zefreak: Stephen Forde: The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves. I value logic, consistency, and truth. Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't.
Stephen Forde: The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves.
The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves.
I value logic, consistency, and truth. Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't.
Why point out your opponent's inconsistency, unless you want them to be consistent?
zefreak:"you ought to do your homework"?
well, you ask 'why' and see if you get a moral answer or non-moral answer. find ought if its a moral kind of ought or not.
Where there is no property there is no justice; a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid
Fools! not to see that what they madly desire would be a calamity to them as no hands but their own could bring
nirgrahamUK: Anarcho-Mercantilist:He will also murder, rape, and steal if he believes he will not get caught. unless, maybe he doesnt want to do those things, and perhaps he doesnt want to do them if he thinks they are 'wrong' things to do. he has access to such knowledge through the reflections that you granted. if he raped and murder etc he would hardly be the libertarian we were discussing, he would be a moral nihilist in action.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:He will also murder, rape, and steal if he believes he will not get caught.
unless, maybe he doesnt want to do those things, and perhaps he doesnt want to do them if he thinks they are 'wrong' things to do. he has access to such knowledge through the reflections that you granted. if he raped and murder etc he would hardly be the libertarian we were discussing, he would be a moral nihilist in action.
His behaviors will still not match a 'normal' empathetic person. For example, I have asserted that he will believe in this 'ought' statement: "to maximize the freedom and prosperity for humanity." However, murdering or raping a few individuals damages humanity as a whole very little.
Suppose that society hates redheads, and society will feel much happier if all redheads are dead. The unempathetic person will murder all redheads to "maximize the freedom and prosperity for humanity."
Life is filled with misinterpretations, misrepresentations, and prodigal folklore.
You misunderstood him. AM is saying that an individual unburdened with empathy can deduce libertarian ethics by assuming certain premises, IE maximizing human happiness, individual liberty, what have you. The logic may be valid, but not necessarily sound. If he feels no empathy and no concern for others wellbeing, why would he feel that the premises from which libertarian ideals are deduced are sound?
edit: correct me if I am wrong, AM. I don't want to put words in your mouth.
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
ok, so now you are rejecting the idea that an unemotional rational creature can understand and follow morality. well why didnt you come out and say so to start with.?
nirgrahamUK: ok, so now you are rejecting the idea that an unemotional unempathetic rational creature can understand and follow morality. well why didnt you come out and say so to start with.?
ok, so now you are rejecting the idea that an unemotional unempathetic rational creature can understand and follow morality. well why didnt you come out and say so to start with.?
If we categorize his belief of the "maximization of freedom" as a form of empathy, I have not believe in this idea in the first place.
Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves. I value logic, consistency, and truth. Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't. Why point out your opponent's inconsistency, unless you want them to be consistent?
I do want them to be consistent. That is not an assertion of the objective value or goodness of consistency, simply the expression of a value preference that I happen to hold.
zefreak:There is as much evidence of moral realism as there is of the supernatural. You cannot disprove either. If an objective moral standard exists, it cannot be derived from observation.
You are strikingly similar to a theist in that regard. (should rile him up)
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
zefreak: Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves. I value logic, consistency, and truth. Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't. Why point out your opponent's inconsistency, unless you want them to be consistent? I do want them to be consistent. That is not an assertion of the objective value or goodness of consistency, simply the expression of a value preference that I happen to hold.
And one that you are trying to achieve by trying to persuade them to alter their conduct. Am I right?
zefreak: nirgrahamUK: Anarcho-Mercantilist:He will also murder, rape, and steal if he believes he will not get caught. unless, maybe he doesnt want to do those things, and perhaps he doesnt want to do them if he thinks they are 'wrong' things to do. he has access to such knowledge through the reflections that you granted. if he raped and murder etc he would hardly be the libertarian we were discussing, he would be a moral nihilist in action. You misunderstood him. AM is saying that an individual unburdened with empathy can deduce libertarian ethics by assuming certain premises, IE maximizing human happiness, individual liberty, what have you. The logic may be valid, but not necessarily sound. If he feels no empathy and no concern for others wellbeing, why would he feel that the premises from which libertarian ideals are deduced are sound?
You're correct. I was wrong to categorize these premises as not empathetic. Someone who helps others, for whatevery reason, is by definition "empathetic."
Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves. I value logic, consistency, and truth. Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't. Why point out your opponent's inconsistency, unless you want them to be consistent? I do want them to be consistent. That is not an assertion of the objective value or goodness of consistency, simply the expression of a value preference that I happen to hold. And one that you are trying to achieve by trying to persuade them to alter their conduct. Am I right?
Yes. What are the implications of this, keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values?
zefreak: Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves. I value logic, consistency, and truth. Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't. Why point out your opponent's inconsistency, unless you want them to be consistent? I do want them to be consistent. That is not an assertion of the objective value or goodness of consistency, simply the expression of a value preference that I happen to hold. And one that you are trying to achieve by trying to persuade them to alter their conduct. Am I right? Yes. What are the implications of this, keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values?
The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this.
AJ: Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good 2. Natural law is derived from nature 3. Natural law is good 4. One ought to follow the good. 5. Thus one ought to follow natural law. Of the two premises 1 and 4, 4 is uncontroversial however 1 is not. It is though defensible: the most robust defence would rest on nature being created by a good God. Not logically defensible. Anyway, a religious person relying on God for their morality doesn't need to cross the is/ought gap: if their god declares that something ought not be done, that is the end of the discussion. And of course pointing out God's views is also an effective persuasion method for all his fellow believers.
Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good 2. Natural law is derived from nature 3. Natural law is good 4. One ought to follow the good. 5. Thus one ought to follow natural law. Of the two premises 1 and 4, 4 is uncontroversial however 1 is not. It is though defensible: the most robust defence would rest on nature being created by a good God.
1. Nature is good
2. Natural law is derived from nature
3. Natural law is good
4. One ought to follow the good.
5. Thus one ought to follow natural law.
Of the two premises 1 and 4, 4 is uncontroversial however 1 is not. It is though defensible: the most robust defence would rest on nature being created by a good God.
Not logically defensible.
Anyway, a religious person relying on God for their morality doesn't need to cross the is/ought gap: if their god declares that something ought not be done, that is the end of the discussion. And of course pointing out God's views is also an effective persuasion method for all his fellow believers.
Please tell me why this is not logically defensible rather than just stating it?
Of course with positing God there's the possibility of a divine command theory though that's not necessary- one could posit a good deist style God to argue nature is good and to then prove that natural law is good. Any way even if you leave open the concept of divine command it's not necessary that it would conflict with natural law.
The atoms tell the atoms so, for I never was or will but atoms forevermore be.
Yours sincerely,
Physiocrat
Physiocrat: AJ: Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good Not logically defensible. Please tell me why this is not logically defensible rather than just stating it?
AJ: Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good Not logically defensible.
Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good
Because it's just persuasion: "Hey guys, c'mon, don't you see how good nature is?" If you meant it to be interpreted any other way, why didn't you give your own definition of "good"?
Why anarchy fails
Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: zefreak: Stephen Forde: The fact that you are defending moral relativism demonstrates that you believe we ought to regard morality as relative. Furthermore, it demonstates that you think there are correct and incorrect moral propositions. Moral relativism/subjectivism/emotivism become instantly dubious once you consider the fact that they entail moral propositions themselves. I value logic, consistency, and truth. Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't. Why point out your opponent's inconsistency, unless you want them to be consistent? I do want them to be consistent. That is not an assertion of the objective value or goodness of consistency, simply the expression of a value preference that I happen to hold. And one that you are trying to achieve by trying to persuade them to alter their conduct. Am I right? Yes. What are the implications of this, keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values? The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this.
Right, I hold certain values and would like other to hold similar values. Certain values are preferable to me. I have never denied this; such an admission does not prove what you think it does. In my statement that you quoted, I said
"keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values"
and before that,
"Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't." (in the off chance that, sharing those values, you adopt similar conclusions)
There is no contradiction here. You are grasping at straws.
AJ: Because it's just persuasion: "Hey guys, c'mon, don't you see how good nature is?" If you meant it to be interpreted any other way, why didn't you give your own definition of "good"?
Its all natural, maaan.
AJ: Physiocrat: AJ: Physiocrat: 1. Nature is good Not logically defensible. Please tell me why this is not logically defensible rather than just stating it? Because it's just persuasion: "Hey guys, c'mon, don't you see how good nature is?" If you meant it to be interpreted any other way, why didn't you give your own definition of "good"?
1. God is good.
2. God created nature.
3. Therefore nature was created good.
Now the question here revolves around what good is? Unless you have a objective basis for goodness then the use of good and evil are arbitrary. This objective basis must transcend all reality and hence must be found in the transcendent God. You could be an amoralist but as Roderick Long has poinetd out the structure of our language precludes this:
1. Theft is bad.
2. Taxes are theft.
3. Taxes are bad.
Taking an amorailst emotivist position are this demonstrates is personal preference. Indeed it does that but it also does more than that. If bad is purely emotive then it is equivalent to saying theft boooooooo and has no propositional content, thus nothing follows from it. Yet as shown above we can logically follow conclusions from it and thus emotivism is moribund.
Now you may invoke Eupthryo on me: is something good because the God's command it or does God command it because it's good?
This is a false dichotomy: God is in his nature is good and acts consistently with his nature.
Back to my first argument:
It would seem that nature is somewhat against us now- natural disasters being the obvious example. But all this would prove is that creation is marred and not lay a glove on the argument that nature was created good. Now as with a broken car you can still see how it should work even though the example you have does not which is analgous to nature as I've formulated it.
Physiocrat: 1. Theft is bad. 2. Taxes are theft. 3. Taxes are bad. Taking an amorailst emotivist position are this demonstrates is personal preference. Indeed it does that but it also does more than that. If bad is purely emotive then it is equivalent to saying theft boooooooo and has no propositional content, thus nothing follows from it. Yet as shown above we can logically follow conclusions from it and thus emotivism is moribund.
It seems that too many individuals believe in every word that Roderick Long has said. I have written a post criticizing the 'cognitivist'/'non-cognitivist' dichotomy. I will present another critique to your claim below:
You can simply define 'good' and 'bad' as 'facts' or 'truths'; not as 'preferences', 'opinions', or 'values' of the 'subject' itself. For example, you can define 'good' as "Ludwig approves it" and 'bad' as "Ludwig disapproves it." Those two statements express 'factual' content that 'describes' how another person 'feels', not the 'preferences' of the 'subject'. Therefore, you can rephrase your statements like this:
1. Ludwig disapproves theft.
2. Ludwig classifies taxation as a form of theft.
3. Ludwig disapproves taxation.
The first statement expresses a 'proposition' because the statement "Ludwig disapproves theft" is 'true'.
Physiocrat: 1. God is good.
Why?
If I wrote it more than a few weeks ago, I probably hate it by now.
It seems that too many individuals believe in every word that Roderick Long has said.
Roderick Long didn't invent libertarian criticism of emotivism. Rothbard initially argued against emotivism in "For A New Liberty" as well. In either case, emotivism *is* bullshit. Normative statements do *not* inherently reduce to the level "Chocolate tastes good" or "Go yankees!". That's absurd on its face. When I make specific arguments for normative ethical premises, I am not merely communicating that I feel a certain way, I am giving reasons.
I will refute this argument:
1. Survival requires one to act in accordance to his 'nature'.
2. One will die if one refuses to act in accordance to his 'nature'.
3. It is logically contradictory for one to deny that one should act in accordance to his 'nature', because denying it will kill oneself.
4. I value logical consistency, not logical contradiction. Hence, I value the third proposition.
5. I, myself, should not deny that I should act in accordance to my 'nature'.
6. I value the law of the excluded third.
7. According to the law of the excluded third, the statement "I should not deny ..." implies "I should agree with ..."
8. I, myself, should agree that I should act in accordance to my 'nature'.
9. By definition, one who agrees to act in accordance to his 'nature' implies that one values 'natural law'.
10. I, myself, should value 'natural law'.
The first premise is unsound because you can still survive even if you refuse to follow most of the laws of 'nature'. You do not necessarily have to follow all of the laws of 'nature' to survive. So the second statement is also unsound because you will not necessarily die if you violated most, but not not all, of the laws of 'nature'.
The neo-Aristotelian ethicists have assumed that one has to obey 'nature' entirely when one can just obey the necessary laws for one to survive. They have stuffed a package-deal called 'natural law' down our throats from this argument.
You're making up an oversimplified argument, and then knocking it down. That isn't reasonable, as it reduces to a red herring. That is what most of your arguments reduce to: either linguistic nitpicking or red herrings.
I classify the statement "Chocolate tastes good" as an 'opinion'.
However, the statement "Billy likes chocolate" is a 'fact'. So the statement "Billy likes chocolate" is a 'proposition'.
Brainpolice:Normative statements do *not* inherently reduce to the level "Chocolate tastes good" or "Go yankees!".
I agree, but I think you are strawmanning the 'emotivists'. The 'emotivists' believe that 'morality reduces to emotions' in the sense that "people have 'feelings' about moral statements" or "it requires empathy to derive morality." That says nothing whether or not one should prescribe one's 'normative' 'preferences' to others. As I said above, I disagree with 'emotivism' if you define it as a theory that 'morality' only arises from the short-term 'gut-feelings' of individuals, not 'reason'. However, 'emotivists' themselves do not define it that way.
Brainpolice: You're making up an oversimplified argument, and then knocking it down. That isn't reasonable, as it reduces to a red herring. That is what most of your arguments reduce to: either linguistic nitpicking or red herrings.
It really doesn't seem that far off from the argument though.
It seems to be about what they're saying. I don't consider it a strawman fallacy just because the argument proposed by natural rights theorists is one that can be knocked down.
existence is elsewhere
The emotions many normative statements express are more intensely felt and more general among humans than those expressed by your examples. But the are nonetheless subjective.
Brainpolice: Normative statements do *not* inherently reduce to the level "Chocolate tastes good" or "Go yankees!". That's absurd on its face. When I make specific arguments for normative ethical premises, I am not merely communicating that I feel a certain way, I am giving reasons.
Normative statements do *not* inherently reduce to the level "Chocolate tastes good" or "Go yankees!". That's absurd on its face. When I make specific arguments for normative ethical premises, I am not merely communicating that I feel a certain way, I am giving reasons.
You make up a caricature of an opposing argument, and then you accuse AM of doing much the same.
If extreme-rationalist natural rights theories, which seem to me to be based on linguistic contrivances, are to be accepted by us as having any bearing on reality, they should at least be able to stand up to such linguistic "nitpicking".
Lilburne:If extreme-rationalist natural rights theories, which seem to me to be based on linguistic contrivances, are to be accepted by us as having any bearing on reality, they should at least be able to stand up to such linguistic "nitpicking".
In other words, if you live by the syllogism, you die by the syllogism.
Anarcho-Mercantilist:The neo-Aristotelian ethicists have assumed that one has to obey 'nature' entirely when one can just obey the necessary laws for one to survive. They have stuffed a package-deal called 'natural law' down our throats from this argument.
Great post, AM.
Wilmot of Rochester: Brainpolice: You're making up an oversimplified argument, and then knocking it down. That isn't reasonable, as it reduces to a red herring. That is what most of your arguments reduce to: either linguistic nitpicking or red herrings. It really doesn't seem that far off from the argument though. It seems to be about what they're saying. I don't consider it a strawman fallacy just because the argument proposed by natural rights theorists is one that can be knocked down.
I have edited my post and expanded my argument. My argument represents Rasmussen's argument on A Groundwork of Rights, except that I explicated his implicit 'ought-assumptions'. So he has not bridged the 'is-ought gap' in a sense.
Lilburne: Anarcho-Mercantilist:The neo-Aristotelian ethicists have assumed that one has to obey 'nature' entirely when one can just obey the necessary laws for one to survive. They have stuffed a package-deal called 'natural law' down our throats from this argument. Great post, AM.
Thank you. I hope you find my reprentation of Rasmussen's argument and my criticism 'natural law' useful.
Anarcho-Mercantilist: Physiocrat: 1. Theft is bad. 2. Taxes are theft. 3. Taxes are bad. Taking an amorailst emotivist position are this demonstrates is personal preference. Indeed it does that but it also does more than that. If bad is purely emotive then it is equivalent to saying theft boooooooo and has no propositional content, thus nothing follows from it. Yet as shown above we can logically follow conclusions from it and thus emotivism is moribund. It seems that too many individuals believe in every word that Roderick Long has said. I have written a post criticizing the 'cognitivist'/'non-cognitivist' dichotomy. I will present another critique to your claim below: You can simply define 'good' and 'bad' as 'facts' or 'truths'; not as 'preferences', 'opinions', or 'values' of the 'subject' itself. For example, you can define 'good' as "Ludwig approves it" and 'bad' as "Ludwig disapproves it." Those two statements express 'factual' content that 'describes' how another person 'feels', not the 'preferences' of the 'subject'. Therefore, you can rephrase your statements like this: 1. Ludwig disapproves theft. 2. Ludwig classifies taxation as a form of theft. 3. Ludwig disapproves taxation. The first statement expresses a 'proposition' because the statement "Ludwig disapproves theft" is 'true'.
Excellent!
AM engages in sophist linguistical nitpicking.
http://mises.org/Community/forums/t/8536.aspx?PageIndex=34
'Men do not change, they unmask themselves' - Germaine de Stael
Pray tell, what are 'necessary laws' and how are they arrived at? How does one deduce that murder is bad?
Anarchist Cain: Anarcho-Mercantilist:The neo-Aristotelian ethicists have assumed that one has to obey 'nature' entirely when one can just obey the necessary laws for one to survive. They have stuffed a package-deal called 'natural law' down our throats from this argument. Pray tell, what are 'necessary laws' and how are they arrived at? How does one deduce that murder is bad?
I imagine the actual laws of physics - like as long as I am on Earth and not in an anti-gravity chamber, I can't just fly off into space if I want.
There weren't any of AM's posts on that page you link to, AC.
I can perhaps see AM's linguistic denial of the means/ends dichotomy as perhaps a bit much. But again, your theory lives by "word-fu", so it must die by it as well.
Lilburne,
Do you fancy commenting on my attempted defence of natural rigths based on the argument that nature is good I posted a page or so back?
I'll reply to AM response to my criticism of emotivisim when I've got sufficient time.
Lilburne:I can perhaps see AM's linguistic denial of the means/ends dichotomy as perhaps a bit much. But again, your theory lives by "word-fu", so it must die by it as well.
Just keep going, you will see what I mean.
Wilmot of Rochester:I imagine the actual laws of physics - like as long as I am on Earth and not in an anti-gravity chamber, I can't just fly off into space if I want.
From physics..you can deduce that murder is bad? Spin this one out for me.
I feel it will be akin to: From the experimentation of the famous string-theory, I can deduce specific Chinese Chi spots on your body.
It seems that you missed this response:
I. Ryan: Lilburne: A natural rights theory based on that conception is basically no different from the crude amoralism of Jacob Bloom, because it makes right-and-wrong into a matter of smart-and-stupid. That does not refute my argument because my argument does indeed show that moral correctness is the same as any other correctness. The simple truth is that all "ought" statements imply a specific "want". As an Austrian economist, if you wanted to make nonexistent the human race, then you would preach extreme statist and totalitarian ideology. However, if you wanted to be successful, then you would have to pretend that the instillation of such ideology will cause all to prosper because that is, generally, the "want" of humans. Any disconnect between "ought" and "want" implies totalitarianism and collectivism.
Lilburne: A natural rights theory based on that conception is basically no different from the crude amoralism of Jacob Bloom, because it makes right-and-wrong into a matter of smart-and-stupid.
A natural rights theory based on that conception is basically no different from the crude amoralism of Jacob Bloom, because it makes right-and-wrong into a matter of smart-and-stupid.
That does not refute my argument because my argument does indeed show that moral correctness is the same as any other correctness. The simple truth is that all "ought" statements imply a specific "want". As an Austrian economist, if you wanted to make nonexistent the human race, then you would preach extreme statist and totalitarian ideology. However, if you wanted to be successful, then you would have to pretend that the instillation of such ideology will cause all to prosper because that is, generally, the "want" of humans.
Any disconnect between "ought" and "want" implies totalitarianism and collectivism.
zefreak: Stephen Forde: The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this. Right, I hold certain values and would like other to hold similar values. Certain values are preferable to me. I have never denied this; such an admission does not prove what you think it does. In my statement that you quoted, I said "keeping in mind that I am not asserting the possibility of proving through deduction the value or preferability of such conduct, but simply appealing to a possible commonality in values" and before that, "Of course I cannot argue that you ought to hold similar values. However, I can critique the consistency, logic and truth value of a position assuming we share such similar values. In other words, while I cannot argue that you "should" be logical or consistent, I can argue that you aren't." (in the off chance that, sharing those values, you adopt similar conclusions) There is no contradiction here. You are grasping at straws.
Stephen Forde: The implications are that you want their present conduct to change from what it is now, to something else. You demonstrate, by arguing, that you believe they ought to do X and not Y. That they ought to hold some values, not others. That certain moral positions are preferable for both you and your opponent. And I don't see how you can consistently deny this.
I'm not sure what you think an "ought" is. I'm pretty sure it's just an expression of valuing one action over another, in which case, I'm right. Also, I think you are assuming that it is only the content of your arguments that is under dispute. It is actually what is implied by the fact that you are arguing that makes the difference.