Lilburne: Again, in Hoppe's system as well as in Rothbard's, it seems that to be a fully moral being necessarily involves rigorous deduction. And such a formulation of morality just seems to be a contrived product of wordplay.
I feel Hoppe's argumentation ethics also fails to derive "ought" from "is",
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
Lilburne:But implicit in Hoppe's argumentation ethics is the notion that being fully moral involves abiding by the conclusions of argumentation ethics which are reached by deduction.
If Hoppe's conclusions are correct, and I don't see anything wrong with his reasoning, then being fully moral, in fact, does involve abiding by the conclusions. It would have to.
Lilburne:If people don't perform Hoppe's deductions, but act in accord with Hoppe's conclusions anyway, then they would only be acting morally by accident.
Or it could be result of moral intuition. Or it could be the result of learning which principles are the most expedient for social conduct and eventually valuing them for their own sake. I don't know all the possibilities, but I'm sure it the "by accident" doesn't necessarily follow. Nor has Hoppe ever argued so.
Lilburne:Again, in Hoppe's system as well as in Rothbard's, it seems that to be a fully moral being necessarily involves rigorous deduction.
I don't think either of them argued anything like that. I also don't see how either of their systems imply that. In fact, both of them, as well as mises, thought that property and law are natural social developments. They are merely providing justification for institutions already established, and established without elaborate justifications.
Lilburne:And such a formulation of morality just seems to be a contrived product of wordplay.
This seems to me, to be an unwarrented dismissal.
Stephen Forde:If Hoppe's conclusions are correct, and I don't see anything wrong with his reasoning, then being fully moral, in fact, does involve abiding by the conclusions. It would have to.
Right, but Hoppe still doesn't manage to say why one "should" not aggress. Let's say Hoppe is correct and his arguments are valid, if that is so then Hoppe still can't tell me not to murder any more than he can tell me not to add 2 and 2 and get 5. It seems to me that "right" and "wrong" are entirely missing from Hoppe's ethics.
"You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows"
Bob Dylan
argumentation ethics, shows how immorality can't be justified. you can do immoral things. who would deny it. its physically possible. if it cant be justified, then it you do it without justification. if you wish to argue about morality and be right, then you must make correct moral arguments, not wrong ones like 'i can kill innocents'. thats a big fail in making justified arguments, etc. just as you would fail in doing math 'correctly' if you wrote down 2+2=5. you can do it, but it is mathematically wrong. (unless you've adopted some weird notation!)
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
But so what if I can't argue it? That doesn't mean I shouldn't go and do it, unless you assume that people ought not to do things that they can't argue in favour of. But nowhere have I seen such a premise in Hoppe's argument and I don't believe you can support it.
but being mathematically wrong is one thing. its compatible with being moral.
being immmoral is not compatible with being moral.
kinda win definitionally, but i know that wont impress. oh well. c'est la vie
How does that pertain to my post?
GilesStratton: Stephen Forde:If Hoppe's conclusions are correct, and I don't see anything wrong with his reasoning, then being fully moral, in fact, does involve abiding by the conclusions. It would have to. Right, but Hoppe still doesn't manage to say why one "should" not aggress. Let's say Hoppe is correct and his arguments are valid, if that is so then Hoppe still can't tell me not to murder any more than he can tell me not to add 2 and 2 and get 5. It seems to me that "right" and "wrong" are entirely missing from Hoppe's ethics.
I totally agree.
I think individuals can only be persaded if they govern their action by principle rather than by their passions. His argument only shows which principles are correct and which are incorrect. A barbarian would never be persaded by Hoppe or anybody else unless they persaded him that they could suppress him with physical violence.
Hoppe's proof is an impossibility theorem demonstrating which actions can and can't be socially justified. I think its the idea of "good and evil" that is missing, not "right and wrong". Although I'm not sure that the two are mutually exclusive.
Ultimately, God is the foundation of morality.
GilesStratton: That doesn't mean I shouldn't go and do it, unless you assume that people ought not to do things that they can't argue in favour of.
people ought not to do things that are wrong. regardless of whether they 'offer' whatever arguments. (plus it is noticable that they wont be able to argue for doing those things)
Stephen Forde: Ultimately, God is the foundation of morality.
Why?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
a theist would answer trivially that god is the foundation of everything.
thanks.
oh, and watch out for that devil guy.....
nirgrahamUK:people ought not to do things that are wrong. regardless of whether they 'offer' whatever arguments. (plus it is noticable that they wont be able to argue for doing those things)
In the standard conception of "right and wrong", this is surely true. However, Hoppe himself points out that his theory stays purely within the realm of "is" statements, so unless you're providing something that Hoppe hasn't I can't say you're correct. Of course, you've offered nothing more than an unsupported assertion and an equivocation. With your statement "people ought not to do things that are wrong" and your use of the word "wrong" respectively.
Stephen Forde: I totally agree. I think individuals can only be persaded if they govern their action by principle rather than by their passions. His argument only shows which principles are correct and which are incorrect. A barbarian would never be persaded by Hoppe or anybody else unless they persaded him that they could suppress him with physical violence. Hoppe's proof is an impossibility theorem demonstrating which actions can and can't be socially justified. I think its the idea of "good and evil" that is missing, not "right and wrong". Although I'm not sure that the two are mutually exclusive. Ultimately, God is the foundation of morality.
Perhaps you're use of "good and evil" is better than "right and wrong", and do you believe that a secular ethics is impossible?
GilesStratton:In the standard conception of "right and wrong", this is surely true. However, Hoppe himself points out that his theory stays purely within the realm of "is" statements, so unless you're providing something that Hoppe hasn't I can't say you're correct. Of course, you've offered nothing more than an unsupported assertion and an equivocation. With your statement "people ought not to do things that are wrong" and your use of the word "wrong" respectively.
it *is* the case that its wrong to do wrong.
GilesStratton:Perhaps you're use of "good and evil" is better than "right and wrong", and do you believe that a secular ethics is impossible?
With regard to interpersonal relations, it isn't. Beyond that, I'm not sure.
GilesStratton:But so what if I can't argue it? That doesn't mean I shouldn't go and do it, unless you assume that people ought not to do things that they can't argue in favour of. But nowhere have I seen such a premise in Hoppe's argument and I don't believe you can support it.
Lilburne:Could a Rothbardian natural rights proponent please enlighten me on this?
Check out the Rassmusen thread in the Mises.org Natural Rights group (see the link in my sig).
Political Atheists Blog
What about premises that are negatively demonstrable? They are not inductively (I'm not sure if we mean the same thing by inductively) formed. Also, empirical induction can only provide hypothetical truths, not necessary truths.
I'm not sure if that's a matter of deduction, in fact I am not quite sure how proofs by contradiction are to be classified - they did come up in mind when I was posting that though. And regarding induction, I am going by the Aristotelian definition, whereby rational reflection can reveal necessary truths that are observed in the world as well as contingent ones. Basically just concept-formation. I can refer you to a paper that more or less captures my epistemological perspective.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Jon Irenicus:I can refer you to a paper that more or less captures my epistemological perspective.
Please do. I especially need to become familiar with the terminology. There is a large overlap of concepts between the mondern rationalists and neo-Aristotelians, but different labels for those concepts. For example, negative demonstration and self-referential self-evidence are really the same thing.
Anarchist Cain: The Hoppeinamtor:Recognizing knowledge as being structurally constrained by its role in the framework of action categories provides the solution to such a complaint. For as soon as this is realized, all idealistic suggestions of rationalist philosophy disappear, and an epistemology claiming that a priori true propositions exist becomes a realistic epistemology instead. Understood as constrained by action categories, the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the mental on the one hand and the real, outside physical world on the other is bridged. So constrained, a priori knowledge must be as much a mental thing as a reflection of the structure of reality, since it is only through actions that the mind comes into contact with reality, so to speak. Acting is a cognitively guided adjustment of a physical body in physical reality. And thus, there can be no doubt that a priori knowledge, conceived of as an insight into the structural constraints imposed on knowledge qua knowledge of actors, must indeed correspond to the nature of things. The realistic character of such knowledge would manifest itself not only in the fact that one could not think it to be otherwise, but in the fact that one could not undo its truth. To: Stephen Forde http://mises.org/journals/scholar/long.pdf I'm glad that Womb posted this link. Here is a shorter article: http://praxeology.net/antipsych.pdf
The Hoppeinamtor:Recognizing knowledge as being structurally constrained by its role in the framework of action categories provides the solution to such a complaint. For as soon as this is realized, all idealistic suggestions of rationalist philosophy disappear, and an epistemology claiming that a priori true propositions exist becomes a realistic epistemology instead. Understood as constrained by action categories, the seemingly unbridgeable gulf between the mental on the one hand and the real, outside physical world on the other is bridged. So constrained, a priori knowledge must be as much a mental thing as a reflection of the structure of reality, since it is only through actions that the mind comes into contact with reality, so to speak. Acting is a cognitively guided adjustment of a physical body in physical reality. And thus, there can be no doubt that a priori knowledge, conceived of as an insight into the structural constraints imposed on knowledge qua knowledge of actors, must indeed correspond to the nature of things. The realistic character of such knowledge would manifest itself not only in the fact that one could not think it to be otherwise, but in the fact that one could not undo its truth.
To: Stephen Forde
http://mises.org/journals/scholar/long.pdf
I'm glad that Womb posted this link.
Here is a shorter article:
http://praxeology.net/antipsych.pdf
The article was a bit broad. What points in particular did you want to get across?
This one.
AC,
I can't find the post right now. But I distinctly remember you promoting eudaimonism for the merit of it not justifying atrocities. If there is some outside moral yardstick by which you justify your moral system, wouldn't it be more appropriate to call that yardstick itself the moral system? And isn't that yardstick your inner sense of right and wrong?
Lilburne: But I distinctly remember you promoting eudaimonism for the merit of it not justifying atrocities.
No I promote eudaimonism because I think there is an overarching goal to everyone's life. A subjective value which is the basis for good living.
Lilburne: If there is some outside moral yardstick by which you justify your moral system, wouldn't it be more appropriate to call that yardstick itself the moral system? And isn't that yardstick your inner sense of right and wrong?
Well eudaimonism can't really tell us what path to take or what behavior we should exhibit [ apart from the means of achieveing such a state ]. I would look at it as eudaimonism establishes our life goals while natural law establishes how one should behavior while achieveing those goals.
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael