added)
Here, Heisenberg clearly identifies resistance to the implications of quantum theory with the objectivist school of thought, the general theoretical approach that seeks to conceive of physical and social objects as existing independently of perceiving subjects. Heisenberg also mentions that his theoretical opponents seem to be concerned with what atomic phenomena "should" or "ought" be.
As Heisenberg sees things, resistance to the limiting implications of the laws of quantum mechanics is associated with theoretical objectivism.
******
The two points are, 1. that the newly asserted law of nature or of action implies a limitation on what was previously believed or hoped was possible, and, 2. resistance to the implications of the newly discovered law seems to be associated with what we identify as theoretical objectivism.
With regard to Hume, I believe the same situation exists.
The the problem of the is-ought gap is attributed to Hume, and has been referred to as "Hume's Law." (see Patrick M. O'Neil: http://mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_4.pdf ) This alone makes Hume one of the most influential and important thinkers in the history of the moral sciences (science of human action). One could argue that all ethics theory goes through Hume. But there is another law of Hume which may go unrecognized. As W. T. Jones explained:
"What are the logical grounds for men's belief in the uniformity of nature?.....Before Hume, the usual answer to this question was in terms of "causal necessity": Everyone agreed that every event that occurs has some cause that necessarily produces it. The new scientific method rested on this belief, and the success of the method seemed to substantiate the belief. Accordingly, Hume set himself to examine the notion that a necessary connection can exist between two events, a connection such that if one of the events occurs,, the other must inevitably also occur." (A History of Western Philosophy, vol. III, Hobbes to Hume, p.315)
I'm not a historian of philosophy, so I can't say whether Hume is the sole philosopher responsible for the law which holds that it is impossible to demonstrate a necessary connection between two events. I have previously referred to this notion as "Hume's Law," believing it to be just as important as the "is-ought" gap.
The important points are that these two notions proposed by Hume can be conceived as laws of human action. Both claim essentially that it will be impossible for us as theorists to do something which we previously may have believed it was possible to do (in one instance, derive an ought from an is, and in the other instance, demonstrate a necessary connection between two events). Both these notions express the idea that, while we previously believed it was possible to achieve X end, achieving X end is not possible. These two laws of Hume express a limitation or "prohibition" on ends it was widely believed were achievable.
Given what I wrote above, it should also be possible to formulate both laws as in positive terms. Here, I'll sketch one suggestion for each:
1. If the attempt is made to derive an ought from an is, a reference must be made to a wanting or desiring subject who "wants" or "desires" the thing that "ought to be" or "ought to happen."
2. If the attempt is made to demonstrate a necessary connection between two events, reference must be made to a power or substance which is not observable. (the idea here is that an arbitrary, "subjective" substance would have to be supposed)
(I'm not claiming these are final or rigorous formulations. I'm sketching them for illustrative purposes to show that Hume's limiting or prohibitionary laws may be expressed in positive form, just as physical laws and praxeological economic laws)
The main point here is to demonstrate that what Hume has essentially done is to uncover laws of human action. These are laws that demonstrate that when the attempt is made to do X, the result will not be Y as had been previously assumed or believed, but instead Z.
In other words, Hume's laws, which are generally conceived as prohibitions stating that "you cannot do X," may be more correctly and more importantly conceived as laws of action stating that "if you attempt X, Z must necessarily happen, and not X."
I think all sides to the debate can agree that Hume's laws restrict the realm of what was previously believed possible, and that in modern times, the school of thought that is intent on overcoming the laws of action discovered or elaborated by Hume is the objectivist school of thought. This doesn't seem controversial.
*******
I would argue that, far from being the end of science, when the essential teachings of Hume and Mises are fully appreciated for what they are, we eventually come to see in their teachings not only prohibitions and limitations on our previous plans, hopes, and dreams, but also laws of human action. The things which Hume and Mises assert are impossible to do, are also, importantly, assertions of a necessary relationship between our attempt at something, and what must necessarily be the result of that attempt. These laws of human action, while constraining the realm of the possible, also give us control over our lives by showing us what must be the necessary result of various forms of action. We now know that if we do X, Z must be the result. We are thus empowered to either bring about Z by means of bringing about X, or avoid Z by means of avoiding X.
As Menger writes:
"The theoretical sciences are supposed to provide us with understanding of phenomena, a knowledge of them extending beyond immediate experience, and a certain ability to foresee them."
By showing us not only what ends are not achievable, but what must be the result of our attempt to achieve various ends, both Hume and Mises provide us with knowledge extending beyond immediate experience and a certain ability to foresee the results of our actions.
Hume and Mises assert laws of human action. Laws of human action limit the realm of what was previously believed possible, and this implies that some of our plans are not realizable as we had previously thought. This has resulted in a theoretical struggle against the theories of Hume and Mises and associated thinkers waged by those who want to maintain or resurrect the possibility of their plans' realizability (socialism, deriving an ought from an is, etc...)
Since the theories of Hume and Mises are theories of human action, and since action is a phenomenon that implies an acting subject, those that seek to overturn or overthrow Hume and Mises have felt that it was necessary to overcome or overthrow subjectivism---the idea that all social phenomena imply and refer to an acting subject and that subject's wants and desires. These thinkers have felt it necessary to counter theoretical subjectivism with an opposed theory of objectivism---the idea that there exist standards of social conduct that are independent of individual subjects and those subject's wants and desires.
As Heisenberg wrote:
"If one follows the great difficulty which even eminent scientists like Einstein had in understanding and accepting the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, one can trace the roots of this difficulty to the Cartesian partition. This partition has penetrated deeply into the human mind during the three centuries following Descartes and it will take a long time for it to be replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality."
"The position to which the Cartesian partition has led with respect to the "res extensa" was what one may call metaphysical realism. The world, i.e., the extended things, "exist."
(Physics and Philosophy, p.81)
What Rothbard and others have problems with is not Hume's skepticism, but rather the fact that the laws discovered by Hume prevent their plans from being realized.
"It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization..." (Mises, UF, p.98)
I think its resistence to integration. Its the same as free will vs determinism; either side gets pouty when they have to consider the grain of truth on the other side.
Liberté: If I want to avoid E, then it is inconsistent for me to do M and to believe that "M will achieve E." Is this what you're saying? Yes, unfortunately there are no necessary efficient causes in synthetic statements; so this doesn't work at all for your 'highest good' or 'natural law' arguments.
Why not just say statements concerning observable reality, do you just like being opaque?
Adam Knott, what do you think of Reinach? I didn't realize how much you had written until I saw Kinsella cite some working paper when I was poking around today.
Anyhow, Hume isn't even of primary importance to me. The Humean problem (is-ought) seems entirely irrelevant to argumentation ethics. I'm just going to quote one line of a message I was sending to someone.
There are actions which are conducive to the process of civilization and being a member of human society, and then there are those which run counter to it.
I'm pretty sure I've said as much here already and people are still talking about "personal subjective value judgements".
Democracy means the opportunity to be everyone's slave.—Karl Kraus.
"For maybe nearly a year Lilburne has attacked life, liberty, and private property in this forum."
Lilburne has not attacked the concept of life, the concept of liberty, the concept of property.
Lilburne has not attacked any person's life, any person's liberty, any person's property.
No, Lilburne has attacked these very things in themselves; the independently existing ones.
"The worst enemy of clear thinking is the propensity to hypostatize, i.e., to acribe substance or real existence to mental constructs or concepts."
(Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p.80)
yessir:What if you run into this argument: sure we might lose a couple GDP growth points by having a state, but I rather have less income inequality? How do you deal with that if you don't believe in something along the lines of natural law and rights
One strategy for egalitarians and other bleeding hearts that I developed in my head years ago is something I call the "starving edge" argument. The argument does not impose ends on the other person. It simply points out additional consequences that the other person may not have thought about, and which, according to their own ends, are likely to be unacceptable to them. It runs as follows:
1. The world market it so highly interconnected that a drop in the productivity of labor in a single country can effect the absolute level of wealth of people all around the world.
2. There are so many people (including especially children) around the world who are on the brink of starvation or death from malnutrition that any decrease in their absolute level of wealth would be fatal to them.
3. Therefore your goal of [insert lefty cause here] can only be accomplished at the expense of deaths by starvation and malnutrition in numbers commensurate with the level of economic intervention required for your cause.
I reckon that the vast majority of people, if they understood economics enough to realize that #1 is true, would prefer, according to their own value scales, to forego their "social reforms", knowing that the cost would entail causing the deaths of thousands or even millions of the world's most vulnerable people.
Those who wouldn't are simply our irreconcilable enemies, and the method for dealing with them is to eventually outnumber and overpower them.
Liliburne: One thing to consider is that most religious and activist groups are really just signalling societies whereby people try to advance in a social heirarchy, trying to construct an alternative when the dominant one does not seem plausible to advance in. Or, to put it another way, most people are (whether they know it or not) involved in political activism to get chicks. In this context, it is far easier (and possibly more successful) to espouse moralistic quasi-religious doctrines and signal broadly to others within the fold, instead of engaging in scholarship and developing actually reasonable arguments for whatever position they're alleged to be advancing.
Adam Knott, that was a good post.
1) Because observable reality is not as simple as the fantasy land you imagine it to be, wherein there is 'coercion' and 'voluntary' and other such mystical categories; 2) Just because you can not comprehend what I am saying does not make it 'opaque' and 3) Because I am not really talking to you, anyway, as I consider your opinion to be beneath consideration.
Olovetto:
I haven't read much Reinach. Is there perhaps a particular essay or chapter you recommend? Maybe a link?
I think the last time I read about Reinach was in an essay by Barry Smith, but that's been a while.
What I've sensed recently, in the last year or two, is a movement to try to conceive the libertarian private property ethic more in terms of human action, and less in terms of natural rights or objective values. For example, I saw a recent article by Justin Michael Altman "Building the Cathedral Sanctuary: Recognizing Action as the Basis of Property." Another example is Bob Schaefer's article last year "A Praxeological Look at Intellectual Property Rights" where Schaefer attempted to develop a concept of "cooperative action" as the basis for intellectual property. I see your brief quote as part of this movement:
"There are actions which are conducive to the process of civilization and being a member of human society, and then there are those which run counter to it."
I'm in support of this kind of approach. I do think this begins the process of taking things in a direction away from the theories of the some of the influential libertarian ethicists of the last century, and obviously toward a more Misesian view of things.
It is interesting to see these developments.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
Yep.
This discussion has helped me to sort out the scientific v. ethical case for liberty, rights, and property....not new to me, just becoming a more organized thought.
The scientific case recognizes that property, rights, and liberty arize in society but makes no judgement concerning them.
The ethical case is a matter of preference as to how to use that information.
This seems a pretty basic thing that is not too hard to accept if I have it right.
I consider myself to be a natural rights advocate related to the points wilderness has expressed. I think I understand, however, that this is merely a preference or a positive case that supports property, rights and liberty.
The ethical case cannot prove to the misanthrope that property, rights and liberty ought to arize in society....as Liebe-te is so apt to point out. Only the scientific case is able to prove that they DO.
"Oh, I wish I could pray the way this dog looks at the meat" - Martin Luther
wilderness:"For maybe nearly a year Lilburne has attacked life, liberty, and private property in this forum."
Adam Knott:Lilburne has not attacked the concept of life, the concept of liberty, the concept of property. Lilburne has not attacked any person's life, any person's liberty, any person's property. No, Lilburne has attacked these very things in themselves; the independently existing ones.
huh? The thing in itself is this life that I am. And it exists independently of your life. I am not sure what you are saying here. I don't think you effectively communicated what you meant, but of course it is possibly me not understanding your point.
E.O.'s quote:There are actions which are conducive to the process of civilization and being a member of human society, and then there are those which run counter to it.
This
Adam Knott:What I've sensed recently, in the last year or two, is a movement to try to conceive the libertarian private property ethic more in terms of human action, and less in terms of natural rights or objective values.
It's been not only the last year or two, but interpretations dealing in the sort of terms that would be praxeologic in the sense of natural rights has been actually happening for over a hundred years. Carl Menger and Franz Brentano come to mind, not that they said "natural rights", but it's the thought pattern of marginal utility that Rothbard and Hoppe being praxeologists, and many others realize. I think you're hang-up is in not understanding what "objective" means. Or what "realist" means. I have tried to engage you on these points for some time but since you haven't reached out then I can only assume that this part of your philosophy is closed off and not demonstrating an open-minded approach to know the meaningful substance instead of getting hung-up on the labels.
- thank you
zefreak:I just want to comment on a remark made by Wilderness that suggests that Hume was a radical skeptic rather than a radical empiricist. While this is a common interpretation of his philosophy, it is based on a complete ignorance of his life and work. Hume's problem of induction is a mark against 'pure' rationalists who thought that experience was not necessary to derive knowledge about the world. Hume used reason to explicate its own limitations. Logic to Hume is analytical; it clarifies relationships between propositions of fact including relations of necessity, but that is all. Pure logic was incapable of deriving a sufficient basis for scientific induction, and that was a mark against rationalism not induction.
First - I never said Hume was a "radical skeptic". I did say "academic skeptic" which I linked from another source so it is not originally my term. Secondly, I know Hume was a radical empiricist but the debate is well past that: radical empiricist is actually skepticism. This is uncontroversial, well, at least to some people.
Second - Some rationalists based their entire philosophy on common sense which is founded on the acts of experience. Phenomenologists of the 18th century and extant ones of today such as Joseph Seifert have established this is the case. Carl Menger is another case in point. So on that point I disagree with.
Third - The readings I've been in touch with point out that Hume made his skeptical assertion of "limitations" psychologically and never was able to make it a logical assertion. On this point, it is not that Hume is wrong. It is simply a case of Hume's psychological assertion that how a person thinks about the world might not be the actual way the world is. But that in no way makes what we know uncertain. Knowledge is certain. The interpretation of knowledge might be incorrect or correct and as Hume stated, just because a person may hold doubts as to what they know about the world this in no way bars any one person from acting in the world. I think your interpretation of what I'm been saying was superficial, but with discussion on certain points any assumptions you may hold as to what you think I'm saying, instead of what I am actually saying would be the only way to really get to the bottom of this.
As to pure logic not being sufficient basis for scientific induction I refer you to Fenyman. You saying this "not being sufficient basis" is why radical empirical is also skepticism:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X8aWBcPVPMo
Notice Feynman uses logic here ("implies") in application with inductive processes. Feynman isn't saying anything new to realists. Hume's skepticism is what, as you say, asserts "not being sufficient basis", and meanwhile common sense (logic) is way ahead of the game and has been for a long time even before Hume came along. Realism is further along in its philosophical discourse than I currently believe you realize.
G8R HED:I consider myself to be a natural rights advocate related to the points wilderness has expressed. I think I understand, however, that this is merely a preference or a positive case that supports property, rights and liberty.
Then we are in agreement. It is a preference. I have never said otherwise.
Adam Knott:Since the theories of Hume and Mises are theories of human action, and since action is a phenomenon that implies an acting subject, those that seek to overturn or overthrow Hume and Mises have felt that it was necessary to overcome or overthrowsubjectivism---the idea that all social phenomena imply and refer to an acting subject and that subject's wants and desires. These thinkers have felt it necessary to counter theoretical subjectivism with an opposed theory of objectivism---the idea that there exist standards of social conduct that are independent of individual subjects and those subject's wants and desires.
I havn't been met with any objective ethicist who's intent was to replace subjectivism in it's entirety. To the contrary, many of them understand the fundamental roll subjective valuation plays in the whole system(including their own). I think it's a mischaracterization of what the objective ethicists are attempting to do by stating that they seek to replace subjectivism in it's entirety.
filc's comment to Adam Knott:I havn't been met with any objective ethicist who's intent was to replace subjectivism in it's entirety. To the contrary, many of them understand the fundamental roll subjective valuation plays in the whole system(including their own). I think it's a mischaracterization of what the objective ethicists are attempting to do by stating that they seek to replace subjectivism in it's entirety.
This.
Thanks filc for your, once again, penetrating intellectual insight.
For example all of Ayn Rand's work in ethics, as well as The Ethics of Liberty, one of the most influential books on libertarian ethics:
"Value in the sense of valuation or utilit is purely subjective, and decided by each individual. This procedure is perfectly proper for the formal science of praxeology, or economic theory, but not necessarily elsewhere. For in natural-law ethics, ends are demonstrated to be good or bad for man in varying degrees; value here is objective---determined by the natural law of man's being,..."(EOL, p.12)
Here, Rothbard not only claims that in ethics, value is objective, but he clearly states that the procedure of subjectivism is not proper for ethics theory.
Rothbard is arguing that the idea that people might choose or decide their own ethical values (subjectivism), as opposed to economic values (television sets, clothing items, etc.) is not proper. He is arguing that subjectivism in ethics must be rejected, and a theory of objective values adopted.
filc is spot on.
Adam,
When a society determines that the law of private property is to be maintained, in other words, ought to be maintained, as long as a society, ie. an aggregrate of individuals, maintains that, then yes, that is the law and it doesn't matter what anybody subjectively thinks because society is maintaing that private property is to be maintained and the society is acting on that maintainment.
edit: Additionally, a society that determines that humans ought to exist (nature of man's being), then such a society that makes a law that maintains that humans are to exist, then yes, it doesn't matter what anybody subjectively thinks because society is maintaining that humans are to exist and that is to be maintained and the society is acting on that maintainment.
Prove my theory wrong. Prove that my value judgements to maintain my private property and my life are wrong. I'll be waiting for you to attempt to refute my existence.
But the problem with this, Knott, is that only subjective values motivate action. So either ethics is subjective value (and arbitrary) or it is 'objective' value, and therefor not the value of an actual individual; meaning no one has any reason to do anything about it.
Liberte:But the problem with this, Knott, is that only subjective values motivate action. So either ethics is subjective value (and arbitrary) or it is 'objective' value, and therefor not the value of an actual individual; meaning no one has any reason to do anything about it.
Your still thinking in terms where objective valuation somehow replaces subjective valuation. But one is a complimentary code of conduct which promotes the wellbeing of the other. It helps steer and guide the means to obtain a subjectively desired end.
"But the problem with this, Knott, is that only subjective values motivate action. So either ethics is subjective value (and arbitrary) or it is 'objective' value, and therefor not the value of an actual individual; meaning no one has any reason to do anything about it."
*****
Liberte:
We may not be speaking about the same things.
When I refer to subjectivism, I'm referring to a theoretical approach that conceives "value" as a category of the theoretical construct of the individual subject.
The idea that value is arbitrary is foreign to this concept, and strictly speaking, the idea that value is subjective is superfluous.
Wilderness said:
"As to pure logic not being sufficient basis for scientific induction I refer you to Fenyman. You saying this "not being sufficient basis" is why radical empirical is also skepticism:
- thank you"
You are dead wrong. Feynman was a pragmatist in both science and philosophy. While one of my intellectual heros, he was simply not interested in philosophy of science. His modus operandi was essentially 'shut up and calculate'. He was an empiricist through and through.
Further, you say that Feynman uses logic in his argument by using the word implies. Surely you know that in logic, 'imply' means something very different than its colloquial usage? Imply in formal logic means requires, whereas in casual language it means suggest.
Hence why the phrase 'correlation does not imply causation' is used in statistics. Correlation does not imply (formally - require) causation, but it certainly does imply (casually - suggest) it!
Feynman was obviously using the casual meaning of the term imply, as his example does not logically require the conclusion he reaches (ontological realism)! Why does he reach his conclusion if it is not logically necessary? A combination of induction, Occam's Razor and pragmatism.
Hume was certainly a realist. His whole point was that science requires more than the strict application of logical inference, but some form of inductive reasoning to reach conclusions that are not logically necessary yet are believed to be true.
I believe I am right.
I interpreted the video to point out while philosophers like Hume's psychological skepticism want to argue if the steak is really there, Popper closed the door on Hume's skepticism and Feynman is doing the same by referring to common sense (axioms). Fynman was most certainly using implies not in the causal but logical means, because as he pointed out, while some people wonder if the steak is here, it is implied that it is very real, becasue if nobody believed that it was real, then they would be dead by now. Yes life is.
You are using skepticism in your last sentence which proves my point. Logical inference is used during implications of contingency. Logic is what determines A is A and is used in every process that a human experiences. Even an illusion believed to be real is made certain by logically believing the illusion is reality, meaning, that A is A. The illusion is inferred to be real. Upon hindsight, or what have you, the illusion then might be seen as the the illusion it is and then once again, reality is understood in another way but it is still A is A. Even Kant thought Hume's point on skepticism was curious, and I'm not even saying it is incorrect. Think of Hume's skepticism about causality. But Hume's assertion was psychological as he never actual refute logically that what a person thinks is certain really is or is not certain. He provided no logical means to suggest that is true at all. It was simply Hume worrying.
You once again fail to understand my point. You have also failed to understand Hume, as you still refer to him as a skeptic as if he really argued that there was no reason to believe in causality or the existence of steak being there. I recommend actually reading Hume rather than whatever rationalist strawman you have been exposed to.
Don't get too excited Zefreak. I doubt Wilderness is intentionally planting a strawman directed at you or your points. You could argue that he simply doesn't understand but ignorance is not the same as dishonesty. At least from my perspective his tone towards you thus far has been neutral and considerable. I'd imagine he'd respect the same return in kind.
zefreak:You once again fail to understand my point. You have also failed to understand Hume, as you still refer to him as a skeptic as if he really argued that there was no reason to believe in causality or the existence of steak being there. I recommend actually reading Hume rather than whatever rationalist strawman you have been exposed to.
I'm sorry zefreak. I am only going by critiques by other philosophers namely Barry Smith, some phenomenologists, Karl Popper, etc.... I provided sources to what I was saying. i have read some Hume in quotes, but not at book length. So I am not an expert on Hume personally. I am referring to extant philosophers that are not even in association of the Mises Institute, again, my sources were provided. Here is one critique by McCloskey as an example, which is the same critique that I come across by other philosophers not even associated with McCloskey. McCloskey is no libertarian, and no linkage to natural rights theorists, etc....:
"Hence, strictly speaking, according to empiricism, predictions are epistemologically impossible. It is irrational to want to predict, because the very possibility of prediction cannot be rationally established. And this, then, is also the ultimate reason for empiricism's skeptical stand regarding the possibility of scientific progress. For if one cannot rationally defend the very idea of causality, how can one expect anything from science but an array of incommensurable observational statements? Progress, as it is commonly understood, is the advancement of predictive knowledge. But surely no such thing can be possible if prediction itself cannot be established as possible." - Hoppe referencing McCloskey.
I am not going to re-paste and re-link everything that I have said in this thread from all of the other sources. I even included Kant agreeing with Hume on this point. I have even said I don't necessarily disagree either. I agree with what Barry Smith says here:
"Indeed, great difficulties may be set in the way of our attaining knowledge of essential structures of certain sorts, and of our transforming such knowledge into the organized form of a strict theory. Above all we may (as Hume showed) mistakenly suppose that we have grasped a law or structure for psychological reasons of habit. Our knowledge of structures or laws can nevertheless be exact. For the quality of exactness or strict universality is skew to that of infallibility. Episteme may be ruled out in certain circumstances, but true doxa (which is to say, `orthodoxy') may be nonetheless available." - Barry Smith
The empiricalism since Locke and Hume is skepticism and Popper is in a way too when it comes to certain things. The skepticism is in reference to wondering if the knowledge a person ascertains to the facts of this world are true or not. But as I quoted Hume saying in a previous post this should not stop science at all. It should not stop humans acting. What has happened as one article I referenced in another post points out that some people interpret Hume as some kind of subjectivist skeptic but the article said this would be wrong and very different from the kind of skepticism of Hume. Hume was, the article stated, an academic skeptic. The interpretation of Hume caused some subjectivist skepticism though the article points out which is what Karl Popper was addressing.
zefreak. I think we are agreeing to an extent. I would have to think more about this as to what Hume really meant. And I wouldn't rely only on Hume for my worldview because I do think the is/ought is an invalid imaginary constructive if taken absolutely in all propositions and also there is a way that the is/ought doesn't even pertain to some philosophic methodology. At times it probably doesn't hurt, but taken absolutely I think it hides the other methods that do exist that I've read that have convinced me. And I'm not talking about simple assertions but step by step proposition outlines that show how an ought is derived from an is and also how "is-ness" nullifies even the need to bring up the is/ought.
I mean even Popper is considered a skeptic, all logical positivists can be, due the focus shifted from propositions and only looking at observational evidence. And what this does is remove some of the certainty that axioms, propositions, and theory in general can provide to affirm observational evidence. Not that science doesn't do this, but the various philosophies tend to leave this out from their formulations, ie. mainstream economists that are not Austrian economist to name one.
I don't think I'm disagreeing with you. I think I worded what I said badly. What I meant is how some people may interpret Hume. I agree with what Barry Smith says above. McCloskey and some others make a different argument regarding Hume (Hume is in that same paragraph and that is whom the quote of Hoppe referring to McClosky is talking about).
I'm going by extant philosophers and some that are dead when I say some of these things because I can't read everything. And I think at times some of these people are more knowledgeable than I am on the subject. I will just concede the point and leave it as is, though, the certainities I have included such as the is/ought imaginary construct in certain instances I still do maintain as I've read enough so far to make a valid point I think. Though I am not done with my philosophical inquirying so maybe my mind will change in time when I see the evidence that differs from the evidence that I presently possess.
- thank you.
filc:I doubt Wilderness is intentionally planting a strawman directed at you or your points
yes. I am not intentionally strawmanning if I am strawmanning. I have sources for what I am saying. I have conceded in my post that some points, though substantiated by other philosophers even some not associated with the Mises Institute, may involve ignorance as I can't say I am an expert with Hume and can only link my sources.
Olovetto: I haven't read much Reinach. Is there perhaps a particular essay or chapter you recommend? Maybe a link? I think the last time I read about Reinach was in an essay by Barry Smith, but that's been a while.
I think Reinach is incredibly important. Here's his major work, The Apriori Foundations of Civil Law.
See also papers by Block and Sechrest.
I just put in a request at my library (1-6 weeks, ugh) for Judgment and Sachverhalt: An Introduction to Adolf Reinach's Phenomenological Realism
and I'm getting some of the papers from Aletheia listed here.
Do you know what essay by Barry Smith? He has a minor reference in the last chapter of his book on Austrian philosophy and I didn't read the earlier chapters yet.
What I've sensed recently, in the last year or two, is a movement to try to conceive the libertarian private property ethic more in terms of human action, and less in terms of natural rights or objective values.
The talks here over the past day really crystallized some certain link to human action. Those terms I underlined are bordering on complete uselessness in my opinion. The main idea is very simple, but then explaining it is not at all. Just "law" by itself is 2 distinct disciplines. I don't feel ready to try to explain it all but am increasingly drawn to try.
For example, I saw a recent article by Justin Michael Altman "Building the Cathedral Sanctuary: Recognizing Action as the Basis of Property." Another example is Bob Schaefer's article last year "A Praxeological Look at Intellectual Property Rights" where Schaefer attempted to develop a concept of "cooperative action" as the basis for intellectual property.
Altman's paper looks interesting. I'd read Schaefer's before, as well as Kinsella's response. Reading it again, Schaeffer seems to have completely misunderstood Mises on autistic exchange. I was going to make a thread about this word "autistic" to ask what is the antonym of it but never got around to it.
I'm still reading through HA for the second time, very slowly, since I didn't get it at all before. Where praxeology applies, I'd say Mises work is certainly very important. Mises' greatest mistake, and this comes out with the "thick libertarian" junk of today, is not being able to separate political economy from legal theory. (or something like that, I'm not up to explaining it now).
@Lilburne
I responded to some of your points, then I realized you seemed to care more about one "uncivil" comment I made than what I said about trying to improve these fora. Oh well.
E. R. Olovetto:Isn't the problem then though that we aren't talking about the suitability of the sadist or the average man in achieving their own preferred ends. We're asking whether the sadist's ("criminal's" sounds better to me) actions are in line with those we say are vital to human society and the process of civilization, and this is where AE comes in.
Lilburne:AE comes in to convince non-sadists and non-ascetics what social arrangement will best suit their ends: namely the contractual society.
If AE = argumentation ethics, you are terribly mistaken here. AE is about justifying punishment. Since you said you didn't know about estoppel, here is a piece on it. I actually normally link Kinsella's other piece about punishment, and you ought to read that too.
E. R. Olovetto: Grayson Lilburne:Hoppe attempts to deduce that private property ethics can't be argued against from the definition of argumentation. Argumentation ethics is indeed deductive. This sounds good, but I don't think it is actually correct. Argumentation ethics is a negative proof. I'm sure you are familiar with performative contradiction. It is the same thing as Mises saying that nobody can deny that humans act, because that denial is itself an action.
Grayson Lilburne:Hoppe attempts to deduce that private property ethics can't be argued against from the definition of argumentation. Argumentation ethics is indeed deductive.
This sounds good, but I don't think it is actually correct. Argumentation ethics is a negative proof. I'm sure you are familiar with performative contradiction. It is the same thing as Mises saying that nobody can deny that humans act, because that denial is itself an action.
Grayson Lilburne:Premise 1: Denying action is an action. Premise 2: The existence of an action disproves any denial of action. Conclusion: Therefore nobody can truthfully deny that humans act. The conclusion is contained in the premises. It's a deduction.
What you are doing is deduction, but this particular form is a tautology. That there exists a universalizable theory of human rights or human action is a priori. Tautologies aren't senseless, but they don't say anything about a particular instance. They just are the substance of reality. For more on this, I suggest Wittgenstein's Tractatus from 4.1 on.
ERO:If AE = argumentation ethics, you are terribly mistaken here.
No, I meant Austrian Economics.
At some point I will get to reading those Kinsella estoppel articles.
Subjective value is arbitrary because it ultimately reduces to elements beyond (or, perhaps more appropriately, beneath) rationality. Ultimately things are 'valued' simply because they are expected to relate to satisfaction, which is ultimately non-rational.