Lilburne,
Remove my quote from the OP.
zefreak:If this is the case (and I think you would agree) then it seems an arbitrary distinction. Useful in common discourse, but there is nothing 'special' about moral sentiment vs 'other' sentiment.
I guess it depends on your definition of "special".
Remove my quote from the OP. You are not being civil and are being gamey.
Just that moral and aesthetic sentiment can be sufficiently reduced to similar phenomenon :)
“Elections are Futures Markets in Stolen Property.” - H. L. Mencken
February 17 - 1600 - Giordano Bruno is burnt alive by the catholic church. Aquinas : "much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death."
zefreak: Just that moral and aesthetic sentiment can be sufficiently reduced to similar phenomenon :)
Sure, I think all urges, moral or otherwise, are similar in that they are feelings and not ratiocinations. But moral feelings are quite remarkable and distinctive in that they, unlike all other urges, impel men to act in ways detrimental to their own material well being, whether it be for the sake of a drowning child, for the sake of man they COULD rob with impunity, for the sake of a god, or for the sake of an internalized doctrine. In that regard, I think human society would have impossible without them.
This is actually becoming more and more fun!
wilderness: Lilburne, Remove my quote from the OP. This is actually becoming more and more fun!
What's the big deal? I don't get it.
"If we wish to preserve a free society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a particular object is not sufficient justification for the use of coercion."
Esuric: wilderness: Lilburne, Remove my quote from the OP. This is actually becoming more and more fun! What's the big deal? I don't get it.
I wonder the same thing. What is the big deal? Just go in and erase it. I don't think he's representing me honestly. He's addressing my quote with strawmans and I will not be subject to his argument. I asked him to remove it because it was part of a whole other thread and now it has been taken out of context. I had already addressed what belong with that quote in numerous other posts and will not repeat myself. He's now changing the whole discussion and addressing me that is not being honest. So I ask. What's the big deal? What fetish does Lilburne have with not being able to simply edit out my quote that does NOT belong in the context of his OP - at all - as my quote was part of a whole other discussion that has nothing to do with his OP.
Rothbard via Conza:And yet as soon as anyone makes any policy suggestion, however narrow or limited, an ethical judgment—sound or unsound—has willy-nilly been made.
Mises via Lilburne:An economist investigates whether a measure a can bring about the result p for the attainment of which it is recommended, and finds that a does not result in p but in g. an effect which even the supporters of the measure a consider undesirable. If this economist states the outcome of his investigation by saying that a is a bad measure, he does not pronounce a judgment of value. He merely says that from the point of view of those aiming at the goal p, the measure a is inappropriate. In this sense the free-trade economists attacked protection. They demonstrated that protection does not, as its champions believe, increase but, on the contrary, decreases the total amount of products, and is therefore bad from the point of view of those who prefer an ampler supply of products to a smaller. It is in this sense that economists criticize policies from the point of view of the ends aimed at. If an economist calls minimum wage rates a bad policy, what he means is that its effects are contrary to the purpose of those who recommend their application. (Human Action, Chapter 39)
J. Grayson Lilburne: zefreak: Just that moral and aesthetic sentiment can be sufficiently reduced to similar phenomenon :) Sure, I think all urges, moral or otherwise, are similar in that they are feelings and not ratiocinations. But moral feelings are quite remarkable and distinctive in that they, unlike all other urges, impel men to act in ways detrimental to their own material well being, whether it be for the sake of a drowning child, for the sake of man they COULD rob with impunity, for the sake of a god, or for the sake of an internalized doctrine. In that regard, I think human society would have impossible without them.
Ok, just checking to see if there was any real disagreement between moral anti-realism and your own position. It seems there isn't, and yet you have in the past rejected such a label. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding.
Either way, your definition of morality is very different from conventional usage, even in academia. I took two undergraduate courses in Ethical Philosophy and it was torture :)
To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve?
Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.—Ludwig von Mises
Life and reality are neither logical nor illogical; they are simply given. But logic is the only tool available to man for the comprehension of both.
Justin Spahr-Summers: To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve?
It facilitates trade and cooperation? Realize that cultural evolution as expounded by David Hume predates the theory of biological evolution. Law and morality as emergent phenomena is not a new idea.
It would be more accurate to say why has man adopted common law and values. Also, part of the reason is physiological. There is strong evidence suggesting that there is a neurological basis for empathy, and initial 'moral' sentiment could have arisen from that.
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve? It facilitates trade and cooperation?
It facilitates trade and cooperation?
But how can we assert that trade and cooperation are "good" or—to be more precise—desirable ends without some objective standard by which to determine that?
zefreak:Ok, just checking to see if there was any real disagreement between moral anti-realism and your own position. It seems there isn't, and yet you have in the past rejected such a label. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding.
The labels I was rejected were "amoralist" and "moral nihilist", because, to me, those terms seem to indicate people, not entirely unlike Bloom, who profess to reject personal conscience-based morality, who profess to look only to further their own material well-being, and who say that it is only external threats of retaliation that keep them from rape, plunder and pillage. That in no way describes me. I consider my conscience to be a hugely important guide to my action and my judgment of the actions of others. So, I bridle at the labels "amoralist" and "moral nihilist" as completely misleading.
Justin Spahr-Summers: zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: To subjective ethicists: why do you believe that man needs a code of values? What purpose does it serve? It facilitates trade and cooperation? But how can we assert that trade and cooperation are "good" or—to be more precise—desirable ends without some objective standard by which to determine that?
We don't? But to be fair, I edited my post. You might want to zip back on up and read it.
people, not entirely unlike Bloom, who profess to reject personal conscience-based morality,
J. Grayson Lilburne: zefreak:Ok, just checking to see if there was any real disagreement between moral anti-realism and your own position. It seems there isn't, and yet you have in the past rejected such a label. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding. The labels I was rejected were "amoralist" and "moral nihilist", because, to me, those terms seem to indicate people, not entirely unlike Bloom, who profess to reject personal conscience-based morality, who profess to look only to further their own material well-being, and who say that it is only external threats of retaliation that keep them from rape, plunder and pillage. That in no way describes me. I consider my conscience to be a hugely important guide to my action and my judgment of the actions of others. So, I bridle at the labels "amoralist" and "moral nihilist" as completely misleading.
That seems like the common equivocation of egoist with egotistical. As we know, psychological egoism is not incompatible with non-material values and goals. It is a very naive egoism indeed that produces an egotist.
Likewise, moral nihilism is a meta-ethical position that has no relevance to the actual values the person holds. There are the occasional Jacob Blooms that take a position based on a very superficial understanding of their philosophy, or who 'overcompensate' by rejecting the concept of value altogether (an altogether untenable position).
Jacob Bloom's material pragmatism is not inconsistent with moral nihilism, but is not necessitated by it, just as psychological egoism allows but does not necessitate egotism.
zefreak: That seems like the common equivocation of egoist with egotistical. As we know, psychological egoism is not incompatible with non-material values and goals. It is a very naive egoism indeed that produces an egotist. Likewise, moral nihilism is a meta-ethical position that has no relevance to the actual values the person holds. There are the occasional Jacob Blooms that take a position based on a very superficial understanding of their philosophy, or who 'overcompensate' by rejecting the concept of value altogether (an altogether untenable position). Jacob Bloom's material pragmatism is not inconsistent with moral nihilism, but is not necessitated by it, just as psychological egoism allows but does not necessitate egotism.
Ah, I see. Still, the average reader doesn't distinguish between meta-ethical and ethical positions, and I don't want them to think something about me that isn't true.
Still, the average reader doesn't distinguish between meta-ethical and ethical positions,
Juan:amoralist noun someone who adheres to the doctrine that ordinary moral distinctions are invalid
I can pick a certain definition & shape the dialogue too :)
Amoralism is the complete absence of moral beliefs, and/or the unequivocal belief that the theory of morality is immaterial. Though often associated with immoralism, the two are fundamentally different.[1] Immoralism is a system that does not accept moral principles and directly opposes morality, while amoralism does not even consider the existence of morality plausible.
"Look at me, I'm quoting another user to show how wrong I think they are, out of arrogance of my own position. Wait, this is my own quote, oh shi-" ~ Nitroadict
zefreak:It would be more accurate to say why has man adopted common law and values. Also, part of the reason is physiological. There is strong evidence suggesting that there is a neurological basis for empathy, and initial 'moral' sentiment could have arisen from that.
Okay, but I don't think this changes or addresses the point at all. Why do men even need a concept of "good" and "evil?" What purpose does it serve?
I think that the latter part of what I quoted actually supports objective ethics. If there's a neurological basis for empathy, neurologically-healthy humans must have a common conception of it, no?
Justin Spahr-Summers: If there's a neurological basis for empathy, neurologically-healthy humans must have a common conception of it, no?
To a certain degree yes, but to say that supports objective ethics is to commit the genetic fallacy.
while amoralism does not even consider the existence of morality plausible.
Justin Spahr-Summers: zefreak: It would be more accurate to say why has man adopted common law and values. Also, part of the reason is physiological. There is strong evidence suggesting that there is a neurological basis for empathy, and initial 'moral' sentiment could have arisen from that. Okay, but I don't think this changes or addresses the point at all. Why do men even need a concept of "good" and "evil?" What purpose does it serve?
zefreak: It would be more accurate to say why has man adopted common law and values. Also, part of the reason is physiological. There is strong evidence suggesting that there is a neurological basis for empathy, and initial 'moral' sentiment could have arisen from that.
Men don't 'need' a concept of good or evil. It does, however, serve a purpose, namely shaping codes of conduct and directing behavior. It served enough of a purpose that groups of people who don't have these norms didn't survive the cultural selection process. We can also see the limited survivability that such people have today, if they refuse to cooperate with dominant norms.
Justin Spahr-Summers: I think that the latter part of what I quoted actually supports objective ethics. If there's a neurological basis for empathy, neurologically-healthy humans must have a common conception of it, no?
That would be committing a naturalistic fallacy. Ethics makes greater claims than 'this is what people believe and how people act'. Plus, lets say I'm not a neurologically-healthy human (healthy is a teleological concept that I reject, incidentally. Who is this ideal human to which we all aspire? Mencken has a great article on this point). How am I bound to this morality that is apparently necessitated by neurology? I don't have it. It has no claim on me.
Juan:I can pick a certain definition & shape the dialogue too :) Yeah, you know what ? I hacked this site and put that definition myself. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/amoralist
http://lesswrong.com/lw/np/disputing_definitions/
J. Grayson Lilburne: Justin Spahr-Summers: If there's a neurological basis for empathy, neurologically-healthy humans must have a common conception of it, no? To a certain degree yes, but to say that supports objective ethics is to commit the genetic fallacy.
Conceded.
However, zefreak is the only one who has yet addressed my primary line of questioning. What purpose does your code of values serve? Why do you have one?
Justin Spahr-Summers: J. Grayson Lilburne: Justin Spahr-Summers: If there's a neurological basis for empathy, neurologically-healthy humans must have a common conception of it, no? To a certain degree yes, but to say that supports objective ethics is to commit the genetic fallacy. Conceded. However, zefreak is the only one who has yet addressed my primary line of questioning. What purpose does your code of values serve? Why do you have one?
Give me more than a second, please. I am responding to multiple people here.
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: Okay, but I don't think this changes or addresses the point at all. Why do men even need a concept of "good" and "evil?" What purpose does it serve? Men don't 'need' a concept of good or evil. It does, however, serve a purpose, namely shaping codes of conduct and directing behavior. It served enough of a purpose that groups of people who don't have these norms didn't survive the cultural selection process. We can also see the limited survivability that such people have today, if they refuse to cooperate with dominant norms.
Justin Spahr-Summers: Okay, but I don't think this changes or addresses the point at all. Why do men even need a concept of "good" and "evil?" What purpose does it serve?
What makes surviving a desirable end?
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: I think that the latter part of what I quoted actually supports objective ethics. If there's a neurological basis for empathy, neurologically-healthy humans must have a common conception of it, no? That would be committing a naturalistic fallacy. Ethics makes greater claims than 'this is what people believe and how people act'. Plus, lets say I'm not a neurologically-healthy human (healthy is a teleological concept that I reject, incidentally. Who is this ideal human to which we all aspire? Mencken has a great article on this point). How am I bound to this morality that is apparently necessitated by neurology? I don't have it. It has no claim on me.
I'm inclined to agree with your thoughts on the concept "healthy." I made a mistake in picking that part of your earlier post as some form of support for objective ethics. It was more of just an interesting thought.
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers:However, zefreak is the only one who has yet addressed my primary line of questioning. What purpose does your code of values serve? Why do you have one? Give me more than a second, please. I am responding to multiple people here.
Justin Spahr-Summers:However, zefreak is the only one who has yet addressed my primary line of questioning. What purpose does your code of values serve? Why do you have one?
I was pointing out that you did respond, where others have yet to do so.
OT: The notification emails I'm getting about this thread are arriving out-of-order. It's extremely annoying. Is anyone else having this problem?
And 2+2 = 4 and A = A. Great, empty tautologies.
Why would the agent undertake the action (remember: action = purposeful behaviour) if they did not believe the expected outcome would suit their ends, i.e. not result in disutility/psychic losses?
Also more generally, Arg. ethics is an epistemic framework. If you don't like it, don't follow it. Won't make any difference since all it does is aim to invalidate other theories thereby neutralising them... by showing them to be logically inconsistent.
Also, hai KoB! Missed you, keep up the good work! ^^
If someone asks for a quote to be removed, please don't be discourteous... and remove it.
Freedom of markets is positively correlated with the degree of evolution in any society...
Justin Spahr-Summers: What makes surviving a desirable end?
Survivability is a desirable end to me, and I don't pick my ends, only my means. It is a generally desirable end for most people, but I in no way presume it to be universal.
J. Grayson Lilburne: Conza88: "Even in the finest works of economics, including Human Action, the concept of property had attracted little attention before Rothbard burst onto the intellectual scene with Man, Economy, and State. Yet, as Rothbard pointed out, such common economic terms as direct and indirect exchange, markets and market prices, as well as aggression, invasion, crime, and fraud, cannot be defined or understood without a prior theory of property. Nor is it possible to establish the familiar economic theorems relating to these phenomena without an implied notion of property and property rights. A definition and theory of property must precede the definition and establishment of all other economic terms and theorems." - Hoppe And what is your definition and theory of property? Exclusive control. It is true that economics shows us the prosperity that comes from exclusive control being associated with homesteading and exchange, and continued exclusive control after homesteading and exchange. But that says nothing about whether such a state of affairs is moral or immoral.
Conza88: "Even in the finest works of economics, including Human Action, the concept of property had attracted little attention before Rothbard burst onto the intellectual scene with Man, Economy, and State. Yet, as Rothbard pointed out, such common economic terms as direct and indirect exchange, markets and market prices, as well as aggression, invasion, crime, and fraud, cannot be defined or understood without a prior theory of property. Nor is it possible to establish the familiar economic theorems relating to these phenomena without an implied notion of property and property rights. A definition and theory of property must precede the definition and establishment of all other economic terms and theorems." - Hoppe And what is your definition and theory of property?
"Even in the finest works of economics, including Human Action, the concept of property had attracted little attention before Rothbard burst onto the intellectual scene with Man, Economy, and State. Yet, as Rothbard pointed out, such common economic terms as direct and indirect exchange, markets and market prices, as well as aggression, invasion, crime, and fraud, cannot be defined or understood without a prior theory of property. Nor is it possible to establish the familiar economic theorems relating to these phenomena without an implied notion of property and property rights. A definition and theory of property must precede the definition and establishment of all other economic terms and theorems." - Hoppe
And what is your definition and theory of property?
Exclusive control. It is true that economics shows us the prosperity that comes from exclusive control being associated with homesteading and exchange, and continued exclusive control after homesteading and exchange. But that says nothing about whether such a state of affairs is moral or immoral.
So "exclusive control" is your definition of property, and the theory of how one comes to justly achieve exclusive control over property is through homesteading? And how does that refute self ownership? How does the below not say anything about "political" ethics?
"if a person A were not the owner of his physical body and all goods originally appropriated, produced or voluntarily acquired by him, there would only exist two alternatives. Either another person, B, must then be regarded as the owner of A and the goods appropriated, produced, or contractually acquired by A, or both parties, A and B, must be regarded as equal co-owners of both bodies and goods.
In the first case, A would be B's slave and subject to exploitation. B would own A and the goods originally appropriated, produced, or acquired by A, but A would not own B and the goods homesteaded, produced, or acquired by B. With this rule, two distinct classes of people would be created—exploiters (B) and exploited (A)—to whom different "law" would apply. Hence, this rule fails the "universalization test" and is from the outset disqualified as even a potential human ethic, for in order to be able to claim a rule to be a "law" (just), it is necessary that such a rule be universally—equally—valid for everyone.
In the second case of universal co-ownership, the requirement of equal rights for everyone is obviously fulfilled. Yet this alternative suffers from another fatal flaw, for each activity of a person requires the employment of scarce goods (at least his body and its standing room). Yet if all goods were the collective property of everyone, then no one, at any time and in any place, could ever do anything with anything unless he had every other co-owner's prior permission to do what he wanted to do. And how can one give such a permission if one is not even the sole owner of one's very own body (and vocal chords)? If one were to follow the rule of total collective ownership, mankind would die out instantly. Whatever this is, it is not a human ethic.
Thus, one is left with the initial principles of self-ownership and original appropriation, homesteading. They pass the universalization test—they hold for everyone equally—and they can at the same time assure the survival of mankind. They and only they are therefore non-hypothetically or absolutely true ethical rules and human rights." - (Hoppe intro to TEOL)
J. Grayson Lilburne: Conza88:I believe, you were charging that he was trying to do what Plato and others had tried? You don't see the difference here? Of course it's not completely analogous. But there is a key commonality: a chimeric quest for universal, absolute, objective values. That the class of values Rothbard was seeking was more limited than those Plato was seeking doesn't change that.
Conza88:I believe, you were charging that he was trying to do what Plato and others had tried? You don't see the difference here?
Of course it's not completely analogous. But there is a key commonality: a chimeric quest for universal, absolute, objective values. That the class of values Rothbard was seeking was more limited than those Plato was seeking doesn't change that.
That's right, it's not analogous. And no, there is no key commonality between the two. Since Rothbard, did not in fact go for "universal absolute, objective values", beyond political philosophy, i.e a "political" ethic as described above.
And I don't see how you have at all shown that a rationalist axiomatic-deductive objective ethics (within political philosophy obviously) is chimeric.
J. Grayson Lilburne: Rothbard via Conza:And yet as soon as anyone makes any policy suggestion, however narrow or limited, an ethical judgment—sound or unsound—has willy-nilly been made. Mises via Lilburne:An economist investigates whether a measure a can bring about the result p for the attainment of which it is recommended, and finds that a does not result in p but in g. an effect which even the supporters of the measure a consider undesirable. If this economist states the outcome of his investigation by saying that a is a bad measure, he does not pronounce a judgment of value. He merely says that from the point of view of those aiming at the goal p, the measure a is inappropriate. In this sense the free-trade economists attacked protection. They demonstrated that protection does not, as its champions believe, increase but, on the contrary, decreases the total amount of products, and is therefore bad from the point of view of those who prefer an ampler supply of products to a smaller. It is in this sense that economists criticize policies from the point of view of the ends aimed at. If an economist calls minimum wage rates a bad policy, what he means is that its effects are contrary to the purpose of those who recommend their application. (Human Action, Chapter 39)
And yet that doesn't refute anything, it only serves to back up what was previously said.
"In economic and political questions, in contrast, ethical and value conflicts abound and permeate society. It is therefore impermissible for the economist or other social scientist to act as if he were a physician, who can generally assume complete agreement on values and goals with his patient and who can therefore prescribe accordingly and with no compunction. Since, then, praxeology provides no ethics whatsoever but only the data for people to pursue their various values and goals, it follows that it is impermissible for the economist qua economist to make any ethical or value pronouncements or to advocate any social or political policy whatsoever.
The trouble is that most economists burn to make ethical pronouncements and to advocate political policies—to say, in effect, that policy X is "good" and policy Y "bad." Properly, an economist may only make such pronouncements in one of two ways: either (1) to insert his own arbitrary, ad hoc personal value judgments and advocate policy clearly on that basis; or (2) to develop and defend a coherent ethical system and make his pronouncement, not as an economist, but as an ethicist, who also uses the data of economic science. But to do the latter, he must have thought deeply about ethical problems and also believe in ethics as an objective or rational discipline—and precious few economists have done either. That leaves him with the first choice: to make crystal clear that he is speaking not as an economist but as a private citizen who is making his own confessedly arbitrary and ad hoc value pronouncements.
Most economists pay lip service to the impermissibility of making ethical pronouncements qua economist, but in practice they either ignore their own criteria or engage in elaborate procedures to evade them. Why? We can think of two possible reasons. One is the disreputable reason that, if Professor Doakes advocates policy X and basically does so as an economics professor, he will be listened to and followed with awe and respect; whereas if he advocates policy X as plain Joe Doakes, the mass of the citizenry maycome to the perfectly valid conclusion that their own arbitrary and ad hoc value judgments are just as good as his, and that therefore there is no particular reason to listen to him at all. A second and more responsible reason might be that the economist, despite his professed disbelief in a science of ethics, realizes deep down that there is something unfortunate—we might even say bad—about unscientific and arbitrary value judgments in public policy, and so he tries desperately to square the circle, in order to be able to advocate policy in some sort of scientific manner."
While squaring this circle is impossible, as we shall consider further, I believe that this putative uneasiness at making arbitrary value judgments is correct. While it is surely admirable (ethical?) for an economist to distinguish clearly and carefully between the value-free science and his own value judgments, I contend further that it is the responsibility of any scientist, indeed any intellectual, to refrain from any value judgment whatever unless he can support it on the basis of a coherent and defensible ethical system. This means, of course, that those economists who, on whatever grounds, are not prepared to think about and advance an ethical system should strictly refrain from any value pronouncements or policy conclusions at all. This position is of course itself an ethical one. But it relates to the ethical system that is the precondition of all science; for, even though particular scientific laws are themselves value-free, the very procedures of science rest on the ethical norm of honesty and the search for truth; that norm, I believe, includes the responsibility to lend coherence and system to all one's pronouncements including valuational ones. I might add in passing that anyone conceding the necessity of honesty in science ipso facto becomes willy- nilly a believer in objective ethics, but I will leave that point to the ethical subjectivists to grapple with. 2
- (Praxeology, Value Judgments, and Public Policy by Murray N. Rothbard. The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics, Edwin Dolan, ed. (Kansas City: Sheed and War, 1976), pp. 89-111; The Logic of Action One (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1997), pp. 78-99.)
Furthermore the use of "bad" and "good" are essentially robbed of their meaning.
"Yeager advocates a utilitarianism of the variety articulated by Ludwig von Mises in Human Action. The normative terms good and bad make sense only in the context of society, and something—be it an action, law, or ideology—is morally good only insofar as it promotes human happiness or satisfaction. Because of the nature of human interaction—a nature discovered by the positive economist as well as other scientists—social cooperation is the means by which individuals satisfy their diverse, subjective ends, and thus ethical issues can be reduced to the expected strengthening or weakening of social bonds. In short, what promotes cooperation is good, what hinders it is bad.
..
The fundamental problem with utilitarianism is this: Despite a succession of ingenious proponents, its advocates have yet to explain why the individual should behave morally. The fact that we are all better off if we all behave morally is utterly true and utterly irrelevant. (Such an argument violates the cherished Austrian precepts of marginalism and individualism.)
...
Utilitarianism seems to rob the words good and bad of their specifically ethical character. The utilitarian cannot make a distinction between guilt and simple error. The person who robs a bank to achieve happiness has made a mistake in qualitatively the same sense as a person who overcooks a steak.
In fact, we can go further. Is it really true, for example, that Josef Stalin acted against his interests, even in the long run? Does the utilitarian really concede that our possible condemnation of Stalin is purely an empirical matter? (It might be true that had every other Soviet acted in his true interests, dictatorship would have been impossible. But this is dodging the issue.)" - Murphy
Also, Arg. ethics is an epistemic framework. If you don't like it, don't follow it.
Justin Spahr-Summers: zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: However, zefreak is the only one who has yet addressed my primary line of questioning. What purpose does your code of values serve? Why do you have one? Give me more than a second, please. I am responding to multiple people here. I was pointing out that you did respond, where others have yet to do so. OT: The notification emails I'm getting about this thread are arriving out-of-order. It's extremely annoying. Is anyone else having this problem?
zefreak: Justin Spahr-Summers: However, zefreak is the only one who has yet addressed my primary line of questioning. What purpose does your code of values serve? Why do you have one? Give me more than a second, please. I am responding to multiple people here.
Justin Spahr-Summers: However, zefreak is the only one who has yet addressed my primary line of questioning. What purpose does your code of values serve? Why do you have one?
Sorry, I must have misread.
Juan: "Dictionary editors are historians of usage, not legislators of language. Dictionary editors find words in current usage, then write down the words next to (a small part of) what people seem to mean by them. If there's more than one usage, the editors write down more than one definition."
Dictionary definitions of philosophical terms are notoriously sketchy. You know both mine and Lilburne's views, we expressed them in more detail than your dictionary definition is capable of doing.
To the first point, it's an implication of action being purposeful behaviour. People who invoke it often try to say that all action is rational, ergo none may be ethically scrutinised. The issue here is conflicting depths of rationality rather than the accuracy of Mises's dictum... to the latter, it was a general comment.